I know that I know

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Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 03:43 pm
@fast,
I also think that truth is a property of sentences. And while the word "true" is sometimes useful, it is also at times redundant. The deflationary theories of truth make a strong case. The correspondence theory of truth does, upon careful consideration, in certain cases, seem a bit redundant....

---------- Post added 12-12-2009 at 04:44 PM ----------

If a fact is a statement that corresponds with reality and at the same time this reality is being debated....what then? And do humans not live, especially in regards to their conceptual "truths," more by the coherence theory of truth?
Don't our current interpretations tend to fit in with our past interpretations?
 
mickalos
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 05:15 pm
@Emil,
Reconstructo;110626 wrote:
I appreciate your contribution, but I don't think you see my point. Some aspects of reality are no longer being debated. Others are. One thinks of cutting edge theories in physics and biology. One also thinks of discussions like these. Our conceptual interpretation of reality is for me no less real than our mental-model of matter in space. For many there is a God. For others there is not. To favor one's own view and call it Reality is hardly uncommon but also perhaps superstitious. This debate very much includes, from my point of view, our conceptions of reality.

Have our telescopes penetrated the outer reaches of the Universe (an invented concept)? Are our telescopes perfect instruments? Is the mammalian human brain a perfect instrument? Consider the limitations, I say, of that by which we obtain knowledge.

I also suggest some research into the deflationary theories of truth. I 'm curious about your reaction to such.

Thanks,
recon


You haven't really said anything about truth, and so I'm not really sure why you think any of this has anything to do with truth, but I think it may be something to do with the sentence, "Our conceptual interpretation of reality is for me no less real than our mental-model of matter in space", because it's the only one which I'm not quite sure of the meaning of. Some people might call a 'mental model of matter in space' a 'conceptual interpretation of reality', then on top of our mental model of matter in space we have matter in space, independent of any mental model or conceptual interpretation, and this is the thing that truth deals with. However, I'm guessing at the meaning of 'conceptual interpretation of reality'; personally, I think it's too vague and ambiguous a phrase to be used in meaningful discourse, and I'm more inclined to say I have absolutely no idea what you mean (which of course assumes it is a meaningful phrase). When I think of the phrase 'conceptual interpretation of reality', the kinds of questions that come to mind are, for example, there is a world with three individuals in it, how many objects are there? Is it simply three, or do we include the various conjunctions of the three individuals as separate objects? In short, questions about ontology, so I'm not sure how the phrase has made its way into a discussion about knowledge.

As far as the bits of the post that I understand go, of course there are propositions we can't verify, and there are propositions that we disagree upon the truth value of, but these propositions do nevertheless have a determinate truth value, whether or not we can verify it is irrelevant, and when we do verify it we can be said to know it. Whether or not our telescopes can see into the dark depths of space, concerns the justification of our beliefs about the dark depths of space. Truth is entirely independent of this. One can have a true belief that is unjustified, i.e. lucky guessing.

The only deflationary theory of truth I've come across is in Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. The idea being saying "P is true" is no different from asserting P, thus truth isn't a real relation. In any case, for any proposition, P, we need to ask "Under what conditions P, and under what conditions not-P?" I'd call them truth conditions, but it's irrelevant really, it certainly didn't stop Ayer from adopting a tripartite theory of knowledge, which he does in his The Problem of Knowledge.


Emil;110653 wrote:
Most monist proposition theories of truth bearers deny truth value changes.

If I utter the sentence "Queen Elizabeth II is alive", then it expresses a true proposition. If someone expresses it in 100 years, then it will presumably express a false proposition. It will express a different proposition in any case, even if it should be true.

You're quite right about that sentence, my lazy mistake. Propositions about the future and the past would have been a better example, pretty dubious though.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 05:20 pm
@Emil,
Emil;110653 wrote:
Most monist proposition theories of truth bearers deny truth value changes.

If I utter the sentence "Queen Elizabeth II is alive", then it expresses a true proposition. If someone expresses it in 100 years, then it will presumably express a false proposition. It will express a different proposition in any case, even if it should be true.


Not if it expresses the proposition that Queen Elizabeth II is alive in 2009 does it express a false proposition. If it expressed the proposition that QE is alive in 2109, then of course, it would express a false proposition. Queen Elizabeth is alive (unless it is understood as "alive this (whatever particular year is) does not express any proposition. It is an incomplete sentence.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 05:24 pm
@mickalos,
mickalos;110688 wrote:
Some people might call a 'mental model of matter in space' a 'conceptual interpretation of reality', then on top of our mental model of matter in space we have matter in space, independent of any mental model or conceptual interpretation, and this is the thing that truth deals with. However, I'm guessing at the meaning of 'conceptual interpretation of reality'; personally, I think it's too vague and ambiguous a phrase to be used in meaningful discourse, and I'm more inclined to say I have absolutely no idea what you mean (which of course assumes it is a meaningful phrase).



And this concept of something behind our concepts is itself just a concept. And "conceptual interpretation of reality" is exactly what you and I are doing right now. :sarcastic:

---------- Post added 12-12-2009 at 06:28 PM ----------

mickalos;110688 wrote:
Whether or not our telescopes can see into the dark depths of space, concerns the justification of our beliefs about the dark depths of space. Truth is entirely independent of this.


Is it indeed? I suppose one can have faith in that sort of thing. Sort of like God, this mind-independent reality that no one has ever experienced. We always experience it processed, by our sense and our instruments and our prejudices/culture. Is it not a bit superstitious, this idea of truth-in-itself?
 
Emil
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 07:23 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;110689 wrote:
Not if it expresses the proposition that Queen Elizabeth II is alive in 2009 does it express a false proposition. If it expressed the proposition that QE is alive in 2109, then of course, it would express a false proposition. Queen Elizabeth is alive (unless it is understood as "alive this (whatever particular year is) does not express any proposition. It is an incomplete sentence.


My mistake. I should have written:

If something says the sentence in 2100, then it will express a false proposition.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 07:44 pm
@fast,
Reconstructo wrote:
I define knowledge as justified belief... If knowledge is true justified belief it must accurately correspond with reality, but reality is still being decided upon.


So, to you, there's no such thing as truth or falsity?

Suppose two students take a multiple-choice test. The students may choose A, B, C, or D. One student chooses B, the other student chooses C. The correct answer to the question happens to be B; that is, according to the answer key, B is right answer.

Suppose, now, that the student who chose B had a justified belief that the answer was B. And that is why he picked B. Would you say he knew the answer was B? I think most would. Suppose the student who chose C, one of the incorrect answers, had a justified belief that the answer was C. Would you say he knew the answer was C? I don't think anyone would. They would say he didn't know the answer.

Quote:
What can the word "true" mean in the absence of absolute (perfect) knowledge?


Would you say that it was true that the answer was B, since the answer was B on the answer key? I would. I think many people would.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 08:43 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;110729 wrote:
So, to you, there's no such thing as truth or falsity?



This is a gross misrepresentation of my views. I'm talking about the limits of the correspondence theory of truth. In regards to the word "true" I urge you to look up deflationary theories of truth.

I'm perfectly willing to debate this with you, but I would like to feel that you understand what it is I'm saying.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 08:58 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;110741 wrote:
This is a gross misrepresentation of my views. I'm talking about the limits of the correspondence theory of truth. In regards to the word "true" I urge you to look up deflationary theories of truth.

I'm perfectly willing to debate this with you, but I would like to feel that you understand what it is I'm saying.


Not sure I was misrepresenting you, as I did not say they were your views. I asked if they were, and then I walked you through a scenario in an effort to have you expound on what you meant. If you agreed with what I said about my scenario, then it makes me wonder why you said:

Quote:
What can the word "true" mean in the absence of absolute (perfect) knowledge?


I'll reread all your posts again and see where I went wrong. Thanks.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 09:07 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;110626 wrote:
I appreciate your contribution, but I don't think you see my point. Some aspects of reality are no longer being debated. Others are. One thinks of cutting edge theories in physics and biology. One also thinks of discussions like these. Our conceptual interpretation of reality is for me no less real than our mental-model of matter in space. For many there is a God. For others there is not. To favor one's own view and call it Reality is hardly uncommon but also perhaps superstitious. This debate very much includes, from my point of view, our conceptions of reality.

Have our telescopes penetrated the outer reaches of the Universe (an invented concept)? Are our telescopes perfect instruments? Is the mammalian human brain a perfect instrument? Consider the limitations, I say, of that by which we obtain knowledge.

Thanks,
recon


Thanks for being a good sport, Zeth. I may have been a bit cranky in my response. Here's a better example I think. Respectfully,
recon

---------- Post added 12-12-2009 at 10:10 PM ----------
 
Emil
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 09:13 pm
@fast,
Will he ever stop derailing all the threads with his idealism or whatever it is? It seems not.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sat 12 Dec, 2009 09:18 pm
@fast,
I'm not an idealist. Try to understand that. But I'm not a naive, all too naive, realist, either. And to me a slavish obsession with the correspondence theory of truth is no better than superstition......

---------- Post added 12-12-2009 at 11:47 PM ----------

Here's one of my favorite books. Excepting his politics, on which I'm neutral, I find little to disagree with here. He writes well too.Contingency, irony, and solidarity - Google Books
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 02:44 am
@Emil,
Emil;110726 wrote:
My mistake. I should have written:

If something says the sentence in 2100, then it will express a false proposition.



Yes. Then the context will "complete" the sentence.

---------- Post added 12-13-2009 at 03:53 AM ----------

Reconstructo;110691 wrote:
And this concept of something behind our concepts is itself just a concept. And "conceptual interpretation of reality" is exactly what you and I are doing right now. :sarcastic:

---------- Post added 12-12-2009 at 06:28 PM ----------



Is it indeed? I suppose one can have faith in that sort of thing. Sort of like God, this mind-independent reality that no one has ever experienced. We always experience it processed, by our sense and our instruments and our prejudices/culture. Is it not a bit superstitious, this idea of truth-in-itself?


I don't know why you keep insisting that we don't experience a mind-independent reality when we clearly do all the time (unless we are involved in a sensory-deprivation experiment). Whenever I cut myself shaving, I experience a mind-independent reality. The experience is not, of course, mind-independent. But what I experience, the razor which cuts into my flesh, is mind-independent. And I don't experience my experience. I experience the razor.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 03:30 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;110843 wrote:
Yes. Then the context will "complete" the sentence.

---------- Post added 12-13-2009 at 03:53 AM ----------



I don't know why you keep insisting that we don't experience a mind-independent reality when we clearly do all the time (unless we are involved in a sensory-deprivation experiment). Whenever I cut myself shaving, I experience a mind-independent reality. The experience is not, of course, mind-independent. But what I experience, the razor which cuts into my flesh, is mind-independent. And I don't experience my experience. I experience the razor.


But your experience of it is not mind-independent. The pain, the sight of the blood, the concepts of razor and cutting. All this is in your consciousness. A mind-independent reality is inferred from the experience of reality. If you mean we interact with a mind-independent reality, I can agree with that. But for me "experience" is associated with consciousness.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 03:59 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;110859 wrote:
But your experience of it is not mind-independent. The pain, the sight of the blood, the concepts of razor and cutting. All this is in your consciousness. A mind-independent reality is inferred from the experience of reality. If you mean we interact with a mind-independent reality, I can agree with that. But for me "experience" is associated with consciousness.


Of course my experience is not mind-independent. I said that several times. What I experience is mind-independent, however. It certainly does not follow from that fact that my experience is mind-dependent, that what I experience is mind-dependent. I have already discussed this several times. And whether we infer reality from our experiences is a different issue. But supposing we do, it does not follow that what we experience is not reality. What is it you think we experience if not reality?
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 04:09 am
@fast,
It's all a matter of terms. I doubt we really disagree on this much. I still think our real disagreement hinges on the correspondence theory of truth and what I think are its limitations.

I also think you neglected to see how much my emphasis of subjectivity was based on philosophical and religious positions. I look around and see humans pride themselves on many different virtues. They are all right in their own minds. Some truths have nothing to correspond to. Fallible humans tend to interpret today in the light of yesterday, if you catch my drift.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 08:48 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;110872 wrote:
It's all a matter of terms. I doubt we really disagree on this much. I still think our real disagreement hinges on the correspondence theory of truth and what I think are its limitations.

I also think you neglected to see how much my emphasis of subjectivity was based on philosophical and religious positions. I look around and see humans pride themselves on many different virtues. They are all right in their own minds. Some truths have nothing to correspond to. Fallible humans tend to interpret today in the light of yesterday, if you catch my drift.


If you mean that fallible human being use what is known to understand the unknown, well of course they do. That is what we call learning from experience. What else should we do? What else could we do?

I don't think it is at all a "matter or terms", nor do I think we agree. People, of course, always think that what they believe is true. If they did not, they would not believe what they believe. I don't understand what you mean by "based on religious and philosophical positions", but, moreover, I don't see how that is relevant.
 
ACB
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 01:32 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;110859 wrote:
But your experience of it is not mind-independent. The pain, the sight of the blood, the concepts of razor and cutting. All this is in your consciousness. A mind-independent reality is inferred from the experience of reality. If you mean we interact with a mind-independent reality, I can agree with that. But for me "experience" is associated with consciousness.


Kennethamy - Do you agree with Reconstructo's comments in the above quote?

The crucial question seems to be: Is what we experience mind-independent? And that, I think, is a matter of terms. "What we experience" is an ambiguous phrase; it could refer either to the experience itself or (in the sense you are using it) the external reality. Precision of terms is very important here.

On the question of the correspondence theory of truth, my view is that there is a partial correspondence between experience and mind-independent reality. Patterns of real events are normally the simplest explanation for patterns of experience. Just as if you see a series of sights through a window, the simplest explanation is that they correspond to real events on the other side, rather than mere changes of light conditions, flaws in the glass, etc. What you see may, of course, not give a direct picture of reality (e.g. the glass may be dirty, or slightly convex), but it is still the events beyond the window that are primarily responsible for the changing patterns we see.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 01:45 pm
@ACB,
ACB;110973 wrote:
Kennethamy - Do you agree with Reconstructo's comments in the above quote?

The crucial question seems to be: Is what we experience mind-independent? And that, I think, is a matter of terms. "What we experience" is an ambiguous phrase; it could refer either to the experience itself or (in the sense you are using it) the external reality. Precision of terms is very important here.

On the question of the correspondence theory of truth, my view is that there is a partial correspondence between experience and mind-independent reality. Patterns of real events are normally the simplest explanation for patterns of experience. Just as if you see a series of sights through a window, the simplest explanation is that they correspond to real events on the other side, rather than mere changes of light conditions, flaws in the glass, etc. What you see may, of course, not give a direct picture of reality (e.g. the glass may be dirty, or slightly convex), but it is still the events beyond the window that are primarily responsible for the changing patterns we see.


"What we experience" is an ambiguous phrase; it could refer either to the experience itself or (in the sense you are using it) the external reality. Precision of terms is very important here.

Yes, of course. But once we make that distinction, isn't it clear that there is an external object that we experience, and that the experience itself is not what we experience. We do not experience experiences. We have experiences, and we experience external objects (and that term is another banana peel) by having experiences. Trying to experience experiences is what phenomenologists try to do. With what success I have no idea. But it is certainly not what we do when we find out about the world around us.

You are talking about "resemblance" not "correspondence". Whether our experiences resemble their causes is a different question.


In any case, if you have been looking at the thread, http://www.philosophyforum.com/images/statusicon/post_new.gif Ortega's Doctrine of the Point of View

it is clear that Ortega confuses those two senses of "what is experienced" badly. And so does Reconstructo.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 02:02 pm
@kennethamy,
It's a slippery zone. Considering your implied distaste for phenomenology, I wonder if you have the patience to make a fair judgment on the issue. As I've said before, the "thing-in-itself" is itself a concept, making it paradoxical. I've also said that the problem of being, which is to some degree just a problem of language, is also difficult. Sure, we experience reality. Hegel might say we experience the appearance of reality. This is to say that Yes, reality appears: reality is at the party with us. His first book was originally going to be titled The Science of the Appearance of Reality. He examines our conceptual development, which is motivated in the first place by desire. At some point consciousness creates a concept of itself, the empirical ego. One could say that being is prior both to idealism and realism. But if the subject turns you off, would you not be motivated to try and write off its complexities? Because it isn't that practical or clear. It's murky territory. And these words are only counters, not coin. I'd be lying to you if I said I believed myself confused. But I do have some humility before this difficult region of philosophy.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 13 Dec, 2009 02:08 pm
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;110978 wrote:
It's a slippery zone. Considering your implied distaste for phenomenology, I wonder if you have the patience to make a fair judgment on the issue. As I've said before, the "thing-in-itself" is itself a concept, making it paradoxical. I've also said that the problem of being, which is to some degree just a problem of language, is also difficult. Sure, we experience reality. Hegel might say we experience the appearance of reality. This is to say that Yes, reality appears: reality is at the party with us. His first book was originally going to be titled The Science of the Appearance of Reality. He examines our conceptual development, which is motivated in the first place by desire. At some point consciousness creates a concept of itself, the empirical ego. One could say that being is prior both to idealism and realism. But if the subject turns you off, would you not be motivated to try and write off its complexities? Because it isn't that practical or clear. It's murky territory. And these words are only counters, not coin. I'd be lying to you if I said I believed myself confused. But I do have some humility before this difficult region of philosophy.


So do you think that when you see a tree, what you are seeing is your seeing of a tree, and not the tree?
 
 

 
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