What do you think that sentence means?

Right. Your "might" and "may" distinction. I don't think in everyday language people usually notice such a thing, but I'll use "might" to mean logical possibility, and "may" to mean plausibility, to humor you.

P1 and P2 I would use interchangably in everyday language. "For all we know" is an expression. Why do you think P1 is false? What do you think that sentence means?

But the issue isn't between P2 and P3. The issue is between P1 and P2. It's simply not the case that based on what we know that we ARE all ... .

My point could have been made without bringing in the "is"/"might"/"may" distinction and simply left it at "is"/"might".

As to the expression, I think if you're gonna use it that it's better used with "might" instead of "are."

And for all we know we are being mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars.

It isn't even true that for all we know we are are being mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars. As a matter of fact, we know we are not.

But, from the point of view of scientific realism, we do know that the actual objects in the world are radically different from the way we see them. For confirmation see "Eddington's Two Tables"

From the fact that two terms or phrases are used interchangeably, it does not follow that they are interchangeable. It depends, in part who used them interchangeably. It is true that "uninterested" and "disinterested" are used interchangeably by lots of people (including those who should know better) but that doesn't mean that they are interchangeable. "For all we know, P" implies, we do not know that P is false.

I don't understand the issue. I'll reread your posts and get back to you.



Translates to: It is a logical possibility that we are being mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars. Well, that is how I meant it. It was a throwing out of a wild possibility.



It is a logical possibility that we are being mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars.



I read what you provided. How I see things is how things are. Just because I could see the table differently with instrumentation, does not mean the table is radically different. It is the same table, it is the same set of atoms, they are just being observed in a different manner. It's our perception that's changing, not the things.



Sorry for not making myself clear. Perhaps you understand me now. If you do not, I will speak again.

From the fact that p is logically possible, it does not follow that we do not know that p is not true, as your example illustrates.

We know that a mass of electrons is not solid (as Eddington argues)

But, in any case, I thought that you were arguing WYSIWYG. (What you see is what you get).

I think one argument in favour of the existence of mind-independent objects is as follows. We can recognise disorder and incoherence when we see or hear it. Our brain does not conceptualise everything as consisting of coherent objects. So it seems reasonable to assume that when it does conceptualise a coherent object, this is because some kind of corresponding discrete thing-in-itself is present. Such a thing-in-itself may of course be very different from our concept of it, but some kind of one-to-one correspondence seems a reasonable assumption.

But are you sure Kant was saying that there are not seperate noumena from which we perceive seperate phenomenas? I think all he said was that the things-in-themselves are unknown, not that they are not individuated.

I think you're right on this.

And this is what you were hinting at earlier when I said I didn't quite understand you, right? Are your beliefs similar to Kant's in regards to this matter?

Yes. There may be some details where we differ, because I am influenced by Hegel as well, but generally I find Kant persuasive on this subject. His ethics not so much. I also love Schopenhauer who is half-Kant half-Nietzsche (to brutally oversimplify).

For me, the Kantian revolution was a sort of Copernican revolution, as he himself claimed. For the mind to take its own limits in to account. For the mind to attempt to mentally model its self as a mental-modeler. This is exciting stuff.

Yes. There may be some details where we differ, because I am influenced by Hegel as well, but generally I find Kant persuasive on this subject. His ethics not so much. I also love Schopenhauer who is half-Kant half-Nietzsche (to brutally oversimplify).

For me, the Kantian revolution was a sort of Copernican revolution, as he himself claimed. For the mind to take its own limits in to account. For the mind to attempt to mentally model its self as a mental-modeler. This is exciting stuff.

But, what does that mean? That you realize that something is true? Can you give an example of "truth realized by someone"?