I presume you have copies of the Treatise and Dialogs in hand (or folder).

I presume you have copies of the Treatise and Dialogs in hand (or folder).

Let's look at the Dialogs first.
Show me where did Berkeley repeat the phrase Esse est percipi in the Dialog.
If this is his central theme, surely he should have repeated it in the Dialogs.

I have numbered the Dialogs and there are 843 conversational paras.
(have not checked whether i have misnumbered, but i don't think this is critical).

.

It might be worth here to make a distinction made by the late Bernard Williams between the History of Philosophy, and the History of Ideas. He makes this distinction as follows: (As described by John Derbyshire).

Williams distinguishes the 'history of philosophy', which is what he professes to be doing here, from the 'history of ideas'. The history of ideas, in Williams's view, aims at accuracy and authenticity, and proceeds by the scrupulous sifting of sources and the careful establishing of context. In the history of philosophy, by contrast, there is a "cut-off point" at which "authenticity is replaced as the objective by the aim of articulating philosophical ideas".

It looks as if you are discussing the history of ideas, and specifically, Berkeley's. But others are discussing the history of philosophy (in Williams' terms). So, you may not really be disagreeing on anything of substance.

I find your post ,thoughtful and interesting. I am not sure my understanding is correct. I have been thinking about the difference between your style of philosophy and my own. In my readings I tend to lean toward Thoreau, Walton and the like, comparing my ideas directly to experience and observations, thus I find metaphors useful in conveying these ideas. While I see you understand my viewpoint ,your style is very different than my own. Is this the difference you are talking about here?

I don't think so. It isn't a matter if styles. It is a matter or what your goal is; history of ideas, or the history of philosophy. But there is something else too: philosophy. Simply discussing philosophical problems, and trying to understand and solve them. Here, particular philosophers, or schools of philosophy are only peripheral.

I think I fall into the later category, I am going to do some more work on understanding the first part, it is an distinction I have not heard before. Blame my lacking of education.

It might be worth here to make a distinction made by the late Bernard Williams between the History of Philosophy, and the History of Ideas. He makes this distinction as follows: (As described by John Derbyshire).

Williams distinguishes the 'history of philosophy', which is what he professes to be doing here, from the 'history of ideas'. The history of ideas, in Williams's view, aims at accuracy and authenticity, and proceeds by the scrupulous sifting of sources and the careful establishing of context. In the history of philosophy, by contrast, there is a "cut-off point" at which "authenticity is replaced as the objective by the aim of articulating philosophical ideas".

It looks as if you are discussing the history of ideas, and specifically, Berkeley's. But others are discussing the history of philosophy (in Williams' terms). So, you may not really be disagreeing on anything of substance.

It might be worth here to make a distinction made by the late Bernard Williams between the History of Philosophy, and the History of Ideas. He makes this distinction as follows: (As described by John Derbyshire).

Williams distinguishes the 'history of philosophy', which is what he professes to be doing here, from the 'history of ideas'. The history of ideas, in Williams's view, aims at accuracy and authenticity, and proceeds by the scrupulous sifting of sources and the careful establishing of context. In the history of philosophy, by contrast, there is a "cut-off point" at which "authenticity is replaced as the objective by the aim of articulating philosophical ideas".

It looks as if you are discussing the history of ideas, and specifically, Berkeley's. But others are discussing the history of philosophy (in Williams' terms). So, you may not really be disagreeing on anything of substance.

Substance, the first of Aristotle's categories, signifies being as existing in and by itself, and serving as a subject or basis for accidents and accidental changes.

Although as I have pointed out, and I think it was maybe the only valid point I managed to make in the previous thread on this topic, there is a sense in which the interpretation of Berkeley depends on the meaning of the word 'substance'. This is one of those terms which everyone assumes they know the meaning of, but actually has a rather specialised meaning in this context, namely, the Aristotlean:

It would help the materialist account if there were actually a definition of matter. I believe that this so far eludes us.

I written it somewhere.

imo and for this purpose we can deal with 'matter' under the
following categories;

1. Common sense perspective
Matter as in the conventional sense

2. Scientific perpective
Matter as define within the scientific method

3. Philosophical materialism
Matter as described by Hylas, i.e.
58 HYLAS. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.


Berkeley agreed with 1 and 2 but not 3.

I believe those who disagree with Berkeley accept 1, 2 and 3, even when they may not be very conscious they are accepting 3.

Are there are other definitions and perspective of matter?

My philosophy tutor (of a module titled History of Philosophy from Descartes to Kant, incidentally) told me about an interview he once held, for a position in what I presume was a philosophy faculty, that illustrates this quite well. One of the candidates gave a presentation on some disagreement between Carnap and Heidegger (I think it was on language). At the end of the presentation, which I'm told was very informative, my tutor said, "So, who was right, Heidegger or Carnap?" To which the candidate replied, "Oh, I think it's far too late to say."

I think it's pretty hard to misread Berkeley on this, especially the Dialogues, which is effectively the Treatise for dummies. All that Berkeley means by Esse est percipi is that there is nothing to an object beyond the phenomenal experience of it, no thing in itself as the metaphysical source of one's perceptions.

He thinks that God is the metaphysical source of our perceptions

Although as I have pointed out, and I think it was maybe the only valid point I managed to make in the previous thread on this topic, there is a sense in which the interpretation of Berkeley depends on the meaning of the word 'substance'. This is one of those terms which everyone assumes they know the meaning of, but actually has a rather specialised meaning in this context, namely, the Aristotlean:

It's not entirely clear what you mean by the 'scientific perspective' and the 'common sense perspective', the latter is certainly too vague a description for you to say that Berkeley agrees with it. I have no idea what "matter as defined within the scientific method" is supposed to mean, but I would say that the common sense understanding of matter is that matter is the sort of thing that physical objects are made of (although this part of the definition, I grant, sounds rather circular), i.e. wood, stone, paper, and so on, are material things, it persists independently of any perceiver, but it does have phenomenal qualities, it is the metaphysical source of our perceptions; that is to say, something happens when we look at it or touch it, that wouldn't happen if it wasn't there.

Berkeley doesn't agree with this. He thinks that God is the metaphysical source of our perceptions, and he most definitely doesn't think that objects have phenomenal qualities, he thinks that objects are phenomenal qualities! If you take the common sense perspective simply to mean that one's foot doesn't go through a stone when one kicks it, as it might were it a hologram, then, yes, Berkeley agrees, but nobody is going to argue with you on that.

In the common sense perspective, matter is defined in whatever manner that is agreed by majority consensus or to specific groups.
The externality of such matter is taken for granted without any debate about it.
It is not even assumed.

Here is how Berkeley viewed matter.
839 PHILONOUS. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER,
and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived.
I shall never quarrel with you for an expression.


The scientific perspective.
In the common sense perspective, we say matter for whatever it is meant to be in accordance to consensus without deliberating it as a concept.
However, from the scientific perspective, whatever is termed 'matter' must be put through the scientific method and peer review.
Science is based on empirical observations, therefore scientist would not put up a scientific theory that there are matter that exist beyond human observations and the scientific method.
They can speculate and hypothesize but it cannot be a scienitific theory until it is observed, tested, repeated under the scientific method and peer-reviewed.

Philosophical Materialism Perspective
If disagree with Berkeley and you argue about matter in a philosophical setting like this and insist that matter is external and is absolutely independent of mind, then you are probably a philosophical materialist.

So, which perspective is your matter?

This is moot. You misunderstood Berkerley whole scheme of ideas.
I raised the OP to establish exactly what Berkeley agreed or did not agree.

As i had suggest why don't you read Berkeley's two books and we start with what is in the OP and we go from there.

Yes, it (material substance) does have a specialized philosophical meaning stemming from the ancient Greek "ousia", which Locke famously called, "something I know not what", from which Berkeley argued, in effect, "that's because it is nothing. No wonder it is 'something you know not what'!". But I have been assuming that specialized meaning all along.

How exactly does the scientific method define matter (content-wise rather than method-wise)? Particles with half-integer spin? I'm not sure, I'm not a scientist. Why don't we just say empiricism, which I rather think is Berkeley's point as an empiricist. The point being, all that we observe, by definition, are phenomena.

You seem to be having some issues with the use/mention distinction. Here is the passage you quote in a firmer context, with some emphasis:

HYL. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same MISTAKING THE QUESTION. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.

PHIL. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE, SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word MATTER should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.

Quite clearly (if you take notice of my own emphasis), if Berkeley were a contemporary philosopher his manner would be "Matter" rather than Matter. In other words he is mentioning the word rather than using it. However, as Berkeley notes, the thing that matter seems to refer to, in its common usage by his contemporaries, is not the sort of thing that Berkeley believes to exist.

How many tails would a dog have if we called legs "tails"? The answer is one, because legs aren't the same thing as tails! The lesson? Just because somebody proposes a new language, you don't have to use it. Hylas is inviting Philonous to speak a new language, Philonous is saying, "Why bother?"

I would hate to suggest that I know more about Berkeley than anybody, even though I often do. Assume that I have read the Dialogues and the Treatise; it's a plausible assumption, I hope. Now, what exactly have I misunderstood about Berkeley's system? I'm pretty sure my post was very much in the spirit of the original post, in that it said what Berkeley agrees with and what Berkeley did not agree with.

Btw, the above is not an excuse, but i am hoping you take a look at B's books seriously and make reference to the relevant points in your discussion.