I know that I know

@Zetherin,

Zetherin - My purpose was to counter your earlier assertion:

Zetherin;111579 wrote:

But in the case of knowing that I know, do you really believe that my (second) knowing has to be justified? Why do you believe it must be justified?

Since knowing is (by definition) justified true belief, it seems to me that we cannot arbitrarily dispense with the justification condition for the second knowing. To "know that one knows that P" must mean that one has a justified true belief that one has a justified true belief that P. Do you agree?

On the question of whether one can know that one knows that P without understanding what knowledge is:

To know that a cat is a mammal, one needs to know that a certain type of creature has certain traits. Similarly, to know that one has knowledge, one needs to know that one has something corresponding to justified true belief (though not necessarily an understanding of the words 'justified', 'true' and 'belief').

Now, the crucial question is this. If one knows that one has a justified true belief that P (i.e. if one has a JTB that one has a JTB that P) but does not know that JTB constitutes knowledge, does one nevertheless know that one has knowledge? I suppose it depends how you look at it.

@fast,

fast wrote:

I guess you know what I'm trying to do and where this is going, and if you think it's a dead end and that I should stop pursuing it, I will. I just didn't want to drop it until I was sure I wasn't being misunderstood.

You have not been misunderstood. At least not by me. (Just to let you know)

Here are my suppositions:

1.) Suppose I stated, "I know that I know what is knowledge is and that cats are mammals". Here, I must know what knowledge, mammals, and cats were, for this to be true. I know you agree.

2.) Suppose I stated, "I know that I know that cats are mammals". You think that I must know the same things: what knowledge, cats, and mammals are. Right?

Now, how can it be that I can be stating that I know less in my second example than in my first example (as I am not stating I know what knowledge is), but still have to know the same as my first example?

I'm just throwing this out there, exploring my position as much as you are. I have just as much potential to be incorrect as you. This is not a contest, we're both learning. Consider my posts as comprised of explorations, not of firm, argumentative statements!

ACB wrote:

Since knowing is (by definition) justified true belief, it seems to me that we cannot arbitrarily dispense with the justification condition for the second knowing. To "know that one knows that P" must mean that one has a justified true belief that one has a justified true belief that P. Do you agree?

I completely agree. I have a habit of typing out my thoughts as questions in order to improve my clarity (of thought). Sorry that you have to deal with me Very Happy

I also apologize for the miscommunication; I wasn't even focusing on that question you quoted of me in the least, as it was a passing inquiry (to which I realized I didn't even need to question). I am still a bit confused as to what needs to be justified, though.

Quote:

Now, the crucial question is this. If one knows that one has a justified true belief that P (i.e. if one has a JTB that one has a JTB that P) but does not know that JTB constitutes knowledge, does one nevertheless know that one has knowledge? I suppose it depends how you look at it.

This is the question we're been focusing on. And I'm saying yes, it is possible. How does it depend on how you look at it?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111791 wrote:

This is the question we're been focusing on. And I'm saying yes, it is possible. How does it depend on how you look at it?

You may be right. But it just strikes me as somewhat odd to say that someone knows something when they are unfamiliar with one or more of the basic words that describe that state of affairs. Would we say that someone knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador if they can only refer to Quito by pointing to a photograph, and to Ecuador by pointing on a map? I don't know - perhaps we would.

@ACB,

ACB;111794 wrote:

You may be right. But it just strikes me as somewhat odd to say that someone knows something when they are unfamiliar with one or more of the basic words that describe that state of affairs. Would we say that someone knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador if they can only refer to Quito by pointing to a photograph, and to Ecuador by pointing on a map? I don't know - perhaps we would.

They may not know that they know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, and so, presumably, would never point to a photograph or map. I can know many things without expressing them to others, or even thinking about expressing them to others, can't I?

Or, I may know that I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, but I may not know where Ecuador or Quito are on maps or photographs. Many students know that Rome is the capital of Italy, but some don't know where Italy and Rome are on maps, or what the city Rome looks like in a photograph. Isn't this true?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111791 wrote:

1.) Suppose I stated, "I know that I know what is knowledge is and that cats are mammals". Here, I must know what knowledge, mammals, and cats were, for this to be true. I know you agree.

The only thing that bothers me is your use of the word, "must," but overlooking that, then yes, I agree with you.

Quote:

2.) Suppose I stated, "I know that I know that cats are mammals". You think that I must know the same things: what knowledge, cats, and mammals are. Right?

Now, how can it be that I can be stating that I know less in my second example than in my first example (as I am not stating I know what knowledge is), but still have to know the same as my first example?

The first example is explicit. The second example is not yet implies the first example.

It just seem to me that knowing what knowledge is should be part of your justification for knowing that you know, so the second supposition (to me) implies the first.

@fast,

fast wrote:

The only thing that bothers me is your use of the word, "must," but overlooking that, then yes, I agree with you.

I mean that in order for someone to know that cats are mammals, it is necessary that they know what cats are and what mammals are. Is this incorrect?

Quote:

The second example is not yet implies the first example.

What is not explicit about, "I know that I know that cats are mammals"?

But yes, the second supposition does imply the first (for you cannot know that you know P, without first knowing P).

Quote:

It just seem to me that knowing what knowledge is should be part of your justification for knowing that you know.

How do you explain that I knew that I knew the answer on my test, but yet had never delved into any philosophical discussion about the matter in my life? I had never even considered that there were conditions for knowledge at the time, yet I knew that I knew. Or are you denying that I knew that I knew?

@Zetherin,

[QUOTE=Zetherin;111808]How do you explain that I knew that I knew the answer on my test, but yet had never delved into any philosophical discussion about the matter in my life? I had never even considered that there were conditions for knowledge at the time, yet I knew that I knew. Or are you denying that I knew that I knew?[/quote]
You didn't know that you knew. You believed you knew. And, you did know the answer.

1) You believed the answer was 7.
2) You knew the answer was 7.
3) You believed you knew the answer was 7.
4) But, you did not know you knew the answer was 7.

What was the justification for your belief that the answer was 7? What was your justification for your belief that you knew the answer was 7? Those were rhetorical questions.

What is important is how those answers are different. Your justification for one belief should be different than your justification for the other. You were taught that the answer was 7, but you were not taught that you knew the answer was 7. So, although you believe you knew the answer, it's not the case that you knew that you knew the answer was 7.

I'm not saying you are, but it sounds like you may be confusing the belief that P is true with your belief that you knew that P is true.

@fast,

And my knowing that I need justification (knowing the conditions for knowledge), would be justification that I had the knowledge (that I knew that I knew P)?

fast wrote:

Your justification for one belief should be different than your justification for the other.

So, how do the justifications differ here:

A.) "I know that I know cats are mammals"
&
B.) "I know that I know what knowledge is and that cats are mammals"

These are two different beliefs, right? Can you detail everything you need justification for in A, and everything you need justification for in B?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111849 wrote:

And my knowing that I need justification (knowing the conditions for knowledge), would be justification that I had the knowledge (that I knew that I knew P)?

That hurts my head worded like that (and it's not all you), but yeah, I think so. However, you also need to know P.

You already had justification for your true belief that P is true (so you knew P is true), but unless you knew what knowledge is (or knew the necessary conditions of knowledge), then you didn't have justification for your true belief that you knew P is true.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111849 wrote:

B.) "I know that I know what knowledge is and that cats are mammals"

To know that you know that cats are mammals, you don't need to know that you know what knowledge is; you just need to know what knowledge is. So it would be better to say:

B.) "I know what knowledge is, and I know that I know that cats are mammals".

But you may be right that, in order to know that you know that P, you don't need to know that JTB constitutes knowledge; you just need to know that you have JTB that P. I have an open mind about this.

@fast,

fast;111857 wrote:

That hurts my head worded like that (and it's not all you), but yeah, I think so. However, you also need to know P.

You already had justification for your true belief that P is true (so you knew P is true), but unless you knew what knowledge is (or knew the necessary conditions of knowledge), then you didn't have justification for your true belief that you knew P is true.

Suppose I meet the conditions of checkmating my opponent. His king is in check, and he has no legal move. Have I checkmated him even if I don't know that I have met the conditions of checkmating him. Yes. Have I checkmated him even if I do not know what "checkmate" means?

@fast,

ACB wrote:

To know that you know that cats are mammals, you don't need to know that you know what knowledge is; you just need to know what knowledge is. So it would be better to say:

B.) "I know what knowledge is, and I know that I know that cats are mammals".

No, you have misunderstood me. I meant every word of B. I am asking for the difference, in terms of justification, between A and B.

B.) "I know that I know what knowledge is and that cats are mammals"

This means I know that I know what knowledge is, and it also means I know that I know that cats are mammals. I am asking what the difference is, in terms of justification, between this and

A.) "I know that I know that cats are mammals".

I am clearly claiming I know that I know more in B (because I am claiming I know that I know knowledge in B, and in A I am not). So, does the amount of justification I need change?

Quote:

But you may be right that, in order to know that you know that P, you don't need to know that JTB constitutes knowledge; you just need to know that you have JTB that P. I have an open mind about this.

I'm saying you need not know you are even fulfilling the conditions; you may not even know that your belief is true or justified, but it may be.

fast wrote:

You already had justification for your true belief that P is true (so you knew P is true), but unless you knew what knowledge is (or knew the necessary conditions of knowledge), then you didn't have justification for your true belief that you knew P is true.

Yeah, I don't see how my knowing what knowledge is, justifies that I have knowledge of something. Unless the thing I'm saying I have knowledge of, is knowledge.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111849 wrote:

So, how do the justifications differ here:

A.) "I know that I know cats are mammals"
&
B.) "I know that I know what knowledge is and that cats are mammals"

These are two different beliefs, right? Can you detail everything you need justification for in A, and everything you need justification for in B?

I wasn't talking about the difference between them two. I meant your justification for I know P versus I know that I know P.

If you know cats are mammals, then you have an adequate justification for knowing what you do, or else you wouldn't know P. But 'A' above isn't about that P.

Before I go in yet another circle, let me make sure the fallacy of accent isn't playing a role here. I'll use 'A' above as an illustration.

P1: I know that I know cats are mammals
versus
P2: I know that I know cats are mammals

When I say, "I know that I know cats are mammals," I'm stressing P1 (not P2). In other words, I'm saying that I know something and what I know is: I know cats are mammals. I'm not saying I know that I know, and what I know that I know is: cats are mammals.

I don't know if that makes any sense or if it's helpful, but I thought I'd throw it out there for what it's worth.

Now, let's look at A and B as you wrote above:
A.) "I know that I know cats are mammals"
&
B.) "I know that I know what knowledge is and that cats are mammals"

What I think that's important is that in both cases you know something (I'm talking about what follows the bold above).

In fact, I'm going to reword A and B a shade without losing meaning for added clarity on what grips me so:

A: I have a JTB that I know cats are mammals
B: I have a JTB that I know what knowledge is and that cats are mammals

What follows the word "know" is different for A and B (I agree), and P is everything that's underlined. But, what needs to (in part) be justified is the first two words of P: I know. It's important to understand that what follows I know is (to me) a distraction. If you have a JTB, then you have a JTB of something, and if what you have a JTB of is knowledge, then regardless of what follows I know, you need to know what knowledge is. Or else, you do not have a JTB that you know but rather a TB that you know--and all of this is regardless of what remains of P.

---------- Post added 12-16-2009 at 05:29 PM ----------

kennethamy;111863 wrote:

Suppose I meet the conditions of checkmating my opponent. His king is in check, and he has no legal move. Have I checkmated him even if I don't know that I have met the conditions of checkmating him. Yes. Have I checkmated him even if I do not know what "checkmate" means?

Yes, I agree.

The point is that the necessary conditions of knowledge can be met without knowing they have been met.

But, the necessary conditions of knowing that you have knowledge is what? 1) you need to believe you know, 2) it needs to be true that you know, and 3) you need to have an adequate justification for the belief you know.

I'll concede that condition 1 and 2 have been met, but I can't for the life of me figure out why you would think the last condition has been met, for it surely has little (some, but little) to do with your justification that you know you have checkmated him.

---------- Post added 12-16-2009 at 05:36 PM ----------

Zetherin;111864 wrote:

Yeah, I don't see how my knowing what knowledge is, justifies that I have knowledge of something. Unless the thing I'm saying I have knowledge of, is knowledge.

Isn't it?

.......

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111864 wrote:

I'm saying you need not know you are even fulfilling the conditions; you may not even know that your belief is true or justified

How can that be? Surely if you know that you know that P, then by definition you know that your belief that P is true and justified. If that condition is not met, you can still know that P, but you can't know that you know that P.

In your post #122 you said you agreed with my assertion that to "know that one knows" is to have a JTB that one has a JTB. Another way of expressing this is: "to know that one fulfils the conditions of knowledge that P". But you now say you need not know you are fulfilling the conditions. Can you clarify this, please.

You earlier referred to an instance where you (supposedly) knew that you knew an answer but could not bring it to mind. But even if you actually did know the answer, you may at that moment have been confusing the question with a different question, in which case your belief that you knew the proper answer would have been unjustified (although accidentally true). In that case you would not have known that you knew.

In ordinary life, "I know that I know it, but it's escaped me for the moment" is usually just an emphatic way of saying "I know it, but it's escaped me..." (especially if the speaker has not studied epistemology). Only in the philosophical sense does the iteration have any real significance.

@fast,

Welcome to the discussion, Mickalos. I see that I have a lot of catching up to do, but unfortunately the forum software is bugged and I cannot at present view the second page, and I don't want to skip some posts. There was a particular post at page two that I wanted to thank you for, but I can't as of now.

@fast,

ACB wrote:

How can that be? Surely if you know that you know that P, then by definition you know that your belief that P is true and justified. If that condition is not met, you can still know that P, but you can't know that you know that P.

If you mean that your belief of P must be true and justified, this would be true. For if you didn't have a true, justified belief P, you could not know that you know P.

Quote:

In your post #122 you said you agreed with my assertion that to "know that one knows" is to have a JTB that one has a JTB.

Yes, I still do agree with this.

Quote:

Another way of expressing this is: "to know that one fulfils the conditions of knowledge that P"

"I know that I know P" does not translate to "I know that I know the conditions of knowledge that P". I am claiming nothing about my understanding of knowledge, only that I know something. If I said, "I know that I know what knowledge is and P", then I'd be claiming something about my understanding of knowledge.

Let's try it like this:

K(P) = I know P
K(K(P)) = I know that I know P

The (K(P)) is what I'm claiming I know in "I know that I know P". If I was claiming I knew what knowledge was, it would look like this (where X is knowledge):

K(K(P) & K(K(X)) = I know that I know P, and I know that I know X.

---

Now, if you still hold your ground, convince me that

K(K(P)) = K(K(P)) & K(K(X))

It seems to me these are two very different propositions.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111947 wrote:

"I know that I know P" does not translate to "I know that I know the conditions of knowledge that P". I am claiming nothing about my understanding of knowledge, only that I know something. If I said, "I know that I know what knowledge is and P", then I'd be claiming something about my understanding of knowledge.

Let's try it like this:

K(P) = I know P
K(K(P)) = I know that I know P

The (K(P)) is what I'm claiming I know in "I know that I know P". If I was claiming I knew what knowledge was, it would look like this (where X is knowledge):

K(K(P) & K(K(X)) = I know that I know P, and I know that I know X.

---

Now, if you still hold your ground, convince me that

K(K(P)) = K(K(P)) & K(K(X))

It seems to me these are two very different propositions.

He could agree that they are different, but believe that they are logically equivalent, or that the first implies the second (where that is the conjunction of the two you wrote in formal language).

But I think that they are not logically equivalent, I think you agree with me about that. K(K(P)) does not logically imply K(K(X)).

@fast,

Emil wrote:

He could agree that they are different, but believe that they are logically equivalent, or that the first implies the second (where that is the conjunction of the two you wrote in formal language).

I think you are right. And I think he thinks:

K(K(P)) → K(K(P)) & K(K(X))

But I think that they are two different propositions, and the first does not imply the second. I don't know how to argue that further, though. Any ideas?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111951 wrote:

I think you are right. And I think he thinks:

K(K(P)) → K(K(P)) & K(K(X))

But I think that they are two different propositions, and the first does not imply the second. I don't know how to argue that further, though. Any ideas?

"K(X)" not "K(K(X))"; know what knowledge is, not know that one knows what knowledge is.

The above are not propositions, rather, the symbols with an interpretation formula express different propositions. I agree with that.

We could argue successfully, I think, that K(P) does not L-imply (logically imply) K(X). We will use what is called a possible worlds parable, i.e. an arguably consistent (thus L-possible) description of a state of affairs where K(K(P)) is true but K(X) is false.

Peter the student

@Emil,

Emil;111965 wrote:

Peter does not 'know what knowledge is' (this is a shorthand, it means that he does not know the necessary/sufficient conditions of knowledge).

How does he know that he does not know what the sufficient conditions of knowledge are if he does not know the sufficient conditions of knowledge? How does he know that he does not know without knowing he knows?

Please, no outrage. Maybe it makes me smile, but I really want to know.

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