But "knowledge" and "belief" are not synonymous. So how can you make a point by supposing that they are? Could you just make your point neat?

Sometimes people try to argue that there is no difference between knowledge and belief because when we believe we know we may be mistaken and only believe. Perhaps that is what you are trying to say. Well, it is true that when we believe we know we may be mistaken and not know at all. But that does not show that there is no difference between knowledge and belief. It just shows that we may be mistaken about whether we know just as we may be mistaken about anything else, for example whether we have been checkmated in chess. It might be that we think we are checkmated and be mistaken because we are not, but that does not mean there is no difference between being checkmated and not being checkmated. What you appear to be supposing (if this is your view) is that if we know, then it should not be possible to be mistaken about whether we know, and that if we know, we should know we know. But, since we can be mistaken about whether we know, we don't know at all. But your premise (if that is what you are arguing) is false. It is not true that if we know then we should not be possible to believe that we don't know. (By the way, there are interesting reasons why people may think that if they know they should know that they know)

I am not sure that the above really is your argument, but, as I said, some people do argue that way, and it does appear similar to what you have been saying.

Again, since the capital of Ecuador might have been Guyaqull and not Quito, it cannot be that the capital of Ecuador is Quito "by definition". What the capital city is decided by convention (definition). But that does not mean it is the capital city by convention (definition). I think you are confusing how a city became the capital with its being the capital however it became the capital.

---------- Post added 02-08-2010 at 07:45 AM ----------



I am not sure whether there is a fallacy of the perfect solution. You cannot argue, for instance, that the Gettier objection commits that fallacy because it assumes there might be a perfect solution to what is the analysis of knowledge.

The decisive argument that Kp cannot imply KKp is that since you cannot know you know unless you already know (in the first place) KKp cannot be a necessary condition of knowing. But if knowing implies you know that you know, then KKp would be a necessary condition of Kp. This is Spinoza's argument, and it is decisive.

Indeed, since KKp implies Kp, then Kp cannot imply KKp unless Kp and KKp are equivalent. And clearly, they are not.

Until the belief is formed, how can you say they know or believe anything concerning it? Is it not a contradiction to talk about something a person knows or believes if they have not in any way formed a belief or knowledge claim about that something?

Forgive me, but I have not taken advanced logic, I will need you to elaborate. That is why my formalization was not very good, but it's the best I can do at the moment.

Hmm, then perhaps my understanding (or lack thereof) of the KK principle has me using it as a placeholder.

What if I simply said:

1. S k p, iff S is objective concerning P.
?

The decisive argument that Kp cannot imply KKp is that since you cannot know you know unless you already know (in the first place) KKp cannot be a necessary condition of knowing. But if knowing implies you know that you know, then KKp would be a necessary condition of Kp. This is Spinoza's argument, and it is decisive.

Indeed, since KKp implies Kp, then Kp cannot imply KKp unless Kp and KKp are equivalent. And clearly, they are not.

Hmm, then perhaps my understanding (or lack thereof) of the KK principle has me using it as a placeholder.

What if I simply said:

1. S k p, iff S is objective concerning P.
?

What does "the belief" refer to?

Then I will not try to make you understand. You should pick up a logic textbook and read it, maybe even twice. If you wish I can send you one in pdf format, just pm me.

---------- Post added 02-12-2010 at 02:46 AM ----------



Well I have no idea what "S is objective concerning P" means if anything. I rather stay far away from that word "objective" since it has so many many different meanings and it is easy to conflate them. If I meant, for instance, impartial, I would use that word instead. If I meant, for instance, not dependent upon what people think, then I would find term for that.

---------- Post added 02-12-2010 at 02:47 AM ----------



I don't think this argument is very good. I asked you to justify why they are not logically equivalent before but I don't recall getting any good justification for that. I will stick to my own argument from counter-example until I have better reasons for using the one you present.

What does "the belief" refer to?

Then I will not try to make you understand. You should pick up a logic textbook and read it, maybe even twice. If you wish I can send you one in pdf format, just pm me.

---------- Post added 02-12-2010 at 02:46 AM ----------



Well I have no idea what "S is objective concerning P" means if anything. I rather stay far away from that word "objective" since it has so many many different meanings and it is easy to conflate them. If I meant, for instance, impartial, I would use that word instead. If I meant, for instance, not dependent upon what people think, then I would find term for that.

I suppose you do not understand the KK principle which is that Kp implies KKp. And that is false.

---------- Post added 02-11-2010 at 08:54 PM ----------



Why should you think that Kp and KKp were logically equivalent? But anyway, I had a different argument. Namely that since you have to know in order to know that you know in the first place, how could you have to know that you know in order to know?

For this case, consider the belief to be that the earth is spherical. My point is how can someone know it is spherical if they have never formed the belief that the earth is spherical?

I would love a logic book, I'll pm you shortly.

Perhaps objective is a bad word... maybe "not dependent upon what people think" would be better. I mean it to be something a person has full knowledge of, such as their understanding of language. It's meant to narrow down the scope of what can be considered knowledge.

---------- Post added 02-11-2010 at 08:05 PM ----------



That's fine, and I see your reason for saying it's false, but what is your response to my revision? That S k p, iff S is objective concerning P. ?

I am objective concerning the proposition that La Paz is the the capital of Ecuador. But I don't know that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador, since La Paz is the capital of Bolivia and not Ecuador.

I used a capitol P to mean a group of propositions. You are not objective, or fully knowledgeable, concerning capitals, therefore you not knowing that La Paz is the capital of Bolivia is fine.

If you are objective concerning the group of propositions that you make up, then you know that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador in the group of made up propositions. However, since made up propositions are not knowledge, you are free to know the proposition without it being a knowledge claim.

What do you mean I am not fully objective about capitals. I thought that objectivity mean independent of what you happen to believe. I really do not know what you are talking about. I did not make up the proposition that La Pax is the capital of Ecuador. What on earth do you mean?

I suppose you do not understand the KK principle which is that Kp implies KKp. And that is false.

---------- Post added 02-11-2010 at 08:54 PM ----------



Why should you think that Kp and KKp were logically equivalent? But anyway, I had a different argument. Namely that since you have to know in order to know that you know in the first place, how could you have to know that you know in order to know?

I asked for justification for your premise, asking me for justification for the negation of the premise is not entirely relevant as I am not disagreeing with the premise, only not agreeing (recall that distinction?).

I would have to interpret a lot to get an argument out of what you wrote since you wrote only questions.

1. If you cannot know that you know unless you know, then knowing that you know is not a necessary condition of knowing.
2. You cannnot know that you know unless you know.

Therefore, 3. knowing that you know is not a necessary condition of knowing.

Alright. But going with Ken's definition "I'm wholly in Florida, and oh by the way, I'm also wholly in South Carolina," is a contradiction. (Unless it is possible that they refer to the same object/space. I don't know.)

I think we would call this a contrary, not a contradiction.

A contradiction would arise, for instance, from these two propositions:

A.) I am in South Carolina.
B.) I am not in South Carolina.

Because no one can be both in South Carolina and not in South Carolina at the same time. More importantly, every person is either in South Carolina or not in South Carolina.

With contraries however, there is always a third option. In this case, the two propositions we have are:

A.) I am in Florida.
B.) I am in South Carolina.

But, it is possible that I could be in, for instance, Texas. That is, I could be in neither Florida or South Carolina. Therefore, it is a contrary.

Thanks.

I did actually respond to his post back when the forum was acting up. It's on post number 351.

1. If you cannot know that you know unless you know, then knowing that you know is not a necessary condition of knowing.
2. You cannnot know that you know unless you know.

Therefore, 3. knowing that you know is not a necessary condition of knowing.

I think we would call this a contrary, not a contradiction.

A contradiction would arise, for instance, from these two propositions:

A.) I am in South Carolina.
B.) I am not in South Carolina.

Because no one can be both in South Carolina and not in South Carolina at the same time. More importantly, every person is either in South Carolina or not in South Carolina.

With contraries however, there is always a third option. In this case, the two propositions we have are:

A.) I am in Florida.
B.) I am in South Carolina.

But, it is possible that I could be in, for instance, Texas. That is, I could be in neither Florida or South Carolina. Therefore, it is a contrary.

A: I'm in Florida
B: I'm not in Florida

C: I'm in Florida
D: I'm in South Carolina

A and B (CONTRADICTION): One must be true. One must be false.
C and D (CONTRARY): Neither must be true. Both can be false.

You are saying C and D is a contradiction, but it's not a contradiction, as it's not the case one of the two (C or D) must be true.