The Fatal Paradox

@kennethamy,

For instance if I say that is logically possible to produce a plain with 500 meters length and fly, I need to prove physically that it can be done to account for all the variables that the process really has...

A Theoretical model would be enough only in the case that it explained all the proceedings part by part based on previous physical knowledge including any emerging property on the assembly of the plain as a Whole and its behaviour...

2+2=4 it is true now, and it will be true tomorrow, its both physically and logically possible...

The problem with formal Logic is that it assumes to much...

For instance :

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a men.
Therefore Socrates is mortal...

its physically and logically true only if:

We know what being a men really is to the full...

...given that mankind is a continued process becoming everyday and yet not finished we cannot really tell what being a man is and less to imply that all men are mortal...

Logic assumes a precise meaning for words but cannot prove this precise meaning is valid to the full...actually it is very close to faith. It assumes a lot...

But it does forget that itself has a physical nature in the brains of those who use it, and that therefore what it can produce must refer to what there is and not to what there is not...

I cannot logically think in a line which is not straight or curved simply because such line it is not conceivable in any possible way...neither physically neither logically which as I said ultimately depends on physical attributes...

To say:

If there is a pink elephant in the world then there are pink elephants roaming around is logically to say nothing...even if there is no contradiction...at best it means that it is physically possible to conceive pink colour in skin, once there are other pink skis in nature in other animals...but it fails to prove logic once there is no real example to confront it and we are real beings with real minds and real memory?s and real thoughts...

...even if I can create such a being artificially with genetic enhancement I still have to account for the will to make it happen to possibly say that such a being is logical to conceive...if it has not happened yet, to say is logical, is speculative extrapolation...

Of course there are things we already know to not be possible in advance as a line which is not curved or straight...but if you look closer this supposed line has not yet been said what it could be, and only was referred metaphorically to what there is already and that it can?t be by rule, itself be...

---------- Post added 05-05-2010 at 04:42 PM ----------

We cannot speak of Non-Being...
Logical concepts are based on previous real experiences extrapolated to other conceptual models...and may only be considered logical if the sum of the premiss does not imply an emerging property, an effect not anticipated...such idea is unverifiable until it actually physically happens...

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;160607 wrote:

For instance if I say that is logically possible to produce a plain with 500 meters length and fly, I need to prove physically that it can be done to account for all the variables that the process really has...

.

What about if you say that it is logically possible to jump 1000 feet into the air, but not physically possible to do so? There is no question about that. So many people on this forum think that philosophy is quibbling in order to argue for the sake of argument. There is this peculiar idea that nothing is clearly true or false in philosophy. That is why non-philosophers have such a low opinion of philosophy. They believed that philosophy is all quibble, and no philosopher can get anywhere, and there can be no progress in philosophy. That is because (mostly amateur) philosophers do behave that way.

That is why some wag suggested that a good collective name for philosophers would be, "a haggle of philosophers". Some of us are our own executioners.

@kennethamy,

...With that I can agree. But it only shows how difficult is to know something, which in the first place no one likes to be reminded of...and that?s why you are right.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;159560 wrote:

So then by saying "your fate is your fate", you are implying that you have a fate but you already said fatalism is false. What do you mean by fate then?

In one sense, fate is just what happens to you. In a different sense, fate is what must happen to you.

The error is to believe that what does happen to you always must happen to you.

Of course, what does happen to you does happen to you. That is trivially tautological. But that what happens to you must happen to you, is clearly false.

---------- Post added 05-05-2010 at 05:55 PM ----------

Fil. Albuquerque;160614 wrote:

...With that I can agree. But it only shows how difficult is to know something, which in the first place no one likes to be reminded of...and that?s why you are right.

N?o entendo..............

It is not difficult to know that water is wet, or that today is May 5th.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;160615 wrote:

In one sense, fate is just what happens to you. In a different sense, fate is what must happen to you.

The error is to believe that what does happen to you always must happen to you.

Of course, what does happen to you does happen to you. That is trivially tautological. But that what happens to you must happen to you, is clearly false.

---------- Post added 05-05-2010 at 05:55 PM ----------

N?o entendo..............

Sim tu entendes ! (Yes you understand) You are right concerning Philosophy being criticised, but only for it is true, that to know is actually something ultimately very hard to do, and no one likes to be reminded of our mediocrity as a species...I do see why, such is so inconvenient for philosophy.

@kennethamy,

In what I have just said, I have assumed that there is some meaning which is the ordinary or popular meaning of such expressions as "The earth has existed for many years past." And this, I am afraid, is an assumption which some philosophers are capable of disputing. They seem to think that the question "Do you believe that the earth has existed for many years past?" is not a plain question, such as should be met either by a plain "Yes" or "No," or by a plain "I can't make up my mind," but is the sort of question which can be properly met by: "It all depends on what you mean by 'the earth' and 'exists' and 'years': if you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so, then I do; but if you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so, or so and so, and so and so, and so and so, or so and so, and so and so, and so and so, then I don't, or at least I think it is extremely doubtful." It seems to me that such a view is as profoundly mistaken as any view can be. Such an expression as "The earth has existed for many years past" is the very type of an unambiguous expression, the meaning of which we all understand. Anyone who takes a contrary view must, I suppose, be confusing the question whether we understand its meaning (which we all certainly do) with the entirely different question whether we know what it means, in the sense that we are able to give a correct analysis of its meaning. The question what is the correct analysis of the proposition meant on any occasion (for, of course, as I insisted in definin (2), a different proposition is meant at every different time at which the expression is used) by "The earth has existed for many years past" is, it seems to me, a profoundly difficult question, and one to which, as I shall presently urge, no one knows the answer. But to hold that we do not know what, in certain respects, is the analysis of what we understand by such an expression, is an entirely different thing from holding that we do not understand the expression. It is obvious that we cannot even raise the question how what we do understand by it is to be analysed, unless we do understand it. So soon, therefore, as we know that a person who uses such an expression is using it in its ordinary sense, we understand his meaning. So that in explaining that I was using the expressions used in (1) in their ordinary sense (those of them which have an ordinary sense, which is not the case with quite all of them), I have done all that is required to make my meaning clear.

"A Defense of Commonsense" G. E. Moore.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;160625 wrote:

In what I have just said, I have assumed that there is some meaning which is the ordinary or popular meaning of such expressions as "The earth has existed for many years past." And this, I am afraid, is an assumption which some philosophers are capable of disputing. They seem to think that the question "Do you believe that the earth has existed for many years past?" is not a plain question, such as should be met either by a plain "Yes" or "No," or by a plain "I can't make up my mind," but is the sort of question which can be properly met by: "It all depends on what you mean by 'the earth' and 'exists' and 'years': if you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so, then I do; but if you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so, or so and so, and so and so, and so and so, or so and so, and so and so, and so and so, then I don't, or at least I think it is extremely doubtful." It seems to me that such a view is as profoundly mistaken as any view can be. Such an expression as "The earth has existed for many years past" is the very type of an unambiguous expression, the meaning of which we all understand. Anyone who takes a contrary view must, I suppose, be confusing the question whether we understand its meaning (which we all certainly do) with the entirely different question whether we know what it means, in the sense that we are able to give a correct analysis of its meaning. The question what is the correct analysis of the proposition meant on any occasion (for, of course, as I insisted in definin (2), a different proposition is meant at every different time at which the expression is used) by "The earth has existed for many years past" is, it seems to me, a profoundly difficult question, and one to which, as I shall presently urge, no one knows the answer. But to hold that we do not know what, in certain respects, is the analysis of what we understand by such an expression, is an entirely different thing from holding that we do not understand the expression. It is obvious that we cannot even raise the question how what we do understand by it is to be analysed, unless we do understand it. So soon, therefore, as we know that a person who uses such an expression is using it in its ordinary sense, we understand his meaning. So that in explaining that I was using the expressions used in (1) in their ordinary sense (those of them which have an ordinary sense, which is not the case with quite all of them), I have done all that is required to make my meaning clear.

"A Defense of Commonsense" G. E. Moore.

Once again I fully agree that we not always need to dispute the meaning of everything around us...but concerning the being of Logic it is hard to agree that it has not Physical boundaries...

I dispute the nature of abstract objects as opposed to concrete ones...

First I can?t really tell what are concrete real objects in the physicall sense...this is in fact disputable nowadays after computer virtual reality?s being possible...

Secondly if by abstract we refer to what does not exist in space time like numbers I have to consider if numbers can refer themselves without what there is to be referred in concrete alone...

Logic concerns Reality and therefore physicality...even if physical does not oppose abstract concepts by necessity...specially for that, all has to be summed up in a set, from this point on...

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;160615 wrote:

In one sense, fate is just what happens to you. In a different sense, fate is what must happen to you.

Right, so when our drunk friend staggers home and the next morning we ask what his fate was, we mean to ask what happened to him. So in that case we each do have a fate and tautologically our fate is our fate. However, going back to the first post of this thread, why did you bother mentioning fatalism if that's all you mean since obviously it doesn't imply it?

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;160643 wrote:

Right, so when our drunk friend staggers home and the next morning we ask what his fate was, we mean to ask what happened to him. So in that case we each do have a fate and tautologically our fate is our fate. However, going back to the first post of this thread, why did you bother mentioning fatalism if that's all you mean since obviously it doesn't imply it?

What is all I mean And what does not imply what? Try nouns rather than pronouns. We'll get there faster.

Try a little pedantry.

There are two senses of "fate". It is important to distinguish between them. I was talking about both, and pointing out that fatalism (the doctrine) is true in one sense, but false in the other. Next.

@Amperage,

Amperage;160557 wrote:

no I have not. I've been busy with my own classes. I have never had a problem with the logic.....but the definitions themselves.

nevertheless my email is [EMAIL="[email protected]"][email protected][/EMAIL]

I do think the modal fallacy is a fallacy itself though and presupposes a position it cannot verify

Don't you think it is a little (to say at least) unwise to talk about logic when you don't have the first clue about it? Hint: "Logic" means something else here than in colloquial discourse.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;160571 wrote:

If the prophet is right, then it will happen (and it is assumed that God is right). But, that does not mean it will happen just because God or the prophet says it will happen. Saying that it will happen does not make it happen. The prophet (supposing he is an infallible prophet, and is always on the money) says X will happen because X will happen. But that does not mean that X will happen because the prophet says it will happen. Not unless the prophet has extra powers so that he can not merely prophecy infallibly, but he can make happen what he prophecies. I know of no prophets like that: have you? So what is true is that if X happens, then the infallible prophet will say it happens. But it is false that if the prophet says it will happen, then it will happen, unless (as I pointed out) the prophet can make X happen. After all, Pete, the infallible prophet, must know X will happen, otherwise he is not infallible. But Pete knows that X will happen because X will happen (and neither he, nor anyone, can know what is not true) but that does not mean that X will happen because Pete knows it will happen. Mere knowing that X will happen does not make X happen. X's happening will cause Pete to know X will happen (for unless X happens, Pete cannot know it will happen). But that is a far cry from the proposition that Pete's knowing X will happen can cause X to happen. How could mere knowing that X will happen cause X to happen?

no I don't know of any prophets like that nor have I insinuated that there were. The mere knowing that X will happen does not cause X to happen nor have I insinuated such. But the mere fact that Pete knows that X will happen suggests that X has already happened and/or that X simply always will happen.

@Emil,

Emil;160656 wrote:

Don't you think it is a little (to say at least) unwise to talk about logic when you don't have the first clue about it? Hint: "Logic" means something else here than in colloquial discourse.

But everyone know that if it is philosophy you are talking about, you need not know what you are talking about. You can invent it as you go along.

---------- Post added 05-05-2010 at 08:44 PM ----------

Amperage;160660 wrote:

no I don't know of any prophets like that nor have I insinuated that there were. The mere knowing that X will happen does not cause X to happen nor have I insinuated such. But the mere fact that Pete knows that X will happen suggests that X has already happened and/or that X simply always will happen.

How could it possibly be that something that will happen in the future, and has not yet happened, has already happened? Don't you think that odd?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;160663 wrote:

How could it possibly be that something that will happen in the future, and has not yet happened, has already happened? Don't you think that odd?

as I said it's a matter of perspective.

If I traveled back to 1985 the people then would say 1986 hasn't happened yet.....but of course it has already happens from my perspective.

and just who do you think is inventing things as they go along? As far as I'm concerned all you and Emil have done is attack a stawman because I have yet to make any of the claims ya'll have been attacking.

I did say I thought the definition of hard determinism was that what happens necessarily happens, but as I said I thought that was the definition. Apparently that is not the definition of hard determinism, but is, instead, the definition of fatalism

---------- Post added 05-05-2010 at 08:40 PM ----------

the initial reason I jumped back into this thread(Post #41, oh just a side note I guarantee Emil did not read any of the posts near that area or those soon following) was to question the reason why fatalism should negate free will because I don't see that it should anymore than if a prophet or God could tell you what was going to happen would negate free will.

But Extrain says that fatalism says that what will happen will happen necessarily which would seem to me to be in conflict with free will.

I see no reason why fatalism needs to say this but if it does obviously it's false. That being the case as I said we ought to be debating The Determined Paradox

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;160648 wrote:

I was talking about both, and pointing out that fatalism (the doctrine) is true in one sense, but false in the other.

Quote:

Fatalism is a philosophical doctrine emphasizing the subjugation of all events or actions to fate or inevitable predetermination.

There is only one sense of fatalism.

@Amperage,

[QUOTE=Amperage;160668]I did say I thought the definition of hard determinism was that what happens necessarily happens, but as I said I thought that was the definition. Apparently that is not the definition of hard determinism, but is, instead, the definition of fatalism[/QUOTE]

Determinist: believes that all macro-events have antecedent causes
Indeterminist: does not believe that all macro-events have antecedent causes
Believer in free will: believes that humans have free will
Non-believer in free will: does not believe that humans have free will

Soft determinist: a determinist that believes in free will
Hard determinist: a determinist that is a non-believer in free will
Libertarian: an indeterminist that believes in free will

Compatibilist: (aka soft determinist)
Incompatibilist: (hard determinists and Libertarians)

@Night Ripper,

Our current Reality necessitates certain initial conditions given causation is true...other alternative Reality would necessitate different initial conditions to be true...do we have any valid reason to suspect a different Reality but our own ? and even if so was to be in fact the case, all we would need to do would be to sum up all initial conditions there is in a Meta initial condition...certainly not to expeculate in an infinite number of possible alternatives as if they were true and say they are Logic as if Logic would not address Reality but something else.

As for time about what happened and what did not happen I advise you on reading again Einstein relativity...it seams needed ! I have read for the first time when I as fifteen...

@fast,

fast;160692 wrote:

Determinist: believes that all macro-events have antecedent causes
Indeterminist: does not believe that all macro-events have antecedent causes
Believer in free will: believes that humans have free will
Non-believer in free will: does not believe that humans have free will

Soft determinist: a determinist that believes in free will
Hard determinist: a determinist that is a non-believer in free will
Libertarian: an indeterminist that believes in free will

Compatibilist: (aka soft determinist)
Incompatibilist: (hard determinists and Libertarians)

the question for me becomes, given hard determinism(determinism with NO free will), and given some initial condition, do all events thereafter or do they not happen necessarily(physical necessity)? And why?

It would seem to me that they do. Because with no free will to interject it would seem to me that things happen physically necessarily just as dominoes physically necessarily fall one after the other. But I guess I am wrong about that.

@Fil Albuquerque,

I think we need to clarify some things:

1 - Truth addresses existence. What there is and will be against what cannot be and never will...

2 - Logic addresses Truth and not Falsity, therefore addresses Reality.

3 - Abstract objects and concrete objects are the same...(...it satisfy?s if we are not able to prove any substantial distinction as at the current moment we can?t...)

4 - Logical speculative possibility is dependent on closed theoretical models which do not entirely reflect reality, so there must be a distinction between Logical speculative possibility, and Logical possibility...they have different roles to play...once the first must serve the second?s purpose and nothing else...

---------- Post added 05-05-2010 at 10:44 PM ----------

Amperage;160696 wrote:

the question for me becomes, given hard determinism(determinism with NO free will), and given some initial condition, do all events thereafter or do they not happen necessarily(physical necessity)? And why?

It would seem to me that they do. Because with no free will to interject it would seem to me that things happen physically necessarily just as dominoes physically necessarily fall one after the other. But I guess I am wrong about that.

And just why do you think so ???
You hesitate to much on a bunch of opinions hardly proven true...follow your nose !
Nobody is going to help you, ultimately you are the one to help yourself ! Smile

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;160678 wrote:

There is only one sense of fatalism.

Yes, I agree. What I wrote was that there were two senses of "fate". And it is the confusion between these two sense of "fate" which makes fatalism plausible. You don't understand the argument.

---------- Post added 05-06-2010 at 01:22 AM ----------

Amperage;160696 wrote:

the question for me becomes, given hard determinism(determinism with NO free will), and given some initial condition, do all events thereafter or do they not happen necessarily(physical necessity)? And why?

It would seem to me that they do. Because with no free will to interject it would seem to me that things happen physically necessarily just as dominoes physically necessarily fall one after the other. But I guess I am wrong about that.

If an event can be subsumed under a law of nature, then that event is physically necessary. But it does not follow from that, that if that event is a person's action or choice, that it cannot be a free action, done of the person's own free will. The reason for that is that even if the action can be explained in terms of its cause (and initial conditions) the explanation need not be in terms of compulsion. It is only if the person's action is compelled that it is not a free action, not just if it is caused. All compulsions are causes, but not all causes are compulsion. So, it is not because an action is caused that it is not a free action; it is because an action has a certain kind of cause that it is not a free action. Forget analogies about dominoes, since dominoes are not people, and cannot be compelled to do anything. Analogies (pictures) often interfere with thought because they are simplistic, and may leave out vital considerations. People are not: dominoes, puppets, actors reading a script, and so on. If they were, things would be different. But they are not. (You have already suggested a different analogy about the future being like an unread book, you recall. And as I pointed out, you would first have to show that the future was like an unread book, for the analogy to work. Now, you have to show that people (if their actions are caused) are like dominoes. My suggestion is that all of these analogies should be dropped unless you can show that their premises are true. For, unless they are true, the argument you want to make on their bases is unsound. Why not just deal with the issue, and forget the analogies, since they are of no help?).

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;160607 wrote:

The problem with formal Logic is that it assumes to much...

For instance :

All men are mortal.
Socrates is a men.
Therefore Socrates is mortal...

its physically and logically true only if:

We know what being a men really is to the full...

It is obvious you have no familiarity with propositional and quantificational logic because your point (whatever it is) is completely irrelevant to it. There are no "assumptions" required concerning empirical facts for the argument above to be valid:

All P are Q
X is P
Therefore, X is Q

This syllogism is logically valid in virtue of its form irrespective of what "man" or "mortal" means.

If you want to dispute first-order logic, then you need to dispute first-order validity and logical consequence, not the linguistic or empirical content of the words "man" and "mortal."

Please see both:
Syllogism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Logical connective - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
---------- Post added 05-06-2010 at 01:33 AM ----------

Fil. Albuquerque;160702 wrote:

I think we need to clarify some things:

1 - Truth addresses existence. What there is and will be against what cannot be and never will...

2 - Logic addresses Truth and not Falsity, therefore addresses Reality.

3 - Abstract objects and concrete objects are the same...(...it satisfy?s if we are not able to prove any substantial distinction as at the current moment we can?t...)

4 - Logical speculative possibility is dependent on closed theoretical models which do not entirely reflect reality, so there must be a distinction between Logical speculative possibility, and Logical possibility...they have different roles to play...once the first must serve the second?s purpose and nothing else...

Your terribly mistaken word-fumble above is a scandal against first-order logic. Nothing you said above is even correct. :rolleyes:

First-order logic deals with both truth/falsity and validity/invalidity. It is a purely formal device which cashes out necessity, possibility, and contingency. And it is formal/non-empirical/a priori science of the rules of "valid thought" which has nothing to say about the empirical world.

So please take the time to learn some basic propositional calculus and quantification before you attempt to say anything about it. It's pretty sickening having to see you trash a purely formal discipline over and over again with your own ignorance.

Please see the following on the difference between logical, metaphysical, and physical possibility/necessity:

Logical possibility - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Modal logic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Possible world - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Please see the following on basic first-order logic:

Logical connective - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Propositional calculus - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
First-order logic - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Quantification - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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