I know that I know

@fast,

fast;110266 wrote:

That you might have justification is no good reason to think you do (or may) have justification, and if you don't have good reason to think you do (or may) have justification, then you shouldn't think you have a true belief that is justified. You wouldn't claim to know what you have is knowledge (of the fact that you know P) if you didn't believe you had justification.

So what that it's logically possible to know you know without knowing what knowledge is! It would be unreasonable to think you can know you know just because you might know you know without knowledge of what knowledge is.

You failed to understand what he meant.

Here, with symbols for clarity.

Simplifying K to JTB.
N ≡ what knowledge is.

First order knowledge
K(P) ⇔ J(P)∧B(P)∧P
That one knows that P is logically equivalent with that (one is justified in believing that P, and one believes that P, and P).

Second order knowledge
K(K(P)) ⇔ J(K(P)∧B(K(P))∧K(P)
That is one knows that one knows that P is logically equivalent with that (one is justified in believing that one knows that P, and one believes that one knows that P, one knows that P).

Second order knowledge and knowing what knowledge is
?(J(K(P)⇒K(N))
It is not the case that that one being justified in believing that one knows that P logically implies that one knows what knowledge is.

?(B(K(P))⇒K(N))
It is not the case that that one believes that one knows that P logically implies that one knows what knowledge is.

?(K(P)⇒K(N))
It is not the case that that one knows that P logically implies that one knows what knowledge is.

And finally (does not follow from the above),
?(J(K(P)∧B(K(P))∧K(P)⇒K(N))
It is not the case that that one is justified is believing that one knows that P, and one believes that one knows that P, and one knows that P logically implies that one knows what knowledge is.

---------- Post added 12-11-2009 at 09:02 PM ----------

kennethamy;110271 wrote:

But I was pointing out that I can be justified without knowing I am. Not that it is logically possible for me to be justified. And, if I am justified, then I am justified whether or not I know I am justified. So my being justified does not depend on whether I know I am.

We are moving within what is called the debate between "internalism and externalism". Need I be aware of my justification to be justified?

Internalism and externalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

See the section on justification.

In symbols:

?(J(P)⇒K(J(P)))
It is not the case that that one is justified in believing that P logically implies that one knows that one is justified in believing that P. This is true for all P, (∀P).

@fast,

fast;110169 wrote:

So, can we know that we know? Yes, no, and yes, respectively. It all depends on what we mean when we say it.

The above statement seems like the heart of the matter for me. Words are only counters in themselves. It's their context and then our personal interpretation of them that gives them "meaning." I think to "know" is to have a "justified belief" rather than a "justified true belief." Is the word "true" in this case not an injection of certainty into the concept? Or does "true" just mean the same thing as justified? And would that not be redundant?

Good post, fast. It's a good issue to clarify.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110275 wrote:

The above statement seems like the heart of the matter for me. Words are only counters in themselves. It's their context and then our personal interpretation of them that gives them "meaning." I think to "know" is to have a "justified belief" rather than a "justified true belief." Is the word "true" in this case not an injection of certainty into the concept? Or does "true" just mean the same thing as justified? And would that not be redundant?

Good post, fast. It's a good issue to clarify.

But whether a statement is true always depends partly on what it means. (And partly on how the world is).

If "Brutus" meant "Caesar", and "Brutus" meant "Ceasar", then Brutus murdered Caesar would be false, and Caesar murders Brutus would be true.

And if "knowledge" meant "justified belief", then people in the Middle Ages would have known that the world was flat. So what? Since they did not know that the world was flat, since it wasn't flat, "knowledge" does not mean "justified belief".

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110275 wrote:

The above statement seems like the heart of the matter for me. Words are only counters in themselves. It's their context and then our personal interpretation of them that gives them "meaning."

I realized what I said when I said it, but I have a different view about what phrases (and some terms) mean versus what individual words (and most terms) mean--even though phrases are composed of words. It's a long story.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;110284 wrote:

And if "knowledge" meant "justified belief", then people in the Middle Ages would have known that the world was flat. So what? Since the they did not know that the world was flat since it wasn't flat, "knowledge" does not mean "justified belief".

But our modern science is hardly done figuring out what "reality" is. If the universe turns out to be 5-dimensional, our current view of the world as spherical will also not be, by your definition, knowledge. I've already suggested the redundancy in the correspondence theory of truth. Our concept of reality is always subject to revision. Or has modern man attained absolute knowledge? I feel that a claim to absolute knowledge is superstitious. And if we don't have absolute knowledge, then reality (which we experience thru the medium of language (concepts) is still being discovered (and also invented by our interpretations which "prove" themselves by their usefulness. Newton was right enough for his time..and Einstein is right enough for us to build A-bombs....):sarcastic:

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110287 wrote:

But our modern science is hardly done figuring out what "reality" is. If the universe turns out to be 5-dimensional, our current view of the world as spherical will also not be, by your definition, knowledge. I've already suggested the redundancy in the correspondence theory of truth. Our concept of reality is always subject to revision. Or has modern man attained absolute knowledge? I feel that a claim to absolute knowledge is superstitious. And if we don't have absolute knowledge, then reality is still being discovered (and also invented by our interpretations which prove themselves by their usefulness. Newton was right enough for his time...)

As usual, "what has that to do with it?" I haven't claimed to have absolute knowledge. I don't even know what that is.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110287 wrote:

But our modern science is hardly done figuring out what "reality" is. If the universe turns out to be 5-dimensional, our current view of the world as spherical will also not be, by your definition, knowledge. I've already suggested the redundancy in the correspondence theory of truth. Our concept of reality is always subject to revision. Or has modern man attained absolute knowledge? I feel that a claim to absolute knowledge is superstitious. And if we don't have absolute knowledge, then reality (which we experience thru the medium of language (concepts) is still being discovered (and also invented by our interpretations which "prove" themselves by their usefulness. Newton was right enough for his time..and Einstein is right enough for us to build A-bombs....):sarcastic:

This thread is about the matter of knowing that we know.

How does any of what you say tie into this? Does Newton or Einstein have a say in this matter? And who brought up modern science's interpretation of reality? I'm sorry, but I am not following what you are saying at all.

@fast,

fast;110285 wrote:

I realized what I said when I said it, but I have a different view about what phrases (and some terms) mean versus what individual words (and most terms) mean--even though phrases are composed of words. It's a long story.

I agree. It's a long story. And this is what I mean by "impossibility of closure." Are we ever done wrestling with the complexity of language? And yet life demands action, so we act on "justified belief." And to act on a belief is to imply its justification for us. I've always liked the phrase "animal faith."

---------- Post added 12-11-2009 at 03:36 PM ----------

kennethamy;110284 wrote:

And if "knowledge" meant "justified belief", then people in the Middle Ages would have known that the world was flat. So what? Since they did not know that the world was flat, since it wasn't flat, "knowledge" does not mean "justified belief".

Consider the implications of this.

@kennethamy,

Kennethamy,

I think (maybe) we're talking past each other. Pay particular attention to the "that's" and "what's".

I'm going to ask you something, but I'm not going to ask you how you know that P (Quito is the capital of Ecuador) is true, for I can check the CIA Factbook for that.

Instead, I'm asking how do you know that what you have is knowledge---that P is true. (notice the long pause). You need to know both what knowledge is and that P is true in order to know that you know P.

Only if you know that what you have is knowledge can it be the case that what you have is knowledge ---that you know P. And yes, of course you also need to know that P is true.

"I know that I know P" in the sense that I'm using it also means, "I know that what I have is knowledge that P."

@fast,

fast;110342 wrote:

Instead, I'm asking how do you know that what you have is knowledge---that P is true. (notice the long pause). You need to know both what knowledge is and that P is true in order to know that you know P.

Only if you know that what you have is knowledge can it be the case that what you have is knowledge ---that you know P. And yes, of course you also need to know that P is true.

"I know that I know P" in the sense that I'm using it also means, "I know that what I have is knowledge that P."

If you are asking how I know that my propositional attitude is that of knowledge that I know rather than say merely belief that I know, then, of course, in order to answer that, I must know what having knowledge is. But that does not mean that in order for me to have knowledge that I know, I must know what knowledge is. So, in that case, I agree with you.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;110291 wrote:

This thread is about the matter of knowing that we know.

How does any of what you say tie into this? Does Newton or Einstein have a say in this matter? And who brought up modern science's interpretation of reality? I'm sorry, but I am not following what you are saying at all.

It ties in with the definition of knowledge. I define knowledge as justified belief. I think that Kenneth Amy defines it as true justified belief.

I think the correspondence theory of truth is redundant. If knowledge is true justified belief it must accurately correspond with reality, but reality is still being decided upon.

In lieu of absolute knowledge we must live and converse without perfect certainty. Therefore I describe knowledge as justified belief.

What can the word "true" mean in the absence of absolute (perfect) knowledge? Does it not mean true enough?

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110372 wrote:

It ties in with the definition of knowledge. I define knowledge as justified belief. I think that Kenneth Amy defines it as true justified belief.

I think the correspondence theory of truth is redundant. If knowledge is true justified belief it must accurately correspond with reality, but reality is still being decided upon.

In lieu of absolute knowledge we must live and converse without perfect certainty. Therefore I describe knowledge as justified belief.

What can the word "true" mean in the absence of absolute (perfect) knowledge? Does it not mean true enough?

You can go around defining words all you like. The question is whether you have defined them correctly. It is not as if what a word means is up to you, anymore than how a knight moves in chess is up to you.

@fast,

I agree. Therefore I address the ever-so-popular correspondence theory of truth, and suggest where it might be flawed. Truth cannot be founded upon a changing reality, unless we are founding a dynamic concept of truth..

But I have no objection to a dynamic concept of truth. What is "true" yesterday is "false" today. What is "false" today is "true" tomorrow.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110404 wrote:

I agree. Therefore I address the ever-so-popular correspondence theory of truth, and suggest where it might be flawed. Truth cannot be founded upon a changing reality, unless we are founding a dynamic concept of truth..

But I have no objection to a dynamic concept of truth. What is "true" yesterday is "false" today. What is "false" today is "true" tomorrow.

What is an example of what is true today and false tomorrow?

@fast,

"It is now December 11th, 2009."

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110415 wrote:

"It is now December 11th, 2009."

A single sentence can express many propositions depending on its use. When that sentence is used on different days it expresses different propositions, which naturally differ in truth value, thus we usually think of truth and falsehood as being properties of the use of a sentence.

The sentence "Queen Elizabeth II is alive" might be used to express a single proposition that is subject to change in truth value, but I don't see why this should encourage us to drop truth as a necessary condition for knowledge. Reality is not "still being decided upon", as you put it, at any given time it is very much determinate; that is every proposition is either true or false. It seems pretty clear to me by simply looking at ordinary language that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge: "He knows that Mrs Dalloway was written by James Joyce, but in fact it was actually written by Virginia Woolf." The sentence is absurd, it simply doesn't conform to the rules and conventions by which we are allowed to use the word 'know' in a meaningful sense.

@mickalos,

mickalos;110622 wrote:

A single sentence can express many propositions depending on its use. When that sentence is used on different days it expresses different propositions, which naturally differ in truth value, thus we usually think of truth and falsehood as being properties of the use of a sentence.

The sentence "Queen Elizabeth II is alive" might be used to express a single proposition that is subject to change in truth value, but I don't see why this should encourage us to drop truth as a necessary condition for knowledge. Reality is not "still being decided upon", as you put it, at any given time it is very much determinate; that is every proposition is either true or false. It seems pretty clear to me by simply looking at ordinary language that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge: "He knows that Mrs Dalloway was written by James Joyce, but in fact it was actually written by Virginia Woolf." The sentence is absurd, it simply doesn't conform to the rules and conventions by which we are allowed to use the word 'know' in a meaningful sense.

I appreciate your contribution, but I don't think you see my point. Some aspects of reality are no longer being debated. Others are. One thinks of cutting edge theories in physics and biology. One also thinks of discussions like these. Our conceptual interpretation of reality is for me no less real than our mental-model of matter in space. For many there is a God. For others there is not. To favor one's own view and call it Reality is hardly uncommon but also perhaps superstitious. This debate very much includes, from my point of view, our conceptions of reality.

Have our telescopes penetrated the outer reaches of the Universe (an invented concept)? Are our telescopes perfect instruments? Is the mammalian human brain a perfect instrument? Consider the limitations, I say, of that by which we obtain knowledge.

I also suggest some research into the deflationary theories of truth. I 'm curious about your reaction to such.

Thanks,
recon

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;110415 wrote:

"It is now December 11th, 2009."

That on December 11th, 2009 it is true that it was December 11th, 2009 will be eternally true. It was true a billion years ago, and will be true a billion years hence.

@fast,

Tautologies are cute like that. Smile

@mickalos,

mickalos;110622 wrote:

A single sentence can express many propositions depending on its use. When that sentence is used on different days it expresses different propositions, which naturally differ in truth value, thus we usually think of truth and falsehood as being properties of the use of a sentence.

The sentence "Queen Elizabeth II is alive" might be used to express a single proposition that is subject to change in truth value, but I don't see why this should encourage us to drop truth as a necessary condition for knowledge. Reality is not "still being decided upon", as you put it, at any given time it is very much determinate; that is every proposition is either true or false. It seems pretty clear to me by simply looking at ordinary language that truth is a necessary condition for knowledge: "He knows that Mrs Dalloway was written by James Joyce, but in fact it was actually written by Virginia Woolf." The sentence is absurd, it simply doesn't conform to the rules and conventions by which we are allowed to use the word 'know' in a meaningful sense.

Most monist proposition theories of truth bearers deny truth value changes.

If I utter the sentence "Queen Elizabeth II is alive", then it expresses a true proposition. If someone expresses it in 100 years, then it will presumably express a false proposition. It will express a different proposition in any case, even if it should be true.

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