Berkeley's Treatise and Dialogues As It Is

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;143458 wrote:

Will M. persuade you that he has looked at Berkeley seriously only when he has agreed with you? So it seems.

It is a very basic expectation in any discussion that we seek consensus on what we understand of the terms used in a contentious theory before we critique it.

@Humanity,

Humanity;143450 wrote:

The two quotes i provided was to show how Berkeley viewed matter in the common sense perspective.

If that was the case, you chose a very strange passage. Perhaps you need to read the Dialogues more closely. To quote you:

"Here is how Berkeley viewed matter.
839 PHILONOUS. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER,
and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived.
I shall never quarrel with you for an expression."

This passage only tells us what kind of discourse Philonous finds acceptable, and nothing about common sense. It is only later in the paragraph (the bit that I quoted) that Berkeley talks about the common man:

PHIL. ... MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE, SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word MATTER should be never missed in common talk.

What does Berkeley say about common people? First, that they generally don't use the word 'matter', which seems beside the point to me, as common people use other words in a similar vain. Second, that if they do it is to refer to the immediate objects of sense, with are ideas for Berkeley. It seems to me there are two possible readings. Berkeley could be attributing his own beliefs to the mass of people, which would be convenient for him. On the other hand, he may be saying, "The immediate objects of perception (whatever they are) are what common people take to be matter," having just argued that the immediate objects of perception are ideas. The latter is more plausible, I think, given that Philonous is clearly not in agreement with the most people, and, indeed, Hylas offers at least token resistance to Philonous' views at almost every point in the Dialogues. Of course, this still leaves open the question as to what the common sense view of immediate objects of perception are.

It's important to note that, Berkeley talks of the common in at least two different ways in the Dialogues. This passage brings it out, I think, but it's quite evident from the first couple of pages of the first dialogue:

PHIL. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that REAL SOUNDS ARE NEVER HEARD, and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

The first is perhaps better put as 'common understanding' or 'common knowledge/belief', referring to some kind of general consensus. The second refers to the commonly accepted principles of reason. Berkeley does not agree with common opinion, although he thinks common opinion may be easily brought around to his point of view.

Quote:

That was para 839 of 843 which is near the end and after Berkeley had totally convinced Hylas that matter cannot exist without the involvement of the mind.

Your comment on use/mention distinction is out of context with the other 800 paras of the Dialogues.

Fortunately, I wasn't talking about the other 800 paragraphs of the Dialogues. Although, if you think you have a point you should elaborate; it is no good to to tell me that what I say is out of context without telling me how.

Quote:

Btw, the above is not an excuse, but i am hoping you take a look at B's books seriously and make reference to the relevant points in your discussion.

I suppose I shall have to spell this out clearly for you. I have read the Dialogues and the Treatise, indeed, I've sat through lectures on them. If it seems to you that I haven't, then one of us should be very worried about our understanding of Berkeley.

@mickalos,

mickalos;143646 wrote:

If that was the case, you chose a very strange passage. Perhaps you need to read the Dialogues more closely. To quote you:

"Here is how Berkeley viewed matter.
839 PHILONOUS. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER,
and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived.
I shall never quarrel with you for an expression."

This passage only tells us what kind of discourse Philonous finds acceptable, and nothing about common sense. It is only later in the paragraph (the bit that I quoted) that Berkeley talks about the common man:

PHIL. ... MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE, SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word MATTER should be never missed in common talk.

What does Berkeley say about common people? First, that they generally don't use the word 'matter', which seems beside the point to me, as common people use other words in a similar vain. Second, that if they do it is to refer to the immediate objects of sense, with are ideas for Berkeley. It seems to me there are two possible readings. Berkeley could be attributing his own beliefs to the mass of people, which would be convenient for him. On the other hand, he may be saying, "The immediate objects of perception (whatever they are) are what common people take to be matter," having just argued that the immediate objects of perception are ideas. The latter is more plausible, I think, given that Philonous is clearly not in agreement with the most people, and, indeed, Hylas offers at least token resistance to Philonous' views at almost every point in the Dialogues. Of course, this still leaves open the question as to what the common sense view of immediate objects of perception are.

It's important to note that, Berkeley talks of the common in at least two different ways in the Dialogues. This passage brings it out, I think, but it's quite evident from the first couple of pages of the first dialogue:

PHIL. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that REAL SOUNDS ARE NEVER HEARD, and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

The first is perhaps better put as 'common understanding' or 'common knowledge/belief', referring to some kind of general consensus. The second refers to the commonly accepted principles of reason. Berkeley does not agree with common opinion, although he thinks common opinion may be easily brought around to his point of view.

Fortunately, I wasn't talking about the other 800 paragraphs of the Dialogues. Although, if you think you have a point you should elaborate; it is no good to to tell me that what I say is out of context without telling me how.

I suppose I shall have to spell this out clearly for you. I have read the Dialogues and the Treatise, indeed, I've sat through lectures on them. If it seems to you that I haven't, then one of us should be very worried about our understanding of Berkeley.

OK, i agree the passage i introduced was not a direct explanation of a common sense view,
but looks like i will have to explain it the long way. (if you insist i will do so).

However the point in discussion was, imo there are 3 perspectives of matter,
i.e. Common sense, Scientific and Philosophical Matterialism.
Another alternative view of common sense of matter is how it is generally
defined in a dictionary.

Do you agree to the above category?

I acknowledge you have read the Dialogues.

My intention was we cover all of the 843 paras starting from para 1 and going through all relevant para towards para 843.
In that way, we do not missed out the critical points and thus avoiding misinterpretating Berkeley.

I am starting with the first 20 paras of the Dialogue as listed in the OP.
I think we can move fast as many of the para are not critical.

While we move sequentially through the paras, we can cross-reference to other paras.
However we should not deviate and focus too much on these references till we get to their turn on the sequence.
This was what happened to para 839.

I want to get back on track to the OP.
From what we have discussed so far,
what is your understanding of what Berkeley meant by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE of the philosopher.

That is to ensure whether both of us understand what he meant before we proceed further.
Understanding what he meant do not imply agreeing with it.

@Humanity,

Quote:

HYL. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same MISTAKING THE QUESTION. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.

PHIL. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE, SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word MATTER should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.

839 PHILONOUS.With all my heart: retain the word MATTER,
and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived.
Aristotle's conception of matter is intrinsically linked to something being made or composed.
In other words, in contrast to the early modern conception of matter as simply occupying space, matter for Aristotle is definitionally linked to process or change: matter is what underlies a change of substance.

Berkeley's interpretation of matter would be similiar to what is bolded and as per stated by Hylas, i.e.

58 HYLAS. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to, their being perceived.

PHIL. ... MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE, SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word MATTER should be never missed in common talk.

Humanity;143788 wrote:

There is definitely more to the "esse" and "peripi" in Berkeley's context.
Those who oppose Berkeley sidestep 'the problem of universals' and bashed Berkeley as a strawman.

Berkeley's contention against the primary and secondary qualities distinction and Lockean Substance as "an object existing distinct from these perceptible qualities but I know not what" is just ONE of Berkeley's problem with materialism in his texts.

Berkeley considers a long series of arguments concerning different sensible qualities, including the so-called "primary" ones. In each case, Hylas is forced to admit that no object existing outside the mind could have both a pair of seemingly incompatible properties (hot and cold, sweet and sour, large and small, swift and slowly). The conclusion is that sensible qualities exist only as ideas in the mind of the perceiver.

From this, Berkeley thinks it follows that there is no material substance outside one's perception of it--or rather that we have no intelligible concept of any material substance existing outside the mind. The reason is that if we abstract from all the sensible qualities, there is nothing left to discuss or consider. So there is no positive Idea of Material Substance.

But wait a minute:

How does Berkeley go from:

(a) We have no intelligible concept of any material substance existing outside the mind.

to

(b) Therefore, No Material Substance can exist outside the mind?

Even if (a) were true (which I don't think it is), and precisely BECAUSE (a) were true, Berkeley CANNOT infer that Material Substance existing independently of the mind doesn't exist. After all, Berkeley doesn't even have the concept of Material Substance, right? So He is inferring from an epistemological premise to a metaphysical conclusion about which Berkeley knows nothing of.

To be consistent with what (a) actually says, how do we even know that (b) is true? We can't know (b) is true, precisely BECAUSE (a) is true. So the inference from (a) to (b) is Berkeley's own way of being totally inconsistent with his very own view. Bad news for Berkeley! He is doing the exact same thing he is accusing his interlocutors of doing, namely, going beyond the bounds of possible experience and asserting a metaphysical thesis about metaphysical states of affairs. It simply doesn't matter what you assert if (a) is true--that Material Substance Exists, or that Material Substance does not Exist: either way, you are going to be caught being inconsistent with Berkeley's own premise (a) since then one would be using the complete linguistically meaningless concept "Material Substance" in one's talk in order to draw a conclusion about the ontological status of all Material Substance. Nice try, no cigar, Berkeley.

I've always found this blatantly and obviously inconsistent for Berkeley to be drawing metaphysical conclusions like these altogether. No wonder Kant thought Berkeley's Idealism is absurd--Berkeley is committing what Kant called the Dialectical Error for which Kant devotes the Latter Half of the Critique in discussing.

So Berkeley's contention, here, is just part of his CORE and CENTRAL argument--what I consider Berkeley's MASTER ARGUMENT--that crops up everywhere in his Dialogues. It looks exactly like this:

(1) You can't perceive any sensible thing without perceiving it.

Berkeley repeatedly says that to suppose otherwise is to be involved in a contradiction. And Berkeley is correct because (1) is necessarily true. But then Berkeley invalidly infers,

(2) Therefore, sensible things cannot exist unperceived.

He constantly goes from,

(A) I cannot perceive that object X exists without at the same time being in a position to perceive that it does,

to

(B) Object X exists only insofar as I perceive that it does.

This inference is INVALID.

Berkeley's arguments work if and only if

(I) the act of perceiving an object just is the object of perception,

in other words,

(I) act of perceiving X=X that is perceived.

But this alleged idenity statement is dubious, not to mention completely unargued for in Berkeley's Dialogues. Philonous agrees with Hylas throughout that it is "common sense" to think that sensible things really exist and are immediately perceived. But then he draws the conclusion from several very poor arguments that sensible things are wholly mind-dependent since, according to Berkeley's implausible view, the sensation of an object just is the object sensed.

But this just amounts to wholescale rejection of the sensation/object distinction without offering any arguments for telling us why collapsing this distinction is plausible in the first place. And each of his arguments relies on doing just this.

So all we have to do is disagree with Berkeley, and the argument is OVER.

@Humanity,

A brief quote on Kant's critique of metaphysics in general and Berkeley in particular:

Quote:

Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world. Beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. Since intuitions of the physical world are lacking when we speculate about what lies beyond, metaphysical knowledge, or knowledge of the world outside the physical, is impossible. Claiming to have knowledge from the application of concepts beyond the bounds of sensation results in the empty and illusory transcendent metaphysics of Rationalism that Kant reacts against.

I presume the target here is scholastic metaphysics.

Quote:

It should be pointed out, however, that Kant is not endorsing an idealism about objects like Berkeley's. That is, Kant does not believe that material objects are unknowable or impossible. While Kant is a transcendental idealist - he believes the nature of objects as they are in themselves is unknowable to us - knowledge of appearances is nevertheless possible. As noted above, in The Refutation of Material Idealism, Kant argues that the ordinary self-consciousness that Berkeley and Descartes would grant implies "the existence of objects in space outside me." (B 275) Consciousness of myself would not be possible if I were not able to make determinant judgments about objects that exist outside of me and have states that are independent of the of my inner experience. Another way to put the point is to say that the fact that the mind of the knower makes the a priori contribution does not mean that space and time or the categories are mere figments of the imagination. Kant is an empirical realist about the world we experience; we can know objects as they appear to us. He gives a robust defense of science and the study of the natural world from his argument about the mind's role in making nature. All discursive, rational beings must conceive of the physical world as spatially and temporally unified, he argues. And the table of categories is derived from the most basic, universal forms of logical inference, Kant believes. Therefore, it must be shared by all rational beings. So those beings also share judgments of an intersubjective, unified, public realm of empirical objects. Hence, objective knowledge of the scientific or natural world is possible. Indeed, Kant believes that the examples of Newton and Galileo show it is actual. So Berkeley's claims that we do not know objects outside of us and that such knowledge is impossible are both mistaken.

This is fairly unequivocal.

From Kant, Immanuel: Metaphysics[The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 02:23 PM ----------

Having said that, I am still very critical of the idea of naive realism, or objectivism, or whatever describes the outlook that 'reality is what is mind-independent' or 'what is simply there'. I think this viewpoint is an abandonment of philosophy, as such. It is the attitude of the scientific naturalist who regards the cosmos as 'all there is'. Even if I agree that Berkeley's is not a coherent or complete account of the nature of reality, I believe that both Berkeley and Kant, even though they disagree in many particulars, both assert that the role of mind, or the observer, or perception, is fundamental to the nature of reality [EDIT - as far as we will ever know it]. Of course, Kant's view is considerably more sophisticated than Berkeley's, but even though it is consistent with a scientific outlook, I don't think it supports the notion of a 'mind-independent reality' as a meaningful philosophical term. I would be interested in any feedback on that proposal.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;143826 wrote:

A brief quote on Kant's critique of metaphysics in general and Berkeley in particular:

I presume the target here is scholastic metaphysics.

This is fairly unequivocal.

From Kant, Immanuel: Metaphysics[The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 02:23 PM ----------

Having said that, I am still very critical of the idea of naive realism, or objectivism, or whatever describes the outlook that 'reality is what is mind-independent' or 'what is simply there'. I think this viewpoint is an abandonment of philosophy, as such. It is the attitude of the scientific naturalist who regards the cosmos as 'all there is'. Even if I agree that Berkeley's is not a coherent or complete account of the nature of reality, I believe that both Berkeley and Kant, even though they disagree in many particulars, both assert that the role of mind, or the observer, or perception, is fundamental to the nature of reality [EDIT - as far as we will ever know it]. Of course, Kant's view is considerably more sophisticated than Berkeley's, but even though it is consistent with a scientific outlook, I don't think it supports the notion of a 'mind-independent reality' as a meaningful philosophical term. I would be interested in any feedback on that proposal.

Consider here Berkelian Metaphysical Idealism vs. Kantian Transcendental Idealism--the first is metaphysical thesis, the latter is an epistemological thesis--so they are totally different:

Strong mind-dependence: X is strongly mind-dependent if and only if X exists only insofar as it is being consciously represented, and if all human minds went out of existence, X would go out of existence too.

Weak mind-dependence: X is weakly mind-dependent if and only if necessarily, were human minds to exist, then they would be able to know X directly.

The latter, which is Kants Thesis, is totally compatible with, if not actually, a form of Robust Direct Realism about our access to the real existence of empirical objects and supposes what's called a "conformity thesis" by all Kantian Scholars, namely, that necessarily objects must conform to the a priori structures of the human mind in order to be perceivable by humans.

Alternatively, the former presupposes that necessarily the mind must conform to objects in the world in order for those objects to be perceivable, and so introduces wholescale skepticism concerning how it is that we actually know our conceptions of objects conform to the objects themselves if we only have direct access to our representations of objects and not those objects themselves. So in the attempt to resolve this skepticism, Berkeley says in the Dialogues that he is lead to assert that it must be case that all that exists in first place are our Ideas. But this kind of resolution of skepticism comes with too high a cost, namely, denying Material Substance exists independently of the human mind altogether. Kant would NEVER say this. But so many unqualified people (e.g. Humanity) make the mistake in thinking that Kant does say this. It is almost unanimously agreed among Kant Scholars that Kant's Transcendental Idealism is actually much closer to a form of Direct Realism and so is in the opposite camp from Berkeley's Idealism!

---------- Post added 03-25-2010 at 10:00 PM ----------

jeeprs;143826 wrote:

Since objects can only be experienced spatiotemporally, the only application of concepts that yields knowledge is to the empirical, spatiotemporal world. Beyond that realm, there can be no sensations of objects for the understanding to judge, rightly or wrongly. Since intuitions of the physical world are lacking when we speculate about what lies beyond, metaphysical knowledge, or knowledge of the world outside the physical, is impossible. Claiming to have knowledge from the application of concepts beyond the bounds of sensation results in the empty and illusory transcendent metaphysics of Rationalism that Kant reacts against.

Hey Jeepers, I would like to clarify this passage above. Kant is very clear in the Critique that "Transcendent" refers to the Dialectical Error of the metaphysicians who thought we can have epistemic access to the world independent of sense-perception, while "Transcendental" just refers to Kant's project of uncovering the a priori necessary conditions of sense-experience in general which makes sense-perception possible to begin with. So for Kant, "Transcendent" does not mean "Transcendental." Former bad, latter good.

@Humanity,

But nevertheless Kant does unequivocally state that the primary intuitions of time and space are what the mind brings to all experience, and without which no experience would be possible. He also says that things in themselves are unknowable to us, so I don't see how that could be compatibile with 'direct realism'. I am vaguely aware the subsequent intepreters have attempted to eliminate the troublesome idea of thing-in-itself, but it is certainly there in the original, is it not?

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;143841 wrote:

But nevertheless Kant does unequivocally state that the primary intuitions of time and space are what the mind brings to all experience, and without which no experience would be possible. He also says that things in themselves are unknowable to us, so I don't see how that could be compatibile with 'direct realism'. I am vaguely aware the subsequent intepreters have attempted to eliminate the troublesome idea of thing-in-itself, but it is certainly there in the original, is it not?

Yes, Kant says the formal intuitions of Space and Time are a priori conditions of possible experience, but since we don't have any license to even be questioning whether the Empiricaly Reality of Space and Time themselves actually exist independently of our Intuitions of Space and Time, we can only supposse that both Space and Time are not only Transcendentally Ideal, but also Empirically Real.

Even further, Kant performs another refutation of Berkelian Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic itself when he discusses S-T.

The "thing-in-itself" for Kant is only a theoretical device to counter the metaphysicians who thought they could go beyond the bounds of sense-experience and talk about how things are independently of sense-experience. So the the "thing-in-itself" is not any kind of metaphysical postulate for Kant in the Critique, like it would be for Berkeley. Kant repeatedly says throughout in the Critique that for all we know the "thing-in-itself" doesn't even exist, and so it is senseless and impossible to even consider the question seriously.

@Extrain,

Extrain;143843 wrote:

those who thought they could go beyond the bounds of sense-experience and talk about how things are independently of sense-experience..

Well that criticism would be equally applicable to those who presume to talk of 'a mind-independent reality' as the touchstone of 'what truly exists', would it not? I still believe that Kant would never endorse such a term, or the viewpoint that it betokens.

---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 03:29 PM ----------

'collateral damage' as the Americans call it.:bigsmile:

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;143845 wrote:

Well that criticism would be equally applicable to those who presume to talk of 'a mind-independent reality' as the touchstone of 'what truly exists', would it not? I still believe that Kant would never endorse such a term, or the viewpoint that it betokens.

---------- Post added 03-26-2010 at 03:29 PM ----------

'collateral damage' as the Americans call it.:bigsmile:

Exactly, but Kant wouldn't say that if I don't perceive X, X doesn't exist--NO--that would Berkelian Idealism.

So Berkeley commits this exact same metaphysicians error--in the opposite manner--of concluding that things which I cannot perceive or conceive, therefore, do not exist at all. What presumption!

(1) Material Substance is that which exists independently of my mind's own conception of it.

(2) Therefore, Material Substance (or that which exists unperceived) does not exist.

But wait. Why does (1) license the inference to (2) any more than licensing the inference to

(3) Therefore, Material Substance (or that which exists unperceived) does exist, I just have no way of conceiving or perceiving it?

I don't see this alleged genius of Berkeley at all, here...:rolleyes:

Berkeley's strawman move consists of adding to premise (1) the claim that

(1a) The concept of "Material Substance" is either meaningless or contradictory altogether because if I countenanced the existence of something that exists without my perception of it, I would be presupposing that I can perceive something unperceived.

But is this true? No. When I make the claim that,

(A) X exists independently of my perception of it.

I do not mean,

(B) It is possible that I can perceive something unperceived.

I wouldn't accept this analysis at all. And I am not sure why Berkeley does either. (B) is certainly absurd to believe, but that's not what I am saying when I assert (A). I might be implying something like (assuming empiricism is true),

(C) I cannot know or perceive that X exists without my also knowing or perceiving that X exists.

(C) is certainly true. And so if I am not in a position to perceive that X exists, X could still either exist or not. So there is nothing problematic about believing X exists independently of my perception of X. So believing this or saying does not commit me to saying, contrary to what Berkeley thinks, that it is possible I can preceive an unperceived X. This is just absurd. So Berkekely is just putting words into everyone's mouth.

So what is going on with Berkeley? There is a hidden premise Berkeley is not telling you about that makes all of his arguments go through and for which Berkeley makes his gullible character Hylas accept. The premise is,

(1b) My perception of X just is the object of my perception.

But is (1b) true? Certainly not for most cases. Here are some examples for consideration where doing X is not identical to the X that is done:

I am now looking at my cup of coffee. So I am seeing my cup of coffee. Is my seeing this cup of coffee the cup of coffee seen? No. Is my thinking about Obama, the Obama thought about? No. Is my brushing my teeth, my teeth that are brushed? No. Is my chopping the wood with an axe, the wood chopped? No. The only cases I can think where something similar to (1b) might be true are cases like these:

(a) My feeling pain just is the pain felt.
(b) My feeling cold just is the cold felt.
(c) My playing a game just is the game played.
(d) My jumping a jump just is the jump jumped.
(e) My promise to marry just is the marriage promised.

But there are just as many, if not more, non-identity cases as well:

(f) My touching the hot fire is not the fire touched.
(g) My feeling the cold metal is not the metal felt.
(h) My criticizing an argument is not the argument criticized.
(i) My hating all dance clubs is not the dance clubs that are hated.
(j) My talking about Obama is not Obama talked about.
(k) My adding two numbers is not the two numbers that are added.

So introducing (1b) for all cases of perception is the only way to make the concept of "Material Substance" contradictory or meaningless--and it is clear that in most cases it is false. So there is no reason to think Berkeley's strawmanning the concept of "Material Substance" is correct. If fact, it is presumptively incorrect, and we have to be just as dull as Hylas in letting Berkeley pull the wool over our eyes. He is too sloppy in his analysis of perception. And Kant thinks so, too.

@Extrain,

Extrain;143849 wrote:

Kant wouldn't say that if I don't perceive X, X doesn't exist.

No. But he did say, a condition of our knowledge of any X, is such that "without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind." (B 75) Locke's mistake was believing that our sensible apprehensions of objects are thinkable and reveal the properties of the objects themselves." [ibid]

I am inclined to think that proponents of the idea of the 'mind-independent reality' are making the same mistake that Kant accused Locke of making. So despite his criticism of Berkeley, it remains the case that Kant "introduced the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception." Source

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;143854 wrote:

No. But he did say, a condition of our knowledge of any X, is such that "without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind."

Correct. But,

(1) I cannot know, perceive, or conceive that object X exists without object X being presented to me in sense-experience,

does not entail that,

(2) X cannot exist without X being known, perceived, or conceived.

The former is Kant's Epistemic Transcendental Idealism. The latter is Berkeley's Metaphysical Idealism. They are completely different things.

jeeprs;143854 wrote:

(B 75) Locke's mistake was believing that our sensible apprehensions of objects are thinkable and reveal the properties of the objects themselves." [ibid]

This is Locke's mistake because Locke thought our understanding of sensible objects are directly given in sensory experience independently of the spontaneous activity of the mind. Kant, on the other hand, thinks objects are directly given to us in sensory experience together with the spontaneous activity of the mind.

jeeprs;143854 wrote:

I am inclined to think that proponents of the idea of the 'mind-independent reality' are making the same mistake that Kant accused Locke of making.

No, this is not the mistake Kant is attributing to Locke; I just mentioned what this mistake is above.

jeeprs;143854 wrote:

So despite his criticism of Berkeley, it remains the case that Kant "introduced the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a passive recipient of perception." Source

That's correct. But Berkeley, just like Locke and unlike Kant, thinks the mind contributes nothing to sensory experience. Berkeley was a strict empiricist.

@Extrain,

Extrain;143821 wrote:

So all we have to do is disagree with Berkeley, and the argument is OVER.

You are still bundling and 'strawmanning' Berkeley.
The argument is NOT OVER.

I will get back to you when I unbundle the straws.
The problem is you are spraying half-truths all over the place and I do
have problem picking after them.

Another constraint is I have to go through the 843 paras
everytime I have to made a counter. (I don't have super memory).
I also have to refresh on the Critique.
I am not complaining as this is good motivator for me to reinforce
my knowledge on Kant and others.

Meantime, here is one clue why I insists that the attempt of Berkeley to
prove the non-existence of material substance is secondary.
He was only doing Hylas a favor and his stance is, preferably, the onus is
actually on Hylas to prove his assertion that absolute material substance exists.

486 PHILONOUS. What! is it come to this, that you only BELIEVE the
existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the
possibility of its being true?
Then you will have me bring reasons against it: though another would think
it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative.
And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to maintain, without any
reason, is in effect what you have more than once during this discourse seen good
reason to give up.

I'll be back.

@Humanity,

Humanity;143859 wrote:

You are still bundling and 'strawmanning' Berkeley.

How so? Now this is the 8th time you said this without proof. I suggest you read my post #30 as well before you get back to me. I address Berkeley's arguments at length there, too.

Humanity;143859 wrote:

I will get back to you when I unbundle the straws.
The problem is you are spraying half-truths all over the place and I do
have problem picking after them.

No. The problem is that you are totally incapable of understanding how my arguments apply to Berkeley since this entire time you have merely been reporting what Berkeley believes like a blind little follower while continually failing to actually start practicing philosophy by engaging with others' counter-arguments against Berkeley. Haven't you heard that goofy platitude, "Those who teach, cannot do"? This is exactly your problem. You don't know how to unpack Berkeley's own argument because you clearly don't have any formal training in these matters. This is fine. But don't mistake your own lack of understanding in these areas as if I were misinterpreting Berkeley--because I am not. I am being completely charitable to his views while I logically unpack his arguments. In case you haven't noticed, this is how philosophy is actually PRACTICED. So your charges toward me are hollow.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143859]486 PHILONOUS.[/QUOTE]

Humanity;143859 wrote:

He was only doing Hylas a favor and his stance is, preferably, the onus is
actually on Hylas to prove his assertion that absolute material substance exists.

What! is it come to this, that you only BELIEVE the

Humanity;143859 wrote:

existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the
possibility of its being true?
Then you will have me bring reasons against it: though another would think
it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative.
And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to maintain, without any
reason, is in effect what you have more than once during this discourse seen good
reason to give up.

I'll be back.

But the burden of proof is no more on Hylas than Philonus for prooving their respective claims. In fact, I have shown that Berkeley has little or no reason to think Material World doesn't exist either.

So now we are required to evaluate which claim is more likely given the respective evidence and arguments on the table. I contine to show that Berkeley's arguments are either invalid, presumptuous, or conceptual confusions.

Precisely because Berkeley's arguments fail in these areas, Johnson has the upper hand by his silly demonstration of kicking a rock. So it is more likely that Berkeley is wrong than that Johnson is wrong.

@Extrain,

Extrain;143860 wrote:

How so? Now this is the 8th time you said this without proof. I suggest you read my post #30 as well before you get back to me. I address Berkeley's arguments at length there, too.

Do exercise some patience, i will get to it.
I prefer to be more accurate then to spraying half-truths.

Quote:

No. The problem is that you are totally incapable of understanding how my arguments apply to Berkeley since this entire time you have merely been reporting what Berkeley believes like a blind little follower while continually failing to actually start practicing philosophy by engaging with others' counter-arguments against Berkeley. Haven't you heard that goofy platitude, "Those who teach, cannot do"? This is exactly your problem. You don't know how to unpack Berkeley's own argument because you clearly don't have any formal training in these matters.

You are just unpacking and repackaging strawmen.
The common MASTER ARGUMENT that is springing all over the internet do not reflect Bekerley's ideas. (9th time without proof)

Quote:

But the burden of proof is no more on Hylas than Philonus for prooving their respective claims. In fact, I have shown that Berkeley has little or no reason to think Material World doesn't exist either.

So now we are required to evaluate which claim is more likely given the respective evidence and arguments on the table. I contine to show that Berkeley's arguments are either invalid, presumptuous, or conceptual confusions.

Precisely because Berkeley's arguments fail in these areas, Johnson has the upper hand by his silly demonstration of kicking a rock. So it is more likely that Berkeley is wrong than that Johnson is wrong.

Berkeley started by qualifying what philosophers and materialists throughout the ages had been asserting on what is matter.

He later repeated,

704 PHILONOUS.The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a REAL existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an ABSOLUTE existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds.

I think if Berkeley was not writing the Dialogue but engaging in a debate with a materialist, you would have requested the materialist to prove their assertion as
practiced by the conventional rule that the onus on the one who holds the affirmative.

@Humanity,

Humanity;143866 wrote:

Do exercise some patience, i will get to it.

uh..huh...:listening:

Humanity;143866 wrote:

I prefer to be more accurate

haha! What "accuracy"? You're a Berkelian Bible-thumper. You won't even use your logic.

Humanity;143866 wrote:

then to spraying half-truths.

9th time.

Humanity;143866 wrote:

You are just unpacking and repackaging strawmen.

Let me remind you: When you make a claim, you are required to defend it with examples directly from Berkeley countering my alleged strawman. So far, you are strawmanning me of committing strawmans.

10th time.

Humanity;143866 wrote:

The common MASTER ARGUMENT that is springing all over the internet do not reflect Bekerley's ideas.

Oh yeah? How so? Are you ready to back this up with textual proof from Berkeley? No, I didn't think so.

Humanity;143866 wrote:

(9th time without proof)

This is false. I have given proof numerous times over and over again.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143866]704 PHILONOUS.[/QUOTE]

Humanity;143866 wrote:

Berkeley started by qualifying what philosophers and materialists throughout the ages had been asserting on what is matter.

He later repeated,
The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a REAL existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an ABSOLUTE existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds.

Correct. So how is "X's existing independently of any Mind's perception or conception of X" any different than "X's existing absolutely exterior to any God's Mind"?
It doesn't matter which way you approach it. Of course if God exists, God sustains everything whether it is material or mental by his perceptive powers. God's perception sustains the existence of other minds just as God's perception sustains the existence of all Ideas. And since all that humans allegedly directly perceive are their own ideas too, and not Matter, our question for Berkeley is whether the only thing that exists are Ideas and other minds, or whether Material Substance exists too. That is the thesis we are considering.

[QUOTE=Humanity;143866] I think if Berkeley was not writing the Dialogue but engaging in a debate with a materialist, you would have requested the materialist to prove their assertion as[/QUOTE]

Humanity;143866 wrote:

practiced by the conventional rule that the onus on the one who holds the affirmative.

hello?? Anyone home?

Berkeley's conclusion is the Metaphysical thesis called "Idealism." This is NOT an epistemic thesis (although Berkeley arrives at it vIa route of the epistemic thesis that the only thing directly perceived are sensible Ideas).

So "Nothing exists absolutely independent of a mind's conception of it" is not the same thing as "I don't positively know whether or not anything exists independently of a Mind's conception of it."

The structure informing the backdrop of all of Berkeley's arguments look like this:

(a) Sensible things are immediately perceived. (the "common sense" premise)

(b) Only ideas are immediately perceived. (Presupposes rejection of the sensation/object distinction--pp. 248 in my book. My book isn't divided in para's.)

(c) So sensible things are ideas. (a, b)

(d) But ideas exist only in the Mind, (whether in God or human minds). (premise)

What is the natural conclusion??

(e) Therefore, sensible things only exist in the mind.

Q.E.D

I reject (b) at length in my other posts, thus making (c) false. And continue to argue why.
Where's your counter-argument?

@Extrain,

Extrain;143858 wrote:

Kant, on the other hand, thinks objects are directly given to us in sensory experience together with the spontaneous activity of the mind.

I would be obliged if you could provide a reference for that.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;143879 wrote:

I would be obliged if you could provide a reference for that.

ARe you serious?

This is basic Kant 101. It's exactly what he means by "Intuitions without concepts are blind, concepts without intutions are empty."

The conclusion? Sensation together with the a priori structure of the mental faculties generate that thing we call EXPERIENCE.

@Extrain,

Extrain;143875 wrote:

Correct. So how is "X's existing independently of any Mind's perception or conception of X" any different than "X's existing absolutely exterior to any God's Mind"?
It doesn't matter which way you approach it. Of course if God exists, God sustains everything whether it is material or mental by his perceptive powers. God's perception sustains the existence of other minds just as God's perception sustains the existence of all Ideas. And since all that humans allegedly directly perceive are their own ideas too, and not Matter, our question for Berkeley is whether the only thing that exists are Ideas and other minds, or whether Material Substance exists too. That is the thesis we are considering.

hello?? Anyone home?

Berkeley's conclusion is the Metaphysical thesis called "Idealism." This is NOT an epistemic thesis (although Berkeley arrives at it vIa route of the epistemic thesis that the only thing directly perceived are sensible Ideas).

So "Nothing exists absolutely independent of a mind's conception of it" is not the same thing as "I don't positively know whether or not anything exists independently of a Mind's conception of it."

The structure informing the backdrop of all of Berkeley's arguments look like this:

(a) Sensible things are immediately perceived. (the "common sense" premise)

(b) Only ideas are immediately perceived. (Presupposes rejection of the sensation/object distinction--pp. 248 in my book. My book isn't divided in para's.)

(c) So sensible things are ideas. (a, b)

(d) But ideas exist only in the Mind, (whether in God or human minds). (premise)

What is the natural conclusion??

(e) Therefore, sensible things only exist in the mind.

Q.E.D

I reject (b) at length in my other posts, thus making (c) false. And continue to argue why.
Where's your counter-argument?

I am not interested in your strawman and distorted argument at all.

My point;

704 PHILONOUS.The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a REAL existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an ABSOLUTE existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds.

Disregarding god, Materialists throughout the ages had claimed that matter exists and that they have an absolute existence distinct from being perceived and exterior to all minds.

Do you agree to the above contention? QED

@Extrain,

Extrain;143882 wrote:

ARe you serious?

This is basic Kant 101. It's exactly what he means by "Intuitions without concepts are blind, concepts without intutions are empty."

The conclusion? Sensation together with the a priori structure of the mental faculties generate that thing we call EXPERIENCE.

Yes I am. What you said was something different to that. It was not about sensations. It was that objects are directly given to us together with the spontaneous activity of mind. I would be be obliged if you could provide a reference for that, in particular. You know Kant a lot better than I do, and I can't recall a statement like that from what I know. It doesn't strike me as anything that Kant would say, but I am willing to stand corrected.

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