I suggest (I don't hold any beliefs yet)that instead of having two notions of reliability, one for persons and one for non-persons, one could do with just one notion, a general one. Suppose that this is the case. Then, one would need another interpretation of "knowing what one is talking about" rather than the straightforward literal one. An interpretation along the lines that I suggested before (a high % of claims are true/justified) works well it seems.

This theory is simpler. The question is whether it's plausible because of its non-literal interpretation of "knowing what one is talking about". I think that it is not so implausible as to not warrant further consideration.

This non-literal interpretation also works well with any fictionalist account of the field, if one holds such an account. This is because it can work with the notion of justification instead of truth. The literal interpretation uses the notion of knowledge which implies truth. That would be inconsistent with any fictionalist account of the field.

What do you think?

---------- Post added 12-27-2009 at 11:59 AM ----------

What are "literal accounts' and "non-literal" accounts of "knowing what one is talking about"? (How did this phrase get to be so important, anyway?)

What is a fictionalist account, and account of what?

I thought we were talking of what makes an authority.

My contention is that there may be other reasons than a person knowing what he is talking about (literally) for calling that person an expert (= reliable source of information).

Yes. What about Searle's 'Chinese room' argument? In that thought experiment, the operator is a reliable source of answers to questions in the Chinese language, but does not know the meaning of any Chinese words himself.

Yes. What about Searle's 'Chinese room' argument? In that thought experiment, the operator is a reliable source of answers to questions in the Chinese language, but does not know the meaning of any Chinese words himself.

But, still, we would not call the digital system in Searle's thought experiment, or things like medical journals (which are considered to be reliable sources of information), experts. People can be experts, and I don't know any reason we would call a person an expert, unless he or she demonstrated they knew things, many things, related to their particular field.

And yes, we do not call non-persons for experts. That would be false. Being an expert implies being a person. (Concepts can have implications. This notion I learned from the book Swartz and Bradley Possible Worlds, 1979.)

All that means is that X is an expert implies X is a person. Propositions have implications.

You are advancing an externalist, rather than an internalist view of knowledge. That is an interesting view, but not one I would adopt.

Internalism and externalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Concepts also have implications. That a concept implies another concept is defined like this:[INDENT]C implies D iff there is no possible where C is instantiated in x but D is not.
[/INDENT]No, I am not. I am an internalist. I am suggesting an externalist view of reliability. That's not the same thing.

Doesn't an externalist view of reliability imply one of knowledge? I don't know whether the converse is true, though.

If concept implication is reducible to proposition implication, then why have two notions rather than just one? And proposition implication is the more familiar one.

All that means is that X is an expert implies X is a person. Propositions have implications.

You are advancing an externalist, rather than an internalist view of knowledge. That is an interesting view, but not one I would adopt.

Internalism and externalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I don't think so.

Out of interest, what kind of internalist approach can deal with Gettier-problems? I've yet to hear of one that does it satisfactorily.

An internalist would say you are justified in believing something told to you by somebody who you have good reason to think is reliable, even if he isn't actually reliable e.g. some layman running around the philosophy department wearing academic dress, and calling himself a professor. An externalist would say something like the listening to the supposed expert actually has to generate true beliefs (as in Nozick's truth tracking theory), or that the belief has to come to you in the appropriate manner, e.g. there has to be a causal chain linking the fact P, the expert's belief in P, and your belief in P (as in Goldman's causal theory).

I'm not sure what an internalist notion of reliability is supposed to be (surely whether or not somebody is reliable necessarily depends on how often he is correct), but what you have said seems to be compatible with either externalism or internalism. In fact, in the case of the causal theory, it is not even necessary for the authority to be a reliable one; all that is necessary is that his belief of P that he is passing on was actually caused by P. Nozick's theory makes it necessary that the authority is reliable: S knows P via method M iff:
1. S believes, via method or way of coming to believe M, that P
2. P is true
3. If P were not true, then S would not believe P via method M
4. If P were true, then S would believe P via method M

Regardless of P having a causal link with the supposed authority's belief in it, the the pupil would have believed P when told so even if it was false; therefore it is not knowledge as it does not satisfy (3). Iin the cases of genuine experts if P were not true then they would not tell people that it was.

Do we understand the notion of reliability, unless we understand the notion of knowledge?

I don't know one, but then, I don't know an externalist one that works either. Seems to be a 'draw battle'. Specifically I think the barn example works against both kind of theories.



Not sure if I agree with this characterization, but its been a while since I read about the internalism/externalism issue. I agree with SEP:[INDENT]"Generally, when a person knows some proposition or other, she does so on the basis of something such as evidence, or good reasons, or perhaps some experiences she has had. The same is true of justified beliefs that may fall short of knowledge. These beliefs are justified on the basis of some evidence, or good reasons, or experiences, or maybe on the basis of the manner in which the beliefs were produced. Internalism in the first instance is a thesis about the basis of either knowledge or justified belief. This first form of internalism holds that a person either does or can have a form of access to the basis for knowledge or justified belief. The key idea is that the person either is or can be aware of this basis. Externalists, by contrast, deny that one always can have this sort of access to the basis for one's knowledge and justified belief. A second form of internalism, connected just to justified belief but probably extendable to knowledge as well, concerns not access but rather what the basis for a justified belief really is. Mentalism is the thesis that what ultimately justifies any belief is some mental state of the epistemic agent holding that belief. Externalism on this dimension, then, would be the view that something other than mental states operate as justifiers. A third form of internalism concerns the very concept of justification, rather than access to or the nature of justifiers. This third form of internalism is the deontological concept of justification, whose main idea is that the concept of epistemic justification is to be analyzed in terms of fulfilling one's intellectual duties or responsibilities. Externalism with respect to the concept of epistemic justification would be the thesis that this concept is to be analyzed in terms other than special duties or responsibilities."
[/INDENT]


Yes, an internalist theory of reliability is consistent with both internalism and externalism about epistemic justification/knowledge. I admit to having made up the term just now. By internalist theory of reliability I mean one that takes it that internal states of the person are necessary (e.g. certain mental states), and an external theory is the negation of that.

I think epistemology should simply be renamed the theory of belief, .

I think epistemology should simply be renamed the theory of belief, that would straighten out the KK principle, because then it would be the KB principle! I know that I believe.
I find the issue simple enough, I think that to know that one knows something would require one (by the non-colloquial definition of the term know) to be an objective observer. Now, it may be possible for one to be an objective observer, but I think even an objective observer would be unable to tell that they are objective rather than subjective. For to claim objectivity and know your claim is correct, requires one to be what is claimed... therefore causing circular reasoning to be summoned. A paradox for the poor objective soul.

I think the best way to build up epistemology and philosophy is through admitting our limitations, not trying to sidestep them or overcome them in a shallow way. To build a good foundation, in this case at least, one must "know" which rocks are missing, not that one is standing on solid rock.

I find the issue simple enough, I think that to know that one knows something would require one (by the non-colloquial definition of the term know) to be an objective observer.

But then we would have to call epistemology, "doxology". And where would we be then?

I don't know what you're talking about, but as Ken said. The study of belief is called doxology. This word for belief is also used in other connections such as doxastic logic.

Uh, why? I know that I know that Trenton is the capital of New Jersey. I'm no objective observer.

Although some have called me God in the past. :devilish:

Where would we be then? In the same spot we're in now... I simply don't think Cartesian knowledge is possible and that if "theory of knowledge" implies some connection to truth then we're off on the wrong foot from the get go.



What I'm saying is that knowledge and belief seem to be synonymous unless one can distinguish that knowledge has the truth behind it while a belief does not.



Ok, but that is purely an semantical argument. I can say I know that I know that two is equal to two and make just as much sense. Things we define are no doubt "knowable" by definition, but beyond that there is no certainty, that is what I was trying to say.

"Knowledge" and "belief" are not synonymous (only words can be synonymous). For I can believe what is false. But I cannot know what is false. (Although, of course, I can think I know what is false).

You don't have to be certain in order to know. I know many things about which I am not certain.