I know that I know

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111564 wrote:

But keep in mind I am not talking about articulating that I know that I know something. I am talking about knowing that I know something. And, of course, I can know without my articulation thereof.

So, nothing you said would apply here. It would begin to apply when we speak of a student who is trying to express they know that they know something, but this is not what I was referring to.

Two things. Firstly, if I was correct in taking you to think that knowing can be seen as a dispositional mental state, I don't see how you could come up with a formulation of this without involving articulation in some way. "S knows P iff he were to be asked the truth value of P, he would give a correct and appropriately justified answer." After all, when we talk about dispositional mental states we are talking about dispositions to behave in certain ways.

More important than the above is what it is possible to believe, and what it is possible to believe with justification in general. Beliefs are propositional attitudes, attitudes that certain propositions are true; it seems to me that if one had never heard of the word know, or heard it in use before, one would not know the syntactic rules governing it's use. 'Know' might be a proper name for all you know, so the only attitude you could adopt to a proposition in the form of "I know P", is an attitude of confusion as to whether it is a proposition or not; it may have the same syntactic form as "I Santa Clause P", which is not a proposition, or even a sentence.

Perhaps you might deduce, after a few circumstances of hearing its use that a statement in the form "I know P" is a declarative sentence that is true or false, but still you have no idea of the semantics of the language that would furnish us with the statement's truth conditions. If one is to know that one knows something then one must believe a statement in the form of "I know P", it must be true, and one must be justified in believing it. Now how can you possible be justified in believing such a statement if you don't even know the conditions under which it is true? Any attitude you take towards the truth or falsehood of "I know P" would be completely arbitrary. You need at least some guide for the use of 'know' in order to justify your use of it, the most simple I can think of is if a philosophy professor (whose research is in epistemology) tells a fresh faced student who has never studied philosophy before, "You know that there is no King of France." Here, the professor has furnished his student with a new semantic rule: "A statement in the form of 'I know P' is true when P is the proposition 'There is no King of France'".

@fast,

mickalos wrote:

More importantly than the above, is what it is possible to believe, and believe with justification, in general. Belief is a propositional attitude, attitudes that a certain propositions are true; it seems to me that if one had never heard of the word know, or heard it in use before, one would not know the syntactic rules governing it's use. 'Know' might be a proper name for all you know, so the only attitude you could adopt to a proposition in the form of "I know that I know P", is an attitude of confusion as to whether it is a proposition or not; it may have the same syntactic form as "I Santa Clause that I Santa Clause P", which is not a proposition, or even a sentence.

I could still know without knowing that I knew. I can know without knowing the word "know". I can know without knowing the syntactic rules governing the term's use. I can know without knowing what the conditions for knowledge are. I could even be fulfilling all the necessary conditions, and not even know.

Quote:

If one is to know that one knows something then one must believe a statement in the form of "I know P", it must be true, and one must be justified in believing it.

I don't have to believe any statements to know that I know something. None at all.

Quote:

Any attitude you take towards the truth or falshood of "I know P" would be completely arbitrary. You need at least some guide for the use of 'know' in order to justify your use of it, the most simple I can think of is if a philosophy professor (whose research is in epistemology) tells a fresh faced student who has never studied philosophy before, "You know that there is no King of France." Here, the professor has furnished his student with a new semantic rule: "A statement in the form of 'I know P' is true when P is the proposition 'There is no King of France'".

This is true. And if I were talking about using the term in a statement, this would be relevant. But I am not, and so it's not. Once again, I am talking about knowing, not using the term "knowing" in a statement.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111606 wrote:

I could still know without knowing that I knew. I can know without knowing the word "know". I can know without knowing the syntactic rules governing the term's use. I can know without knowing what the conditions for knowledge are. I could even be fulfilling all the necessary conditions, and not even know.

I amended that paragraph as you were posting, there wasn't supposed to be any iteration in it. I agree with you, my objection is that you cannot know that you know without knowing anything about the word "know" or it's synonyms.

Quote:

I don't have to believe any statements to know that I know something. None at all.

Oh yes you do! You have to believe a statement in the form of "I know P". If one is to know any statement, and statements are the only things which we may be said to know (in this sense), one must believe it.

Quote:

This is true. And if I were talking about using the term in a statement, this would be relevant. But I am not, and so it's not. Once again, I am talking about knowing, not using the term "knowing" in a statement.

I'm not talking about using the term 'knowing' in a statement either, I am talking about attitudes towards statements containing the term 'know' or anything synonymous with it, which is entirely relevant. I don't think I was entirely clear, to rephrase the important sentence in that paragraph: at the very least, you need some understanding of how 'know' may be correctly used in order to justify any belief in a statement containing the word 'know'. Without any such understanding, any attitude (including belief) you take towards an "I know ..." proposition is entirely arbitrary because how a statement is correctly used what lets us know the conditions under which such a statement is true or false.

I think it is fairly obvious that these are the kind of propositions involved in iterated knowledge. If K(p) is true, then p is the thing that is believed, etc.. If K(K(p)) is true, then K(p) is the thing that is believed, etc..

@fast,

mickalos wrote:

Oh yes you do! You have to believe a statement in the form of "I know P". If one is to know any statement, and statements are the only things which we may be said to know (in this sense), one must believe it.

Statements are not the only things which can be known. I don't know why you think this. I am not talking about knowing statements, and I don't understand why you think I am.

Quote:

at the very least, you need some understanding of how 'know' may be correctly used in order to justify any belief in a statement containing the word 'know'.

But who's talking about statements containing the word "know"? Not me! I'm talking about knowing that I know.

@Zetherin,

[QUOTE=Zetherin;111598]I'm not aware that I avoided your question. I am not one to avoid things, even if I am incorrect in my response (ignoring reason makes me sick). So, I will reread your question, and then attempt to respond appropriately again.[/QUOTE]
Oh goodness. I hope you didn't think I was being aggressive. I get a little anxious sometimes, and I admit my tone sometimes comes across as atrocious, but I certainly didn't mean to be negative at all. I'm just trying to stay focused and was remiss (is that the right word?) to take great care to say what I did.

[QUOTE]I never said that was plausible. What I did say is that you could still know that a cat exists (that is, you could still see the creature), without knowing of the word "cat".[/QUOTE]I'm generally not one to mistake a term for the referent of a term (well, sometimes maybe). I don't see that I should say, "I know that cats are mammals" unless I know what a cat is. If you see a creature and know that it's a mammal but don't know that the creature is a cat, then I don't suspect you'll be saying that you know cats are mammals, nor do I think it would be true that you know cats are mammals if you don't know what a cat is. This brings to mind the idea where one might say: "I knew it but didn't know it," and that seems to me a contradiction. This seems to me to be an instance where what something is called matters because unless you know what a cat is, you're not going to be holding the belief that cats are mammals, let alone have knowledge that cats are mammals. I may need to rethink this and word it differently.

Crap. Now that I think about it more, you do know that the creature that so happens to be the referent of the term, "cat", namely a cat is a mammal. And, if asked, you'll likely say that you don't know what a cat is, but then again, (as I rack my brain even more) you do know what a cat is but simply don't know what it's called. (I think)

It's getting late and I don't know what parts to delete.

[QUOTE]Just as I could know that a plant exists beside me, but not know that it is an elm tree. I may not know what an object is, but I can still know it is an object - I know that it is something. [/QUOTE]Well, I can agree with you on that. That comes across as perfectly reasonable.

Ewe, reason, yuck. Very Happy

[QUOTE]But I am also looking for a good reason for you to think that you need to know what knowledge is to know that you know.[/QUOTE]Faced with so much opposition, I'm rethinking my position, but before I relent, I'm trying to get to the heart of why I think what I do. That's why I've reverted back to the basics of "I know P" instead of the more complicated, "I know that I know P." I'm figuring that if I can in fact know that a cat is a mammal yet not know what a cat or mammal is, then I may as well give up on thinking that I need to know what knowledge is in the more complicated phrase.

[QUOTE]That seems clearly false to me. I even have personal experience. Years ago I used to know that I knew things, but I could not remember them on tests sometimes. [/QUOTE]We know things that we cannot sometimes recall.

[QUOTE]And besides my having known in the past, I had no other justification for this - I had never delved into any philosophical discussion on knowing.[/QUOTE]Well, you thought you knew things, and maybe you did know things, but that doesn't mean you knew that you knew things. If you didn't know the things, then you most certainly didn't know you knew things, but now that you know what it means to say you know something (and are not mistaken about it), then you know that you knew--as opposed to merely believing you knew things. And yes, I know that you disagree, but don't worry, I might disagree with me soon too. Smile

@fast,

fast wrote:

Oh goodness. I hope you didn't think I was being aggressive. I get a little anxious sometimes, and I admit my tone sometimes comes across as atrocious, but I certainly didn't mean to be negative at all. I'm just trying to stay focused and was remiss (is that the right word?) to take great care to say what I did.

Oh, no, I didn't interpret you negatively at all! Sorry, I know it's tough to interpret tone through text!

Quote:

I'm figuring that if I can in fact know that a cat is a mammal yet not know what a cat or mammal is, then I may as well give up on thinking that I need to know what knowledge is in the more complicated phrase.

You can know that a creature exists and that it has traits, but you will not know that that creature is called a cat nor that those general traits make up the class we call mammal, unless you know what a cat or a mammal is. But you would still be seeing a cat, and you would still be seeing a mammal - you just wouldn't know that you were seeing a cat, or that you were seeing a mammal.

Quote:

If you didn't know the things, then you most certainly didn't know you knew things, but now that you know what it means to say you know something (and are not mistaken about it), then you know that you knew--as opposed to merely believing you knew things.

I know I knew the things, because shortly after the test I remembered. And, all along, I knew that I knew that thing, which is why I was so frustrated whilst taking the test. And I did all this, including getting frustrated Smile

, without any sort of detailed understanding of what knowledge is.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111617 wrote:

Statements are not the only things which can be known. I don't know why you think this. I am not talking about knowing statements, and I don't understand why you think I am.

But who's talking about statements containing the word "know"? Not me! I'm talking about knowing that I know.

You are clearly mistaken. What do I know that is not a proposition? Not objects. When I say "I know a chair" or "I know Gilbert Ryle", I am saying that I am acquainted with a chair or Gilbert Ryle. When I say, "I know there is no King of France", I am not saying "I am acquainted with there is no King of France". Do I know how to play chess? Yes, in the sense that I understand the rules of the game, and if put in certain chess-situations I would take appropriate action. No if you mean, do I believe 'how to play chess', am I justified in believing it, and is it true. If I I know that I know Gilbert Ryle, I merely know that I am acquainted with Gilbert Ryle, it is first degree knowledge.

Am I wrong in thinking that you are mistaking other senses of the word 'know' for the sense we are interested in in epistemology? Can you offer me a counter-example to my claim that statements are the things I know?

@fast,

mickalos wrote:

What do I know that is not a proposition?

You can know something and write it out as a proposition, and you can also know a proposition. But what I know need not be written out as a proposition. I need not articulate what I know in language, is what I mean.

Quote:

Am I wrong in thinking that you are mistaking other senses of the word 'know' for the sense we are interested in in epistemology?

What "sense" do you think I'm using here?

Quote:

Can you offer me a counter-example to my claim that statements are not the things I know?

Your claim is that statements are not the things I know? I thought you were claiming that statements are what we know? Didn't you just say this:

Quote:

What do I know that is not a proposition?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111598 wrote:

His knowing the cat is a mammal is not dependent on his knowing the relevant criteria for knowledge. He may not know that he knows, but that does not mean he doesn't know.

I agree. But I was talking about whether he knows that he knows.

Zetherin;111598 wrote:

What exactly do you think has to be justified in, "I know that I know what P is"? You think the second "I know" has to be justified? That is, I must justify that I have the capacity to know?

"I know that I know what P is" means "I have a justified true belief that I have a justified true belief about what P is". And in my example in post #99, X does not have any belief that he has a justified true belief about P; he only believes he has a true belief about P. He has not considered whether his belief about P is justified (although in fact it is), and is therefore not justified in believing that he knows. So, he knows that cats are mammals, but does not know that he knows it.

@ACB,

ACB;111658 wrote:

"I know that I know what P is" means "I have a justified true belief that I have a justified true belief about what P is". And in my example in post #99, X does not have any belief that he has a justified true belief about P; he only believes he has a true belief about P. He has not considered whether his belief about P is justified (although in fact it is), and is therefore not justified in believing that he knows. So, he knows that cats are mammals, but does not know that he knows it.

One not need consider whether their belief is justified to have a justified belief. How do you think it is that people can know without knowing that they know? It is because people can have a justified, true belief without even knowing they have a justified, true belief. Just because I don't know what my justification is, doesn't mean I don't have any.

I may have misunderstood you. You italicized some words, and I do not know why you italicized them (the emphasis could allow my understanding).

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111637 wrote:

You can know something and write it out as a proposition, and you can also know a proposition. But what I know need not be written out as a proposition. I need not articulate what I know in language, is what I mean.

What "sense" do you think I'm using here?

As it turns out you are using 'know' in a perfectly proper philosophical sense, but not 'proposition'. You can write something that is known out as a sentence

Quote:

Your claim is that statements are not the things I know? I thought you were claiming that statements are what we know? Didn't you just say this:

I really should proof read more carefully. Anyway, it should be clear from the above that I am saying that statements, or propositions, are the things we know.

@Zetherin,

[QUOTE=Zetherin;111632]You can know that a creature exists and that it has traits, but you will not know that that creature is called a cat nor that those general traits make up the class we call mammal, unless you know what a cat or a mammal is. But you would still be seeing a cat, and you would still be seeing a mammal - you just wouldn't know that you were seeing a cat, or that you were seeing a mammal.[/QUOTE]You're telling me that I can know that a creature exists, and I agree with that, but I'm still not sure why that is applicable, but I'll work with it. Let's try another (yet simpler still) proposition, "Zetherin believes that he sees a cat." By the way, I'm not changing propositions for the sake of changing them. I'm trying to hone in on something.

Suppose you clearly see a cat but do not know what a cat is. In other words, you clearly see a creature that is the referent to the term, "cat," but you do not have a justified true belief about what a cat is. Do you or do you not believe the proposition is true?

If the answer is no, then you do not believe you see a cat, and if you don't believe you see a cat, then you don't know you see a cat. In this scenario, the truth or falsity hinges on whether you know what a cat is, for if you know what a cat is and see a cat, then you're gonna believe you see a cat, and if the true belief is justified and barring Gettier type exception, you'll know you see a cat if you know what a cat is.

If I can make what I'm trying to do stick, then I ought to eventually be able to make it stick with the original prior complicated proposition about, "I know that I know Quito is the capital of Ecuador." In this case, you would need to know what knowledge is, what Quito is, what a capital is, and what Ecuador is in order to know that you know. In order to merely know, you don't need to know what knowledge is, but you would still need to know what the others are.

Also, back to something I mentioned earlier (and most of this you agree with): K1 doesn't imply K2, but K2 does imply K1. Also, K5 implies K1 through K4. Also, K4 implies K1 through K3. Also, K3 implies both K1 and K2. And of course, K2 implies K1. You agree with all that.

However, what I eluded to at the time was that although K1 doesn't imply K2, K2 does imply K3, and K3 implies K4 just as K33 implies K34. This is something you unlikely agree with, but the reason for my belief that it's true is because no other variables are added. Once you know what knowledge is, you need no further justification because S includes nothing beyond P and knowledge. In other words, if you know that you know, then you also know that you know that you know. I've only met one other person that has agreed with me on this (not that agreement matters much), and I figure you nor Kennethamy or Emil is going to agree with me either until I manage to make a better case for it. Oh well; I just thought I'd clear up what I meant earlier.

---------- Post added 12-15-2009 at 11:59 PM ----------

mickalos;111709 wrote:

I really should proof read more carefully. Anyway, it should be clear from the above that I am saying that statements, or propositions, are the things we know.

My three cents:

Three kinds of knowledge:
1) Propositional knowledge--which is what we're discussing
2) Knowing a place or a person --which is not what we're discussing
3) Knowing how to do something --which is not what we're discussion

@fast,

mickalos wrote:

As it turns out you are using 'know' in a perfectly proper philosophical sense, but not 'proposition'.

A proposition, in a philosophical sense, is a sentence which expresses truth or falsity.

Quote:

You can write something that is known out as a sentence, but I am not claiming that sentences can be known, a sentence is the sort of thing that we may be acquainted with.

If you mean that I cannot know the concept of the sentence, that doesn't make any sense to me. What sentences are, I can surely know.

Quote:

Well, it would be very important that you have an understanding of each language, as you may inadvertently be expressing two different propositions.

Quote:

If I ask you if snow is white, you would respond with, "Yes, I know the proposition that snow is white"? That seems incredibly odd to me. You don't think you know that snow is white, only that the proposition "snow is white" is true? Well, I guess I know more than you in this regard, as I know that snow is white (not just that the proposition "snow is white" is true).

Quote:

Propositions, or statements, are more like referents of sentences, rather than something you can write down.

In philosophy, propositions are the sentences doing the referring (the truth-bearers!). The referents are the things the proposition refers to. Like snow.

Quote:

They are things that are the case,

No. A chair is a chair independent of the proposition, "My chair is green". Propositions express truth or falsity, but they are clearly not the thing they are expressing truth or falsity about. You are confusing the matter.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;111716 wrote:

A proposition, in a philosophical sense, is a sentence which expresses truth or falsity.
...
In philosophy, propositions are the sentences doing the referring (the truth-bearers!). The referents are the things the proposition refers to. Like snow.

"The present King of France is bald" is a sentence, it was the same sentence when it was uttered in 1685 as it is when it is uttered today. However, when uttered in 1685 it expressed the same proposition that the sentence "Louis XIV was bald in 1685" expresses when uttered today. When uttered in 1790, it expressed the same proposition as the sentence "Louis XVI was bald in 1790" expresses when uttered today (a different proposition to the one about Louis XIV, obviously). When uttered today, it doesn't express a proposition because it fails to refer to anything. The sentence "My chair is green" can be used to express innumerable propositions about as many different chairs as there are people with chairs. What does this tell us? Well firstly it tells us that sentences are not truth bearers, truth is a property of the use of a sentence. More importantly, a single sentence may be used to express many different propositions. Therefore, clearly propositions are something entirely different from the sentences used to express them, which is what the fact that German sentences express the same propositions as English ones is supposed to show us in fewer words. Like referents of sentences (not actual referents, although I believe that was Russell's position at least at one point). In short, sentences are what we utter, propositions are what is said. There's no reason we might not express propositions through pictures, in fact, Wittgenstein suggests that in order to grasp the essential nature of the proposition we should consider hieroglyphs. 'A logical picture of facts.'

Quote:

If you mean that I cannot know the concept of the sentence, that doesn't make any sense to me. What sentences are, I can surely know.

I mean that the sentence "The present King of France is bald" isn't the type of thing that can be said to be known, except in the sense of saying that we are acquainted with that particular string of words. The type of thing that can be said to be known, for example, the proposition expressed by the sentence, "The present King of France is bald", when it was uttered in 870AD when Charles II (also known as Charles the bald) was King of France.

Quote:

No. A chair is a chair independent of the proposition, "My chair is green". Propositions express truth or falsity, but they are clearly not the thing they are expressing truth or falsity about. You are confusing the matter.

"They are things that are the case, and things that are not the case". Propositions are things that are true, and things that are not true. I'm not trying to say that a literal green chair is a proposition. Quite absurd to suggest so.

Back to the issue, if you think that propositions are truth bearers, surely you must agree that propositions are the things that are known (the type of thing that may be known, or the objects of our knowledge, whatever you prefer). Truth is a necessary condition for knowledge, that is, only things that are true can be known; if propositions are the truth-bearers, then, necessarily, they are the only things that can be known (because they are the only things that are true).

Quote:

If I ask you if snow is white, you would respond with, "Yes, I know the proposition that snow is white"? That seems incredibly odd to me. You don't think you know that snow is white, only that the proposition "snow is white" is true? Well, I guess I know more than you in this regard, as I know that snow is white (not just that the proposition "snow is white" is true).

What exactly do you think the difference is between knowing that snow is white, and knowing that the proposition, snow is white, is true? Here you seem to be suggesting that what you know is something somehow more primary than propositions, and I'm not really sure what that is supposed to be.

@fast,

mickalos wrote:

Back to the issue, if you think that propositions are truth bearers, surely you must agree that propositions are the things that are known (the type of thing that may be known, or the objects of our knowledge, whatever you prefer). Truth is a necessary condition for knowledge, that is, only things that are true can be known; if propositions are the truth-bearers, then, necessarily, they are the only things that can be known (because they are the only things that are true).

I have always considered propositions to be sentences which expressed truth or falsity. Suppose I knew that snow was white, but never wrote out the proposition, "Snow is white". I have a true, justified belief, but I have never written out a proposition; I have never expressed the truth in language. You are saying that the true belief, in my mind, is actually the proposition?

In the end, I think you are correct and I am incorrect about this matter. I now consider it fair why you would consider a proposition to also be a thought (which expresses truth or falsity). I have just never looked at the matter this way. Thank you.

@fast,

fast;111710 wrote:

You're telling me that I can know that a creature exists, and I agree with that, but I'm still not sure why that is applicable, but I'll work with it. Let's try another (yet simpler still) proposition, "Zetherin believes that he sees a cat." By the way, I'm not changing propositions for the sake of changing them. I'm trying to hone in on something.

Suppose you clearly see a cat but do not know what a cat is. In other words, you clearly see a creature that is the referent to the term, "cat," but you do not have a justified true belief about what a cat is. Do you or do you not believe the proposition is true?

I think we should distinguish between:

1. A sees a cat.
2. A sees that C is a cat.

There is a difference between seeing and seeing that. Seeing that is propositional seeing. To believe that I am seeing a cat is to believe that a proposition is true. And, to do that, I must know what the proposition means, and so, I must know what a cat is. I must be able to recognize cats. But for it to be true only that I see a cat, I need not believe that I am seeing a cat, not have any idea what a cat is. A radiologist may show we a lesion on an X-ray. Unless the radiologist tells me it is a lesion, I do not know that I am seeing a lesion, but I am seeing a lesion, nevertheless.

@fast,

fast wrote:

If I can make what I'm trying to do stick, then I ought to eventually be able to make it stick with the original prior complicated proposition about, "I know that I know Quito is the capital of Ecuador." In this case, you would need to know what knowledge is, what Quito is, what a capital is, and what Ecuador is in order to know that you know. In order to merely know, you don't need to know what knowledge is, but you would still need to know what the others are.

You don't have to keep reiterating this. I understand what you are saying. Don't think I'm missing something, I'm not Smile

I still stand that you can know that you know something without knowing first what knowledge is. In, "I know that I know Quito is the capital of Ecuador", I am not saying that I have an understanding of knowledge. I am simply saying that I know that I know Quito is the capital of Ecuador. If I said, "I know that I know what knowledge is and that Quito is the capital of Ecuador", I would have to know what knowledge is. But, I am not saying that I know what knowledge is in, "I know that I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador". What I'm expressing is the truth that I know, not that I know what knowledge is.

And what if I have an inaccurate understanding of knowledge? This would render me incapable of knowing that I know? My understanding of knowledge doesn't change my capacity to know in any way; I cannot know more things simply because I know what knowledge is, nor will I lose the ability to know things because I don't know what knowledge is.

@Zetherin,

I agree with mickalos about propositions. Now, to return to your earlier point:

Zetherin;111659 wrote:

One not need consider whether their belief is justified to have a justified belief. How do you think it is that people can know without knowing that they know? It is because people can have a justified, true belief without even knowing they have a justified, true belief. Just because I don't know what my justification is, doesn't mean I don't have any.

I may have misunderstood you. You italicized some words, and I do not know why you italicized them (the emphasis could allow my understanding).

I think you did misunderstand me. What I am saying is that X has a justified (and true) belief that cats are mammals, but he has an unjustified (albeit true) belief that he knows that cats are mammals. Therefore, although he does indeed know that cats are mammals, he does not know that he knows. (Remember that this thread is primarily about "knowing that one knows".) Have another read over my earlier posts to see my detailed reasoning. I will try to clarify further if you wish.

@fast,

ACB wrote:

I think you did misunderstand me. What I am saying is that X has a justified (and true) belief that cats are mammals, but he has an unjustified (albeit true) belief that he knows that cats are mammals.

If his belief that he knew that he knew was unjustified, then he did not know that he knew.

But this does not mean that he couldn't have a belief that he knew that he knew and that it was justified. I'm saying this is possible, and it happens quite often.

So, what is your point? Just to tell me it's possible that one can have an unjustifed belief?

Quote:

I agree with mickalos about propositions.

I think I also agree with mickalos.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;111765 wrote:

I think we should distinguish between:

1. A sees a cat.
2. A sees that C is a cat.

In the first instance, A sees a cat, and that is so even if A doesn't know what a cat is.

In the second instance, A sees that the creature is a cat, so A does know what a cat is.

How do we apply this distinction to knowledge?

1. A knows that A sees a cat. A need not know what knowledge is.
2. A knows that A knows that A sees a cat. ???

I guess you know what I'm trying to do and where this is going, and if you think it's a dead end and that I should stop pursuing it, I will. I just didn't want to drop it until I was sure I wasn't being misunderstood.

Yes, I know there's a difference between agreement and understanding, but sometimes disagreement is a consequence of misunderstanding.

kennethamy wrote:

There is a difference between seeing and seeing that. Seeing that is propositional seeing. To believe that I am seeing a cat is to believe that a proposition is true. And, to do that, I must know what the proposition means, and so, I must know what a cat is. I must be able to recognize cats. But for it to be true only that I see a cat, I need not believe that I am seeing a cat, not have any idea what a cat is. A radiologist may show we a lesion on an X-ray. Unless the radiologist tells me it is a lesion, I do not know that I am seeing a lesion, but I am seeing a lesion, nevertheless.

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