I suspect that you have psychological reasons for adopting this conception of epistemology and its relationship to psychology. Sure, you can have all the faith you want in this view of yours, but it doesn't, for me, escape the difficulties I have mentioned.

People disagree very much on certain facts. Some facts allow for quite a bit of consensus. Truth is a property of sentences. Show me one single truth that is not a sentence, or a phrase. ("Sentence" is metonymy). Let's phrase it this way. Show me a truth, in your sense of the word, that isn't made of words. Just one. Only one. Please.

Once again, just because someone has a bias doesn't mean that what they believe is wrong.

I never implied that. You misunderstand me significantly. Of course truth is a concept. And snow is white.

I'm also stressing that truth is a property of sentences. I won't say that this is the only use of the word, but it's an instructive thought. I note your failure to meet the challenge. I can't meet the challenge either.

I'm trying to met you but you keep postponing. You're ignoring an important point that I made. Truth is a concept and concepts are made of words, but you're confusing words and concepts with facts and objects. Please respond to that point?

Perhaps you don't see my point. Objects only exist as concepts. Without concepts, perception would be a chaos of sensation. Concepts are the way we slice up the totality of perception.

Concepts are not made only of words, in my opinion. But words are the only way we can write about concepts.

I will argue this point. At the moment I think I can defend it. Facts and objects are impossible without concepts.

Once again you're confusing objects with words and concepts. Whether or not you had a word for a chair would have no effect on the necessary properties that make a chair a chair.

No, you aren't seeing my point. An "object" is a concept. We use concepts to frame sensory perceptions.

Check out Kant.
Immanuel Kant - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

With regard to knowledge, Kant argued that the rational order of the world as known by science could never be accounted for merely by the fortuitous accumulation of sense perceptions. It was instead the product of the rule-based activity of "synthesis." This activity consisted of conceptual unification and integration carried out by the mind through concepts or the "categories of the understanding" operating on the perceptual manifold within space and time, which are not concepts,[24] but are forms of sensibility that are a priori necessary conditions for any possible experience. Thus the objective order of nature and the causal necessity that operates within it are dependent upon the mind.

Show me a truth, in your sense of the word, that isn't made of words. Just one. Only one. Please.

The question is: Can things-in-themselves be individuated? If so, it would make sense to talk about mind-independent objects: if not, not.

I want you to try and separate the word from the object. As you said, the word or concept is a frame for what's already there. If I say that I'm sitting on an table that doesn't change the fact that I'm sitting on an object that we call a chair. Whether or not I change the name of the object has no effect on the properties of the object. Kant's idealism is bunk! He mistook concepts and words for objects and facts.

Do you believe your car is a seperate entity from your wallet?

If Kant's distinction is correct, a car and a wallet are separate phenomena; the question is, do they correspond to separate noumena? If Kant is wrong, of course, the question does not arise.

But are you sure Kant was saying that there are not seperate noumena from which we perceive seperate phenomenas? I think all he said was that the things-in-themselves are unknown, not that they are not individuated.

Even if Kant is right about noumenon, there can still be seperate actual objects in the world, can't there be? We just can't know them directly.

I think that Kant denied that the noumenon consisted of objects or things. Those are categories of the phenomenon.

By Kant's view, humans can make sense out of phenomena in these various ways, but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves", the actual objects and dynamics of the natural world

But are you sure Kant was saying that there are not seperate noumena from which we perceive seperate phenomenas? I think all he said was that the things-in-themselves are unknown, not that they are not individuated.

Even if Kant is right about noumenon, there can still be seperate actual objects in the world, can't there be? We just can't know them directly.

Yes, if things-in-themselves can be individuated. But since we can't know them directly, we don't know how closely they correspond to the concepts formed from our sense-data. Common sense suggests that they correspond very closely in many ways, and from a pragmatic point of view this is a reasonable assumption. But there is no absolute proof of this. For all we know, the things-in-themselves could be radically different from our concepts of them, in ways we cannot even imagine

And for all we know we are are being mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars. But there is no reason to believe that is true. I also haven't seen any good reason to believe that the actual objects in the world are radically different from how we perceive them. In fact, I have many good reasons for believing we do perceive the world to a good degree of accuracy.

I'm going to do a little touch up work to your first sentence.

P1: For all we know, we are all being mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars.
P2: For all we know, we might all be mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars.
P3: For all we know, we may all be mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars.

I think you meant to convey what P1 conveys, but P1 is false. P3 is false also. P2 is the correct one.

Right. Your "might" and "may" distinction. I don't think in everyday language people usually notice such a thing, but I'll use "might" to mean logical possibility, and "may" to mean plausibility, to humor you.

P1 and P2 I would use interchangably in everyday language. "For all we know" is an expression. Why do you think P1 is false? What do you think that sentence means?

And for all we know we are are being mind-controlled by rabid penguins hiding on Mars. But there is no reason to believe that is true. I also haven't seen any good reason to believe that the actual objects in the world are radically different from how we perceive them. In fact, I have many good reasons for believing we do perceive the world to a good degree of accuracy.