What is X?

.....

I agree that a proposition is what is expressed by a sentence, or at least that's the simple explanation. I think it would be proper to say that we express propositions with the sentences we use; after all, I wouldn't want to give the impression that sentences are as talented as I. That's not to suggest that we express a proposition with every sentence we use.

Also, I think it would be good to distinguish between two senses of the term, "proposition": 1) the narrow sense (the kind Emil is using) and 2) the broad sense.

If you use "proposition" such that only declarative sentences can express them, then you are using "proposition" in the narrow sense. A proposition in this sense is always either true or false. This is not to say that all declarative sentences express propositions.

I believe the term, "proposition" can also be used in a broad sense. For example, other sentence types (imperative, interrogatory, and exclamatory) can also express propositions, but this isn't to imply that propositions in this sense are true or false. For example, the sentences, "where did Mary go?" and "where did my mom go?" express the same proposition (in the broad sense) even though neither sentence expresses a proposition (in the narrow sense).

Also, and this is just something to think about. Consider what you think the word, "what" refers to in the sentence, "a proposition is what is expressed by a sentence." It tells us that a proposition can be the product of a sentence, but it fails to explicitly state just what that product is. I think it refers to the meaning of a sentence. Keep in mind that we shouldn't forsake context in determining the meaning of a sentence; hence, the meaning of a sentence is more than the sum of the individual meanings of the words.

Of course, I have been sloppy by simply saying that a proposition is the meaning of a sentence. After all, it depends on what sense I'm using the term, "proposition."

We often use it in the narrow sense, so I'll speak on that now. Again, a proposition is what is expressed by most declarative sentences, and what I think is expressed is what is meant, so a proposition is the meaning expressed by the declarative sentences we use.

A sentence that is not true yet also not false does not express a proposition in the narrow sense.

I know all that is a bit jumbled, but I just wanted to say a little about it while I was thinkin' about it.

The sentence "Mary is sitting" can express the very same proposition as can the sentence, "my girlfriend is sitting." Both sentences, in the proper context, can express a proposition (in the narrow sense), and if the first sentence is true, then so is the other and vice versa.



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K(K(P)) implies K(X).

Oh, that again. I guess you mean that the sentence, "I know that I know Mary is sitting"

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I don't think I meant that. I just meant that I don't think those two sentences do express the same proposition.

1. If I do not understand the meaning of the word "know", can I believe that I know that P, purely on the teacher's authority?

2. If I think I understand the word "know", but erroneously believe that knowledge is simply TB rather than JTB, am I justified in believing that I know that P, purely on the teacher's authority?

Emil,

In response to where I didn't show that K(K(P)) implies K(X):

Oh, that again. I guess you mean that the sentence, "I know that I know Mary is sitting" doesn't imply that I know what knowledge is, and you think this because you also think (as you should) that your knowing she is sitting doesn't imply that you know what knowledge is, but what is known isn't merely that Mary is sitting; rather, what is known is that you have knowledge that Mary is sitting, and that difference makes all the difference in the world.

What justification do you have for your belief that Zebra's have stripes? Then, what justification do you have for your belief that you know Zebra's have stripes? You can know Zebra's have stripes without knowing what knowledge is, but tell me, just what would your justification be for your belief that you know zebra's have stripes? Either you don't have justification and therefore don't know that you know, or your true belief is justified and you do know that you know Zebra's have stripes.

Your objection is (as usual) that conditions can be met without knowing they are met, but knowing they are met is the very condition that needs to be met since the proposition under question isn't whether you know but whether you know that you know.

I already gave an example of a situation with K(K(P)) but not K(X). What more do you want? You keep repeating this but offer no arguments, only questions. There are other kinds of justification for K(K(P)) other than knowing what knowledge is. I used authority in my example.

Your objection is (as usual) that conditions can be met without knowing they are met, but knowing they are met is the very condition that needs to be met since the proposition under question isn't whether you know but whether you know that you know.

The sentence "Mary is sitting" can express the very same proposition as can the sentence, "my girlfriend is sitting." Both sentences, in the proper context, can express a proposition (in the narrow sense), and if the first sentence is true, then so is the other and vice versa.

The sentence "Where is Mary?" can also express the very same proposition (in the broad sense) as can the sentence, "Where is my girlfriend?", but the sentences do not express a proposition in the narrow sense since the sentences are neither true nor false.

The sentence "Mary is sitting" expresses a proposition (both in the broad and narrow sense), and "Where is Mary?" express a proposition only in the broad sense.

So, if you say the sentence "'Where is Mary' expresses a proposition", I know immediately that you're using "proposition" in the broad sense, but if you say the sentence, "'Mary is sitting' expresses a proposition," then I wouldn't know what sense you were using the term, "proposition" ... if not for the fact I know you seem to always use only the narrow sense exclusively.

When you say, "'proposition' can also mean proposal," you're eluding to an entirely different meaning (as opposed to a different sense) of the term, "proposal."

By the way, the question, "Where is Mary?" is neither true nor false. It's not true, of course. I guess this answers your question about truth bearers.

That seems to me dubious, because if that were true, then I should know that when you say, Mary is sitting" that you are saying "my glrlfriend is sitting" without knowing anything else, and, obviously, I don't. The contingent fact that two sentences always have the same truth values does not make it true that they both express the same proposition. That is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. What is your criterion of proposition-identity?

Haven't you just moved up another layer?

It sounds like you're talking about the bolded J in, "I have a JTB that I have a JTB that I have a JTB that P is true." The issue is whether or not you have the bolded J in the following, "I have a JTB that I have a JTB that P is true."

I can see how authority is relevent to the bolded J in, "I have a JTB that P is true," but if you mistake TB for JTB (as I think ACB was trying to point out), then you do not "know that you know P is true" even if it's true "you have a JTB that P is true."

You find no difference between these two statements:

A.) I know the conditions of knowledge.

B.) I know that I know.

But they are clearly expressing different propositions. In the latter, you are not stating that you know what knowledge is. Just as when I state I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, I am not stating I know about Quito or Ecuador. I need not know where Quito or Ecuador are on maps, what they look like, population data about the city or country, geographical makeup of the city or country, etc. to know this fact. Because in this particular statement, I am only expressing that I know the fact (that Quito is the capital).

And likewise, when I state I know that I know, I am not stating that I know about knowledge. That is not the proposition being expressed. I can know something and not know about something.

It seems to me that Fast is stuck at imagining a J(K(P)) that is not based on knowing what knowledge is. I offer appeal to authority. Depending on how strict we are with "knowing what knowledge is" (could it be JB only and still work as J? It seems so) I may be able to offer other possible justifications.

I'm not talking about third degree knowledge. Count the K's. There are only two. Thus, second degree knowledge. Not third. Where did you get that idea?

Suppose that:

(a) I believe that P.
(b) My belief of P is both true and justified, and my teacher knows this.
(c) My teacher tells me that I know that P, but does not specifically tell me either the meaning of the word "know" or the conditions of knowing.

1. If I do not understand the meaning of the word "know", can I believe that I know that P, purely on the teacher's authority?

2. If I think I understand the word "know", but erroneously believe that knowledge is simply TB rather than JTB, am I justified in believing that I know that P, purely on the teacher's authority?

I still have no idea what this broad sense of proposition is. How did you learn about it?

I did count the K's, and that's why I added two. You said, "There are other kinds of justification for K(K(P)) other than knowing what knowledge is." That's where I got the idea. I'm not asking you to justify your belief that p is true, nor am I asking you to justify your belief that KKp is true. I'm asking you to justify your belief that Kp is true.

Or at least I was.

The meaning expressed by a sentence as opposed to the stricter cognitive meaning expressed by a sentence.

"I am Henry" is cognitively meaningful.
"Where is Mary?" isn't cognitively meaningful.

"Where is Mary?" expresses a proposition in the broad sense.
"I am Henry" expresses a proposition in both senses.

1.) Yes, you can believe things for any number of reasons.

2.) I don't know. I'm not exactly clear on what knowledge is (I'm really pissed at the JTB model right now). But, I think, whatever it is, we are the authorities over it. I think we should be justified in stating what we know, as we are the authorities over what we know. We need no one to tell us that we know something. And, even if they did, that would not necessarily mean that we know that something, would it? Because they could be mistaken about knowing that we know. Teachers have this problem all the time, "Jimmy, you scored so poorly on your test! I thought you knew the capitals!!?!". Jimmy could have easily misunderstood her in class, and believed something not true.

2.) I don't know. I'm not exactly clear on what knowledge is (I'm really pissed at the JTB model right now).

But, I think, whatever it is, we are the authorities over it. I think we should be justified in stating what we know, as we are the authorities over what we know.

I'm not sure what you mean by "we are the authorities over what we know."

And, I think, knowing that we know is one of those truths. I should be able to safely say I know that I know, and be justified in the same way I am justified when I say I know that I have a headache. I am the authority.

Why are you angry at the JTB model? It is false but why be angry at it?

You find no difference between these two statements:

A.) I know the conditions of knowledge.

B.) I know that I know.

But they are clearly expressing different propositions. In the latter, you are not stating that you know what knowledge is.