@kennethamy,
kennethamy;114490 wrote:Well, consider authorities. A judge is an authority on the law; a professor of archeology an authority on ancient artifacts, authority on the history of art, and so on? Authorities are so considered because they have certain credentials which support their claim that they are authorities. Credentials like education, experience, estimation by their peers, position in their fields, and so on. But what is it that these credential support? Isn't it that they know a lot about their fields, and so, are likely to be right when they pronounce on on matters in their field? If not, why else are they believed to be authorities? What do you mean by taking "knowing what you are talking about literally". What it means literally is what it says. Namely, knowing what you are talking about. What do you think is its figurative meaning?
I
suggest (I don't hold any beliefs yet)that instead of having two notions of reliability, one for persons and one for non-persons, one could do with just one notion, a general one. Suppose that this is the case. Then, one would need another interpretation of "knowing what one is talking about" rather than the straightforward literal one. An interpretation along the lines that I suggested before (a high % of claims are true/justified) works well it seems.
This theory is simpler. The question is whether it's plausible because of its non-literal interpretation of "knowing what one is talking about". I think that it is not so implausible as to not warrant further consideration.
This non-literal interpretation also works well with any fictionalist account of the field, if one holds such an account. This is because it can work with the notion of justification instead of truth. The literal interpretation uses the notion of knowledge which implies truth. That would be inconsistent with any fictionalist account of the field.
What do you think?
---------- Post added 12-27-2009 at 11:59 AM ----------
Zetherin;114528 wrote:How would you come to the conclusion that the likelihood of someone being correct about a matter was high, if you had not evaluated what they knew about the matter previously? It seems to me that if that person had not demonstrated that they knew a lot about the matter, we would not call them an expert. We wouldn't just start saying X has a high likelihood of being correct about a matter for no reason, would we?
I did not say that we would start saying it for no reason. One should not dismiss the
possibility of a justification for claiming that a person is a reliable source about something because one cannot imagine a such reason. That was what Fast was doing here earlier about a J(K(P)), and he turned out to be wrong. Depending on how to interpret what you wrote, you may or may not be doing a similar thing.
Zetherin;114528 wrote:No, when we say that someone has a high likelihood of being correct, we are not necessarily saying they know. But, of course, them knowing and demonstrating they know about the matter has much to do with our trust in them. Do you disagree?
No, I don't disagree. I also agree. (There is a difference.)
Zetherin;114528 wrote:For instance, take a scientist who is an expert in biology. This scientist has demonstrated time and time again that he knows much about biology, and many other scientists have been witness to his experiments and research. If we ask him a biology question, no, just because he is an expert that does not mean he knows the answer. But, as you note, the likelihood of him being right would be high. And, his having demonstrated that he knew many things related to his field previously is why we think this.
I agree. My contention is that there may be other reasons than a person knowing what he is talking about (literally) for calling that person an expert (= reliable source of information).
The notion under discussion is reliability. Let's not lose sight of it.