The Fatal Paradox

@Extrain,

Extrain;162154 wrote:

If Fate is absolutely certain, then which course of action is absolutely certain? You've just trivially said, "If P then P, If Q then Q, If R then R"

If what will occur is absolutely unpredictable, then what will occur is not absolutely certain.

Hello extrain,

Do you perceive fate as a future event? I don't - I see it as the record of events that have taken place, I may choose to swim the channel - if I drown trying or get to France - either will have been my fate, yet we cannot ascertain this until the event has taken place. the one thing that is for certain is - that whatever will take place, WILL take place.

Que sera

Thankyou and farewell

Mark...

@mark noble,

mark noble;162158 wrote:

Hello extrain,

Do you perceive fate as a future event? I don't - I see it as the record of events that have taken place, I may choose to swim the channel - if I drown trying or get to France - either will have been my fate, yet we cannot ascertain this until the event has taken place. the one thing that is for certain is - that whatever will take place, WILL take place.

Que sera

Thankyou and farewell

Mark...

Many of us having been discussing this for some time now. "If whatever will take place, will take place" is true, then it is also trivially true because it is a tautology "If P then P." So no one disagrees with "Necessarily, If P then P." What some people disagree with is, "If P, then necessarily P." The former is true, the latter is false. The problem with fatalism is either that it is trivially true and doesn't say anything, and hence is not fatalism. Or, fatalism has something substantively to say which is clearly false. Whatever it says, fatalism is not fatalism and is true, or fatalism is fatalism and is false. Either way, it is false.

@mark noble,

mark noble;162153 wrote:

Hello all,

How can anyone or anything avoid what will innevitably be their/it's next action?

Mark...

No one can avoid what will inevitably be his next action, of course. But that does not mean that he cannot avoid what would be his next action unless he avoided it. As long as his next action is not inevitable, of course. You seem to think that your next action is always inevitably your next action. Wherever did you get such an idea?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;162160 wrote:

No one can avoid what will inevitably be his next action, of course. But that does not mean that he cannot avoid what would be his next action unless he avoided it. As long as his next action is not inevitable, of course. You seem to think that your next action is always inevitably your next action. Wherever did you get such an idea?

That's right.

I take you to mean: I can avoid what will be my next action if I avoid it, even if I cannot avoid what will be my next action when I do not avoid it.

@Extrain,

Extrain;162162 wrote:

That's right.

I take you to mean: I can avoid what will be my next action if I avoid it, even if I cannot avoid what will be my next action when I do not avoid it.

I don't think that is what I mean. What I mean is that I cannot avoid doing what is inevitably my next action (since what is inevitably my next action is, of course, unavoidable). But that does not mean that I cannot avoid doing my next action, since there is not reason to believe that my next action is inevitably my next action. Again the same confusion:

1. It is inevitable that my next action is my next action.
2. My next action is inevitably my next action.

1 is (trivially) true 2. is significantly false.

"Will no one rid me of this irritating modal fallacy?" (apologies to T.S. Eliot, to Henry II of England, and especially, Thomas a Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury).

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;162163 wrote:

I don't think that is what I mean. What I mean is that I cannot avoid doing what is inevitably my next action (since what is inevitably my next action is, of course, unavoidable). But that does not mean that I cannot avoid doing my next action, since there is not reason to believe that my next action is inevitably my next action. Again the same confusion:

1. It is inevitable that my next action is my next action.
2. My next action is inevitably my next action.

1 is (trivially) true 2. is significantly false.

"Will no one rid me of this irritating modal fallacy?" (apologies to T.S. Eliot, to Henry II of England, and especially, Thomas a Becket, the Archbishop of Canterbury).

It is just that your language can be confusing sometimes. (1) and (2) might clear it up. Like this???--

Necessarily, my next action is my next action.--true. (Necessary identity statement)
My next action is not an inevitable action.--true. (Predicative statement denying the predicate "inevitable" of my next action)

@Extrain,

Extrain;162164 wrote:

It is just that your language can be confusing sometimes. (1) and (2) might clear it up. Like this???--

Necessarily, my next action is my next action.--true. (Necessary identity statement)
My next action is not an inevitable action.--true. (Predicative statement denying the predicate "inevitable" of my next action)

Sure, but why switch from "inevitable" to "necessary" in mid-stream like that?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;162169 wrote:

Sure, but why switch from "inevitable" to "necessary" in mid-stream like that?

Then call the latter a "necessary action."

Necessity in the first instance is de dicto necessity about a proposition that is necessarily true--since it is a statement of identity about your next action--which is clearly what your statement was implying. Your latter statement is clearly using "inevitable" predicatively, so that you are denying "inevitability" of your next action since you said (2) was false.

So I would just construe the latter statement as a predicative statement denying de re (not de dicto) "necessity" of your next action. "Necessity" has two functions here: de dicto, and de re.

Am I misunderstanding something? Ken, I just notice structure before content, and if that structure is ambiguous, I try to clear it up, otherwise I can't understand it all.

@Extrain,

Extrain;162171 wrote:

Then call the latter a "necessary action."

Necessity in the first instance is de dicto necessity about a proposition that is necessarily true--since it is a statement of identity about your next action--which is clearly what your statement was implying. Your latter statement is clearly using "inevitable" predicatively, so that you are denying "inevitability" of your next action since you said (2) was false.

So I would just construe the latter statement as a predicative statement denying de re (not de dicto) "necessity" of your next action. "Necessity" has two functions here: de dicto, and de re.

Am I misunderstanding something? Ken, I just notice structure before content, and if that structure is ambiguous, I try to clear it up, otherwise I can't understand it all.

The clearer the better, only I think we should stick to the same vocabulary if at all possible. Otherwise it will we might be diverted by pointless "semantic" quibbles. We don't want to be diverted from the essential considerations of structural ambiguity to inessential considerations of semantic ambiguity.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;162173 wrote:

The clearer the better, only I think we should stick to the same vocabulary if at all possible. Otherwise it will we might be diverted by pointless "semantic" quibbles. We don't want to be diverted from the essential considerations of structural ambiguity to inessential considerations of semantic ambiguity.

But if there is any semantic ambiguity, then there is structural ambiguity. Semantic clarity supervenes on structural clarity. Therefore, if the semantics is unclear, that means the structure is unclear.

Of course, in the end, we are not at odds. I am just a stickler about the appropriate logical formulations in order to make sense of philosophical claims so that they can become arguable. No clarity--> no argument.

@Extrain,

Extrain;162175 wrote:

But if there is any semantic ambiguity, then there is structural ambiguity. Semantic clarity supervenes on structural clarity. Therefore, if the semantics is unclear, that means the structure is unclear.

Of course, in the end, we are not at odds. I am just a stickler about the appropriate logical formulations in order to make sense of philosophical claims so that they can become arguable. No clarity--> no argument.

Yes. Although I don't see why semantic ambiguity implies structural ambiguity. But that issue is a diversion.

I am a fan of appropriate logical formulations too, just as long as it does not involve the use of heavy logical machinery for its own sake. The problem is that unneeded heavy logical machinery is often used for its own sake.

@Extrain,

Hello Kennethamy and extrain.

I can see that you have been discussing this for a long time, but I have also, just not with you guys.
I studied Leucippus and democritus at a very early age and became aware of Leucippus's (5thcent bc) principle theory that - 'The way things are now will lead with absolute certainty to the way they will be in a thousand years'. He was, as you are probably aware, the inventor of the atomic theory of matter, and believed that atoms invariably follow fixed laws in their behaviour.
I agree with Leucippus because he is the reason the universe makes sense to me.

I don't mean to be a hindrance to your discussion, but how can you avoid your next action when you don't know what it is until it has taken place?
As for if p then p - it should follow - if p then p+csquared+1. P is only P at the time it is equated, any secondary P must possess the minimum value of lightspeedsquared +1.

Thank you, and don't get annoyed with my trivial points. sometimes the blindingly obvious is blindingly obvious.

Mark...

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;161320]
So just be sure not to equivocate determinism with fatalism. P=cause and Q=effect:

If P then Q
P
Therefore, Q

This is determinism. If P occurs, then Q has to occur. The occurence of P is sufficient (not necessary) for the occurence of Q.

If P then Q
P
Therefore, Necessarily Q

This is fatalism, and it is invalid. Just because Q occurs if P occurs, does not entail that if P occurs, Q necessarily occurs. This is the modal fallacy of fatalism. The fallacy is thinking that if P does not occur, Q must still occur--but this is not obviously true, and can easily be false, since Q might not occur at all.[/QUOTE]
Why do you say, "has to"? That is equivalent to "must," and that is equivalent to "necessarily."

If X must happen, then X will happen, but that X will happen isn't to say that X must happen. I get that. I understand that. However, determinism isn't the view that if X happens, then X must happen. Determinism is the view that if event X happened, happens, or will happen, then there was, is, or will be an antecedent cause to event X.

It is not the case that X has to happen simply because events are determined. To say of an event that it is determined is to say there is an antecedent cause for the event. It may be the case that X will happen in a deterministic universe, but that's different, but whatever determinism is, it's certainly not the case that X has to happen.

Why you think fatalism is what you say it is is even more perplexing.

@mark noble,

mark noble;162215 wrote:

Hello Kennethamy and extrain.

I can see that you have been discussing this for a long time, but I have also, just not with you guys.
I studied Leucippus and democritus at a very early age and became aware of Leucippus's (5thcent bc) principle theory that - 'The way things are now will lead with absolute certainty to the way they will be in a thousand years'. He was, as you are probably aware, the inventor of the atomic theory of matter, and believed that atoms invariably follow fixed laws in their behaviour.
I agree with Leucippus because he is the reason the universe makes sense to me.

I don't mean to be a hindrance to your discussion, but how can you avoid your next action when you don't know what it is until it has taken place?
As for if p then p - it should follow - if p then p+csquared+1. P is only P at the time it is equated, any secondary P must possess the minimum value of lightspeedsquared +1.

Thank you, and don't get annoyed with my trivial points. sometimes the blindingly obvious is blindingly obvious.

Mark...

Avoiding my next action would mean its not being my next action, for it it is my next action, then I did not avoid it (although maybe I attempted to avoid it).

It is not true that I do not know what my next action will be until it has taken place. For instance, if I am playing chess, I may know that my next action will be to move the knight. I need not wait for the knight to move in order to know that my moving the knight will be my next action.

@kennethamy,

mark noble wrote:

I don't mean to be a hindrance to your discussion, but how can you avoid your next action when you don't know what it is until it has taken place?

This question seems confused. If you avoided it, it wasn't in fact your next action. If it was in fact your next action, you didn't avoid it (even though you may have tried, as ken pointed out).

But I of course can know my next action. Why do you think I can't? I can know that I will get up from this chair, and I don't need to wait until I get up from this chair to know that I knew. But I think delving into this particular point would divert the conversation because we would have to once again go over what it means to know something.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;162301 wrote:

This question seems confused. If you avoided it, it wasn't in fact your next action. If it was in fact your next action, you didn't avoid it (even though you may have tried, as ken pointed out).

But I of course can know my next action. Why do you think I can't? I can know that I will get up from this chair, and I don't need to wait until I get up from this chair to know that I knew. But I think delving into this particular point would divert the conversation because we would have to once again go over what it means to know something.

Yes. mark noble presents another example of what Wittgenstein meant when he wrote that much of philosophy goes on when "language goes on holiday". In other cases, as with Reconstructo, language not only goes on holiday. It retreats into complete retirement.

@fast,

fast;162280 wrote:

Why do you say, "has to"? That is equivalent to "must," and that is equivalent to "necessarily."

Sheesh...I can't believe you focused on this one thing outside of everything else I said in that post. Consider it a typo.

It is merely the weak kind of conditional "necessity" coming from the logic of material implication, not absolute necessity. I don't "have" to do anything. It is simply true that if I choose A, then I do A. Since "If P then Q, and P" is true, it follows that Q.

P implies Q. P doesn't "necessitate" Q. That's all I meant. Please don't put words into my mouth. I never said "If P then it must be the case that Q." I explicitly said the opposite in that post. I said P is causally sufficient for Q.

[QUOTE=fast;162280]If X must happen, then X will happen, but that X will happen isn't to say that X must happen. I get that. I understand that. However, determinism isn't the view that if X happens, then X must happen. Determinism is the view that if event X happened, happens, or will happen, then there was, is, or will be an antecedent cause to event X. [/QUOTE]

fast;162280 wrote:

It is not the case that X has to happen simply because events are determined. To say of an event that it is determined is to say there is an antecedent cause for the event. It may be the case that X will happen in a deterministic universe, but that's different, but whatever determinism is, it's certainly not the case that X has to happen.

...and causes are sufficient for their effects. That's just what causes are.

You're not telling me anything I don't already know, fast. Where have you been the past few days? If you read all the posts you missed, you will see I've argued and discussed determinism at great length already.

fast;162280 wrote:

Why you think fatalism is what you say it is is even more perplexing.

So you don't agree that fatalism says everything that happens, happens necessarily? Of course it does. If P occurs, then P must occur--fatalism. "P is fated, and there is nothing anyone could do to change that."

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;162301 wrote:

This question seems confused. If you avoided it, it wasn't in fact your next action. If it was in fact your next action, you didn't avoid it (even though you may have tried, as ken pointed out).

But I of course can know my next action. Why do you think I can't? I can know that I will get up from this chair, and I don't need to wait until I get up from this chair to know that I knew. But I think delving into this particular point would divert the conversation because we would have to once again go over what it means to know something.

Hello Zetherin,

How can you know what your next action is when -

A) you cannot without the sum knowledge of the entire universe, and the variables beyond, identify with your next action at the subatomic leve.
B) What if you die, lightning strikes, the earth implodes, aliens invade, your chair collapses or someone superglued the chair before you sat on it?

My point is - we can only assume to know our next action, and then only in the timeframe and physical environment we are accustomed to.

[CENTER]Is anything for certain
Can anything be known
When each man's wisdom
Is, primarily, His own
?[/CENTER]

Thank you and fare well.

Mark...

---------- Post added 05-10-2010 at 11:25 AM ----------

kennethamy;162298 wrote:

Avoiding my next action would mean its not being my next action, for it it is my next action, then I did not avoid it (although maybe I attempted to avoid it).

It is not true that I do not know what my next action will be until it has taken place. For instance, if I am playing chess, I may know that my next action will be to move the knight. I need not wait for the knight to move in order to know that my moving the knight will be my next action.

Hello Kennethamy,

Are you talking about your next "conscious" physical intention? Because if you are, then "next action" is completely different from "next physical intention".

How many infinite variables occur between thought process, action and reaction?

Again, I apologise for coming at this from an alternate angle, but, seeing that there is one, does it not need revealing? Should we brush under the carpet what is ugly and awkward, and hope it just goes away?

Thank you again,

Mark...

@mark noble,

mark noble;162336 wrote:

Hello Zetherin,

How can you know what your next action is when -

A) you cannot without the sum knowledge of the entire universe, and the variables beyond, identify with your next action at the subatomic leve.
B) What if you die, lightning strikes, the earth implodes, aliens invade, your chair collapses or someone superglued the chair before you sat on it?

My point is - we can only assume to know our next action, and then only in the timeframe and physical environment we are accustomed to.

[CENTER]Is anything for certain
Can anything be known
When each man's wisdom
Is, primarily, His own
?[/CENTER]

Thank you and fare well.

Mark...

---------- Post added 05-10-2010 at 11:25 AM ----------

Hello Kennethamy,

Are you talking about your next "conscious" physical intention? Because if you are, then "next action" is completely different from "next physical intention".

How many infinite variables occur between thought process, action and reaction?

Again, I apologise for coming at this from an alternate angle, but, seeing that there is one, does it not need revealing? Should we brush under the carpet what is ugly and awkward, and hope it just goes away?

Thank you again,

Mark...

It is true, of course, that I can intend to do A, and do B instead, if I change my mind (for instance). And certainly, my intention to do A is different from doing A. But how does it follow that I cannot know that I am going to do A when A is my next action? Answer. It does not follow. Sometimes my wife tells me that I am so confused that I never know what I am going to do next. But I am sure she is exaggerating. It is not that bad. At least I hope she is exaggerating.

Anyway, if I know what I intend to do, and if what I intend to do is what I will do X, then of course, I know what I will do next. That should settle it.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;162347 wrote:

Anyway, if I know what I intend to do, and if what I intend to do is what I will do X, then of course, I know what I will do next. That should settle it.

Hello Kennethamy,

Before your next action?- Can we assume that your physical interaction with your own anatomical diversity is not of your control?
So - the next time you inhale, for instance, can you inhale the exact quantity of oxygen, nitrogen , co2, etc, that you choose? Can you direct the white blood corpusles to a given location so they eliminate a parasitic infection, that you are unaware of?
No, you can't - therefore you are only able to assume your next conscious intended interaction with relative criteria available in the realm to which you are accustomed.

If what you intend to do, indeed, you do? Then you can only be aware of that having taken place, after it has taken place - which clearly makes fatalism a record of the event and not the pre-emption of.

And unless you can be certain of every action complying with said intention, the event loses substance through its random occurence.

Thank you Kennethamy, and fare well.

Mark...

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