@Emil,
Reconstructo;110626 wrote:I appreciate your contribution, but I don't think you see my point. Some aspects of reality are no longer being debated. Others are. One thinks of cutting edge theories in physics and biology. One also thinks of discussions like these. Our conceptual interpretation of reality is for me no less real than our mental-model of matter in space. For many there is a God. For others there is not. To favor one's own view and call it Reality is hardly uncommon but also perhaps superstitious. This debate very much includes, from my point of view, our conceptions of reality.
Have our telescopes penetrated the outer reaches of the Universe (an invented concept)? Are our telescopes perfect instruments? Is the mammalian human brain a perfect instrument? Consider the limitations, I say, of that by which we obtain knowledge.
I also suggest some research into the deflationary theories of truth. I 'm curious about your reaction to such.
Thanks,
recon
You haven't really said anything about truth, and so I'm not really sure why you think any of this has anything to do with truth, but I think it may be something to do with the sentence, "Our conceptual interpretation of reality is for me no less real than our mental-model of matter in space", because it's the only one which I'm not quite sure of the meaning of. Some people might call a 'mental model of matter in space' a 'conceptual interpretation of reality', then on top of our mental model of matter in space we have
matter in space, independent of any mental model or conceptual interpretation, and this is the thing that truth deals with. However, I'm guessing at the meaning of 'conceptual interpretation of reality'; personally, I think it's too vague and ambiguous a phrase to be used in meaningful discourse, and I'm more inclined to say I have absolutely no idea what you mean (which of course assumes it is a meaningful phrase). When I think of the phrase 'conceptual interpretation of reality', the kinds of questions that come to mind are, for example, there is a world with three individuals in it, how many objects are there? Is it simply three, or do we include the various conjunctions of the three individuals as separate objects? In short, questions about ontology, so I'm not sure how the phrase has made its way into a discussion about knowledge.
As far as the bits of the post that I understand go, of course there are propositions we can't verify, and there are propositions that we disagree upon the truth value of, but these propositions do nevertheless have a determinate truth value, whether or not we can verify it is irrelevant, and when we do verify it we can be said to know it. Whether or not our telescopes can see into the dark depths of space, concerns the justification of our beliefs about the dark depths of space. Truth is entirely independent of this. One can have a true belief that is unjustified, i.e. lucky guessing.
The only deflationary theory of truth I've come across is in Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic. The idea being saying "P is true" is no different from asserting P, thus truth isn't a real relation. In any case, for any proposition, P, we need to ask "Under what conditions P, and under what conditions not-P?" I'd call them truth conditions, but it's irrelevant really, it certainly didn't stop Ayer from adopting a tripartite theory of knowledge, which he does in his
The Problem of Knowledge.
Emil;110653 wrote:Most monist proposition theories of truth bearers deny truth value changes.
If I utter the sentence "Queen Elizabeth II is alive", then it expresses a true proposition. If someone expresses it in 100 years, then it will presumably express a false proposition. It will express a different proposition in any case, even if it should be true.
You're quite right about that sentence, my lazy mistake. Propositions about the future and the past would have been a better example, pretty dubious though.