I can never come to grips with justification, and it bothers me.

What is false about it?

I retract what I said.

I was confusing thoughts with propositions. I was recognizing that all sentence types can express thoughts while also recognizing that only declarative sentences can express thoughts that have either a truth or false value, and while I was referring to what is often expressed by declarative sentences as propositions (the narrow sense), I was using the term (in a more broad sense) to capture the expressed thoughts of the other sentence types despite the lack of truth or false value.

English, as do all natural languages, contains various types of sentences such as declarative, interrogative, exclamatory, and so on, which allow for the effective communication of thoughts and ideas. Some sentences are short and to the point, whereas others are long and rambling. Some sentences are either true or false, such as something you might hear on the weather channel when the weather-person announces, "Hurricane Betsy will strike Florida at 8 P.M. on Wednesday." That sentence, although we cannot be sure of its accuracy until 8 P.M. on Wednesday, nevertheless is either true or false. Other sentences, like the interrogatory sentence, "Where's my keys?" or the exclamatory sentence, "Not again!" express thoughts, but have no truth or false value. The sentences we study in this book are declarative and are intended to convey information.

I can know something and not know about something.

Can you know something without knowing anything at all about it? This is the point I was getting at in my posts #163 and 187. My problem here concerns the 'belief' element rather than the justification. If I believe something, then an authority can tell me whether my belief is justified and true. But I have to have the belief in the first place. If an authority makes a factual statement that is completely incomprehensible to me, can I genuinely believe it? I can say I believe it, and I can blindly accept it ("whatever the teacher says must be right"), but is that really belief?

I have no firm view about the above, but I think it is a relevant point. It also arises in the case of obscure religious dogmas, e.g. transubstantiation (although there a believer would at least have some vague idea of the general subject).

Regarding your assertion that we are the authorities on whether we know something, wouldn't that violate the requirement of (objective) truth, let alone that of justification?

Can you know something without knowing anything at all about it?

Regarding your assertion that we are the authorities on whether we know something, wouldn't that violate the requirement of (objective) truth, let alone that of justification?

Not at all. I am not saying what we know determines what is true. That is obviously false. I am speaking about justification. If I say I have a headache, I believe you are justified in believing that I have a headache. Similarly, if I say that I know, I think you can be justified in believing that I know. Now, I could be mistaken about knowing, but that is besides the point. People are mistaken about knowing all the time, so, naturally, one could be mistaken about what someone else knows. But, I still think you could be justified in believing that I knew, even though it may not be true that I knew.

Is that adequate justification?

So, my adequate justification for my belief that you have a headache is that you told me so. Interesting.

Now, what's my adequate justification for my belief that you know you have a headache? Same thing?

Can you know something without knowing anything at all about it? This is the point I was getting at in my posts #163 and 187. My problem here concerns the 'belief' element rather than the justification. If I believe something, then an authority can tell me whether my belief is justified and true. But I have to have the belief in the first place. If an authority makes a factual statement that is completely incomprehensible to me, can I genuinely believe it? I can say I believe it, and I can blindly accept it ("whatever the teacher says must be right"), but is that really belief?

I have no firm view about the above, but I think it is a relevant point. It also arises in the case of obscure religious dogmas, e.g. transubstantiation (although there a believer would at least have some vague idea of the general subject).

Generally, yes. How else would you come to know I have a headache, except if I told you? You don't think I'm the best authority here? I mean, I'm the only one that can feel my own pain, am I not?



This is what I'm saying. I think you can be justified in believing that I know I have a headache, if I tell you I know I have a headache.

This is what I'm saying. I think you can be justified in believing that I know I have a headache, if I tell you I know I have a headache.

I suppose that certain brain scans would reveal that you have a headache.

I have been wondering this myself. Suppose that the person has no clue what a sentence means. Can he believe it? Maybe.

Generally, yes. How else would you come to know I have a headache, except if I told you? You don't think I'm the best authority here? I mean, I'm the only one that can feel my own pain, am I not?



This is what I'm saying. I think you can be justified in believing that I know I have a headache, if I tell you I know I have a headache.

This headache example is an awkward example to illustrate the difference between a proposition being true and knowing that a proposition is true.

My belief that you have a headache is justified, ceterus paribus if you tell me you know you have a headache. But clearly, you might be fibbing (as some wives are allleged to do in the evening). But my belief that your handle is "Zetherin" when you sincerely tell me your name is "Zetherin". Who should be in a better position to tell me than you? I hope I can rely on a lot of things you assure me you know. Not only your internal states.

Well, this is getting hard to follow. One minute I think you're trying to show that my belief that you have a headache is justified, and the next minute I think you're trying to show that my belief that you know you have a headache is justified.

There is certainly a difference between your having a headache and your knowing you have a headache.

I am essentially trying to show both.

1.) Your belief that I have a headache is justified if I state I have a headache, because you can trust that I am the main authority over whether or not I have a headache.

2.) You can be justified in believing that I know I have a headache. Now, I may not know I have a headache (I could be lying)

I thought you were saying that you always know whether you have a headache.

I am saying that if I say that I have a headache, other people should be justified in believing that I have a headache. Whether I have a headache or not, does not have anything to do with whether there is justification for the belief, does it?

Whether or not I always know whether I have a headache or not, isn't the point. The point is that we appeal to authority as justifiers because we believe they have less of a chance of being mistaken than the common person; we have more faith in their beliefs. And, I think, the same can be shown here: People should assume that there is much less of a chance of me being mistaken that I have a headache, as I am the main authority over my own pain.

They are justified only if they have good reason to suppose you are speaking truthfully.