@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;163200 wrote: A posteriori is knowledge gain by experience, but it does not say which agent.
But one would not have
a posteriori knowledge that fatalism were true in some possible world unless he, himself, were
IN that possible world, and not in the actual world. So
your knowledge that fatalism is true in some other world can only be known
a priori, because it is simply metaphysically impossible for YOU to know a posteriori that fatalism is a posteriori know
able for some other person in some other world of which you are
not a part.
TuringEquivalent;163200 wrote:The entire human race will probable never ever know if there are multiple universes, but it is not logically impossible that some life form can know.
It's not logically impossible that some life forms can know that telephones can fly in some possible worlds, either. But so what?
TuringEquivalent;163200 wrote: Are you joking? Since when is a posteriori knowledge dependent on a single observer, me? I am flattered by the way.
Huh? Since when are we
not talking about
someone's knowledge relativized to a possible world when we are talking about "someone's knowing that P"? If John knows that fatalism is true, then he either knows this a posteriori or a priori. If he knows fatalism is true a posteriori, then he knows this by personal experience. And if he knows fatalism is true by experience, then he knows fatalism is true in his actual world.
On the other hand, if John knows fatalism is true in some
other world, then he can only know this a priori, not a posteriori, simply because he is
not part of that other world.
No one can have a posteriori knowledge about other possible worlds: it is metaphysically impossible.
TuringEquivalent;163200 wrote: Not to mention the endless time you misread me by saying i claim fatalism to be true in the actual world.
You are simply not thinking through what you are saying. If fatalism is a posteriori known to be true in the actual world, then it is known to be true in the actual world of which that person is a part. If someone knows fatalism is true for some possible world, but not the actual world, then he knows fatalism is true for
that world of which he is
not a part--
a priori.
So fatalism cannot be not known to be true a posteriori for other possible worlds
by us in the actual world, since we can only know fatalism is true in other possible worlds
a priori.
TuringEquivalent;163200 wrote:Your ridiculous claim that that fatalism is metaphysically necessary is also something you ignore knowing that i am right. Too shy?
I already said I don't care about this point since you already admitted you don't know fatalism is true in the actual world. Further, I also said I am not a realist about possible worlds like David Lewis. So I find further discussion of this topic useless.
