I know that I know

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fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:04 am
This thread is intended to differentiate between three possible meanings of the phrase, "I know that I know."

Possibility number 1:
Consider Tim the teenager who not only believes he knows where Sally went but also knows as well. When questioned about whether he really knows where she went, he responds, "Oh, but I know that I know!" All he is doing is expressing great confidence in that what he is saying is true.

Possibility number 2:


Possibility number 3:
Consider Phil again. He knows his name, but his philosophizing throughout the years has led him to believe that he really doesn't know his name because he thinks that we can't really know anything. However, although he may not know what knowledge is, we do, so we can recognize that he in fact does know his name even though he denies the obvious fact that he knows his name.

He knows his name, but he doesn't know that he knows his name. Even though he doesn't know that he knows his name, we do know that he knows his name. Hence, we have a justified true belief that he has a justified true belief.

Also, I know my name, but in addition to that, and because I know the necessary conditions of knowledge, not only do I know P (my name), but I also know Q (that I know P), so I know that I know P means not that I know P (although it does imply it), it means that I know that I know my name.

Comments:
So, can we know that we know? Yes, no, and yes, respectively. It all depends on what we mean when we say it. The first has to do with confidence, the second with certainty, and the third with knowledge. We can have the first and last but only in rare instances can we have the one in-between.
 
Emil
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:14 am
@fast,
I always mean the third when I use the phrase.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:22 am
@fast,
How would your second possibility differ from your third?

If Phil says, "I do not know that I know my name", even though we knew he did, what does this have to do with knowledge any more than when Phil says, "Yeah, we all say that we know, but we really don't know because we don't know that we know". It seems to me he is speaking about certainty in both cases. In the former, he is just speaking about something specific (his name), and in the latter he is speaking generally.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:37 am
@fast,
fast;110169 wrote:

Also, I know my name, but in addition to that, and because I know the necessary conditions of knowledge, not only do I know P (my name), but I also know Q (that I know P), so I know that I know P means not that I know P (although it does imply it), it means that I know that I know my name.

Comments:
So, can we know that we know? Yes, no, and yes, respectively. It all depends on what we mean when we say it. The first has to do with confidence, the second with certainty, and the third with knowledge. We can have the first and last but only in rare instances can we have the one in-between.


If by knowing the necessary conditions of knowledge you mean that you know that TJB is necessary for knowledge, why would it follow that you know you know? And, if you mean by knowing the necessary conditions of knowledge that you satisfy those conditions, why would knowing you satisfy the necessary conditions of knowledge mean you know you know?

I don't get the argument. Or I must be missing something.

When I say that I know I know, I always mean something like, "Of course I know". "I am in a position to know". "How could I not know such a thing?"
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:43 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;110173 wrote:
How would your second possibility differ from your third?

If Phil says, "I do not know that I know my name", even though we knew he did, what does this have to do with knowledge any more than when Phil says, "Yeah, we all say that we know, but we really don't know because we don't know that we know". It seems to me he is speaking about certainty in both cases. In the former, he is just speaking about something specific (his name), and in the latter he is speaking generally.

If I say, "I know that I know my name" and am confusing knowledge with certainty, then chances are, I am using it in the second sense.

If, however, I say the same thing and am not confusing knowledge with certainty, then chances are, I am using it in the third sense.

In the second sense, I am saying that I am certain, and as you should know, that is false.

In the third sense, I am saying that not only do I know, but I know that I know, meaning not that I am certain but rather that I know S where S is I know P.
 
Emil
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:45 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;110176 wrote:
If by knowing the necessary conditions of knowledge you mean that you know that TJB is necessary for knowledge, why would it follow that you know you know? And, if you mean by knowing the necessary conditions of knowledge that you satisfy those conditions, why would knowing you satisfy the necessary conditions of knowledge mean you know you know?

I don't get the argument. Or I must be missing something.

When I say that I know I know, I always mean something like, "Of course I know". "I am in a position to know". "How could I not know such a thing?"


Maybe that's what you mean, but that's not what is literally meant by the phrase.
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:47 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;110176 wrote:
If by knowing the necessary conditions of knowledge you mean that you know that TJB is necessary for knowledge, why would it follow that you know you know? And, if you mean by knowing the necessary conditions of knowledge that you satisfy those conditions, why would knowing you satisfy the necessary conditions of knowledge mean you know you know?

I don't get the argument. Or I must be missing something.

When I say that I know I know, I always mean something like, "Of course I know". "I am in a position to know". "How could I not know such a thing?"

If I know what the capital of Equador is (P) but don't know what knowledge is, then I know P, and I do not know that I know P.

If I know what the capital of Equador is and do know what knowledge is, then not only do I know P, but I also know that I know P.
 
Emil
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:49 am
@fast,
fast;110181 wrote:
If I know what the capital of Equador is (P) but don't know what knowledge is, then I know P, and I do not know that I know P.

If I know what the capital of Equador is and do know what knowledge is, then not only do I know P, but I also know that I know P.


We went over this before, he must have forgotten.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:49 am
@fast,
fast wrote:

If I know what the capital of Equador is (P) but don't know what knowledge is, then I know P, and I do not know that I know P.


You can know that you know P without knowing what knowledge is.
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:50 am
@fast,
If I do know what knowledge is but don't know P, then I neither know P nor know that I know P.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:51 am
@fast,
fast;110184 wrote:
If I do know what knowledge is but don't know P, then I do neither know P nor know that I know P.


Knowing what knowledge is, is a different matter. If you don't know P, it would be implied that you do not know that you know P (because in order to know that you know P, you must know P). But what does this have to do with knowing what knowledge is?
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:54 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;110183 wrote:
You can know that you know P without knowing what knowledge is.
I don't think so.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:55 am
@fast,
fast;110186 wrote:
I don't think so.


My knowing something, and my understanding of knowledge, are two different things. People that don't understand what knowledge is still know. And they can still know that they know (because knowing that you know is still just knowing something - in this case, what you know).
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:57 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;110185 wrote:
Knowing what knowledge is, is a different matter. If you don't know P, it would be implied that you do not know that you know P (because in order to know that you know P, you must know P). But what does this have to do with knowing what knowledge is?

It has to do with the fact the subject has changed. We're no longer concerned about whether or not you know P, so long as you do.

The issue is S (not P.) What I want to know is whether or not you know S. S is "I know P." How could you know that unless you know what knowledge is? P distracts us from the real issue.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:57 am
@Emil,
Emil;110179 wrote:
Maybe that's what you mean, but that's not what is literally meant by the phrase.


What you mean by "literally", I suppose, is that it means, I know that the sufficient conditions of my knowing are satisfied (and not only that they are satisfied). I suppose I can also believe that I know, i.e. believe that TJB are sufficient conditions of knowing, and that they are satisfied.

I bet no one ever means that, though. Just as a person may say to another, "you are the biggest idiot in the world", but no one means that literally.
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 10:59 am
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;110188 wrote:
My knowing something, and my understanding of knowledge, are two different things. People that don't understand what knowledge is still know. And they can still know that they know (because knowing that you know is still just knowing something - in this case, what you know).

Knowing you know implies you know, but knowing doesn't imply that you know that you know. I think both Emil and Kennethamy agree with that.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 11:01 am
@fast,
fast wrote:

The issue is S (not P.) What I want to know is whether or not you know S. S is "I know P." How could you know that unless you know what knowledge is? P distracts us from the real issue.


I know S (I know that - I know P)

I know P (I know that - P)

Both are still knowing something. And can't you know regardless of your understanding of knowledge?

Quote:

Knowing you know implies you know, but knowing doesn't imply that you know that you know. I think both Emil and Kennethamy agree with that.


I also agree with that. What makes you think I don't (if you do in fact think I don't)?
 
fast
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 11:01 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;110190 wrote:
What you mean by "literally", I suppose, is that it means, I know that the sufficient conditions of my knowing are satisfied (and not only that they are satisfied). I suppose I can also believe that I know, i.e. believe that TJB are sufficient conditions of knowing, and that they are satisfied.

I bet no one ever means that, though. Just as a person may say to another, "you are the biggest idiot in the world", but no one means that literally.

That would be possibility number 2 from the OP; not the third.

---------- Post added 12-11-2009 at 12:03 PM ----------

Zetherin;110192 wrote:
And can't you know regardless of your understanding of knowledge?
You don't have to know you know to know. I agree.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 11:05 am
@fast,
fast wrote:
You don't have to know you know to know. I agree.

And you may not know that you know S (you know that you know P).

Is that possible?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Fri 11 Dec, 2009 11:09 am
@fast,
fast;110191 wrote:
Knowing you know implies you know, but knowing doesn't imply that you know that you know. I think both Emil and Kennethamy agree with that.


Of course. Since, you cannot know you know unless you first know.
 
 

 
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