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Berkeley's Treatise and Dialogues As It Is

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@jeeprs,

jeeprs;145428 wrote:

Well really, this betokens a complete lack of knowledge of the life and teaching of the Buddha. I am sorry, but it is most disrespectful. I won't open up the whole subject here but suggest you do some reading on it.

You mistake my trite images for a complete lack of understanding of it. And when you speak of the life and teachings of the Buddha, which ones? Theravada, Mahayana? Tibeten, Dzochgen? Chinese zen? Japanese Zen? I used to meditate at a Zen Center by where I live now, and at other places too. And though I am not as widely read as you, it seems, my point is that I just don't identify with the "Spirit of the East" at all. Are you telling me you don't notice these distinctions? I am not saying one is "better than" the other. I am only making the observation of their glaring idiosyncratic differences at their core.

@Humanity,

Well no, it was the means of expression - the 'cute plump little face'. Rather trite, don't you think? Guatama, who became the Buddha, sacrificed everything he had in his quest. This included forfeiting personal life, home, family and all of his possessions. He engaged in an arduously ascetic life in the wilderness for six years before finally realizing the futility of, and renouncing, asceticism.

As far as the records of the Buddha's life goes, aside from some ceremonial embellishments and mythical elements, the main elements of the story are fairly well accepted by all the schools you mention.

In any case, just as Christians are able to encounter Jesus, and be transformed by Him, so also Buddhists are transformed by Dharma. However, in the Buddhist view, this is not necessarily an encounter on the spiritual plane. The actual text says 'He that sees the Dharma, sees Me'. But again there are different schools, and many of the traditions have absorbed elements of various Indian religious and mystical lore during the last 2.5 millenia. The Tibetan schools have all kinds of mystical and symbolic practices that are completely alien to Theravada or Zen.

But in terms of personal spiritual practise, there are levels of realisation that arise through insight into the dharmas of inter-connectedness, lawfulness, and so on, through meditation. Despite the doctrinal differences between Christianity and Buddhism, the idea of the 'awakened heart' (i.e. 'sacred heart') is very similar in Catholic spirituality and Mahayana Buddhism.

One of my personal encounters with Catholicism was at a Catholic teaching hospital during my (mis-spent) youth. I fetched up there as a casuality wardsman and saw how those Teaching Sisters manifested the spirit of the Mother of Mercy (Mater Misercordae) in the midst of the chaos and suffering of an emergency department. I left there after 9 months with not a shadow of doubt I had seen the holy spirit at work. This was a big part of my spiritual education. (Straight afterwards I hitchhiked to the Satyananda Ashram and camped out there for 4 months, but that is a whole other story.....)

@Extrain,

Extrain;145091 wrote:

Let me just say this right now. You consistently misinterpret the philosophical passages you are actually quoting. You need to pay closer attention to what all these authors are actually saying. No wonder you are so confused about everything.

I stated earlier that i am aware of Berkeley's primary intention was to support the existence of God.
You disputed and I provided the evidence.
In the intro, Berkeley wrote a 'letter' to God.
From what i read, we can infer that Berkeley primary intention was to support God existence.
He did attempt to prove god's existence as well in the treatise.

If i missed out anything, you can always highlight to me in
a non-provocative manner.
If you do not llike my style, then there is the concept of 'ignore'.

I had suggested you stop the ad hominems but despite that you are persisting.
The problem with ad hominems at this more refined level of intellectual discussion is that it divert and distract our mind to the lower brain and activates beastly thoughts which constraint higher intellectual thinking.

Anyway, I will be reporting you to the moderators and hope they take
appropriate action.

I suggest you take things easy and relax, this is just a discussion.

************************
Here is my part-repy to your long post.
Will post the other part later.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Humanity
Berkeley readily agree to common sense realism.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Humanity
Within that context the objects are in conventional space (not Kant or Physics).
Note Berkeley view of common things,

792 PHILONOUS. In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed IDEAS, but THINGS.

From the above, Berkeley would not have called the stone he was standing on as an Idea-stone but just plain stone as Johnson would have perceived it.

He didn't say this. Look at the text again. He said these things really exist be that he didn't care what you call it so long as you don't grant that these things "can exist unperceived outside the mind".

Therefore, if these things cannot be perceived outside the mind then they are certainly not perceived external to the mind either as YOU contend, since to suppose so is to grant their absolute existence independent of the mind! Read the passage.

Here is a very crucial passage concerning Berkeley's Metaphysical Idealism from the Treatise. You need to understand how drastically different it is from Kant's own views. So I will contrast this passage with a passage directly from Kant, which actually criticizes how Berkeley is approaching the problem here in his Treatise:

"But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this?
[NOTICE: He is not asking whether the Material Substance without qualities exists outside the mind. He is asking whether Material Substance WITH QUALITIES exist outside the mind--namely, those which are solid, figured, moveable]
Either we must know it by sense, or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived,
[NOTICE! NOT EVEN the sensible qualities perceived WITHIN experience tell us whether actual objects exist without the mind]
like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. By what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend, there is any necessary connection betwixt them and our ideas?" (George Berkeley, p59)

As to the doubt about a Substance Existing outside the mind in the Paralogisms of Reason, Kant criticizes Descartes and Berkeley at length for thinking that the existence of the external world has to be "proven or inferred" as the cause of our given impressions on the mind in order to come to know that the external world exists. He says there is no reason for thinking we have to do this because the existence of the external world independent of my perception IS given in my experience already. So Kant critizes Berkeley for thinking the following has to be done which Kant is NOT endorsing:

"The fourth Paralogism of the Ideality (of outer relation): That whose existence can be inferred only as a cause of given perceptions has only a doubtful existence. Now all outer appearances are of this kind: their existence cannot be immediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause of given perceptions.

That the existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the Ideality of outer appearances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called Idealism." (A 367)

Kant is here mentioning Descartes and Berkeley's Problematic Idealism which says nothing can be known independent of our Ideas--which Kant says is false.

And Berkeley's subsequent conclusion is that, therefore, nothing but Ideas and minds exist. And this is the metaphysical Idealism Kant later REFUTES.

Humanity wrote:

As such, Berkeley recognized external reality within the common sense perspective.

No, he didn't recognize "external reality" as seen above. Here's another crucial passage from the Treatise para 25:

"25. Since they [Ideas] and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follow that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be a the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect.8. Whence it plainly follow that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.

(FYI, Kant denies all of this. See the Kant's passage below. He thinks the object in the material world causes sensations in us. Way different than Berkeley.)

So either rocks are ideas in which case they cannot do anything. Or rocks are things, also, in which case they have no causal power or activity since "extension, figure, and motion [the primary qualities] cannot be the cause of our sensations." Why? Because they are Ideas, and Ideas have no causal powers. So to say that our sensations are the effect of "powers resulting from number, motion, and size of particles, must be certainly false."

So if it is not Ideas that cause sensations in us, can it be corporeal matter? No. Because right after in 26 titled "The Cause of Our Ideas" Berkeley says,

"We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, other are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance; it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit....some other will or spirit that produces them (.29)

So the the cause of our ideas is not corporeal, but incorporeal Substance, another Spirit or Will (God). So if Berkeley really thought corporeal matter was the cause of our Ideas, he would have certainly mentioned it in this passage titled "The Cause of Our Ideas." So matter doesn't have causal power because all matter is just Ideas. Even worse, Berekeley explicitly DENIES the existence of Corporeal Substance in this passage altogether.(Kant NEVER denies the existence of Corporeal Substance; rather, he ASSERTS its Existence. See below.)
You misunderstood and do not realize that Corporeal Matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
Kant's idea (Plato's) is different from Bekeley's IDEA.
Note my explanation in the later part of this post.

Humanity wrote:

To Berkeley, Ideas are real material objects in the common sense and empirical perspective. This is the immediate given object.

And Kant says Ideas are NOT material objects. Further, the actual "commonsense view" is that Ideas are not material objects, because the commonsense view is that Ideas do not have any causal power, while most people think material objects do have causal power. And since material objects just are Ideas, Berkeley says we need to look to a Spiritual Incorporeal Substance or Will that causes or produces these Ideas in us (this is way different than Kant. See below.)
Note, Kant's idea is different from Berkeley's IDEA.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Humanity
What Berkeley disagreed is the "material object" that materialists claimed, i.e. the object-in-itself in absolute existence.

I haven't seen Berkeley talk about this alleged "object-in-itself" yet.
But most importantly, he explicitly denies extension, motion, and number are capable of producing Ideas in us because they have no causal power. They have no causal power because they are obviously ideas. What else could they be? It would take a strangely confused person to say that "common sense matter" really exists but then deny it has any causal powers at all. So matter just is Ideas.

Not specifically 'object-in-itself' but "things-in-itself". Will provide a list of examples later.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Humanity
That would the same as how can we know that god-in-itself doesn't exist either.

Sure. But how is that an objection? The notion is nonsensical, so I can't make any sense of what it means for it to either exist, or not exist. So as far as I know god-in-itself could either exist or not exist.
To speculate on whether "God-in-itself" or whatever-in-itself could either exist or not exists in the fancy of pure reason.
From Kant's perspective this is delusional.
Will you still insist on this doubt, if you insist, then according to Kant, your view on this is delusional.

Originally Posted by Humanity
However, the materialists are speculating that their so-called matter-in-itself exist independent of human minds.

Originally Posted by Humanity
This is what Berkeley is denying.

As we have seen, Berkeley is also denying that corporeal matter is the cause of our Ideas, only a Spiritual Substance or Will can cause our ideas because all Ideas are causally inert.
Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
Kant's idea (Plato's) is different from Bekeley's IDEA.
Although Kant explained in detailed how his 'matter' manifest from sensation and a priori element, it fall short of the range of reality that Berkeley was explaining how we view reality.
Berkeley extended the source of our reality to Spiritual Substance or Will whereas Kant stop short at the a priori level.

Originally Posted by Humanity
Yes, not an argument.

Originally Posted by Humanity
It was just an evidence to show that Berkeley had used the same concept of thing-in-itself that Kant (more detailed) used.

Here is another example (not argument);
482 PHILONOUS: I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS.

But you just said earlier that Berkely countenanced the existence of real material objects when he is clearly denying it here. So only Ideas are real. And Kant NEVER says what Berkeley is saying here. I challenge you to show me a passage from Kant where this same kind of thing is explicitly stated as it is here in Berkeley.

482 PHILONOUS: I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from (pure) reason for the existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS. (thing-in-itself).
To Berkeley, 'REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS' is what Kant deemed as "thing-in-itself" i.e. the noumenon.
Kant was explicit on 'pure reason' but for Berkeley it was only 'reason' but both are referring to the same mental event, i.e. pure reason.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Humanity
Or, whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did.

Now Berkeley is also denying the existence of real-material objects-in-themselves (whatever that means), too. And Kant NEVER said anything remotely like this at all.
Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
Kant's idea (Plato's) is different from Bekeley's IDEA.

Originally Posted by Humanity
The more i read of Berkeley, i am noticing more similarities between B and Kant's philosophy. It may be possible, the later Kant borrowed that term from Berkeley.

Yeah, right.. It's Funny that Kant gives several arguments refuting Berkelian Idealism in the Critique.
Basically Kant agreed with Berkeley in his first edition and subsequently changed his mind in the 2nd edition. Imo, his refutation was sort of a 'quickie' and I don't think he did an effective job on that.
To me, it does not matter as despite Kant's refutation both of them are the same boat leveraging on the human mind to account for reality in opposing the philosophical realists.

And its also funny that Kant NEVER denied the existence of the "Material-in-itself" (whatever that means). I challenge you to show me ONE passage where Kant actually says this. He only denies that the bare THING-IN-ITSELF can ever be known--he never said the "material-thing-in-itself doesn't exist or cannot be known."
He actually says the opposite: that all Material Substance CAN be known. So I wonder why you think Kant is so similar to Berkeley? Are you telling me that your genius far surpasses Kant's own intelligence because Kant was mistaken when he thought he was refuting Berkeley? Which is more likely? That Kant is an idiot, or that you don't understand Kant's philosophy at all? I vote for the latter.

Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
Kant is definitely a genius with reference to his 'Critique of Pure Reason' in highlighting and curbing the excesses of metaphysics, but there was no reason for him to refute Berkeley at all.
He agreed with Kant in the fist edition but I think he was under social pressure to do so for some reason.
His refutation of Berkeley was a quickie and he did not do a good job on it.
Kant should have reconciled his philosophy of mind with that of Berkeley, for they are similar at the core.

Humanity wrote:

He did not explain this concept in detailed like Kant.

Kant didn't explain the concept of the Thing-in-Itself in "detail." He postulated that it could not be known at all and then described in detail how the necessary a priori cognitive faculties of the mind structure our experience of the materially subsistent phenomenon which is immediately perceived when the object itself directly causes sensations in us. Perhaps in the Dialectic he explores at a great length how reason goes astray making metaphysical claims which go beyond the bounds of all possible experience.
I understand this part and how Kant's object itself directly causes sensation in us.
But Kant's given object of the outer sense is totally different from what Berkeley termed as the philosophers' material object.
Berkeley's material object is the thing-in-itself.

Here's is one of the more important parts of Kant's work needing to expressed to here. It is part of the Intro to Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic:

"In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is a least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of intuition [sensation]. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) although the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But all this must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to ability, because in no other way can an object be given to us.

The determined object of an empirical intuition, is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I term its matter; but that which affects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation."

Later in the Aesthetic Kant says,

"By means of outer sense (a property of the mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time." (CPR A22-23/B37)
I am familiar with the above.

Kant parts with Berkeley on several points here:
(1) Physical objects directly affect or "cause" sensations in us--Berkeley denies this is even possible.
Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.

(2) The sensation of the object, the faculties of the mind, the object sensed, and the matter corresponding to the object (or phenomenon) of sensation) are all distinct elements within experience --whereas Berkeley collapses them together.
Again a misunderstanding where, corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
As far as it is considered within the common sense framework, Berkeley did not collapse them together.
(3) The phenomenon which is the completely articulated and fully structured object of experience (as distinct from the Noumena--or Thing in Itself) actually corresponds to something really existent and distinct from itself which is the bare matter in sensation--that thing Berkeley denies exists altogether.
Berkeley recognized the existence of the phenomenon like what Kant did.
Kant however, explained in greater detail how the phenomenon is derived from a synthesis with a priori element via space and time.
Kant implied the following, one can cognized the phenomenon but do not ever attempt to think that is an phenomenal object-in-itself.
Berkeley on the other hand, distinguish between phenomenon and what the philosophical realist called Matter.
Berkeley accept what is 'matter' in the phenomenon but not Matter (note it Matter with a capital M) that is outside the phenomenon.
Berkeley's Matter (with the capital M) which is contrasted with phenomenon is the same as Kant's noumenon.

(4) Kant says the Formal Intuitions of Space and Time represent objects as existing outside of my mind in the real world--whereas Berkeley says this representing things outside my mind distinct from my Ideas is a contradiction. Kant, contradicting Berkeley, says this representation of things existing outside me and independent of my actual perception of it is a necessary condition for experience to be possible at all.
Aha, I think this is where you failed to misunderstand the finer points of Kant's philosophy.
Kant stated that Space (not time) represents objects as existing external to us.
If you want to use the phrase "existing outside of my mind" then you have to be very careful in what you meant by 'mind'.
Kant stated that Space is in mind and conditioned by the subject.
If Space is in mind, how can it represent objects as existing outside of mind.
To reconcile this contradiction, we need to view mind as two layers.
We thus have mind1 and mind2.
Mind 1 encompassed mind 2. Mind2 is the subset of mind1, i.e.
Mind1 ( mind2 ), thus
Mind1 -space ( mind2-externality of objects )
Therefore while internal Space generate an outer sense of externality,
that sense of externality is ultimately conditioned by mind1.

Accordingly Kant, thing-in-itself would be presented as such;

[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]

<--/--> = absolute independent, i.e. the unconditioned.

Mind1 and mind2 refers to Kant's experience and the thing-in-itself is outside
Experience.

Using the above, what Berkeley meant by Matter is this;

[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects )]<--/-->[Matter]

Berkeley accepts mind1 space (he did not elaborate on this) and mind2 externality, but he deny is the philosophical realists' Matter that is outside mind1 and mind 2.

From the above, what Berkeley termed and deny as Matter (philosophical realist) is the same the Kant's thing-in-itself (noumenon).

If you want to reconcile the 'matter' (small m) of Kant to the Matter (Capital M) of Berkeley, then it is;

For Kant,
[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects{matter} )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]

For Berkeley,
[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects{matter})]<--/-->[Matter]

You will note that Berkeley and Kant agree with the concept of matter (with small m)
within mind2.

(5) For Kant the Mind takes an Active role in Sensation, for Berkeley it take a passive role--the Mind is completely passive in its reception of Ideas given to it.
This misunderstanding is due to your misunderstanding of the complex concept of 'mind'.
In terms of mind2, both Berkeley and Kant accept that the mind (mind2) takes an active role in Sensation.
As for Kant's mind1, Berkeley conceptualizes it in term of 'spirit' (not God).
Kant's mind1 comprised a whole lot of a priori elements but Berkeley simply termed it as intermediate 'spirit' (not God) which in a way is the a priori of Kant in simplified term.
Both meant the same thing, but credit to Kant for being more detailed but note, there is a difference of one generation and more shoulders for Kant to stand on.

Quote:
Berkeley would agree with Kant and you with regards to the concept of the thing-in-itself.

But Berkeley explicitly denies the existence of material-things-in-themselves altogether in the above several passages. Kant does not. For Kant, the Material Substance is the phenomenon which does have causal powers and enters into relations with other physical objects.
As we have seen in the above passages Berkeley denies that corporeal Substance exists.
But Kant emphatically asserts it--it is one of his categories. Berkeley also denies that corporeal matter has any causal powers because only Spiritual Incorporeal Substance has causal power. Kant says nothing like this at all. And Causality is one of his Categories too which apply to material objects themselves given directly in experience.
Your problem is that you did not understand that the Corporeal Matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
Note my explanation earlier.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley's crude Spiritual Incorporeal Substance is the same as Kant's Causality in the Categories in terms of mind1.
Admitted Kant delved deeper in more detail than what Berkeley did in their philosophy of mind.
But in another sense, Berkeley ventured further when he crudely extended his search to the Will, a penultimate to his God-of-the-Gap.

Quote:
Berkeley stated the materialists speculated that matter-in-itself based on reason and for Kant, it is pure reason.

Quote:
556 PHILONOUS: The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.
Do you notice the similarity? The intelligible "Matter" above implied matter-in-itself as stated by Berkeley elsewhere

No. I don't see the similarity at all. You need to quote the rest of context in which this passage is imbedded so we know what Berkeley is talking about. And you need to know your Kant which you clearly don't. This doesn't even sound like Kant at all.
You should not judge a person merely by a few posts.
I have numbered the para.
Suggest you use a pencil to number the para in your book.
I think they should be the same, if not, should be thereabout.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley's intelligible Matter is the same as Kant intelligible thing in itself which is both derived from reason (Kant = pure).

Quote:
If yes, then, it can only mean matter-in-itself which as you say is non-sensical.

I told you before--I don't subscribe to Berkeley's limited definitions because it produces Metaphysical Idealism something Kant NEVER endorsed, but refuted in many places, three of which are in

The Transcendental Aesthetic.
The Parologisms of Reason (in the Dialectic--yes, Berkeley commits a metaphysical blunder)
The BiG Refutation right after the Analytic of Principles.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley and Kant agree with the concept of thing-in-itself.
Berkeley repeated this concept in similar veins many times in the Dialogue.
Here is another example as confirmed by Hylas;
665 HYLAS. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

I will be compiling and sorting all the paras that refer to this concept.

Quote:
If your 'matter' is that of the common sense then it cannot be absolutely independent of the senses of common sense.

Kant never said matter is dependent on one's perception of it, not even this "common sense" matter you are talking about. You continue to try to fit Kant into your tiny Berkelian categories. But that's like trying to fit the entire world's population into the State of Rhode Island. It just doesn't work. You aren't providing any Kant passages either, so you are not succeeding in making any comparisons at all.
Yes, within Kant's framework of outer sense generated by Space, Kant's matter is stated to be separated from one's perception.
From a set perspective mind-dependent common sense is as follows;

For Kant,
[Mind1-space (mind2 (common sense (-externality of objects){matter}) )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]

Quote:
In a way, when you perceive something in the day-to-day sense there is apparently a 'perceiver' and what 'is perceived', i.e. a subject and an object.

Berkeley explicitly denies the distinction in the Dialogues between the perception and what is perceived because "sensation is not an act but is a completely passive in its reception of Ideas,and the object unperceived is a contradiction."
Berkeley says all of the following in the same passages that, "only ideas are immediately perceived" so the perception just IS what is perceived. He explicitly says this right here:

There is a problem of semantics here.
When I stated "in a way when you perceive something" I use it in the ordinary sense and conventional sense of seeing things.
When Berkeley used the concept of "perception" what he had done was to collapse the whole of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to one concept, i.e. "perception".
I mentioned somewhere, you need to view Berkeley's perception as something in the line of the German "Anschuuang" which imply a meaning more wider than the conventional or scientific term "perception".
In Berkeley's perception the whole scheme of event of how an object is actualized or emerge as in emergence.

Hyl: One great oversight I take to be this: that I did not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation. Now though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.
Phil: What object do you mean? The object of the Senses?
Hyl:The same
Phil: It is then immediately percieved?
Hyl: Right
Phil: Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived, and a sensation.
Hyl: The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; beside which, there is something perceived; and this I call the object. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.
Phil: What tulip do you speak of: is it that which you see?
Hyl: The same
Phil: And what do you see beside color, figure, and extension?
Hyl: Nothing
Phil: What would you say then is, that the red and yellow are co-existent with the extension; is it not?
Hyl: That is not all: I would say, they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.
Phil: That the colours are really in the tulip which I see, is manifest. Neither can it be denied, that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but that any immediate object of the sense, that is, any idea, or combination of ideas should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction.

Seeing light or darkness, perceiving white, smellingaction your were speaking of, as an ingredient in every sensation? And doth it not follow from your concession, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?

Phil: Since you distinguish the active and passive in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, etc.,, are not all equally passive sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them "external objects," and give them in words what subsistence you please. But examine you own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?

"Phil: So whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?
Hyl: To suppose that were absurd: but inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?
sense you can best tell, whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived, are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you then thought."

Quote:
But that independence is only apparent and generated by our faculty of 'outer sense' based on a priori space.

Quote:
That is Kant's. Berkeley mentioned "outness" and "distance".

No. Kant doesn't think the object's independence of the mind is "only apparent" as if it were a illusory or "imaginative." Quite the opposite:
Notice the First Analogy in the Category of the Analogies of Experience: Principle of the Permanence of Substance.
I did not mention "illusory" or "imaginative" and do not imply that at all.

"All appearances contain that which persits (substance) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists. Or, [contrary to Berkeley] In all change of appearances substance persits, and its quantum neither increased nor diminished in nature."

"Only in that which persists (substance) are temporal relations (simultaneity and succession) possible, i.e., that which persists is the substratum of the empirical representation of the empirical reality of time itself, by which alone all time-determinations are possible...consequently also the condtion of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, i.e., of experience, and in this persisting thing all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a modus of existence of that which lasts and persists. Therefore in all appearances that which persits is the object itself, i.e., the substance

Rather than deny Substance like Berkeley, Kant maintained it as central piece of all time-determination and the persistence of unchanging objects through changing appearances. Moreover, Substance is not the perceptible qualities (as Berkeley supposed), but is the condition for their persistence in a single unchanging substratum without which experience of simultaneity, coexistence, and the underlying permanence in time is not possible at all. And remember, Time, for Kant, has been demonstrated in the Aesthetic to be not only Transcendentally Ideal but also Empirically Real.

Since the existence of material Substance is that which takes place in Space and time, and since in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant demonstrates both the a priori transcendental possibility of space and also the empirical reality of space, it therefore follows that Substance really exists. It is a two part task for Kant because space and time are both Transcendentally Ideal and Empirically real.

Here is that Refutation of Berkeley's Idealism again:

The Skeptical or Problematic Idealism of Descartes who merely doubts the existence of the external world, and what Kant calls "the Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism of Berkeley" which says
(a) matter is impossible
(b) Idealism applies to all objects
(c) All the proper objects of all human cognition are nothing but ideas.

Kant claims all of (a)-(c) are false here in the section titled "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason" in the CPR where he takes both Descartes and Berkeley to task in the A and B editions:

A341-405/B399-432

READ IT AGAIN.

In stark contrast to Berkeley, Kant argues at length that,

(d) Transcendental Idealism says that, not only is the existence of matter possible, but is also a necessary condition of all possible experience whatsoever.
(e) Transcendental Idealism does NOT say all proper objects of human cognition are nothing but ideas (objects existing only within the mind).
(f) And finally, that Transcendental Idealism makes room for Empirical Realism which implies that "necessarily something actually exists outside my concsious states in space." (B274) And if fact, this is the exact conclusion of his refutation of Berkeley's Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism.

Kant's Argument Against Berkeley:
(A) "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" (B 276)
(B) All determination in time presupposes something persistent in perception" (B 276)
(C) "That which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same. (B225)
(E) "This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside of me" (Bxl)
(E) "But this persisting element cannot be an intution [a sense-perception] in me [contra Berkeley]. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are reperesentations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be deternmined" (CPR Bxxxix n.)
(F) "Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" (B 275-276)
(G) Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of this time-determination. Therefore, it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination. (B276)
(H) "I.e., the consciousness of my existence is at the same time (zugleich) an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276)

So Berkeley's metaphysical Idealism is false Q.E.D.

I have read and understood Kant refutation of Berkeley idealism.
There seem to be some misunderstandings, note Kant in 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula:
"All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth." Kant

Berkeley did not treat all cognition through the senses and experience as nothing but sheer illusion. Never.
Whatever the above, imo, without the theistic aspect of Berkeley, the core ideas of Berkeley and Kant are the same in term of philosophy of the mind.
Note, yours in blue, mine in black.

ps. You imposed such a long post and i may have missed out on some points.
Do highlight nicely if you want further information.

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 02:40 AM ----------

Extrain;145347 wrote:

That's correct. But honestly, i'm not sure exactly how Kant dealt with God, "Divine Revelation," and the immortality of the Soul after the Critique, but we all know what he did with both Morality and Freedom of the Will--the Categorical Imperative--as outlined in his practical philosophy. Of course, people like the logical positivists would accuse Kant of being blatantly inconsistent, but I don't care. The positivists were wrong anyway. And I find myself believing metaphysics IS possible, but I am also very cautious with it and treat it with deep suspicion.

There are ways to reconcile Kant's denying of god in the Critique and apparent acceptance of God in the Moral.
How? long story.
But fundamentally he rejected God outright.

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 02:53 AM ----------

Extrain;145394 wrote:

and then suddenly convert to Catholicism at 27 years old. Funny how that works, eh?

You're Catholic? no wonder...
Do you agree to Kant calling your God a transcendental delusion?
I think highly of the Catholic religion, especially its mysticism
and most of the Catholics i met are very nice people, except..

@Humanity,

that last point was addressed to a question that I posed which I admitted was completely tangential to the main thread so I don't know if it is part of the main argument, or ought to be, which I think should be argued on its philosophical merits.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;145473 wrote:

that last point was addressed to a question that I posed which I admitted was completely tangential to the main thread so I don't know if it is part of the main argument, or ought to be, which I think should be argued on its philosophical merits.

On threads i raised, i personally seldom complain about off-tangents.
I leave that to the moderator is they seriously think it is so.
I've rephrase the question.
It is relevant, cos, I thought Extrain was an atheist.
I want to know whether he thinks Kant was atheist or theist, which
would effect how one view diffferent philosophies.

@Humanity,

Humanity;145456 wrote:

I stated earlier that i am aware of Berkeley's primary intention was to support the existence of God.
You disputed and I provided the evidence.
In the intro, Berkeley wrote a 'letter' to God.
From what i read, we can infer that Berkeley primary intention was to support God existence.

No. His arguments are a two part task designed to eventually bring people to God. But that doesn't mean his arguments for God's existence are somehow more important than his arguments against skepticism.

I can easily have an overall intention of converting people to Christianity and to the message in the Gospel by not putting any more importance on my own arguments for God's existence than my arguments addressing skepticism. After all, if I can't know anything, then how would I know that God existed even if you did offer an argument for God's existence? It doesn't mean that I am automatically going to believe that he does exist, if I am a skeptic who believes I can't knowing anything external to my mind in the first place. So you first MUST address skepticim before you address the existence of God, otherwise the argument offered for God's existence are not going to have any effect on the skeptic. In fact, it is clear that his arguments against skepticism would have to be, if not more important, at least more foundational than the other task. But this can only be accomplished if I keep my Duty to God first and foremost in my mind.--This is what Berkeley saying.

And second, isn't Berkeley's "letter" before the Preface just his way of praying to God to hopefully accomplish this very same task?

Quote:

He did attempt to prove god's existence as well in the treatise.

When did i ever say that he didn't?

Quote:

If i missed out anything why, you can always highlight to me in
a non-provocative manner. If you do not llike my style, then there is the concept of 'ignore'.

If you have your own "style," then it is a style that consistently leads you to misinterpret your own authors and derive false conclusions about their own intentions and beliefs.

Quote:

I had suggested you stop the ad hominems but despite that you are persisting.
The problem with ad hominems at this more refined level of intellectual discussion is that it divert our mind to the lower brain and activates
beastly thoughts which constrainsts higher intellectual thinking.

These aren't ad hominems. Ad hominems are direct attacks on the person in order to knock down what he believes. Example: John believes God doesn't exist. But John murdered 10 people and is a compeletely immoral and deranged person. Therefore, Atheism is false.

My critiques of what you are doing are truthful accusations of your failure to be charitable to the texts you consistently misrepresent. This isn't an ad hominem.

Quote:

Anyway, I will be reporting you to the moderators and hope they take
appropriate action.

On what ground? That I am too direct for you?

Quote:

I suggest you take things easy and relax, this is just a discussion.

I suggest you start paying to attention what is actually being said by other philosophers and everyone else on this forum before you respond to their posts, otherwise this isn't even a discussion at all.

[QUOTE] I have read and understood Kant refutation of Berkeley idealism[/QUOTE]

Obviously not because of your misrepresentation below.

[QUOTE] There seem to be some misunderstand, note Kant in '[/QUOTE]

Quote:

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula:
"All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth." Kant

Berkeley did not treat all cognition through the senses and experience as nothing but sheer illusion. Never.

wow. After all that I posted you snip this one quote out of the Prolegomena showing that Kant was so stupid to think Berkeley thought everything from experience was a "sheer illusion"? No. Read the rest of the passage in depth. What Kant has to say about the Eleatic School and Berkeley himself, is Kant's assessment of the result of Berkeley's Idealism which Berkeley failed to notice. In other words, Berkeley's arguments don't succeed in refuting skepticism at all--so he is still left with this "illusory appearance" of an only allegedly-existent external world on his hands to contend with. After all, Kant's refutation of Idealism is Kant's way of showing Material Substance DOES exist. So if it doesn't, according to Berkeley, then that makes, for Berkeley, Material Substance nothing but an illusion, and not really existent at all.

Q.E.D

This one isolated *snip* is not as simple-minded as you're taking it to be. "Cognition" is a very technical term for Kant, so is "Sensibility" and "Understanding." Read the rest of the passage; Kant explores what Berkeley said, how Kant himself interprets what he said, and his offering of his own alternative solution to the problem of skepticism different than Berkeley's as Kant saw it needing to be done. Stop being so uncharitable to Kant. This is not how philosophy is actually done.

[QUOTE]Whatever the above, imo, without the theistic aspect of Berkeley, the core ideas of Berkeley and Kant are the same in term of philosophy of the mind. [/QUOTE]

This is false. And you have still yet to show this claim is actually true.

@Extrain,

Extrain;145478 wrote:

This one isolated *snip* is not as simple-minded as you're taking it to be. Stop being so uncharitable to Kant. This is not how philosophy is actually done.
This is false. And you have still yet to show this claim is actually true.

There are constraints in posting a limited forum like this especially for a complex subject like Kant.
I have spent months studying Kant but admittedly not an expert.
I have to build up a dictionary of 200+ Kant terms with a small base from Steven Palmquist.
In addition i have charted half the above relevant points into a connected
flowchart and it still semi-completed after 20 versions.

An isolated "snip" is just an indication to you that i know something about the subject and is not at a total lost on the whole subject of it.
Searching for the relevant points in Kant, Berkeley or Schopenhauer is sometimes like finding a needle in a haystack and its something
that we can extract one needle that would lead to more.

That isolated *snip* should not be the end to it at all, if we persist, i will eventually get to the point of it.
In anycase, despite the messiness of it all, i have retrieved quite a substantial amount of references from the original source (more than you anyway) to support my point.

@Humanity,

Humanity;145481 wrote:

There are constraints in posting a limited forum like this especially for a complex subjects like Kant.
I have spent months studying Kant but admittedly not an expert.
I have to build up a dictionary of 200+ Kant terms with a small base from Steven Palmquist.
In addition i have charted half the above relevant points into a connected
flowchart and it still semi-completed after 20 versions.

Keep working on it. And get some commentary. I wasn't even able to thoroughly learn what Kant was actually saying without the outside help from other contemporary scholarly philosophers on Kant. Believe it or not, my first mistake was to think Kant was in many ways like Berkeley just you like you do--and everyone makes this terrible mistake at first--but it's a natural mistake to make. However, enough investigation into his philsophy shows how they are actually on opposite sides of the philosophical camp! And I am not speaking metaphorically at all. I really mean that.

Humanity;145481 wrote:

An isolated "snip" is just an indication to you that i know something about the subject and is not at a total lost on the whole subject of it.

I'm afraid you are lost. I've had to stop offering my own arguments here and there because you don't understand the philosphers whom you are reading. In other words, my stance now concerns the defence of Kantian and Berkelian Apologetics against your flippant meandering through their texts trying to put them together as if they were the same philosopher. I keep telling you this doesn't work, but you don't seem to believe it.

Humanity;145481 wrote:

Searching for the relevant points in Kant, Berkeley or Schopenhauer sometimes like finding a needle in a haystack and it something
that we can extract one needle that would lead to more.
That isolated snip should not the end to it at all, if we persist, i will eventually get to the point of it.

I guess. But it takes years of practice, just like learning mathematics and eventually reaching calculus. Philosophy is a very rigorous discipline which you seem to think is easy. But if you don't have that necessary humility toward what it is you are actually reading, then you are going to miss it altogether.

Further, you have to learn how each passage fits into the totality of the larger work of the person's philosophy, and how that philosopher understood the problem he was trying to address. Things are not always as black and white, as if they will spring right off the page itself.

Humanity;145481 wrote:

In anycase, despite the messiness of it all, i have retrieved quite a substantial amount of references from the original source (more than you anyway) to support my point.

I doubt that. But that's not the point....

Anyone can *snip* passages from a larger text, but if you don't understand what they are really saying (which you clearly haven't) then what's the use??

Worst of all, you have been snipping passages without explaining what they mean. Notice how I do it. I present the quote, then I provide my own commentary on what is being said. That's what you need to do, and that's how reading any historical text works when you are trying to present a case to somebody else about what a philosopher actually said. And you do your best if he was unclear in a certain passage to give him the most charitable interpretation of what he most likely meant. Uninterpreted texts just lying in pieces on the floor doesn't tell anybody anything.

@Extrain,

Extrain;145488 wrote:

Worst of all, you have been snipping passages without explaining what they mean. Notice how I do it. I present the quote, then I provide own commentary on what is being said. That's what you need to do, and that's how reading any historical text works when you are trying to present a case to somebody else about what a philosopher actually said. And you do your best if he was unclear in a certain passage to give him the most charitable interpretation of what he most likely meant. Uninterpreted texts just lying in pieces on the floor doesn't tell anybody anything.

You stated you understood Kant and Berkeley thoroughly.
Thus when i produced the quote to support the point i was making,
I thought there is no need for me to explain.

Frankly I don't need your explanations at all for most of the quotes
you provided on Kant and Berkeley.
It is a waste of your time to repeat the fundamentals on Kant.
If i am not sure, then i will ask.

In anycase, providing quote is better than paraphrases.
At least from the quotes, one is able to judge whether is it relevant
or not.

By the same, if you think i am off course, just ask and you shall be given.
I have not attempted to run away from anything of your question,
it is just a case of omission and not clearly understanding what you expect.
(other than the points i deliberately told you i will avoid).
As i had said, this is only a discussion and there is always room for negotiation and consensus.
it is not a trial for murder or something serious.

Quote:

Uninterpreted texts just lying in pieces on the floor doesn't tell anybody anything.

This is rather not the case and as i originally intended.
I set up this OP to go through every line of the the Dialogues and intend to discuss them in details so that there is no miscomprehension.
It never went on track and that how it is now.

Quote:

Keep working on it. And get some commentary. I wasn't even able to thoroughly learn what Kant was actually saying without the outside help from other contemporary scholarly philosophers on Kant. Believe it or not, my first mistake was to think Kant was in many ways like Berkeley just you like you do--and everyone makes this terrible mistake at first--but it's a natural mistake to make. However, enough investigation into his philsophy shows how they are actually on opposite sides of the philosophical camp! And I am not speaking metaphorically at all. I really mean that.

I am doing just that.
I did learn a bit of Kant from Schopenhauer's critique and others.
Earlier I also thought Kant wanted to banish metaphysics totally,
but changed my view when i read his critique more thoroughly.
Btw, i have NEVER proclaimed to be an expert of Kant.

@Humanity,

I think that what Kant replaces metaphysics with, is a metaphysic of a different kind. Of course, when you understand the metaphysic he was criticizing, and the alternative that he proposes, you will see that they are very different. However the unfortunate effect of this is that most will just say 'to hell with all of it'. Which is exactly what philosophy, on the whole, has done. After Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer, it all became too difficult.

The whole thing then becomes very bogged down in technical arguments which very few can comprehend. My take from a 'backwards telescope' viewpoint is that, in the first place, Aristotle did not really 'get' Plato, because Plato was an initiate of the Mysteries, and Aristotle was much more a man of the world. Then, secondly, we have all Augustine's enormous sexual hangups, notwithstanding the fact that Augustine was also a genius of the highest order. And then you have the attempt to do a mash up of Aristotle's critique of Platonism + Augustine's attempts to fit Plotinus into the straightjacket of Christian orthodoxy (which is an unholy, pardon the irony, amalgam of Greek sophistry and Semitic mysticism). And there's your 'metaphysics'.

No wonder it was a mess.

One result of all this was that Kant was a nominalist. I am sure that if he were a realist, his whole system would have been far more coherent. Kant plus platonism - now you're talking. But it was not to be. And it is going to take someone considerably more learned and much smarter than me to work all that out. Life is too short for all this. But somewhere in the middle of all of it, there is the core of immortal genius.

@jeeprs,

[QUOTE=Humanity;145456]I792 PHILONOUS. In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed IDEAS, but THINGS.

From the above, Berkeley would not have called the stone he was standing on as an Idea-stone but just plain stone as Johnson would have perceived it.

He didn't say this. Look at the text again. He said these things really exist be that he didn't care what you call it so long as you don't grant that these things "can exist unperceived outside the mind".

Therefore, if these things cannot be perceived outside the mind then they are certainly not perceived external to the mind either as YOU contend, since to suppose so is to grant their absolute existence independent of the mind! Read the passage.

Here is a very crucial passage concerning Berkeley's Metaphysical Idealism from the Treatise. You need to understand how drastically different it is from Kant's own views. So I will contrast this passage with a passage directly from Kant, which actually criticizes how Berkeley is approaching the problem here in his Treatise:

"But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this?
[NOTICE: He is not asking whether the Material Substance without qualities exists outside the mind. He is asking whether Material Substance WITH QUALITIES exist outside the mind--namely, those which are solid, figured, moveable]
Either we must know it by sense, or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived,
[NOTICE! NOT EVEN the sensible qualities perceived WITHIN experience tell us whether actual objects exist without the mind]
like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. By what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend, there is any necessary connection betwixt them and our ideas?" (George Berkeley, p59)

As to the doubt about a Substance Existing outside the mind in the Paralogisms of Reason, Kant criticizes Descartes and Berkeley at length for thinking that the existence of the external world has to be "proven or inferred" as the cause of our given impressions on the mind in order to come to know that the external world exists. He says there is no reason for thinking we have to do this because the existence of the external world independent of my perception IS given in my experience already. So Kant critizes Berkeley for thinking the following has to be done which Kant is NOT endorsing:

"The fourth Paralogism of the Ideality (of outer relation): That whose existence can be inferred only as a cause of given perceptions has only a doubtful existence. Now all outer appearances are of this kind: their existence cannot be immediately perceived, but can be inferred only as the cause of given perceptions.

That the existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the Ideality of outer appearances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called Idealism." (A 367)

Kant is here mentioning Descartes and Berkeley's Problematic Idealism which says nothing can be known independent of our Ideas--which Kant says is false.

And Berkeley's subsequent conclusion is that, therefore, nothing but Ideas and minds exist. And this is the metaphysical Idealism Kant later REFUTES.

No, he didn't recognize "external reality" as seen above. Here's another crucial passage from the Treatise para 25:

"25. Since they [Ideas] and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follow that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be a the cause of anything: neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from sect.8. Whence it plainly follow that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false.

(FYI, Kant denies all of this. See the Kant's passage below. He thinks the object in the material world causes sensations in us. Way different than Berkeley.)

So either rocks are ideas in which case they cannot do anything. Or rocks are things, also, in which case they have no causal power or activity since "extension, figure, and motion [the primary qualities] cannot be the cause of our sensations." Why? Because they are Ideas, and Ideas have no causal powers. So to say that our sensations are the effect of "powers resulting from number, motion, and size of particles, must be certainly false."

So if it is not Ideas that cause sensations in us, can it be corporeal matter? No. Because right after in 26 titled "The Cause of Our Ideas" Berkeley says,

"We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, other are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance; it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit....some other will or spirit that produces them (.29)

So the the cause of our ideas is not corporeal, but incorporeal Substance, another Spirit or Will (God). So if Berkeley really thought corporeal matter was the cause of our Ideas, he would have certainly mentioned it in this passage titled "The Cause of Our Ideas." So matter doesn't have causal power because all matter is just Ideas. Even worse, Berekeley explicitly DENIES the existence of Corporeal Substance in this passage altogether.(Kant NEVER denies the existence of Corporeal Substance; rather, he ASSERTS its Existence. See below.)
You misunderstood and do not realize that Corporeal Matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
I never said they were the same. Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is an Idea. But how this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
Kant's idea (Plato's) is different from Bekeley's IDEA.
NO. Kant doesn't talk about Platonic Forms at all. So Kant was not a Platonist. Again, you are just inventing things without textual textual proof or explanation for what you mean. You obviously don't know what you are talking about.

Further, what is Berkeley's "IDEA"? Define it with textual proof from Berkeley himself.

And Kant says Ideas are NOT material objects. Further, the actual "commonsense view" is that Ideas are not material objects, because the commonsense view is that Ideas do not have any causal power, while most people think material objects do have causal power. And since material objects just are Ideas, Berkeley says we need to look to a Spiritual Incorporeal Substance or Will that causes or produces these Ideas in us (this is way different than Kant. See below.)
Note, Kant's idea is different from Berkeley's IDEA.
What is Kant's "Idea" which you talk about that is supposed to be so different than Berkeley's "IDEA"? Again, this is another failed explanation.

I haven't seen Berkeley talk about this alleged "object-in-itself" yet.
But most importantly, he explicitly denies extension, motion, and number are capable of producing Ideas in us because they have no causal power. They have no causal power because they are obviously ideas. What else could they be? It would take a strangely confused person to say that "common sense matter" really exists but then deny it has any causal powers at all. So matter just is Ideas.

Not specifically 'object-in-itself' but "things-in-itself". Will provide a list of examples later.
This is proof that you make your own terms up without even defining them. This is an example of your being uncharitable to Berkeley.

Sure. But how is that an objection? The notion is nonsensical, so I can't make any sense of what it means for it to either exist, or not exist. So as far as I know god-in-itself could either exist or not exist.
To speculate on whether "God-in-itself" or whatever-in-itself could either I don't understand what your point is.
From Kant's perspective this is delusional. What is delusional from Kant's perspective? Will you still insist on this doubt, if you insist, then according to Kant, your view on this is delusional.
My view of what? And how is it that whatever my view you claim to be is, contrary to whatever you are clailming Kant said? Where's the Textual Proof?
Originally Posted by Humanity
However, the materialists are speculating that their so-called matter-in-itself exist independent of human minds.

Originally Posted by Humanity
This is what Berkeley is denying.

As we have seen, Berkeley is also denying that corporeal matter is the cause of our Ideas, only a Spiritual Substance or Will can cause our ideas because all Ideas are causally inert.
Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
I never said they were the same. Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is an Idea. But how this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
Kant's idea (Plato's) is different from Bekeley's IDEA.
Kant didn't believe in the existence of Platonic Forms. If you think he did, then show me the textual proof.

Although Kant explained in detailed how his 'matter' manifest from sensation and a priori element, it fall short of the range of reality that Berkeley was explaining how we view reality.
I don't understand this. Please explain.

Berkeley extended the source of our reality to Spiritual Substance or Will whereas Kant stop short at the a priori level.
I don't understand this. Please explain.

Originally Posted by Humanity
Yes, not an argument.

Originally Posted by Humanity
It was just an evidence to show that Berkeley had used the same concept of thing-in-itself that Kant (more detailed) used.

Here is another example (not argument);
482 PHILONOUS: I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS.

But you just said earlier that Berkely countenanced the existence of real material objects when he is clearly denying it here. So only Ideas are real. And Kant NEVER says what Berkeley is saying here. I challenge you to show me a passage from Kant where this same kind of thing is explicitly stated as it is here in Berkeley.

482 PHILONOUS: I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from (pure) ["Pure" for Berkeley doesn't mean the same thing as "Pure" for Kant. Berkeley is referring to the impossibility of DEDUCING the existence of material Substance from reason alone. Kant says, on the other hand, that "pure" reason is attempts to talk about objects beyond all possible sensible experience. So our faculty of reason should take place WITHIN experience and not make any assertions about the world independent of that experience.] reason for the existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS. (thing-in-itself).NO. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT THE SAME THING AS THE KANTIAN THING-IN-ITSELF.

To Berkeley, 'REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS' is what Kant deemed as "thing-in-itself" i.e. the noumenon.NO. KANT DID NOT "DEEM" MATERIAL OBJECTS AS THE THING-IN-ITSELF.
STOP MAKING THINGS UP Kant never said!!!!
Kant was explicit on 'pure reason' but for Berkeley it was only 'reason' but both are referring to the same mental event, i.e. pure reason.
No they are not referring to the same thing. For Berkeley, reason is applicable to experience just as Kant thought reason was applicable to experience. He shows this quite consistently, it is an obvious truism. Berekley merely thought that reason couldn't DEDUCE the existence of the MATERIAL SUBSTANCE from its any known logical princples because reason doesn't provide any emprical content to the mind, and material substance is not observable in the world either.
For Kant, on the other hand, "pure" reason is the application of reason BEYOND the bounds of all possible experience. But Kant DID think the existence of Material Substance is the Necessary condtion for all possible experience, and It wasn't just an Idea or Concept, but a metaphysical THING inherent in the emprically observable world.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Humanity
Or, whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did.

Now Berkeley is also denying the existence of real-material objects-in-themselves (whatever that means), too. And Kant NEVER said anything remotely like this at all.
Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
Kant's idea (Plato's) is different from Bekeley's IDEA.
This is false. So stop saying Kant's "Idea" is Plato's Form. You haven't even told me what this alleged Kantian "Idea" is, and how it is different than Berkeley's "IDEA." What is Berkeley's "IDEA"? What is Kant's "idea"? And what is Plato's "Form"?

Again, you've explained nothing.
Originally Posted by Humanity
The more i read of Berkeley, i am noticing more similarities between B and Kant's philosophy. It may be possible, the later Kant borrowed that term from Berkeley.

Yeah, right.. It's Funny that Kant gives several arguments refuting Berkelian Idealism in the Critique.
Basically Kant agreed with Berkeley in his first edition and subsequently changed his mind in the 2nd edition. Imo, his refutation was sort of a 'quickie' and I don't think he did an effective job on that.
To me, it does not matter as despite Kant's refutation both of them are the same boat leveraging on the human mind to account for reality in opposing the philosophical realists.

And its also funny that Kant NEVER denied the existence of the "Material-in-itself" (whatever that means). I challenge you to show me ONE passage where Kant actually says this. He only denies that the bare THING-IN-ITSELF can ever be known--he never said the "material-thing-in-itself doesn't exist or cannot be known."
He actually says the opposite: that all Material Substance CAN be known. So I wonder why you think Kant is so similar to Berkeley? Are you telling me that your genius far surpasses Kant's own intelligence because Kant was mistaken when he thought he was refuting Berkeley? Which is more likely? That Kant is an idiot, or that you don't understand Kant's philosophy at all? I vote for the latter.

Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
I never said they were the same. Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is an Idea. But how this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
Kant is definitely a genius with reference to his 'Critique of Pure Reason' in highlighting and curbing the excesses of metaphysics, but there was no reason for him to refute Berkeley at all.WHY?

He agreed with Kant in the fist edition but I think he was under social pressure to do so for some reason. BERKELEY AGREED WITH KANT? So he knew what Kant was going to write before Kant actually wrote it?
His refutation of Berkeley was a quickie and he did not do a good job on it.
Why? What was wrong with his criticism?
Kant should have reconciled his philosophy of mind with that of Berkeley, for they are similar at the core.WHY?What was wrong with Kant's entire philosophy? And what is so superior about Berkeley's?

Kant didn't explain the concept of the Thing-in-Itself in "detail." He postulated that it could not be known at all and then described in detail how the necessary a priori cognitive faculties of the mind structure our experience of the materially subsistent phenomenon which is immediately perceived when the object itself directly causes sensations in us. Perhaps in the Dialectic he explores at a great length how reason goes astray making metaphysical claims which go beyond the bounds of all possible experience.
I understand this part and how Kant's object itself directly causes sensation in us.
But Kant's given object of the outer sense is totally different from what Berkeley termed as the philosophers' material object.SO?
Berkeley's material object is the thing-in-itself.Did Berkeley ever use the term "thing-in-itself"? And if he did, how do you know Berkeley meant the same thing Kant did?

Here's is one of the more important parts of Kant's work needing to expressed to here. It is part of the Intro to Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic:

"In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is a least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of intuition [sensation]. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) although the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But all this must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to ability, because in no other way can an object be given to us.

The determined object of an empirical intuition, is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I term its matter; but that which affects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation."

Later in the Aesthetic Kant says,

"By means of outer sense (a property of the mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time." (CPR A22-23/B37)
I am familiar with the above.
maybe you are familiar with the words, but you fail to grasp what the words mean.
Kant parts with Berkeley on several points here:
(1) Physical objects directly affect or "cause" sensations in us--Berkeley denies this is even possible.
Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.

I never said they were the same. Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is an Idea. But how is this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
(2) The sensation of the object, the faculties of the mind, the object sensed, and the matter corresponding to the object (or phenomenon) of sensation) are all distinct elements within experience --whereas Berkeley collapses them together.
Again a misunderstanding where, corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
I never said they were the same. I said Berkeley collapses SENSATION with the PHENOMENA, which which is exactly what he does. I give proof of this in the text concerning Philonus' conversation with Hylas about it.
Look:
Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance altogether. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is JUST an Idea, because ALL IDEAS ARE SENSATIONS. AND ALL PERCEPTIBLE SENSATIONS ARE EITHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY QUALITIES. But how this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
As far as it is considered within the common sense framework, Berkeley did not collapse them together.
I never said Berkeley's Material Substance is the same as his common sense notion of matter. I said Berkeley collapses SENSATION with the PHENOMENA, which which is exactly what he does by proof of the text I gave in Philonus' conversation with Hylas.
Look:
Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance altogether. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is JUST an Idea, because ALL IDEAS ARE SENSATIONS. AND ALL PERCEPTIBLE SENSATIONS ARE EITHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY QUALITIES. For Berkeley, all phenomena (NOT phenomenon) are Ideas--and these random collections of phenomena encountered in experience just is sensation itself--this is Berkeley's collapsing sensation together with phenomena, so there are no objects of sensation, just sensation itself, or the sensation itself just IS the object of senseation: THIS is the allegedly "common-sense notion of matter" he speaks of.

For Kant, on the other hand, the phenomenon is immediately and directly given in experience, but it is not Berkeley's notion of an "Idea" that is given directly in experience for Kant. So, the phenomenon is not an "Idea" for Kant like it is for Berkeley. For Kant the phenomenon is the direct OBJECT OF experience, but it is not that experience ITSELF of the object. So most importantly the PHENOMENON IS NOT A SENSATION . The ACT of Sensation and the OBJECT of Sensation are distinct. They are NOT distinct in Berkeley.

Even further, for Kant, Sensation consists in the actual SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY OF THE MIND. Contra Berkeley who thought SENSATION is completely PASSIVE--because the act of sensation just is the Idea. This is exactly why Berkeley says IDEAS ARE CAUSALLY INERT, NAMELY BECAUSE SENSATIONS THEMSELVES ARE CAUSALLY INERT! THIS IS BERKELEY'S STRICT EMPIRICISM AT WORK SAYING ALL THIS HERE.

SO I SEE NO SIMILARITIES BETWEEN BERKELEY'S DISCUSSION OF PHENOMENA AND KANT'S DISCUSSION OF THE PHENOMENON WHATSOEVER. But how is this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
(3) The phenomenon which is the completely articulated and fully structured object of experience (as distinct from the Noumena--or Thing in Itself) actually corresponds to something really existent and distinct from itself which is the bare matter in sensation--that thing Berkeley denies exists altogether.
Berkeley recognized the existence of the phenomenon like what Kant did.
Just because Berkeley used the same word doesn't entail he meant the same thing as Kant. Further, in what respect are they the same? I just showed how wildly different their two notions, in fact, ARE.
Kant however, explained in greater detail how the phenomenon is derived from a synthesis with a priori element via space and time.
No. The phenomenon is not "derived" from a "synthesis." A synthesis of what? The phenomenon is immediately and directly given in experience without the mediation of any ideas. It is the direct object OF experience.
Kant implied the following, one can cognized the phenomenon but do not ever attempt to think that is an phenomenal object-in-itself.
What does "phenomenal object-in-itself" mean? This is not a Kantian term. Where does Kant use this term?
Berkeley on the other hand, distinguish between phenomenon and what the philosophical realist called Matter.For Berkeley, phenomena were just the primary and secondary sensible qualities given in experience which don't have any structure, nor are these qualities united in an empirical Substance because he denied the existence of Material Substance, which is Berkeley's METAPHYSICAL Dialectical ERROR Kant accuses him of making. Further, phenomena for Berkeley, just are Ideas.
The phenomenon for Kant, however, just IS Material Substance with all of its qualities, properities, and relation bound up together with it. And Material Substance really exists, it is immediately perceivable, and it is NOT and idea. Further, it exists independently of one's perception of it.
Berkeley accept what is 'matter' in the phenomenon but not Matter (note it Matter with a capital M) that is outside the phenomenon.Again "Berkelian common sense matter" just is the phenomena (not phenomenon) of sensible qualities given in Berkelian sensible experience but they are not united to any particular object perceived because no object (Material Substance) exists, nor is it perceived, to support those qualities. Further, the "matter" of phenomena just are Berkelian Ideas.[SEE ABOVE]
Berkeley's Matter (with the capital M) which is contrasted with phenomenon is the same as Kant's noumenon.I am so sick of this!!!!!!!! No. Kant said Material Substance is NOT the noumenon.

(4) Kant says the Formal Intuitions of Space and Time represent objects as existing outside of my mind in the real world--whereas Berkeley says this representing things outside my mind distinct from my Ideas is a contradiction. Kant, contradicting Berkeley, says this representation of things existing outside me and independent of my actual perception of it is a necessary condition for experience to be possible at all.
Aha, I think this is where you failed to misunderstand the finer points of Kant's philosophy.NO I DIDN'T. You Did.
Kant stated that Space (not time) represents objects as existing external to us. The formal intuition of Space is the "outer sense" which makes possible the representation of objects within space. Further, in the Aesthetic, Kant proves Space is also empirically real.

The formal intuition of Time is the "inner sense" which makes possible those objects outside me already in space as continuing in time. But it is called the "inner sense" because the formal intuition of time makes possible the representation of external objects in space as consisting of the flow of perceptions within me via the fundamental unity of apperception of the self as existing permanently in time. That is why Substance is closely tied up with Time. Substance makes possible the representation of the what Kant calls "the paradoxically permanent in time." Further, in the Aesthetic, Kant demonstrates Time is also Empirically real.

If you want to use the phrase "existing outside of my mind" then you have to be very careful in what you meant by 'mind'.HAHAHA! Yeah! Like I need to be careful!
Kant stated that Space is in mind and conditioned by the subject.NO, Kant DID NOT say space is "IN THE MIND and conditioned by the subject." He said the formal intution of Space is a necessary condtion for all possible experience. Moreover, it is empirically real and makes possible the representation of objects existing OUTSIDE me. He explicitly said this in this passage i've already quoted.

Further, You also failed to read this:"Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself"

If Space is in mind, how can it represent objects as existing outside of mind.this is just your problem, Kant never said space is "in the mind." He said space is the necessary condition for my representing objects outside me. And the passage here I just quoted here PROVES that space (and time) is not merely a representation itself that exists only inside the mind, because for my representation of objects existing outside me to be possible at all by means of the formal intution of outer space and the inner sense of time, it is also a necessary condition that an ACTUAL THING EXISTS outside me that I perceive itself. Idealism is False.
To reconcile this contradiction, we need to view mind as two layers.
We thus have mind1 and mind2.WHAT CONTRADICTION? Your OWN?
Mind 1 encompassed mind 2. Mind2 is the subset of mind1, i.e.
Mind1 ( mind2 ), thus
Mind1 -space ( mind2-externality of objects )
Therefore while internal Space generate an outer sense of externality,
that sense of externality is ultimately conditioned by mind1.
This isn't Kant. Further, I don't even know what your inventions of Mind subsets are supposed to mean, as if I have a mind within a mind. Whatever. You are just pulling an AD HOC argument to Make Kant a Berkeliean Idealist which is he clearly NOT.
Accordingly Kant, thing-in-itself would be presented as such;

[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]
I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS. Are you copying this somewhere from the internet?
what is this symbol "<--/-->"? Is it supposed to be logical truth-fuctional connective such as the bi-conditional SYMBOL <-->? But what are the propositions which are flanking the symbol saying exactly? Are they propositions at all? ARe you trying to make a statement of logical identity, metaphysical identity? Or are you offering defintions of terms? Are you offering a notion of metaphysical or ontological dependency? Or are you stating a relation between minds and space? Are you saying a mind just IS space, and Matter? Are you saying MIND just is SPACE and NOT MATTER. Are you saying matter exists in subset part of mind2 (or 1) but not in the mind1 (or 2) of the other? What in the world are you even saying??
This isn't a fair representation of Kant at all. Stop trying to make Kant a Berkelian Idealist.
<--/--> = absolute independent, i.e. the unconditioned.
STOP making Kant a Berkelian Idealist.
Mind1 and mind2 refers to Kant's experience and the thing-in-itself is outside
Experience.Kant doesn't talk about Mind1 and Mind2. If he did, then there would be two minds, but Kant thinks there is one, and it is grounded in the FUNDAMENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION which you, of course, KNOW NOTHING ABOUT.
Stop making Kant a Berkelian Idealist

Using the above, what Berkeley meant by Matter is this;

[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects )]<--/-->[Matter]
whatever.

@Extrain,

Berkeley accepts mind1 space (he did not elaborate on this) and mind2 externality, but he deny is the philosophical realists' Matter that is outside mind1 and mind 2.

From the above, what Berkeley termed and deny as Matter (philosophical realist) is the same the Kant's thing-in-itself (noumenon).
THIS IS FALSE. NOR DOES IT LOGICALLY FOLLOW FROM YOUR MINDLESS INVENTION.
If you want to reconcile the 'matter' (small m) of Kant to the Matter (Capital M) of Berkeley, then it is;
Why would I want to relegate Kant's Philosophy to your meaningless symbols?
For Kant,
[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects{matter} )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]
THIS IS FALSE.
For Berkeley,
[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects{matter})]<--/-->[Matter]
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS.
You will note that Berkeley and Kant agree with the concept of matter (with small m)
within mind2.
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
(5) For Kant the Mind takes an Active role in Sensation, for Berkeley it take a passive role--the Mind is completely passive in its reception of Ideas given to it.
This misunderstanding is due to your misunderstanding of the complex concept of 'mind'. i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
In terms of mind2, both Berkeley and Kant accept that the mind (mind2) takes an active role in Sensation. i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
As for Kant's mind1, Berkeley conceptualizes it in term of 'spirit' (not God).
Kant's mind1 comprised a whole lot of a priori elements but Berkeley simply termed it as intermediate 'spirit' (not God) which in a way is the a priori of Kant in simplified term. i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
Both meant the same thing, i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS but credit to Kant for being more detailed but note, there is a difference of one generation and more shoulders for Kant to stand on.

Quote:
Berkeley would agree with Kant and you with regards to the concept of the thing-in-itself.

But Berkeley explicitly denies the existence of material-things-in-themselves altogether in the above several passages. Kant does not. For Kant, the Material Substance is the phenomenon which does have causal powers and enters into relations with other physical objects.
As we have seen in the above passages Berkeley denies that corporeal Substance exists.
But Kant emphatically asserts it--it is one of his categories. Berkeley also denies that corporeal matter has any causal powers because only Spiritual Incorporeal Substance has causal power. Kant says nothing like this at all. And Causality is one of his Categories too which apply to material objects themselves given directly in experience.
Your problem is that you did not understand that the Corporeal Matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual power because the common sense notion of matter is an Idea. But how is this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
Note my explanation earlier.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley's crude Spiritual Incorporeal Substance is the same as Kant's Causality in the Categories in terms of mind1.THIS IS FALSE.
Admitted Kant delved deeper in more detail than what Berkeley did in their philosophy of mind.
But in another sense, Berkeley ventured further when he crudely extended his search to the Will, a penultimate to his God-of-the-Gap.

Quote:
Berkeley stated the materialists speculated that matter-in-itself based on reason and for Kant, it is pure reason. THIS IS FALSE

Quote:
556 PHILONOUS: The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.
Do you notice the similarity? The intelligible "Matter" above implied matter-in-itself as stated by Berkeley elsewhere

No. I don't see the similarity at all. You need to quote the rest of context in which this passage is imbedded so we know what Berkeley is talking about. And you need to know your Kant which you clearly don't. This doesn't even sound like Kant at all.
You should not judge a person merely by a few posts.
I have numbered the para. I am judging you by ALL OF THEM.
Suggest you use a pencil to number the para in your book.
I think they should be the same, if not, should be thereabout.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley's intelligible Matter is the same as Kant intelligible thing in itself which is both derived from reason (Kant = pure).This is all just HOT AIR.

Quote:
If yes, then, it can only mean matter-in-itself which as you say is non-sensical.

I told you before--I don't subscribe to Berkeley's limited definitions because it produces Metaphysical Idealism something Kant NEVER endorsed, but refuted in many places, three of which are in

The Transcendental Aesthetic.
The Parologisms of Reason (in the Dialectic--yes, Berkeley commits a metaphysical blunder)
The BiG Refutation right after the Analytic of Principles.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley and Kant agree with the concept of thing-in-itself.THIS IS FALSE.
Berkeley repeated this concept in similar veins many times in the Dialogue.
Here is another example as confirmed by Hylas;
665 HYLAS. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

I will be compiling and sorting all the paras that refer to this concept.
PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS
Quote:
If your 'matter' is that of the common sense then it cannot be absolutely independent of the senses of common sense.

Kant never said matter is dependent on one's perception of it, not even this "common sense" matter you are talking about. You continue to try to fit Kant into your tiny Berkelian categories. But that's like trying to fit the entire world's population into the State of Rhode Island. It just doesn't work. You aren't providing any Kant passages either, so you are not succeeding in making any comparisons at all.
Yes, within Kant's framework of outer sense generated by Space, Kant's matter is stated to be separated from one's perception.
From a set perspective mind-dependent common sense WHOSE? YOURS? is as follows;

For Kant,
[Mind1-space (mind2 (common sense (-externality of objects){matter}) )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]
PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS

Quote:
In a way, when you perceive something in the day-to-day sense there is apparently a 'perceiver' and what 'is perceived', i.e. a subject and an object.

Berkeley explicitly denies the distinction in the Dialogues between the perception and what is perceived because "sensation is not an act but is a completely passive in its reception of Ideas,and the object unperceived is a contradiction."
Berkeley says all of the following in the same passages that, "only ideas are immediately perceived" so the perception just IS what is perceived. He explicitly says this right here:

There is a problem of semantics here.
When I stated "in a way when you perceive something" I use it in the ordinary sense and conventional sense of seeing things.
When Berkeley used the concept of "perception" what he had done was to collapse the whole of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to one concept, i.e. "perception".BERKELEY collapsed the whole of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to one concept before KANT EVEN WROTE IT???????????
I mentioned somewhere, you need to view Berkeley's perception as something in the line of the German "Anschuuang" which imply a meaning more wider than the conventional or scientific term "perception".
In Berkeley's perception the whole scheme of event of how an object is actualized or emerge as in emergence.WOW. SO AN OBJECT ACTUALIZED EMERGES? WOW! THAT'S QUITE AN INSIGHT YOU GOT THERE, BUDDY! I WILL TELL ALL THE KANTIAN SCHOLARS ABOUT THE AMAZING DISOVERY YOU MADE! THEY SHOULD BE CALLING YOU SOON TO RECOGNIZE YOU WITH AN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AWARD FOR THE MOST HIGHLY REGARDED GENIUS NEVER BEFORE RECOGNIZED IN PHILOSOPHY.

Hyl: One great oversight I take to be this: that I did not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation. Now though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.
Phil: What object do you mean? The object of the Senses?
Hyl:The same
Phil: It is then immediately percieved?
Hyl: Right
Phil: Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived, and a sensation.
Hyl: The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; beside which, there is something perceived; and this I call the object. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.
Phil: What tulip do you speak of: is it that which you see?
Hyl: The same
Phil: And what do you see beside color, figure, and extension?
Hyl: Nothing
Phil: What would you say then is, that the red and yellow are co-existent with the extension; is it not?
Hyl: That is not all: I would say, they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.
Phil: That the colours are really in the tulip which I see, is manifest. Neither can it be denied, that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but that any immediate object of the sense, that is, any idea, or combination of ideas should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction.

Seeing light or darkness, perceiving white, smellingaction your were speaking of, as an ingredient in every sensation? And doth it not follow from your concession, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?

Phil: Since you distinguish the active and passive in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, etc.,, are not all equally passive sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them "external objects," and give them in words what subsistence you please. But examine you own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?

"Phil: So whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?
Hyl: To suppose that were absurd: but inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?
sense you can best tell, whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived, are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you then thought."

Quote:
But that independence is only apparent and generated by our faculty of 'outer sense' based on a priori space.

Quote:
That is Kant's. Berkeley mentioned "outness" and "distance".

No. Kant doesn't think the object's independence of the mind is "only apparent" as if it were a illusory or "imaginative." Quite the opposite:
Notice the First Analogy in the Category of the Analogies of Experience: Principle of the Permanence of Substance.
I did not mention "illusory" or "imaginative" and do not imply that at all.
"ONLY AN APPEARANCE" MEANS "IMAGINARY"

OH BUT WAIT. I FORGOT. YOU LIKE TO INVENT YOUR OWN WORDS. I'M SORRY.
"All appearances contain that which persits (substance) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists. Or, [contrary to Berkeley] In all change of appearances substance persits, and its quantum neither increased nor diminished in nature."

"Only in that which persists (substance) are temporal relations (simultaneity and succession) possible, i.e., that which persists is the substratum of the empirical representation of the empirical reality of time itself, by which alone all time-determinations are possible...consequently also the condtion of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, i.e., of experience, and in this persisting thing all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a modus of existence of that which lasts and persists. Therefore in all appearances that which persits is the object itself, i.e., the substance

Rather than deny Substance like Berkeley, Kant maintained it as central piece of all time-determination and the persistence of unchanging objects through changing appearances. Moreover, Substance is not the perceptible qualities (as Berkeley supposed), but is the condition for their persistence in a single unchanging substratum without which experience of simultaneity, coexistence, and the underlying permanence in time is not possible at all. And remember, Time, for Kant, has been demonstrated in the Aesthetic to be not only Transcendentally Ideal but also Empirically Real.

Since the existence of material Substance is that which takes place in Space and time, and since in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant demonstrates both the a priori transcendental possibility of space and also the empirical reality of space, it therefore follows that Substance really exists. It is a two part task for Kant because space and time are both Transcendentally Ideal and Empirically real.

Here is that Refutation of Berkeley's Idealism again:

The Skeptical or Problematic Idealism of Descartes who merely doubts the existence of the external world, and what Kant calls "the Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism of Berkeley" which says
(a) matter is impossible
(b) Idealism applies to all objects
(c) All the proper objects of all human cognition are nothing but ideas.

Kant claims all of (a)-(c) are false here in the section titled "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason" in the CPR where he takes both Descartes and Berkeley to task in the A and B editions:

A341-405/B399-432

READ IT AGAIN.

In stark contrast to Berkeley, Kant argues at length that,

(d) Transcendental Idealism says that, not only is the existence of matter possible, but is also a necessary condition of all possible experience whatsoever.
(e) Transcendental Idealism does NOT say all proper objects of human cognition are nothing but ideas (objects existing only within the mind).
(f) And finally, that Transcendental Idealism makes room for Empirical Realism which implies that "necessarily something actually exists outside my concsious states in space." (B274) And if fact, this is the exact conclusion of his refutation of Berkeley's Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism.

Kant's Argument Against Berkeley:
(A) "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" (B 276)
(B) All determination in time presupposes something persistent in perception" (B 276)
(C) "That which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same. (B225)
(E) "This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside of me" (Bxl)
(E) "But this persisting element cannot be an intution [a sense-perception] in me [contra Berkeley]. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are reperesentations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be deternmined" (CPR Bxxxix n.)
(F) "Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" (B 275-276)
(G) Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of this time-determination. Therefore, it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination. (B276)
(H) "I.e., the consciousness of my existence is at the same time (zugleich) an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276)

So Berkeley's metaphysical Idealism is false Q.E.D.

I have read and understood Kant refutation of Berkeley idealism.
There seem to be some misunderstandings, note Kant in 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula:
"All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth." Kant

Berkeley did not treat all cognition through the senses and experience as nothing but sheer illusion. Never.
Whatever the above, imo, without the theistic aspect of Berkeley, the core ideas of Berkeley and Kant are the same in term of philosophy of the mind.
Note, yours in blue, mine in black.

ps. You imposed such a long post and i may have missed out on some points.
Do highlight nicely if you want further information.

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 02:40 AM ----------

There are ways to reconcile Kant's denying of god in the Critique and apparent acceptance of God in the Moral.How? long story.
But fundamentally he rejected God outright.WOW! KANT DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF GOD? I DIDN'T KNOW. I WILL TELL ALL THOSE KANT SCHOLARS YOU MADE ANOTHER BRILLIANT DISCOVERY!

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 02:53 AM ----------

You're Catholic? no wonder...
Do you agree to Kant calling your God a transcendental delusion?WOW! KANT SAID GOD IS TRANSCENDTAL DELUSION? I WILL TELL ALL THOSE KANT SCHOLARS YOU MADE ANOTHER BRILLIANT DISCOVERY!

I think highly of the Catholic religion, especially its mysticism
and most of the Catholics i met are very nice people, except..
YOUR GROSS ERRORS ARE THE WORST THING I'VE SEEN YET IN THE HISTORY OF PRESUMPIVE ARROGANCE IN PHILOSOPHY. YOU HAVE NO RESPECT FOR THE SUBJECT AT ALL. AND YOU ABUSE IT AS IF IT WERE YOUR PLAY TOY TO MAKE THE MOST OUTRAGEOUSLY FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT WHAT OTHER'S ACTUALLY SAID. PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS. YOU INSULT EVERYONE HERE BY YOUR CONSISTENTLY MALIGNED ABUSE OF PHILOSOPHY.
[/QUOTE]

@Extrain,

Extrain;145535 wrote:

THIS IS FALSE. NOR DOES IT LOGICALLY FOLLOW FROM YOUR MINDLESS INVENTION.

Why would I want to relegate Kant's Philosophy to your meaningless symbols?

THIS IS FALSE.

i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS.
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
, i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
THIS IS FALSE.
THIS IS FALSE

I am judging you by ALL OF THEM.

This is all just HOT AIR.

THIS IS FALSE.

PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS
WHOSE? YOURS?

PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS

BERKELEY collapsed the whole of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to one concept before KANT EVEN WROTE IT???????????

WOW! THAT'S QUITE AN INSIGHT YOU GOT THERE, BUDDY! I WILL TELL ALL THE KANTIAN SCHOLARS ABOUT THE AMAZING DISOVERY YOU MADE! THEY SHOULD BE CALLING YOU SOON TO RECOGNIZE YOU WITH AN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AWARD FOR THE MOST HIGHLY REGARDED GENIUS NEVER BEFORE RECOGNIZED IN PHILOSOPHY.
OH BUT WAIT. I FORGOT. YOU LIKE TO INVENT YOUR OWN WORDS. I'M SORRY.

WOW! KANT DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF GOD? I DIDN'T KNOW. I WILL TELL ALL THOSE KANT SCHOLARS YOU MADE ANOTHER BRILLIANT DISCOVERY!
WOW! KANT SAID GOD IS TRANSCENDTAL DELUSION? I WILL TELL ALL THOSE KANT SCHOLARS YOU MADE ANOTHER BRILLIANT DISCOVERY!

YOUR GROSS ERRORS ARE THE WORST THING I'VE SEEN YET IN THE HISTORY OF PRESUMPIVE ARROGANCE IN PHILOSOPHY. YOU HAVE NO RESPECT FOR THE SUBJECT AT ALL. AND YOU ABUSE IT AS IF IT WERE YOUR PLAY TOY TO MAKE THE MOST OUTRAGEOUSLY FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT WHAT OTHER'S ACTUALLY SAID.

PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS. YOU INSULT EVERYONE HERE BY YOUR CONSISTENTLY MALIGNED ABUSE OF PHILOSOPHY.

Wow..............

@Humanity,

Humanity;145491 wrote:

You stated you understood Kant and Berkeley thoroughly.
Thus when i produced the quote to support the point i was making,
I thought there is no need for me to explain.

What do you think philosophical scholars do concerning older philosophical writings? Have you ever heard of that thing called "philosophical exegesis" of older philosophical texts? Apparently not. It's because you're simple-minded and think philosophy is as easy as playing the game of Monopoly. But if you had any once of humility toward the subject, you would recognize your limitations and complete lack of formal training in this area. You've been consistently mistaking your own invented undefined terms for other philosopher's ideas. You collapse two philosophies together. And you don't know how to read philosophy either, or offer any charitable reading of the text that is consistent with the author's own intentions and the rest of his overall philosophy itself.
I could make a list of your numerous blunders, like I have been. All I have been doing is correcting your mistakes. And I'm tired of doing it.

Humanity;145491 wrote:

Frankly I don't need your explanations at all for most of the quotes
you provided on Kant and Berkeley.

You stubborn resistance to being corrected makes you look really foolish because you continue to repeat the same errors over and over and over and over and over and over and over again. And guess what? YOU HAVEN'T SAID ANYTHING NEW FROM ALL THE PREVIOUS POSTS where you make the same mistake over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over..............

Humanity;145491 wrote:

It is a waste of your time to repeat the fundamentals on Kant.
If i am not sure, then i will ask.

As if you actually knew what they were anyway.... Socrates said something on the lines that the wisest man is he who knows that he knows not much at all. The second man is he who doesn't know that he knows alot. But the worst of all, is he who thinks he knows much when he really knows nothing at all. Guess where you fall.....

Humanity;145491 wrote:

In anycase, providing quote is better than paraphrases.
At least from the quotes, one is able to judge whether is it relevant
or not.

Not when it is taken out of context which you continually do, hence always distorting its meaning. Nor when the passage itself could easily be taken one way because the author was misleading about what he was actually trying to say. You are very naive if you think an author's meanings and intentions are always immediately self-evident by the string of words he puts on paper. Therefore, it is not always better to quote without paraphrazing. Again, have you ever heard of the practice of philosophical "exegesis" of older philosophical texts? Apparently not. What do you think scholars do?

Quote:

By the same, if you think i am off course, just ask and you shall be given.
I have not attempted to run away from anything of your question,
it is just a case of omission and not clearly understanding what you expect. (other than the points i deliberately told you i will avoid).

Seriously, who do you think you are? Do you think you get to just say anything you want without explaining yourself? Your "deliberately telling me you will avoid things" is your way of choosing to be blatantly close minded. You don't have that liberty if you want people to take you seriously. And I don't take you seriously at all anymore. You're a fool for the way you approach philosophy, and you consistently abuse it.

Quote:

As i had said, this is only a discussion and there is always room for negotiation and consensus. it is not a trial for murder or something serious.

That's exactly your problem. You DON'T make any room for consensus, but insist on your own false readings of philosophers, and anything that challenges your misrepresentation you discard immediately. Real practicing philosophers hate dealing with people like you because you choose to be ignorant and don't like to be corrected.

Further, Philosophy is not "just discussion." It is a really rigorous discipline that takes these questions very seriously with caution and respect for your interlocutor's ideas even if you disagree with them. But if your companion refuses to answer your questions concerning his own definition of terms, he is being dishonest if he continues to insist on holding those defintions, while criticizing his opponent for being wrong on those definitions he hasn't defined..

I disagree with many people all the time on this forum. That's what we do. But we always make headway. I am carrying on a joint and very cooperative discussion right now someone whose views I disagree with completely. But we both respect eachother, and we are honest. We answer eachother's question, and want to be corrected when we've made a mistake. So what we are doing is trying to solve a problem TOGETHER. Why? Because we are philosophers who want to discover the Truth. But you fail to abide the rules of having a sensible discussion altogether because you don't like your views being questioned or challenged, you don't want to learn more, and you insist on being Dogmatic about your views.

Quote:

This is rather not the case and as i originally intended.
I set up this OP to go through every line of the the Dialogues and intend to discuss them in details so that there is no miscomprehension.

But you continue to "miscomprehend" them all the time.

Quote:

Earlier I also thought Kant wanted to banish metaphysics totally,
but changed my view when i read his critique more thoroughly.

Then it is evident you haven't actually understood his critique at all whatsoever and what the whole purpose of writing it was.:rolleyes: He didn't "banish" metaphysics. He just didn't think it could reveal any knowledge about the world at all because of the very nature of the discipline itself which goes beyond the bounds of experience to talk about the nature of the external world independent of the senses.

Quote:

Btw, i have NEVER proclaimed to be an expert of Kant.

But you are assigning beliefs to him he never actually held. So not only are you not an expert. You also contradict those very experts in the field. So it is just stupid to insist on what you keep insisting about Kant, and I have no clue why you are doing this, except for the fact that you are either (1) arrogant and think you DO know more than the experts, (2) totally ignorant about what Kant said at all because you lack the training, or (3) a complete dunce, or (4) a stubborn jerk. Those are your options.

@Extrain,

Extrain;145551 wrote:

But you are assigning beliefs to him he never actually held. So not only are you not an expert. You also contradict those very experts in the field. So it is just stupid to insist on what you keep insisting about Kant, and I have no clue why you are doing this, except for the fact that you are either (1) arrogant and think you DO know more than the experts, (2) totally ignorant about what Kant said at all because you lack the training, or (3) a complete dunce, or (4) a stubborn jerk. Those are your options.

Forums are merely discussion.
Wonder why you are so worked up.
Take a break. :cool:

With the above sort of insults, i guess that is the end of the road
in our discussions.
Thanks for the exchange for whatever it is worth.

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 08:34 AM ----------

Extrain;145535 wrote:

Berkeley accepts mind1 space (he did not elaborate on this) and mind2 externality, but he deny is the philosophical realists' Matter that is outside mind1 and mind 2.

From the above, what Berkeley termed and deny as Matter (philosophical realist) is the same the Kant's thing-in-itself (noumenon).
THIS IS FALSE. NOR DOES IT LOGICALLY FOLLOW FROM YOUR MINDLESS INVENTION.
If you want to reconcile the 'matter' (small m) of Kant to the Matter (Capital M) of Berkeley, then it is;
Why would I want to relegate Kant's Philosophy to your meaningless symbols?
For Kant,
[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects{matter} )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]
THIS IS FALSE.
For Berkeley,
[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects{matter})]<--/-->[Matter]
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS.
You will note that Berkeley and Kant agree with the concept of matter (with small m)
within mind2.
i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
(5) For Kant the Mind takes an Active role in Sensation, for Berkeley it take a passive role--the Mind is completely passive in its reception of Ideas given to it.
This misunderstanding is due to your misunderstanding of the complex concept of 'mind'. i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
In terms of mind2, both Berkeley and Kant accept that the mind (mind2) takes an active role in Sensation. i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
As for Kant's mind1, Berkeley conceptualizes it in term of 'spirit' (not God).
Kant's mind1 comprised a whole lot of a priori elements but Berkeley simply termed it as intermediate 'spirit' (not God) which in a way is the a priori of Kant in simplified term. i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS
Both meant the same thing, i'M PRETTY SURE THIS IS FALSE TOO, WHATEVER IT MEANS but credit to Kant for being more detailed but note, there is a difference of one generation and more shoulders for Kant to stand on.

Quote:
Berkeley would agree with Kant and you with regards to the concept of the thing-in-itself.

But Berkeley explicitly denies the existence of material-things-in-themselves altogether in the above several passages. Kant does not. For Kant, the Material Substance is the phenomenon which does have causal powers and enters into relations with other physical objects.
As we have seen in the above passages Berkeley denies that corporeal Substance exists.
But Kant emphatically asserts it--it is one of his categories. Berkeley also denies that corporeal matter has any causal powers because only Spiritual Incorporeal Substance has causal power. Kant says nothing like this at all. And Causality is one of his Categories too which apply to material objects themselves given directly in experience.
Your problem is that you did not understand that the Corporeal Matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual power because the common sense notion of matter is an Idea. But how is this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
Note my explanation earlier.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley's crude Spiritual Incorporeal Substance is the same as Kant's Causality in the Categories in terms of mind1.THIS IS FALSE.
Admitted Kant delved deeper in more detail than what Berkeley did in their philosophy of mind.
But in another sense, Berkeley ventured further when he crudely extended his search to the Will, a penultimate to his God-of-the-Gap.

Quote:
Berkeley stated the materialists speculated that matter-in-itself based on reason and for Kant, it is pure reason. THIS IS FALSE

Quote:
556 PHILONOUS: The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, and not by sense.
Do you notice the similarity? The intelligible "Matter" above implied matter-in-itself as stated by Berkeley elsewhere

No. I don't see the similarity at all. You need to quote the rest of context in which this passage is imbedded so we know what Berkeley is talking about. And you need to know your Kant which you clearly don't. This doesn't even sound like Kant at all.
You should not judge a person merely by a few posts.
I have numbered the para. I am judging you by ALL OF THEM.
Suggest you use a pencil to number the para in your book.
I think they should be the same, if not, should be thereabout.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley's intelligible Matter is the same as Kant intelligible thing in itself which is both derived from reason (Kant = pure).This is all just HOT AIR.

Quote:
If yes, then, it can only mean matter-in-itself which as you say is non-sensical.

I told you before--I don't subscribe to Berkeley's limited definitions because it produces Metaphysical Idealism something Kant NEVER endorsed, but refuted in many places, three of which are in

The Transcendental Aesthetic.
The Parologisms of Reason (in the Dialectic--yes, Berkeley commits a metaphysical blunder)
The BiG Refutation right after the Analytic of Principles.
As I had reconciled above, Berkeley and Kant agree with the concept of thing-in-itself.THIS IS FALSE.
Berkeley repeated this concept in similar veins many times in the Dialogue.
Here is another example as confirmed by Hylas;
665 HYLAS. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

I will be compiling and sorting all the paras that refer to this concept.
PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS
Quote:
If your 'matter' is that of the common sense then it cannot be absolutely independent of the senses of common sense.

Kant never said matter is dependent on one's perception of it, not even this "common sense" matter you are talking about. You continue to try to fit Kant into your tiny Berkelian categories. But that's like trying to fit the entire world's population into the State of Rhode Island. It just doesn't work. You aren't providing any Kant passages either, so you are not succeeding in making any comparisons at all.
Yes, within Kant's framework of outer sense generated by Space, Kant's matter is stated to be separated from one's perception.
From a set perspective mind-dependent common sense WHOSE? YOURS? is as follows;

For Kant,
[Mind1-space (mind2 (common sense (-externality of objects){matter}))]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]
PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS

Quote:
In a way, when you perceive something in the day-to-day sense there is apparently a 'perceiver' and what 'is perceived', i.e. a subject and an object.

Berkeley explicitly denies the distinction in the Dialogues between the perception and what is perceived because "sensation is not an act but is a completely passive in its reception of Ideas,and the object unperceived is a contradiction."
Berkeley says all of the following in the same passages that, "only ideas are immediately perceived" so the perception just IS what is perceived. He explicitly says this right here:

There is a problem of semantics here.
When I stated "in a way when you perceive something" I use it in the ordinary sense and conventional sense of seeing things.
When Berkeley used the concept of "perception" what he had done was to collapse the whole of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to one concept, i.e. "perception".BERKELEY collapsed the whole of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic to one concept before KANT EVEN WROTE IT???????????
I mentioned somewhere, you need to view Berkeley's perception as something in the line of the German "Anschuuang" which imply a meaning more wider than the conventional or scientific term "perception".
In Berkeley's perception the whole scheme of event of how an object is actualized or emerge as in emergence.WOW. SO AN OBJECT ACTUALIZED EMERGES? WOW! THAT'S QUITE AN INSIGHT YOU GOT THERE, BUDDY! I WILL TELL ALL THE KANTIAN SCHOLARS ABOUT THE AMAZING DISOVERY YOU MADE! THEY SHOULD BE CALLING YOU SOON TO RECOGNIZE YOU WITH AN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AWARD FOR THE MOST HIGHLY REGARDED GENIUS NEVER BEFORE RECOGNIZED IN PHILOSOPHY.

Hyl: One great oversight I take to be this: that I did not sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation. Now though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.
Phil: What object do you mean? The object of the Senses?
Hyl:The same
Phil: It is then immediately percieved?
Hyl: Right
Phil: Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived, and a sensation.
Hyl: The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; beside which, there is something perceived; and this I call the object. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.
Phil: What tulip do you speak of: is it that which you see?
Hyl: The same
Phil: And what do you see beside color, figure, and extension?
Hyl: Nothing
Phil: What would you say then is, that the red and yellow are co-existent with the extension; is it not?
Hyl: That is not all: I would say, they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.
Phil: That the colours are really in the tulip which I see, is manifest. Neither can it be denied, that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but that any immediate object of the sense, that is, any idea, or combination of ideas should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction.

Seeing light or darkness, perceiving white, smellingaction your were speaking of, as an ingredient in every sensation? And doth it not follow from your concession, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?

Phil: Since you distinguish the active and passive in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, etc.,, are not all equally passive sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them "external objects," and give them in words what subsistence you please. But examine you own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say?

"Phil: So whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind?
Hyl: To suppose that were absurd: but inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?
sense you can best tell, whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived, are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you then thought."

Quote:
But that independence is only apparent and generated by our faculty of 'outer sense' based on a priori space.

Quote:
That is Kant's. Berkeley mentioned "outness" and "distance".

No. Kant doesn't think the object's independence of the mind is "only apparent" as if it were a illusory or "imaginative." Quite the opposite:
Notice the First Analogy in the Category of the Analogies of Experience: Principle of the Permanence of Substance.
I did not mention "illusory" or "imaginative" and do not imply that at all.
"ONLY AN APPEARANCE" MEANS "IMAGINARY"

OH BUT WAIT. I FORGOT. YOU LIKE TO INVENT YOUR OWN WORDS. I'M SORRY.
"All appearances contain that which persits (substance) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e., a way in which the object exists. Or, [contrary to Berkeley] In all change of appearances substance persits, and its quantum neither increased nor diminished in nature."

"Only in that which persists (substance) are temporal relations (simultaneity and succession) possible, i.e., that which persists is the substratum of the empirical representation of the empirical reality of time itself, by which alone all time-determinations are possible...consequently also the condtion of the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, i.e., of experience, and in this persisting thing all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a modus of existence of that which lasts and persists. Therefore in all appearances that which persits is the object itself, i.e., the substance

Rather than deny Substance like Berkeley, Kant maintained it as central piece of all time-determination and the persistence of unchanging objects through changing appearances. Moreover, Substance is not the perceptible qualities (as Berkeley supposed), but is the condition for their persistence in a single unchanging substratum without which experience of simultaneity, coexistence, and the underlying permanence in time is not possible at all. And remember, Time, for Kant, has been demonstrated in the Aesthetic to be not only Transcendentally Ideal but also Empirically Real.

Since the existence of material Substance is that which takes place in Space and time, and since in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant demonstrates both the a priori transcendental possibility of space and also the empirical reality of space, it therefore follows that Substance really exists. It is a two part task for Kant because space and time are both Transcendentally Ideal and Empirically real.

Here is that Refutation of Berkeley's Idealism again:

The Skeptical or Problematic Idealism of Descartes who merely doubts the existence of the external world, and what Kant calls "the Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism of Berkeley" which says
(a) matter is impossible
(b) Idealism applies to all objects
(c) All the proper objects of all human cognition are nothing but ideas.

Kant claims all of (a)-(c) are false here in the section titled "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason" in the CPR where he takes both Descartes and Berkeley to task in the A and B editions:

A341-405/B399-432

READ IT AGAIN.

In stark contrast to Berkeley, Kant argues at length that,

(d) Transcendental Idealism says that, not only is the existence of matter possible, but is also a necessary condition of all possible experience whatsoever.
(e) Transcendental Idealism does NOT say all proper objects of human cognition are nothing but ideas (objects existing only within the mind).
(f) And finally, that Transcendental Idealism makes room for Empirical Realism which implies that "necessarily something actually exists outside my concsious states in space." (B274) And if fact, this is the exact conclusion of his refutation of Berkeley's Dogmatic Metaphysical Idealism.

Kant's Argument Against Berkeley:
(A) "I am conscious of my existence as determined in time" (B 276)
(B) All determination in time presupposes something persistent in perception" (B 276)
(C) "That which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same. (B225)
(E) "This consciousness of my existence in time is thus bound up identically with the consciousness of a relation to something outside of me" (Bxl)
(E) "But this persisting element cannot be an intution [a sense-perception] in me [contra Berkeley]. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are reperesentations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be deternmined" (CPR Bxxxix n.)
(F) "Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself" (B 275-276)
(G) Now consciousness [of my existence] in time is necessarily bound up with consciousness of the [condition of the] possibility of this time-determination. Therefore, it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination. (B276)
(H) "I.e., the consciousness of my existence is at the same time (zugleich) an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276)

So Berkeley's metaphysical Idealism is false Q.E.D.

I have read and understood Kant refutation of Berkeley idealism.
There seem to be some misunderstandings, note Kant in 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula:
"All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth." Kant

Berkeley did not treat all cognition through the senses and experience as nothing but sheer illusion. Never.
Whatever the above, imo, without the theistic aspect of Berkeley, the core ideas of Berkeley and Kant are the same in term of philosophy of the mind.
Note, yours in blue, mine in black.

ps. You imposed such a long post and i may have missed out on some points.
Do highlight nicely if you want further information.

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 02:40 AM ----------

There are ways to reconcile Kant's denying of god in the Critique and apparent acceptance of God in the Moral.How? long story.
But fundamentally he rejected God outright.WOW! KANT DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF GOD? I DIDN'T KNOW. I WILL TELL ALL THOSE KANT SCHOLARS YOU MADE ANOTHER BRILLIANT DISCOVERY!

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 02:53 AM ----------

You're Catholic? no wonder...
Do you agree to Kant calling your God a transcendental delusion?WOW! KANT SAID GOD IS TRANSCENDTAL DELUSION? I WILL TELL ALL THOSE KANT SCHOLARS YOU MADE ANOTHER BRILLIANT DISCOVERY!

I think highly of the Catholic religion, especially its mysticism
and most of the Catholics i met are very nice people, except..
YOUR GROSS ERRORS ARE THE WORST THING I'VE SEEN YET IN THE HISTORY OF PRESUMPIVE ARROGANCE IN PHILOSOPHY. YOU HAVE NO RESPECT FOR THE SUBJECT AT ALL. AND YOU ABUSE IT AS IF IT WERE YOUR PLAY TOY TO MAKE THE MOST OUTRAGEOUSLY FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT WHAT OTHER'S ACTUALLY SAID. PLEASE STOP INVENTING FICTIONS AND HAVE KANT BELIEVE ALL OF YOUR RIDICULOUSLY MISINFORMED, UNEDUCATED, ILLOGICAL, UNCHARITABLE, IMPIOUS, DISHONEST, COMPLETELY SENSELESS IDEAS. YOU INSULT EVERYONE HERE BY YOUR CONSISTENTLY MALIGNED ABUSE OF PHILOSOPHY.

[/QUOTE]......................................

Forums are merely discussion.
Wonder why you are so worked up.
Take a break. :cool:

With the above sort of insults, i guess that is the end of the road
in our discussions.
Thanks for the exchange for whatever it is worth.

Btw, i have made 3 complains of infraction to the moderators.
I hope they will take the appropriate and necessary actions.

@Humanity,

Humanity;145536 wrote:

Wow..............

Exactly. WOW:D

It's amazing they allow Dogma on a philosophy forum. You need to join the Dogmatic Forum for Dogmatic people, who like to discuss Dogmatic things, while insisting on their Dogmatic views, without actually using their reason because they think Dogmatism trumps logic, sensibility, honesty, charity, and Truth itself.

---------- Post added 03-29-2010 at 07:49 AM ----------

Humanity;145557 wrote:

Forums are merely discussion.
Wonder why you are so worked up.
Take a break. :cool:

I'm worked up because you insult my very profession by making a mockery of it. You would be upset too. DUH!

Philosophy is not "just a discussion"--it's a serious enterprise, whose rules of fair discourse you've consistently violated. You act as if we are discussing literature or baseball. If you want to "just have a disussion" about these things, then go somewhere else--you don't belong here.

It is ok to make errors. But when someone dogmatically insists on his view over and over and over and over and over again in the face of being disproven, there is something seriously upsetting about his absence of a sensibility and reason. And he is defying the Truth itself. It is very disturbing knowing this kind of stubborn arrogance goes unnoticed in these forums. Since the Subject Matter of Philosophy is the Truth, why don't we have thought police who turn the dysfunctional machine off that keeps sptitting out lines of faulty code as if it were a broken record? It doesn't improve on itself, because it has broken down; it doesn't provide any information or say anything of substantive value. It's uselss for the task at which it has appointed itself in doing.

Humanity;145557 wrote:

With the above sort of insults, i guess that is the end of the road
in our discussions.
Thanks for the exchange for whatever it is worth.

It was worth nothing. I gained nothing. I learned nothing. Neither did you.

@Humanity,

Quote:

Kant's idea (Plato's) is different from Bekeley's IDEA.
This is false. So stop saying Kant's "Idea" is Plato's Form. You haven't even told me what this alleged Kantian "Idea" is.

This is just a post for information only, it is not intended to be addressed to anyone specifically.

Anyone who is familiar with Kant would have understood that there
is a relationship between Kant's use of 'idea' and Plato's idea as it was
very clearly stated by Kant in his chapter of "Ideas in General".

"If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's methods of expression, the philosopher's spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting upon the physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation." Kant (CPR - Ideas in General)

"Plato's Ideas are similar to Kant's ideas in so far as Kant's ideas are not taken from experience, they contain archetypes that are used by the understanding faculty, cannot be defined synthetically (see above), and all of morals is based on ideas; while Plato's Ideas are not taken from experience (i.e., the senses), are archetypes of things themselves, are not formed by merely sorting out appearances according to synthetic unity (as Leibniz-Wolffian tradition's ideas are formed), and are primarily practical.

This is not to say that Kant's ideas are the same as Plato's Ideas, but they are similar enough that it justifies Kant in using the term."
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/jamiemellway/kantideasquaideas.html#_ftn12

@Humanity,

Humanity;145575 wrote:

This is just a post for information only, it is not intended to be addressed to anyone specifically.

But it is not an accurate comparison!

Humanity;145575 wrote:

Anyone who is familiar with Kant would have understood that there
is a relationship between Kant's use of 'idea' and Plato's idea as it was
very clearly stated by Kant in his chapter of "Ideas in General"

Mere similiarities is not evidence that they believed the same thing. So who even cares? Do you realize there are literally thousands of the philosophers in history who believe in the existence of Ideas? What does that prove? Do you realize any theory on ideas is going to overlap with some other theory, just like the most often disputed term in philosophy "SUBSTANCE" overlaps with another philosopher's view of it? All theories will have overalpping aspects of their account of ideas just because of what ideas ARE. They are abstract mental entites. So how does the existence of mere similarities between theories make them all the same theory, or "close" to the same theory? It doesn't!
So stop making useless comparisons. You need to be making DISTINCTIONS instead!!!

"If we set aside the exaggerations in Plato's methods of expression, the philosopher's spiritual flight from the ectypal mode of reflecting upon the physical world-order to the architectonic ordering of it according to ends, that is, according to ideas, is an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation." Kant (CPR - Ideas in General)

Quote:

"Plato's Ideas are similar to Kant's ideas in so far as Kant's ideas are not taken from experience, they contain archetypes that are used by the understanding faculty, cannot be defined synthetically (see above), and all of morals is based on ideas; while Plato's Ideas are not taken from experience (i.e., the senses), are archetypes of things themselves, are not formed by merely sorting out appearances according to synthetic unity (as Leibniz-Wolffian tradition's ideas are formed), and are primarily practical.

This passage is very wrong, and it was written by an undergraduate at the University of Waterloo!!!!!!!!

I am a Graduate Student at one of the Better deparments in philosophy throughout the States.

Quote:

This is not to say that Kant's ideas are the same as Plato's Ideas, but they are similar enough that it justifies Kant in using the term."

whatever.

@Extrain,

Here's is one of the more important parts of Kant's work needing to expressed to here. It is part of the Intro to Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic:

"In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is a least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of intuition [sensation]. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) although the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But all this must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to ability, because in no other way can an object be given to us.

The determined object of an empirical intuition, is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation I term its matter; but that which affects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation."

Later in the Aesthetic Kant says,

"By means of outer sense (a property of the mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time." (CPR A22-23/B37)
I am familiar with the above.
maybe you are familiar with the words, but you fail to grasp what the words mean.
Kant parts with Berkeley on several points here:
(1) Physical objects directly affect or "cause" sensations in us--Berkeley denies this is even possible.
Corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.

I never said they were the same. Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is an Idea. But how is this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
(2) The sensation of the object, the faculties of the mind, the object sensed, and the matter corresponding to the object (or phenomenon) of sensation) are all distinct elements within experience --whereas Berkeley collapses them together.
Again a misunderstanding where, corporeal matter of Berkeley is different from Kant's concept of matter.
I never said they were the same. I said Berkeley collapses SENSATION with the PHENOMENA, which which is exactly what he does. I give proof of this in the text concerning Philonus' conversation with Hylas about it.
Look:
Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance altogether. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is JUST an Idea, because ALL IDEAS ARE SENSATIONS. AND ALL PERCEPTIBLE SENSATIONS ARE EITHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY QUALITIES. But how this an objection to what I said? Moreover, what's your point?
As far as it is considered within the common sense framework, Berkeley did not collapse them together.
I never said Berkeley's Material Substance is the same as his common sense notion of matter. I said Berkeley collapses SENSATION with the PHENOMENA, which which is exactly what he does by proof of the text I gave in Philonus' conversation with Hylas.
Look:
Berkeley denied the existence of Material Substance altogether. And he said the common sense notion of matter has no casual powers because the common sense notion of matter is JUST an Idea, because ALL IDEAS ARE SENSATIONS. AND ALL PERCEPTIBLE SENSATIONS ARE EITHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY QUALITIES. For Berkeley, all phenomena (NOT phenomenon) are Ideas--and these random collections of phenomena encountered in experience just is sensation itself--this is Berkeley's collapsing sensation together with phenomena, so there are no objects of sensation, just sensation itself, or the sensation itself just IS the object of senseation: THIS is the allegedly "common-sense notion of matter" he speaks of.

For Kant, on the other hand, the phenomenon is immediately and directly given in experience, but it is not Berkeley's notion of an "Idea" that is given directly in experience for Kant. So, the phenomenon is not an "Idea" for Kant like it is for Berkeley. For Kant the phenomenon is the direct OBJECT OF experience, but it is not that experience ITSELF of the object. So most importantly the PHENOMENON IS NOT A SENSATION . The ACT of Sensation and the OBJECT of Sensation are distinct. They are NOT distinct in Berkeley.

Even further, for Kant, Sensation consists in the actual SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY OF THE MIND. Contra Berkeley who thought SENSATION is completely PASSIVE--because the act of sensation just is the Idea. This is exactly why Berkeley says IDEAS ARE CAUSALLY INERT, NAMELY BECAUSE SENSATIONS THEMSELVES ARE CAUSALLY INERT! THIS IS BERKELEY'S STRICT EMPIRICISM AT WORK SAYING ALL THIS HERE.

SO I SEE NO SIMILARITIES BETWEEN BERKELEY'S DISCUSSION OF PHENOMENA AND KANT'S DISCUSSION OF THE PHENOMENON WHATSOEVER. (3) The phenomenon which is the completely articulated and fully structured object of experience (as distinct from the Noumena--or Thing in Itself) actually corresponds to something really existent and distinct from itself which is the bare matter in sensation--that thing Berkeley denies exists altogether.
Berkeley recognized the existence of the phenomenon like what Kant did.
Just because Berkeley used the same word doesn't entail he meant the same thing as Kant. Further, in what respect are they the same? I just showed how wildly different their two notions, in fact, ARE.
Kant however, explained in greater detail how the phenomenon is derived from a synthesis with a priori element via space and time.
No. The phenomenon is not "derived" from a "synthesis." A synthesis of what? The phenomenon is immediately and directly given in experience without the mediation of any ideas. It is the direct object OF experience.
Kant implied the following, one can cognized the phenomenon but do not ever attempt to think that is an phenomenal object-in-itself.
What does "phenomenal object-in-itself" mean? This is not a Kantian term. Where does Kant use this term?
Berkeley on the other hand, distinguish between phenomenon and what the philosophical realist called Matter.For Berkeley, phenomena were just the primary and secondary sensible qualities given in experience which don't have any structure, nor are these qualities united in an empirical Substance because he denied the existence of Material Substance, which is the METAPHYSICAL Dialectical ERROR Kant accuses him of making. Further, phenomena for Berkeley, just are Ideas.
The phenomenon for Kant, however, just IS Material Substance with all of its qualities, properities, and relation bound up together with it. And Material Substance really exists, it is immediately perceivable, and it is NOT and idea. Further, it exists independently of one's perception of it. And Kant proves this very point in his REFUTATION of Berkeley's Idealism!!!
Berkeley accept what is 'matter' in the phenomenon but not Matter (note it Matter with a capital M) that is outside the phenomenon.Again "Berkelian common sense matter" just is the phenomena (not phenomenon) of sensible qualities given in Berkelian sensible experience but they are not united to any particular object perceived because no object (Material Substance) exists, nor is it perceived, to support those qualities. Further, the "matter" of phenomena just are Berkelian Ideas.[SEE ABOVE]
Berkeley's Matter (with the capital M) which is contrasted with phenomenon is the same as Kant's noumenon.I am so sick of this!!!!!!!! No. Kant did NOT say Material Substance is the noumenon.

(4) Kant says the Formal Intuitions of Space and Time represent objects as existing outside of my mind in the real world--whereas Berkeley says this representing things outside my mind distinct from my Ideas is a contradiction. Kant, contradicting Berkeley, says this representation of things existing outside me and independent of my actual perception of it is a necessary condition for experience to be possible at all.
Aha, I think this is where you failed to misunderstand the finer points of Kant's philosophy.NO I DIDN'T. You Did.
Kant stated that Space (not time) represents objects as existing external to us. The formal intuition of Space is the "outer sense" which makes possible the representation of objects within space. Further, in the Aesthetic, Kant proves Space is also empirically real.

The formal intuition of Time is the "inner sense" which makes possible those objects outside me already in space as continuing in time. But it is called the "inner sense" because the formal intuition of time makes possible the representation of external objects in space as consisting of the flow of perceptions within me via the fundamental unity of apperception of the self as existing permanently in time. That is why Substance is closely tied up with Time. Substance makes possible the representation of the what Kant calls "the paradoxically permanent in time." Further, in the Aesthetic, Kant demonstrates Time is also Empirically real.

If you want to use the phrase "existing outside of my mind" then you have to be very careful in what you meant by 'mind'.HAHAHA! Yeah! Like I need to be careful!
Kant stated that Space is in mind and conditioned by the subject.NO, Kant DID NOT say space is "IN THE MIND and conditioned by the subject." He said the formal intution of Space is a necessary condtion for all possible experience. Moreover, it is empirically real and makes possible the representation of objects existing OUTSIDE me. He explicitly said this in this passage i've already quoted.

Further, You also failed to read this:"Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself"

If Space is in mind, how can it represent objects as existing outside of mind.this is just your problem, Kant never said space is "in the mind." He said space is the necessary condition for my representing objects outside me. And the passage here I just quoted here PROVES that space (and time) is not merely a representation itself that exists only inside the mind, because for my representation of objects existing outside me to be possible at all by means of the formal intution of outer space and the inner sense of time, it is also a necessary condition that an ACTUAL THING EXISTS outside me that I perceive itself. Idealism is False.
To reconcile this contradiction, we need to view mind as two layers.
We thus have mind1 and mind2.WHAT CONTRADICTION? Your OWN?
Mind 1 encompassed mind 2. Mind2 is the subset of mind1, i.e.
Mind1 ( mind2 ), thus
Mind1 -space ( mind2-externality of objects )
Therefore while internal Space generate an outer sense of externality,
that sense of externality is ultimately conditioned by mind1.
This isn't Kant. Further, I don't even know what your inventions of Mind subsets are supposed to mean, as if I have a mind within a mind. Whatever. You are just pulling an AD HOC argument to Make Kant a Berkeliean Idealist which is he clearly NOT.
Accordingly Kant, thing-in-itself would be presented as such;

[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects )]<--/-->[thing-in-itself]
I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS.

FIRST, Kant doesn't even talk about Mind1 and Mind2. If he did, then there would be TWO minds, but Kant thinks there is only ONE MIND withing which A GIVEN EXPERIENCE takes place, precisely because this very experience is grounded in the FUNDAMENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION which is the implicit consciousness of oneself (not direct consciousness of oneself) that is given in all possible experience of the phenomenon along with it. So the important point to notice is that the FUNDAMENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION represents all my sensations of objects as coming from outside ME and a certain element of my experience as-happening-to-ME and not to any OTHER mind. But, of course, you obviously didn't know this--and so you therefore haven't the slightest clue about Kant's actual Philosophy.

Second, are you copying this proposed analysis somewhere from the internet? I don't understand what it means. What is this symbol "<--/-->"? Is it supposed to be logical truth-fuctional connective such as the bi-conditional SYMBOL <-->? Does it have the opposite meaning of the biconditional, which is what exactly? There exists no truth functional connective like that in FIRST ORDER LOGIC. So assuming it is a truth functional connective of some kind, what exactly are the propositions flanking the symbol saying exactly? Are they propositions or statements at all? ARe you trying to make a statement of logical identity, metaphysical ANTI-identity between two INCORPOREAL MINDS and thing in itself? Well DUH! Two minds are not the Thing in itself. Or are you offering defintions of terms? Are you offering a notion of metaphysical or ontological dependency? Or are you stating a relation between minds and space? Are you saying a mind just IS space, and Matter but not the thing in itself? Are you saying MIND just is SPACE and NOT MATTER, and also not the thing in itself? Are you saying matter exists in subset part of mind2 (or 1) but not in the mind1 (or 2) of the other? What in the world are you even saying??
This isn't a fair representation of Kant at all. Stop trying to make Kant a Berkelian Idealist.
<--/--> = absolute independent, i.e. the unconditioned.
STOP making Kant a Berkelian Idealist.
Mind1 and mind2 refers to Kant's experience and the thing-in-itself is Experience outside. THIS IS NONESENSE. IT DOESN'T EVEN MAKE SENSE. HOW DOES MIND1 AND MIND2 REFER TO KANT'S OWN EXPERIENCE? FURTHER, HOW IS IT THAT THE THING-IN-ITSELF IS EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE? THE THING IN ITSELF CAN'T BE EXPERIENCED OUTSIDE EXPERIENCE BECAUSE THAT IS A CONTRADICTION. SO HOW IS IT THAT THE THING-IN-ITSELF JUST IS THE ACT OF EXPERIENCE OUTSIDE ITSELF WHICH YOU SEEM TO DIRECTLY IMPLY? HAHAHAHAHA. SO SENSE EXPERIENCE JUST IS THE THING IN ITSELF???????
Using the above, what Berkeley meant by Matter is this;

[Mind1-space ( mind2-externality of objects )]<--/-->[Matter]
whatever.

@Extrain,

Here's an article on Berkeley from SEP with the fol headings;
George Berkeley (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

1. Life and philosophical works
2. Berkeley's critique of materialism in the Principles and Dialogues
- 2.1 The attack on representationalist materialism
- 2.2 Contra direct realist materialism
  - 2.2.1 The master argument?
  - 2.2.2 The First Dialogue and relativity arguments
3. Berkeley's positive program: idealism and common sense
- 3.1 The basics of Berkeley's ontology
- 3.2 Replies to objections
4. Other philosophically important works [Not yet available]
- 4.1 Berkeley's works on vision
- 4.2 De Motu and Berkeley's Newtonianism
- 4.3 Alciphron
- 4.4 Siris
Bibliography

I agree with of what is written above but there are many point which i disagree.
One example of what i disagree is where the comment on the Master Argument ended with;
"Thus (as many commentators have observed), this argument fails."

An interesting comment to note is;
"As this passage illustrates, Berkeley does not deny the existence of ordinary objects such as stones, trees, books, and apples.
Thus, although there is no material world for Berkeley, there is a physical world, a world of ordinary objects.
This world is mind-dependent, for it is composed of ideas, whose existence consists in being perceived.
For ideas, and so for the physical world, esse est percipi."

The concept above is mind-boggling as in Samm's post in the other thread.
Untangling and unravelling the above concept is the key to understanding Berkeley in greater depth.

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