@fast,
fast;126749 wrote:Yes, I understand what you pointed out. Thank you. And fine, I'll accept that. But, we still shouldn't call a statement that doesn't imply a contradiction a contradiction.
I don't think he is.
Also, what does "statement" mean? Do you mean sentences or propositions or something in between or something else? I will consider it a synonym for "sentence" in this context.
Quote: The complex statement, "I am in Florida, and I am not in Florida" is a contradictory statement, for the simple statements "I am in Florida" and "I am not in Florida" contradict one another.
It is a contradiction, yes. If you want to call that "contradictory statement", then fine by me.
Quote: The complex statement, "I am in Florida, and I am in South Carolina" is a contrary statement, for the simple statements "I am in Florida" and "I am in South Carolina" are contrary to each other.
The example is wrong. It is possible to be in both and so they (the simple statements, in your terminology) are not contrary. I could stand with one foot on each side of the border. This approach also works with the above. So, some additional clarity would be needed for this example. I propose to add the word "wholly" in the sentence and "at the same time" at the end of the sentence. That way I can see no problems with the example.
I think this term "a contrary" (i.e. a noun) is a peculiarity to you. I have never seen it before in my readings of logicians' works.
Quote: The complex statement, "I know that P, but for all I know, P may be false" can be broken apart into simple statements just as I did in the previous two examples: "I know P" and "P may be false."
I disagree that these are the two parts. The phrase
"P may be false" and "for all I know, P may be false" do not mean the exact same. The latter clearly expresses epistemic possibility but the former is interpretable as something else.
Quote:You said that what implies a contradiction is, itself, a contradiction, so let's see what "I know P" implies to see if it (along with "P may be false") implies a contradiction, for if it does, then the complex statement is, itself, a contradiction.
Knowledge implies truth, so "I know P" implies P is true, but the simple statement "P is true" (an implication of "I know P") and the simple statement, "P may be false" are not contradictory statements, so we have yet to derive the conclusion that the complex sentence is contradictory.
This is correct, but it matters not because of what I wrote just above.
Quote:You, I, nor anyone else should say that we know P unless we have a good reason to think P is true, but be that as it may, it's still not the case that "P may be true" and "P may be false" are contradictory statements, so although the complex statement may not be contradictory, it is contrary-in other words, some implications of the simple sentences derived from the complex statement are contrary to one another.
I do not agree with your ethical evidentialistic (named after
Clifford's ethical evidentialism) thesis "
You, I, nor anyone else should say that we know P unless we have a good reason to think P is true" but let's put that aside for now. Pyrrho would probably want to defend it and I am skeptical.
Your last paragraph seems confused. Ken's definition of contradiction is this and let's call it the broad definition of contradiction:
[INDENT]A proposition (or sentence or statement etc.) of the form P and not-P, or a proposition (or sentence etc.) from which a proposition (or sentence or statement etc.) of the form P and not-P is deducible.
[/INDENT]The one I use is this, the strict definition:
[INDENT]A proposition (or sentence or statement etc.) of the form P and not-P.
[/INDENT]A contradiction is deducible from
"I know that P, but for all I know, P may be false", namely, "I know that P and I do not know that P.".