Yet, you would still say: "It's not really possible that it can be on heads if it's on tails," but that's different than it's not really on heads if it's on tails. What sense of "possible" would you be using?

I suppose the sort of possibility that can correspond with the real world. If the coin lands on tails, it lands on tails. Maybe it was possible it landed on heads, but it didn't. And so, after knowing the coin is on tails, we would not say, "It's possible the coin is on heads". That's something we say when we do not know, not when we know. We wouldn't doubt ourselves just because it's possible that the coin could have landed on heads. The coin didn't land on heads, and we know it landed on tails, so probability is irrelevant now, isn't it?

I suppose the sort of possibility that can correspond with the real world. If the coin lands on tails, it lands on tails. Maybe it was possible it landed on heads, but it didn't. And so, after knowing the coin is on tails, we would not say, "It's possible the coin is on heads". That's something we say when we do not know, not when we know. We wouldn't doubt ourselves just because it's possible that the coin could have landed on heads. The coin didn't land on heads, and we know it landed on tails, so probability is irrelevant now, isn't it?

I don't think it is probability that is relevant. It is our knowledge of it landing on a specific side that is relevant, that is, relevant for a kind of possibility: epistemic possibility.

It is the modal sense that is meant by Emil and me.

Exactly. And I even like the example they give on Wiki:

"If you tell me "It's possible that it is raining outside"-in the sense of epistemic possibility-then that would weigh on whether or not I take the umbrella. But if you just tell me that "It's possible for it to rain outside"-in the sense of metaphysical possibility-then I am no better off for this bit of modal enlightenment."



And fast! Don't forget to include fast!

Exactly. And I even like the example they give on Wiki:

"If you tell me "It's possible that it is raining outside"-in the sense of epistemic possibility-then that would weigh on whether or not I take the umbrella. But if you just tell me that "It's possible for it to rain outside"-in the sense of metaphysical possibility-then I am no better off for this bit of modal enlightenment."



And fast! Don't forget to include fast!

Yes.

But careful. Metaphysical possibility is not the same as logical possibility, though I don't know what it is. I have still not seen a definition of it only read that it is something between (in logical strength) physical and logical possibility.

What would you think that would be? Ein halb-schwache?

I don't know. But the thing about its logical strength means that everything that is logically impossible is metaphysically impossible. Everything that is metaphysically impossible is physically impossible. But some things are logically possible and metaphysically impossible. And so on. This is all that I have learned so far. Ask Angra who has been looking for a clarification of what it means for some time. But beware that his standards for knowing what something means are absurdly high.

Well, someone must know. Maybe it is Loungehead. If anyone would know, Loungehead would know. Or his alter-egos here.

Haha. LoungeHead is anti-philosophical, so he probably wouldn't use the term, except perhaps as in an attempt to discredit philosophy. But in doing so he would probably fail at using it the way other people are using it anyway. Nothing good has ever come out of him, at least of what I have seen.

But then again there are many people here just like him in that respect, think of Fido or the religious crowd. Though Fido is not condescending, he is completely un-understandable.

No need to mention names. It is dangerous.

The mods don't seem to be paying much attention around here. Not in this thread. Except Z. of course.

I did not say you don't have to be certain in order to claim to know (in fact, I think you should be pretty sure if you claim to know, otherwise you would be misleading). I said that you don't have to be certain in order to know. Quite a different thing.

(Claiming to know is one thing, but knowing is a very different thing, and they are independent of one another. A major problem is that they are often confused. As above).

So, to be clear, there are:

1. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, and do in fact know, because they are true.
2. Things you are certain of, and thus claim to know, but do not in fact know, because they are false.
3. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, but which you do in fact know, because they are true.
4. Things you justifiably believe but are not certain of, and thus do not claim to know, and which you do not in fact know, because they are false.

Is that correct? (I assume you don't have any unjustified beliefs.)

I don't claim to be certain of anything (with the possible exception of my own existence). But despite that, I do know (and claim to know) many things, like that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Or, the Nile is the longest river in Africa. Or Mars is the fourth planet.

I probably do hold some unjustified beliefs which I am pretty sure are unjustified.

If any belief of yours may be mistaken, how can you say without qualification that you "do know many things"? It would be a contradiction to say: "Quito is the capital of Ecuador, but it is epistemically possible that it is not".



Not philosophical ones, I hope.

Thank you. I will consider this matter further, but I would just like to make clear that I was talking about epistemic, not logical, possibility/certainty. I realise that it is logically possible for Quito not to be the (current) capital of Ecuador.