Berkeley's Treatise and Dialogues As It Is

@Humanity,

Humanity;146673 wrote:

I understand your point and you will probably end up stating that the moon existed before consciousness.
As i do not have CoPR on my fingertips at present, i do not want to venture to reply, otherwise it will be a long drawn issue.
I am refreshing the whole of the Critique again, if i am confident
to argue from Kant POV I will do so, but not at the moment.
On the other hand, to be fair, you will have to read the Critique as well, otherwise the other person will have to explain everything that you are not aware of in the Critique.

Well, what is certainly true is that either external objects existed before human beings did, or they did not. Now, if science is right, then they did exist before human beings. So, if Kant holds they did not, then either science is right or Kant is wrong.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;146678 wrote:

Well, what is certainly true is that either external objects existed before human beings did, or they did not. Now, if science is right, then they did exist before human beings. So, if Kant holds they did not, then either science is right or Kant is wrong.

This issue is not as simple as dealing with one or two variables.
imo, we will need to trash out tons of variables and terms before we get
to present something for consideration.

Just quick note, and i do not want to go into for heavy discussion at the moment;
Kant assserted that time and space is in us, i.e. mind interdependent.
Therefore whatever 'before' and 'after' the moon is conditioned a priori
by the mind.
There is no moon-in-itself and it is not possible as a -ve noumenon,
as such whatever moon that is 'before' or 'after' can only be ultimately mind-interdependent.
Kant did mention 'external objects' but this is manifested in space which ultimately is mind-interdependent as i quoted earlier.

@Humanity,

Humanity;146691 wrote:

This issue is not as simple as dealing with one or two variables.
imo, we will need to trash out tons of variables and terms before we get
to present something for consideration.

Just quick note, and i do not want to go into for heavy discussion at the moment;
Kant assserted that time and space is in us, i.e. mind interdependent.
Therefore whatever 'before' and 'after' the moon is conditioned a priori
by the mind.
There is no moon-in-itself and it is not possible as a -ve noumenon,
as such whatever moon that is 'before' or 'after' can only be ultimately mind-interdependent.
Kant did mention 'external objects' but this is manifested in space which ultimately is mind-interdependent as i quoted earlier.

Since I don't know what a "Moon-in-itself" is supposed to be, I cannot comment. I do know, however, that scientist hold that the Moon antedates human beings, and have a lot of evidence that is true. Have you any reason for disputing them? If so, why not say what that is?

@Humanity,

Carl Sagan:

Quote:

We are a way for the cosmos to know itself. We are creatures of the cosmos and always hunger to know our origins, to understand our connection with the universe.

It is quite true that the moon existed for billions of years before there was anyone around to see how beautiful she is.....

@Humanity,

Humanity;146628 wrote:

External objects or objects outside us are linked to a property of our mind, therefore external objects are mind interdependent.

[ xxxx ] in the quote above is added by me

Summary
It [space] must in its origin be intuition.
This intuition must be a priori
It [intuition] must be found in us prior to any perception of an object.
It [intuition]must therefore be pure, not empirical, intuition.

From the above it is obvious that space is "in us" as it originates from pure intuition which is "in us".

NO! You are abusing Kant and not reading the rest of these passages. Stop saying "in us" as if that had the same meaning as Berkeley' understanding that Ideas, Concepts, and Meanings are ONLY in us.

You don't understand that Kant's entire project is the reverse of Berkeley's. He is asking how it is that objects conform to the mind. Berkeley is asking how it is that the mind conform to objects. Kant takes as given that objects already exist external to us. Berkeley tried to prove that objects are external to us in the Treatise, and found that he couldn't, so he resigned the project and said only MIND exists. Kant's and Berkeley's projects are not the same projects.

Transcendentally, Space and time are pure a priori intutions that make possible the representation of objects. Kant is demonstrating this through the concept of space, through the concept of time. And he explicitly says that. He also explicitly says Space and Time are NOT ideas, they are NOT concepts "abstracted" from experience like Berkeley and Leibniz thought they were. It's a transcendental project of telling us the a priori conditions that make experience possible: Kant's project is NOT a project of telling us what Space and Time are themselves, or whether or not they exist as if they existed "ONLY in us,"--like Berkeley said--because THEY DON'T EXIST in us at all. Only the INTUITIONS exist "IN US." Space and time don't exist "in us." Read the rest of the Transcendental Aesthetic VERY CAREFULLY, and stop pulling passages out of Kant as if you understood them, because you obviously DON'T.

Pay attention to what Kant is actually saying. For instance:

"In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intution. This, however, takes place ONLY insofar as THE OBJECT IS GIVEN TO US; but this in turn, <at least for humans>, is possible only if IT [the object] affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representaions through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are threfore given to us by means of sensibility [NOT conditioned BY sensibility], and it [sensibility] along affords in us [empirical] intuitions; but they [empirical intuitions] are thought through the understanding, and from it [the understanding] ARISE concepts. But all thought, whether straightaway direct or through a detour, must, by means of cerain marks, ultimately related to intutions [which is precisely why metaphysics is impossible], thus, in our case, to sensibility [not "sensations"], since there is no other way in which objects CAN be given to us" [but this doesn't mean the only way in which we can SAY an object exists external to the "mind," or the only means by which an object ACTUALLY exists itself as if it existed "only" in the mind--because it doesn't..]

"Geometry is a Science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori [and properities are NOT concepts or ideas, as if the properties of real space only existed in the mind--because they don't]. What then must the representation of space be for such a COGNITION of it to be possible? It must orignally be in intuition; for from the mere concept no propositions can be drawn that go BEYOND the concept, which however happens in geometry [So you See? Geometery is able to talk about the real properties of Real Space itself synthetically a priori beyond my mere concepts of it.]"

"Our expositions accordingly teach the REALITY (the objective validity) of space [now Kant is saying "space," not the the formal intution OF space] in regard to severything that can come before us EXTERNALLY as AN OBJECT, but at the same time the Ideality [Dialectic Ideality] of space in regard to things when they are considered in themselves through [pure] reason, i.e., that it is NOTHIING as soon as we leave aside the condition of the possibility of all experience, and take it [OUR OWN ABILITY TO EXPERIENCE THINGS] as something that grounds the things-in-themselves [which was Berkeley's mistake when Berkeley asked how I can know the external world exists independent of my own ability to experience things: he said we couldn't know this, and concluded that only the Mind and the contents of the mind, could be known--and Kant shows that drawing this conclusion is INVALID in the Paralogisms of PURE REASON--and that asking Berkley's initial question is senseless from the start. The question doesn't need to answered, nor is it even possible to ask this question in the first place because the very question presupposes the existence of the thing-in-itself which is the very presupposition that DEFEATS any possible ANSWERS to the question, and DEFEATS Berkeley's ability to even ASK the question!!! TRULY, AND WITH MUCH RESPECT TOWARD YOU AS A FELLOW THINKER TRYING TO UNRAVEL THESE QUESTIONS, I WISH YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS, BECAUSE IF YOU DID, YOU WOULD POSSESS THE KEY, THE HOLY GRAIL, TO UNLOCK WHY KANT'S AND BERKLEY'S PHILOSOPHIES ARE SO RADICALLY DIFFERENT.]"

THEREFORE, SPACE AND TIME ARE BOTH IDEAL AND REAL. But it is the external object that makes determination of OBJECTS possible. The INTUITIONS of SPACE AND TIME make our representing of the object possible. They don't make the OBJECT possible.

Berkeley said the exact opposite that Kant does. Berkeley says sensation makes the possibility of objects. Kant says objects make possible the objects. INTUTIONS MAKE possible the Representation of Objects. The intuitions of space and time DON'T make the objects possible as they do for Berkeley.

THE FORMAL INTUITIONS of Space and Time are Transcendentally Ideal, but SPACE and TIME THEMSELVES are also EMPIRICALLY REAL.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;146829 wrote:

Carl Sagan:

It is quite true that the moon existed for billions of years before there was anyone around to see how beautiful she is.....

Whether the Moon can be beautiful in the absence of consciousness is a different matter.

@Extrain,

Extrain;146846 wrote:

But it is the external object that makes determination of OBJECTS possible. The INTUITIONS of SPACE AND TIME make our representing of the object possible. They don't make the OBJECT possible for representing.

Berkeley said the exact opposite that Kant does. Berkeley says sensation makes the possibility of objects. Kant says objects make possible the objects. INTUTIONS MAKE possible the Representation of Objects. The intuitions of space and time DON'T make the objects possible as they do for Berkeley.

THE FORMAL INTUITIONS of Space and Time are Transcendentally Ideal, but SPACE and TIME THEMSELVES are also EMPIRICALLY REAL.

I am a bit confused about how this relates to Kant's (arguably) most famous proposition, the so-called 'Copernican Revolution' he introduced to theory of knowledge:

Quote:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given.

He adds a little further along

Quote:

If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility. Since I cannot rest in these intuitions if they are to become known, but must relate them as representations to something as their object, and determine this latter through them, either I must assume that the concepts, by means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, that the experience in which alone, as given objects, they can be known, conform to the concepts

Critique of Pure Reason (Prefaces and Introduction)

Note my underline.

I find these hard to reconcile with the statement "They don't make the OBJECT possible for representing."

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;146906 wrote:

I am a bit confused about how this relates to Kant's (arguably) most famous proposition, the so-called 'Copernican Revolution' he introduced to theory of knowledge:

He adds a little further along

Critique of Pure Reason (Prefaces and Introduction)

Note my underline.

I find these hard to reconcile with the statement "They don't make the OBJECT possible for representing."

Everything you just quoted supports exactly everything I just said. So I don't see what the problem is.

Intuitions don't make possible the object, intuition makes possible the representation of the object. And the further, an actually existent external object makes possible my very own ability to represent it by my faculties of Intuition of Space and Time.

IF, it were the other way around, such that my formal Intuitions of Space and Time made possible the Object Itself, then my very own cognition OF that object would be impossible. But clearly it IS possible to cognize objects external to me. Therefore, Objects really DO exist external to me.
It's rather simple, to tell you the truth.

See? It's a two-part process at the foundation of all experience, and Kant proves it a priori. But, of course, this isn't the actual proof--but it's something like that. You have to go find the "proof" in his refutation of Berkelian Idealism. Kant talks about it at great length in many passages set aside to do just that.

---------- Post added 03-31-2010 at 08:04 PM ----------

I'm actually feeling kind of giddy about all this.

Kan't description of how are minds interact with a really existent physical world external to our minds, is a very beautiful description.

It makes you feel as if you are actually home in the world cooperating with it in the attempt to understand it. His Transcendental approach to all this is just absolutely amazing and gorgeous, and will bring any philosopher to tears if he starts paying attention to what Kant is actually saying. Smile

@Humanity,

So would this be right then? I have slightly edited the last sentence of the quote I provided

"either I must assume that the concepts, by means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else I assume that the objects...conform to the concepts".

I presume Kant's is the latter position, which then implies that "Insofar as the object does exist external to my experience, it is unknowable".

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;146963 wrote:

So would this be right then? I have slightly edited the last sentence of the quote I provided

"either I must assume that the concepts, by means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else I assume that the objects...conform to the concepts".

I presume Kant's is the latter position, which then implies that "Insofar as the object does exist external to my experience, it is unknowable".

I am very happy you are presenting these passages, because you are showing exactly how Kant understood the problem!! Nice job!

Though your edit you gave is "correct," the conclusion you derive is not actually Kant's conclusion whatsoever and he would NOT say any such thing--he would say "of course it is knowable--why suppose that it isn't?" So you are misreading the passage. Here it is again it two parts.

Quote:

If intuition must conform to the constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.

DONE. This is the question he investigates in his extensive Refutation of Berkelian Idealism later in the Critique. So he is setting it aside as given that external objects really do exist independent of the mind.

Now he is asking an altogether different question here, and it is clear that he is (notice the "since"):

Quote:

SINCE I cannot rest in these intuitions if they are to become known, but must relate them as representations to something as their object, and determine this latter through them, either I must assume that the concepts, by means of which I obtain this determination, conform to the object, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, that the experience in which alone, as given objects, they can be known, conform to the concepts

Kant is presenting the very dilemma (P or ~P) about to be explored in the entire Critique. In fact, it is THE very question he explores throughout the entire work:

The question is:

Since Objects can be known, how are synthetic a priori judgments possible of them? To put it rather colloquially, which parts of what we know are contributed by the world, and which parts of what we know are contributed by the understanding?

We have to pay attention to what SYNTHETIC A PRIORI MEANS for Kant.

This kind of knowledge is what makes possible the representation of objects outside experience.

"Synthetic a priori" means our knowledge is partly constructed by the mind, but that empirical content is given by the world in those synthetic a priori judgments about the world. So we can know, not only how the world is experienced as it is experienced, but we can also know the world independent of all immediate experience--and this is possible by the a priori part.

Understanding all this is the clue to understanding why Kant was "saving Science" from Hume's devestating skepticism, but also the clue to understanding why Kant thought Metaphysics was impossible.

Make sense? Smile

---------- Post added 03-31-2010 at 09:15 PM ----------

no worries. I just now added a little about what "synthetic a priori" means for Kant. Hopefully that helps too.

@Extrain,

That is good:

Extrain;146966 wrote:

To put it rather colloquially, which parts of what we know are contributed by the world, and which parts of what we know are contributed by the understanding?

And, implicitly, where, and how, to draw the line - because many won't even realise that there is a line to be drawn.

Thanks for the clarifications.

@jeeprs,

jeeprs;146972 wrote:

That is good:

And, implicitly, where, and how, to draw the line - because many won't even realise that there is a line to be drawn.

Thanks for the clarifications.

You're asking very good questions, and those are the exact questions Kant is exploring in the very Critique itself. Asking these very questions which Kant asks throughout the work is precisely the reason why his project is called "Transcendental Philosophy"--people (Humanity) too often make the mistake in thinking "Transcendental" means "Transcendent (metaphysical)"--as if we are strictly talking about what the mind alone contributes to knowledge--But the mind actually contributes only a part.

"Transcendental," for Kant, actually means how do we even go about differentiating between what is contributed by experience and what is contributed by the mind. And Kant proposes puzzles and "tests" to decide the answer to this question. So Kant's philosophy consits of forming a priori hypotheses, testing these hypotheses against raw sensation (or what's given in raw experience), and then figuring out which parts of what we know are empirical and which parts are pure. So Kant's philosophy is a trial and error process, you might say--and his conclusions hit the target dead on!

What's interesting is that Berkeley never did any of this. He just assumed everything was empirical right from the start, directly given in experience, and then he proceeded to analyze the content of empirical sensations. But he never bothered asking, how do I know which aspects of my experience are pure a priori, and which aspects are empirical? He just assumed there was a distinction and proceeded to analyze according to the distinction he had already set up, so it gave him some false results that David Hume later attacked.

For instance, Berkeley thought there wasn't anything problematic about inductive reasoning, he just assumed it worked for the empirical world and then deduced other conclusions about sensations--while Hume attacked this approach altogether because he said inductive reasoning is fallacious from the start. So in many ways, Berkeley's analysis of knowledge comes up very short compared to Hume's devestating attack on its possibility and Kant's later salvation of it.

@Extrain,

Quote:

"Transcendental," for Kant, actually means how do we even go about differentiating between what is contributed by experience and what is contributed by the mind.

i.e. contributed by experience (inevitably is by the mind) and what is contributed by the mind.
Mind1 differenitate from Mind2?, but ultimately they are all 'by the same mind'.

For the sake of effectiveness, the mind can be discussed in explict sections. layers, etc, but fundamentally, there is only one mind.

From another perspective, there may be no mind at all!

@Humanity,

Humanity;146981 wrote:

i.e. contributed by experience (inevitably is by the mind) and what is contributed by the mind.
Mind1 differenitate from Mind2?, but ultimately they are all 'by the same mind'.

For the sake of effectiveness, the mind can be discussed in explict sections. layers, etc, but fundamentally, there is only one mind.

From another perspective, there may be no mind at all!

With respect what Kant said and held, I don't know what this even means. You can't have "2 minds," or even "one mind being the subset of the other"--neither of which could be contained in one fundamental unity of experience. There are presumably many minds, but one is never the subset of the other. It wouldn't make sense for Kant at all. So why are you even proposing this idea? It's presposterous as it is, anyway.

I've already told you, you need to read all Kan't talk on the fundamental unity of apperception. This is another crucial piece for understanding Kant. It is similar in some ways to Descartes' Cogito, but Kant didn't think one had to be directly aware of one's own self as a thinking being to be able to experience the world as a fundamental totality.

If there were two minds, according to Kant's way of looking at it, there would be many experiences we couldn't structure into a coherent whole at all. So the unity of the self is one of the other preconditions for knowledge of the external world as a fundamental totality itself.

Actually, it was Spinoza who thought something like this. He thought the entire world was God, and everything within it was a modification of one Substance. So every person was a mode of God, mind (or the mental) is a mode and matter is a mode. But none of this is something Kant said or would agree with.

Or, you are trying impose a kind of "Eastern" view of things on these Western Philosophers--which isn't correct for Berkeley, nor is it correct for Locke, Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza, Descartes, or any of the others. It's not correct for Plato, nor is it correct for Aristotle. I'm sure there are a many Western philosophers who actually think this, but none of these guys are one of them.

Lastly, what does all this have to do with my post you are replying to?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;146749 wrote:

Since I don't know what a "Moon-in-itself" is supposed to be, I cannot comment. I do know, however, that scientist hold that the Moon antedates human beings, and have a lot of evidence that is true. Have you any reason for disputing them? If so, why not say what that is?

Kant stated a moon-in-itself is an impossibility.

From what i read of Kant, I would interpret him as implying that only a moon-in-myself is possible. (:a-thought: coined a new word!)

The whole scheme of science is based on a priori and a posteriori based knowledge culminating in peer review which is mental.
Whatever scientists conclude, they cannot extricate the mind from their eventual conclusions.
Therefore as implied by Berkeley, you cannot have an unthought conclusion on unthought objects. i.e.

mind (Moon antedates human beings)

how can you separate the two sets?
Berkeley stated you are using reason to do it, and so did Kant who explained it in more detail.

Berkeley also mentioned that "the moon" is just an abstract general idea that do not represent any particular at all.
There is no permanent moon at all, the moon is impermanent (Heraclitus).
Everytime a meteorite strikes the moon, the moon becomes different from the previous moon and is a new particular.
Even if one molecule of the moon floats away to space, then we
have a new particular 'moon'.
Over an hour we may have billions of molecule floating away and adding to the moon.
In reality, we do have billions of new particulars of the so-called moon. i.e. which should be named, moon1, moon2, moon3 ................ to moon1billion.

Berkeley acknowledged that is not practical to chase after every real particular.

Quote:

18. It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.

But when cornered philosophically to deal with reality, then we must resort to the particular and not words or abstract general ideas.

To Berkeley, the best particular we can have is the one that we engages with the object of experience, i.e. a moon that we are sighting or have sighted earlier, not a moon that you imagined, conceptualized or theorized. This is what he meant by Esse is Percipi.

Quote:

22........Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words I do not see how I can easily be mistaken.
The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not.
It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so.
To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

Since the best option to view reality is to deal with the particular which is most effectively dealt with the mind, reality and its objects cannot exist without the involvement of the mind.

Thus whatever scientists hold of their conclusions and whatever they are concluding on (observer and the observed), all these cannot be actualized without the mind.

---------- Post added 04-01-2010 at 02:06 AM ----------

Extrain;146991 wrote:

With respect what Kant said and held, I don't know what this even means. You can't have "2 minds," or even "one mind being the subset of the other"--neither of which could be contained in one fundamental unity of experience. There are presumably many minds, but one is never the subset of the other. It wouldn't make sense for Kant at all. So why are you even proposing this idea? It's presposterous as it is, anyway.

I've already told you, you need to read all Kan't talk on the fundamental unity of apperception. This is another crucial piece for understanding Kant. It is similar in some ways to Descartes' Cogito, but Kant didn't think one had to be directly aware of one's own self as a thinking being to be able to experience the world as a fundamental totality.

If there were two minds, according to Kant's way of looking at it, there would be many experiences we couldn't structure into a coherent whole at all. So the unity of the self is one of the other preconditions for knowledge of the external world as a fundamental totality itself.

Actually, it was Spinoza who thought something like this. He thought the entire world was God, and everything within it was a modification of one Substance. So every person was a mode of God, mind (or the mental) is a mode and matter is a mode. But none of this is something Kant said or would agree with.

Or, you are trying impose a kind of "Eastern" view of things on these Western Philosophers--which isn't correct for Berkeley, nor is it correct for Locke, Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza, Descartes, or any of the others. It's not correct for Plato, nor is it correct for Aristotle. I'm sure there are a many Western philosophers who actually think this, but none of these guys are one of them.

Lastly, what does all this have to do with my post you are replying to?

Btw, FYI, i have mentioned i have decided not to communicate directly with you.
Whatever i have posted is with reference to general information in this thread and not intended to be addressed to you personally.
It is posted for whatever it is worth or not worth at all (which they are free to ignore) to others.
It is a vexation to one mental state to communicate with an obnoxious brat.
I have been posting in philosophical forums for a long time and
i know what infractions are about.
While i complied with the rules of the forum, you took advantage and thought i was sitting duck for your personal attacks and insults.
I have made numerous complains to the moderator and hope you will
get a reality check.

@Humanity,

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Btw, FYI, i have mentioned i have decided not to communicate directly with you.
Whatever i have posted is with reference to general information in this thread and not intended to be addressed to you personally.
It is posted for whatever it is worth or not worth at all (which they are free to ignore) to others.

I don't care. But when you post your thoughts on a public forum, be aware that others will respond to those posts. And with respect to your case, someone definitely needs to correct your errors, because you stubbornly refuse to be truthful about what other philosophers actually think. So not only are you consistently in error, but you also consistently lie about committing these errors too. Philosophy is the quest for truth, not about deceiving people, and you are advancing lies all over this forum. So I will continue to correct your posts, because I DO respect the truth.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

It is a vexation to one mental state to communicate with an obnoxious brat.

I get upset at your stubborn insistence on making a mockery of my profession, you bet. And rightly so! But at least I respect the philosophical discipline.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

I have been posting in philosophical forums for a long time and i know what infractions are about.

Kind of like your own infraction of calling me an "obnoxious brat"?

Humanity;146994 wrote:

While i complied with the rules of the forum, you took advantage and thought i was sitting duck for your personal attacks and insults.
I have made numerous complains to the moderator and hope you will
get a reality check.

I haven't actually received any "warnings" yet. Maybe because someone "up on high" agrees with my corrections of your posts, and my own willingness to stand up for what is right and true?

@Extrain,

Extrain;147000 wrote:

I don't care. But when you post your thoughts on a public forum, be aware that others will respond to those posts.

Anyone can respond to anything posted in whatever manner they want, but as far as you are concern, do NOT ask me directly.
I will respond at my own discretion.

@Humanity,

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Kant stated a moon-in-itself is an impossibility.

He did? Kant even actually "stated" it? Wow! In which passage did he say this? Can you point me to it? I'd really like to know.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

From what i read of Kant, I would interpret him as implying that only a moon-in-myself is possible. (:a-thought: coined a new word!)

"coining new words" is ok for you. But "coining new words" as if Kant actually would agree with you is Kantian Blasphemy because Kant took his own words very, very seriously! If you know Kant so well like you claim you do, Can you tell everyone here what Kant would mean by your own term "moon-in-myself""? It's only fair and charitable to Kant if you actually told us. So we are all waiting................

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Whatever scientists conclude, they cannot extricate the mind from their eventual conclusions.

Wow, so scientists own individual minds are in their conclusions?

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Therefore as implied by Berkeley, you cannot have an unthought conclusion on unthought objects.

If scientists minds are in their conclusions how can the conclusions be "unthought"?

Humanity;146994 wrote:

mind (Moon antedates human beings)

how can you separate the two sets?

These aren't "sets."

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Berkeley stated you are using reason to do it, and so did Kant who explained it in more detail.

Kant and Berkeley actually talked about about mind "sets"? I didn't know. Exactly where is this to be found in all their literature?.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Berkeley also mentioned that "the moon" is just an abstract general idea that do not represent any particular at all.
There is no permanent moon at all, the moon is impermanent (Heraclitus).
Everytime a meteorite strikes the moon, the moon becomes different from the previous moon and is a new particular.
Even if one molecule of the moon floats away to space, then we
have a new particular 'moon'.
Over an hour we may have billions of molecule floating away and adding to the moon.
In reality, we do have billions of new particulars of the so-called moon. i.e. which should be named, moon1, moon2, moon3 ................ to moon1billion.

I actually commed you for this. This WOULD be a consequence of Berkeley's view. Good for you. You said something substantively correct.

Berkeley has the problem accounting for continued Identity through time of a changing object if everything is just a particular. Kant, however, did not have this problem.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Berkeley acknowledged that is not practical to chase after every real particular.

But the question is: which one is the "real" moon? Moon1, Moon2, Moon3...? The answer is none. They are all different moons, and there are billions and quadrillions of them every time somebody looked at these moons.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

But when cornered philosophically to deal with reality, then we must resort to the particular and not words or abstract general ideas.

But all particulars are particular ideas (sensations) since there are no abstract general ideas for Berkeley.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

To Berkeley, the best particular we can have is the one that we engages with the object of experience, i.e. a moon that we are sighting or have sighted earlier, not a moon that you imagined, conceptualized or theorized. This is what he meant by Esse is Percipi.

Berkeley thought this was achieved by induction from past particulars to future particulars, or from present cases to past cases. Hume later undermined this aspect of Berkeley's theory, resulting in the worst skepticism ever.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Since the best option to view reality is to deal with the particular which is most effectively dealt with the mind, reality and its objects cannot exist without the involvement of the mind.

"Best" option with respect to what? What we can know? But we only know the present particulars as they are given in present experience. And Berkeley has not told us yet why inductive reasoning about all these cases accurately reflects the apparent regularities in our own sensations. David Hume said these regularities are mere regularities, but we can't actually know these regularities take place with any necessity with respect to our sensations because no necessity is contained in them. So the very veracity of inductive reasoning is not epistemically justified by anything found in experience itself. So Berkeley has no way of knowing whether inductive reasoning is veridical at all with respect to his own sensations.

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Thus whatever scientists hold of their conclusions and whatever they are concluding on (observer and the observed), all these cannot be actualized without the mind.

This would be trivially true for Berkeley, which would make knowledge of anything deeply problematic for him (which he didn't see). But David Hume did see this.

Good job for spelling some of that out. It was a little sloppy--but you got the general idea of what Berkeley is saying.

---------- Post added 04-01-2010 at 02:21 AM ----------

Humanity;147001 wrote:

Anyone can respond to anything posted in whatever manner they want, but as far as you are concern, do NOT ask me directly. I will respond at my own discretion.

I can ask you anything I want. That doesn't violate the forum rules. If you don't want to read my posts (which I will post regardless), then all you have to do is put me on your "ignore list." Actually, I would prefer that you did, because then I could correct your errors more efficiently without getting more senseless feedback I had to correct. I don't like having to do this at all, but I will if I have to, because error should not be tolerated. And no one said that it had to be tolerated either.

My concern is not with YOU; my concern is for what others are viewing. So I will continue to correct your errors about what you think other philosophers held because someone needs to stand up for the truth.

@Humanity,

Humanity;146994 wrote:

Kant stated a moon-in-itself is an impossibility.

From what i read of Kant, I would interpret him as implying that only a moon-in-myself is possible. (:a-thought: coined a new word!)

The whole scheme of science is based on a priori and a posteriori based knowledge culminating in peer review which is mental.
Whatever scientists conclude, they cannot extricate the mind from their eventual conclusions.
Therefore as implied by Berkeley, you cannot have an unthought conclusion on unthought objects. i.e.

But it does not follow from the fact that the conclusion that there is a Moon cannot be drawn from the scientific evidence by scientists without a mind, that what the conclusion is about cannot exist without a mind. Your argument is just an other variation on the theme of the WAITW. It does not follow that because a mind is needed to draw a conclusion, that what the conclusion is about needs a mind.

@kennethamy,

Quote:

It does not follow that because a mind is needed to draw a conclusion, that what the conclusion is about needs a mind.

This is exactly why Berkelian Idealism is impossible, and commits the very same alleged "metaphysical error" Berkely accuses the "Materialists" of making.

If what the conclusion were about did need a mind to perceive or conceive it, then what the conclusion is about would not even be able to be drawn.

Just consider what this is saying. If "esse est percipi" is true, then how could I even draw a conclusion about non-esse-est-percpi things? I couldn't. But I do draw a conclusion about non-esse-est-percipi things, therefore, "esse est percipi" is false.

...we ought to be performing a kind of reductio ad absurdum on Berkeley's own view like Kant did.

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