"I know many things about which I am not certain." Then by your own definitions you don't know them! For you can't know something that is false, and since you are not certain, you do not know.

That is my point, and as far as saying knowledge and belief are synonymous, I mean it in the sense that if the theory of "knowledge" is really just a theory of belief claiming connection to truth, then the WORDS knowledge and belief are synonymous in that sense.

I understand they are meant to mean different things, but I think you are jumping between them when defining knowledge.

Perhaps I'm only looking at it pragmatically, that if we can't know truth, then what's the point in having a theory of knowledge, which is dependent on truth, instead of calling it what it would be, a theory of belief?

But why does my knowing something about which I am not certain imply that I know something that is false?

Of course we can know what is true, since if it is not true, we cannot know it.

That is not what I'm implying... I'm saying you can't know something without being certain, because without being certain something you claim to know could be false.

I think we can only believe we know what is true, because to say anything further than that would be to claim to be god and to claim you "know" you are god (thus coming up with the same problem as before).

That what I claim to know could be false does not mean it is false. And I don't know if what I claim to know is false. But that does not mean that if what I claim to know could be false I don't know. After all, if what I claim to know could be false, and if it is false, then I don't know; still, what I claim to know could be true, and if it is true, then I do know. It isn't playing fair to argue that since what I claim to know could be false, I don't know, and forget that what I claim to know could (also) be true, and therefore, could be true.

It is a necessary condition of my knowing that what I claim to know is not false. It is not a necessary condition of my knowing that what I claim to know could not be false.

It is fair because I think there is a useful distinction between believing something that happens to be true and knowing something. The way you've talked so far about knowledge is from a third-person viewpoint, that is not from the individual who is claiming knowledge. It is easy from a third-person viewpoint to not care about certainty, but as far as the individual making the claim is concerned, I think you have to be certain in order to have knowledge. Otherwise you have a belief that may happen to be true... and that is not useful since we can not confirm it's truth value. That's why the distinction is valid in my opinion.

Maybe it would make more sense if I turn it around. You're saying it is not "fair" to claim you know something that later turns out false, but you are saying it is fair to claim you know something that could later turn out true...

In my opinion that's a double standard, and unless knowledge claims can be somehow founded on objectivity, there is no justification for making the claims at all, whether they are true or false.

Consider an example. I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. And it is the capital of Ecuador. Are you telling me that even if it is the capital, that because it could (might) not have been the capital, that I do not know it is the capital?

I did not say that it is not fair to claim you know something that could later turn out to be false. I said it is not fair to claim to know something that you have tons of evidence for, and that is true, just because it might be false.

Think of this dialogue:

Teacher: "Who knows what the capital of Ecuador is?"
Student: "I do".
Teacher: "All right, Mary. What is the capital?"
Student: "Quito"
Teacher: "Wrong!"
Student: "Why am I wrong? Isn't Quito the capital of Ecuador?"
Teacher: "Yes, Quito is the capital of Ecuador, but you claimed to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, and that is wrong".
Student: "What do you mean?"
Teacher: "Well, you see, Quito could not have been the capital of Ecuador, so when you claimed to know it was, you were wrong!"
Student: "You mean that I have all that evidence that Quito is the capital, and Quito is the capital, but that because it could not have been the capital, I am wrong to claim I know it is the capital?"
Teacher: "Yes, that's what I mean".
Student: "Goodbye. You are crazy!"

In order to discuss the disagreement in our definitions, I think a place to start would be if you addressed my post that said something like:
there is a meaningful distinction between having a belief which happens to be true and knowing something to be true.

Of course there is a distinction between a true belief and knowledge. Plato makes that distinction in his Theatetus, and in his, Meno. A lucky guess is a true belief, but it is not knowledge. I certainly am not denying that. Knowledge is, at least, true belief with (as Plato put it, logos). Or as it is now put, justified true belief.

Ok, but that is purely an semantical argument. I can say I know that I know that two is equal to two and make just as much sense. Things we define are no doubt "knowable" by definition, but beyond that there is no certainty, that is what I was trying to say.

I mean it seems more useful to me to say we can not be certain of what is true, therefore we should find another foundation

I don't know what you're getting at. Are you saying we can't know things? If so, can you be more precise as to why you think this?

And the levels of certainty obviously vary. For instance, I am very certain about what my name is, but I am not certain at all who is going to play in the SuperBowl (though I think I know the teams that are).



But we can be certain about what is true. I suppose, though, you mean we cannot be absolutely certain - that is, we cannot be infallible. And that is true, we are fallible. But our fallibility does mean we can't know the truth. And, by the way, certainty is another matter entirely. We can, for instance, know things without being certain at all. Being certain isn't a prerequisite for our knowing. We can know no matter the level of certainty we have, can't we (of course, we have to believe X, so that may be argued as a step in certainty)?

Where would we be then? In the same spot we're in now... I simply don't think Cartesian knowledge is possible and that if "theory of knowledge" implies some connection to truth then we're off on the wrong foot from the get go.



What I'm saying is that knowledge and belief seem to be synonymous unless one can distinguish that knowledge has the truth behind it while a belief does not.



Ok, but that is purely an semantical argument. I can say I know that I know that two is equal to two and make just as much sense. Things we define are no doubt "knowable" by definition, but beyond that there is no certainty, that is what I was trying to say.

Yes, but justified beliefs can still be wrong, and that is why I think "theory of knowledge" is really just a glorified theory of belief... because unless someone can be objective, the theory lacks a way to distinguish the truth claimed in a JTB stance.

What I mean is that a theory of knowledge, if pinned directly to truth, is only useful to an objective observer, because by definition they would be able to tell what is true...

Do you see what I'm getting at?... I hope I'm not missing something, but if I am I need you to explain it to me...

I'm not saying we can't make true statements, we can define them as true, such as 1+1=2, or Jefferson City is the capital of Missouri. But beyond the ability to make semantical truths, why is truth even in epistemology? I mean it seems more useful to me to say we can not be certain of what is true, therefore we should find another foundation, such as consistency. Something consistent may turn out to be false, but to me it seems the most justifiable starting position.

Hi there! I agree with you. I've argued with K on this for who knows how long. You can find the same issues and points buried in the epistemological forum. Some people just won't get it.
Are you into Wittgenstein? I really like his notion that a words meaning is its use. Words are "meaningless" apart from social practices.
Too much philosophy is wheels in the mud, precisely because it doesn't want to see this.

True is just an adjective, isn't it? I agree that knowledge and belief are synonymous. Seems obvious to those without pseudo-religious attachment to this word "truth." For some philosophy is one more church, which is fine, except they will eagerly deny it -- and that's annoying.

Here's one of my favorite foolosophers Richard Rorty on this beast known as "truth" that Pilate was so curious about.

YouTube - Rorty on Truth

A little more.

YouTube - Rorty on the End of Inquiry

But that a justified belief can be false does not mean that it is false. So a justified belief also can be true. You seem to have the principle that unless it is impossible for a justified belief to be false, then, even if it is true, it cannot be a case of knowledge. But you give no reason for this principle, and this principle, that for a justified belief to be knowledge, it must be impossible for the belief to be false, seems to be the core principle of your view. Very often, that is because two different propositions are confused:

1. Necessarily, if I know that p is true, then p is true. and,
2. If I know that p is true, then p is necessarily true.

Now, 2. seems to be the principle you espouse. But 2. is false, for it would imply that only necessary truths can be known. And that is false. On the other hand, 1. is true. But 2. and 1. can be easily confused so that someone (like you) may believe that because 1. is true, 2. is true. And, as a consequence, believe that only if you are certain can you know (where "certain truth" means "necessary truth" (another confusion). The confusion between 1. and 2. above is very often the source of the confusion between knowledge and certainty, and may be, at least, part of the source of yours.

Of course we can make true statements. But not only is 1+1=2 true, but Mars is the fourth planet, and the Nile is the largest river in Africa true too. What is true need not be necessarily true (another confusion). It is true that you exist, but that you exist is not a necessary truth.

(By the way, it is, of course, true that Jefferson City is the capital of Missouri. But why would it be a truth like 2+2=4. Jefferson City need not have been the capital. Some other city if Missouri might have been designated the capital. Isn't that true? 1+1=2 is a necessary truth, but that Jefferson City is the capital of Missouri is not a necessary truth. It is a contingent truth like London is the largest city in the United Kingdom).

---------- Post added 02-07-2010 at 03:43 AM ----------




1. If "knowledge" and "belief" are synonymous, then I can know what is false (since I can believe what is false)
2. But I cannot know what is false.
Therefore, 3. "knowledge" and "belief" are not synonymous. QED

1. If "knowledge" and "belief" are synonymous, then I can have knowledge, but no justification for my knowledge. (Since I can believe, but have no justification for my belief).
2. But I cannot know, but have no justification for my knowledge.

Therefore, 3. "knowledge" and "belief" are not synonymous. QED

1. If "knowledge" and "belief" are synonymous, I could not truly say, I believe that p, but I do not know that p.
2. But I can truly say that I believe that p, but I do not know that p.

Therefore, 3. "knowledge" and "belief" are not synonymous. QED.

Hi there! I agree with you. I've argued with K on this for who knows how long. You can find the same issues and points buried in the epistemological forum. Some people just won't get it.
Are you into Wittgenstein? I really like his notion that a words meaning is its use. Words are "meaningless" apart from social practices.
Too much philosophy is wheels in the mud, precisely because it doesn't want to see this.

True is just an adjective, isn't it? I agree that knowledge and belief are synonymous. Seems obvious to those without pseudo-religious attachment to this word "truth." For some philosophy is one more church, which is fine, except they will eagerly deny it -- and that's annoying.

Here's one of my favorite foolosophers Richard Rorty on this beast known as "truth" that Pilate was so curious about.

YouTube - Rorty on Truth

Hmm, perhaps I'm arguing backwards? In a kind of "foot in your mouth" way? Because I still feel you do not see my point...

I think I can respond to your first section fairly easily. The distinction between 1 and 2 is one of definition only. If I must know that I know something, then your definition of knowledge does not stand.

As far as the second section. Bravo, you've proven my point! What I am saying is that the theory of knowledge IS a theory of belief. Therefore the way knowledge is used by you and others is actually synonymous with belief. I agree that knowledge and belief are not synonymous, which is why I think it should be called the "theory of belief", because there is no distinguishable truth value.

I also do not understand why there is a distinction between a necessary truth and a truth... to me the difference seems arbitrary, because I do not agree that there is a difference between the truths of 1+1=2 and Jefferson City is the capitol of Missouri. Both can be changed, they are merely symbolic... Look, I understand you will probably reply by explaining the difference between necessary truth and truth, but I know that already, my objection arises out of what I take will be a disagreement about what can be distinguished as reality, and also a disconnect I see as the symbolism of words is taken literally.

---------- Post added 02-07-2010 at 05:19 AM ----------



.

"X" and "Y" are synonymous if and only if "X" and "Y" are intersubstitutable in every context preserving truth.

Is this always the case? "Paradise" is synonymous with "Heaven", but "He knows that Paradise is Heaven" can be false while "He knows that Heaven is Heaven" is true.

I also do not understand why there is a distinction between a necessary truth and a truth... to me the difference seems arbitrary, because I do not agree that there is a difference between the truths of 1+1=2 and Jefferson City is the capitol of Missouri. Both can be changed, they are merely symbolic...

But the truth-value of "Jefferson City is the capital of Missouri" can be changed in two ways: by changing the meaning of the words (symbols), or by keeping the meaning the same and making an official decision that the city referred to as "Jefferson City" shall cease to be the capital.

The truth-value of "1+1=2", however, can only be changed by changing the meanings of the symbols. Given their current meanings, 1+1 cannot be made to equal anything other than 2 by mere stipulation, or by any other event.