Hello Kennethamy,

Before your next action?- Can we assume that your physical interaction with your own anatomical diversity is not of your control?
So - the next time you inhale, for instance, can you inhale the exact quantity of oxygen, nitrogen , co2, etc, that you choose? Can you direct the white blood corpusles to a given location so they eliminate a parasitic infection, that you are unaware of?
No, you can't - therefore you are only able to assume your next conscious intended interaction with relative criteria available in the realm to which you are accustomed.

If what you intend to do, indeed, you do? Then you can only be aware of that having taken place, after it has taken place - which clearly makes fatalism a record of the event and not the pre-emption of.

And unless you can be certain of every action complying with said intention, the event loses substance through its random occurence.

Thank you Kennethamy, and fare well.

Mark...

Yes, of course before my next action if I have not yet done what I intend to do, and what I intend to do is my next action, then if I know what I intend to do I know what I will do before I do it. The future is not like the past. You cannot know what happened before it happened. But that does not mean that you cannot know what will happen before what will happen, happens. You seem to believe that the future is like the past, but it is not.

Is there any reason to think that directing my blood corpuscles which I cannot do, is like knowing what my next action will be which I can do? Not that I can see. So, you cannot simply assume the analogy between the two. You have to show that there is one. If X is like Y, then a property of Y's might well be a property of X's. But first, you have to establish that X is really like Y. Don't you agree?

Hello Kennethamy,

What if something intervenes with your decision to, let's say, climb a tree?
Mark...

Yes, of course before my next action if I have not yet done what I intend to do, and what I intend to do is my next action, then if I know what I intend to do I know what I will do before I do it. The future is not like the past. You cannot know what happened before it happened. But that does not mean that you cannot know what will happen before what will happen, happens. You seem to believe that the future is like the past, but it is not.

Is there any reason to think that directing my blood corpuscles which I cannot do, is like knowing what my next action will be which I can do? Not that I can see. So, you cannot simply assume the analogy between the two. You have to show that there is one. If X is like Y, then a property of Y's might well be a property of X's. But first, you have to establish that X is really like Y. Don't you agree?

I am happy you love my arguments. And I don't blame you, not a bit! I just hope you do so for the right reason. Namely, that they are sound arguments.

).

You said it yourself, careful as you always are..."if what you intended to do is your next action

Not at all. No more than if I claim that if 6 is divisible by 2, then 6 is an even number, am I being uncertain. "If" may, but certainly does not always, signal uncertainty. It may, as in my case, simply signal a sufficient condition. "If my name is 'Fred' then I am a male" does not signal that I am uncertain about what my name is, nor my confidence that "Fred" is a male name in English.

Hi Ken,

Your arguments are sound. and gratefully accepted.
I have no pedestal from which to fall. and therefore appreciate all responses equalibriously.

Have no concern about my motives - Causality applies on all fronts - How you perceive others is exactly equal to how they perceive you!

Hope to hear from you soon, my friend.

Mark...

If you think that my arguments are sound, then you should be convinced by them. And, if you are rational, you will be.

Not at all. No more than if I claim that if 6 is divisible by 2, then 6 is an even number, am I being uncertain. "If" may, but certainly does not always, signal uncertainty. It may, as in my case, simply signal a sufficient condition. "If my name is 'Fred' then I am a male" does not signal that I am uncertain about what my name is, nor my confidence that "Fred" is a male name in English.

If you were rational you would not say such thing...are you 100% certain of what you are saying ? I just gave you one example on how you could be wrong ! :sarcastic:

Which example was that? I am afraid I missed it. What objection have to you what is, after all, the trivial truism that if someone thinks an argument is sound, and that person is a rational person, then he ought to be convinced by that argument. That seems to me analytically true.

I gave you a panorama were fatalism is true and you could not tell the difference from Determinism...and of course there is a difference between truth, and impression of truth...

---------- Post added 05-10-2010 at 09:02 AM ----------

I have to ask, do you know what simulation means ??? In VR you cannot trace it...

If you think that my arguments are sound, then you should be convinced by them. And, if you are rational, you will be.

Hi Ken,

I do, indeed think your arguments are sound - rationally drawn up. Nevertheless, they are still arguments, and I don't agree with them all, or indeed in entirity. Otherwise, why would the argument exist?

And , as for being convinced by them? I'm not - If I were to revert to (semantics) I would easily find argument with, even my own deliberations.
There are always opposing factors in debate, and alternate views thereof.

This doesn't make me a wanton disciple of any one or any group. I am ME, not you.

I do enjoy the challenges posed by interacting with you, Ken.

Thank you and fare well.

Mark...

You mean that unless you agreed with an argument, it would not exist, therefore, if the argument exists, it must be because you disagree with it. Hmm. Now that is quite an argument. It must follow, then, that the Ontological argument for God only began to exists when you disagreed with it. But wait, can that be right? For how could you have disagreed with it before it even existed? Very confusing, don't you think?

The mere fact that there are objections to an argument has nothing whatever to do with its soundness; unless, of course, the objections good objections. Someone can conjure up an objection to the proposition that the Moon is not made of cream cheese. What would that show? That it is not true that the Moon is not made of cream cheese, or that we do not know that the Moon is not made of cream cheese? It is the validity of the objections that counts, not the fact of it.

Hi Ken,

If you think the moon is made of cheese? then it must therefore smell of cheese - how can we determine this to be true, if A) we can't get there. B) If we could - we wouldn't be able to remove our spacesuits, so as to verify its' aroma, and C) It would imply that aliens had a damn huge cow out there somewhere.

I can't prove that the moon is not made of cheese, but I'll resign myself to the assumption that it isn't.

May I (in accordance with wittenthingy's beetle principle) redefine your arguments as "GOOD" and "ENJOYABLE" rather than sound?

I like you, my friend.

Thank you,

Mark...

Hi Ken,

If you think the moon is made of cheese? then it must therefore smell of cheese - how can we determine this to be true, if A) we can't get there. B) If we could - we wouldn't be able to remove our spacesuits, so as to verify its' aroma, and C) It would imply that aliens had a damn huge cow out there somewhere.

I can't prove that the moon is not made of cheese, but I'll resign myself to the assumption that it isn't.

May I (in accordance with wittenthingy's beetle principle) redefine your arguments as "GOOD" and "ENJOYABLE" rather than sound?

I like you, my friend.

Thank you,

Mark...

What makes you believe that for me to think that the Moon is made of cheese, the Moon has to smell cheesy? That the Moon smells cheesy may, indeed, cause me to believe it is made of cheese, but I happen to be crazy enough to believe it is made of cheese even if it is not redolent of cheese at all.

Wherever did you get the idea that I said anything one way or the other about proving the Moon is made of cheese? However, it may be made of cheese regardless of whether or not it can be proved that it is. Certainly, I need not prove it is not made of cheese to know that it is not. For there is (to say the least) no reason in the world to think it is, and every reason in the world to think it is not. It is hardly an assumption that it isn't, unless "assumption" means something very different from what I think it means.

Given what we already know about the moon, there is no good reason to think the moon is made of cheese, even if we cannot verify the moon is not made of cheese. If I know that P implies Q, and I know that P, then I know that Q. There is no reason to suppose I don't know that Q if I know that P and know that P implies Q.

If I know the moon is made of rock, and I know that rocks are not made of cheese, then I know the moon is not made of cheese. I know the moon is not made of cheese because I know it is made of rock, and knowing that it is made of rock implies knowing it is not made of cheese.

Not unless the cheese is hard cheese. But, yes. I agree whole-heartedly.