The Fatal Paradox

Get Email Updates Email this Topic Print this Page

Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 01:39 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162060 wrote:
But this is false. If you want to claim this, then you need to show why a world where fatalism is false is logically impossible.


Huh? Why is the burden on me more than you if I can imagine it? You are begging the question on behalf of your own imagination.

Besides, what you say is a contradiction. If fatalism is false in a world and is logically impossible in that world, then it is logically impossible in all worlds. That's just what "logically impossible" means. I must say your understanding of the semantics of possible worlds is incredibly confused.

TuringEquivalent;162060 wrote:
Sure, but this is not the case. There is good intuitive reason for the contingency.


No, there isn't. That's just the point of Kripke's argument which you apparently haven't read. Water=H20 is metaphysically necessary, and that is intuitively true.

TuringEquivalent;162060 wrote:
Almost everyone agree that laws of nature are contingent, and mathematical propositions are necessary. This is established not so much by argumentation, but by intuition.


Of course, but "Intuition" is a technical term in philosophy implying something on the lines of "self-evidently the case." And "Imagination" has no place in philosophy, unless you think philosophy is about writing poetry. So it is self-evident to me that fatalism, if true, would be true in all possible worlds. There is no reason to suppose it is contingent because there is nothing in the content of that claim which implies it is contingent in the first place.

TuringEquivalent;162060 wrote:
Determinism is physical necessity. Yes, it is necessary, but it necessary with respect to a world in which determinism is true.


You simply don't understand what you are saying, and this very same mistake is made too often. Determinism is a claim which explicitly says, "a set of initial conditions together with the laws of nature entails all future facts." This "entaliment" is logical entailment through material implication, If P then Q, P, therefore Q. This has nothing to do with "physical necessity." There is no such thing.

The real world conditions are causally sufficient conditions. Sufficiency is not necessity. Sufficiency is purely conditional on prior causes, and there is nothing "necessary" about this sufficiency at all. To think otherwise is to commit the modal fallacy which you continue to assert.

TuringEquivalent;162060 wrote:
No. Fatalism is necessary with respect to a world in which fatalism is true


Since when is de dicto necessity relativized to possible worlds? That doesn't even make any sense at all. If a proposition is necessarily true, then it is true in all possible worlds. If it is true some worlds but not others, then it is contingently true. Period.

TuringEquivalent;162060 wrote:
This is not so in a possible world in which fatalism is false. Yes, it is contingent.


This is redundant.

TuringEquivalent;162060 wrote:
But this is wrong, if the laws of our world is deterministic.


This is wrong. Q is determined because "If P then Q, and Q" is true. It does not follow from this that "It is physically necessary that Q." That doesn't even make sense. "Physically necessary" with respect to what??
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 01:40 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162065 wrote:
Here is two argument:



Claim 1: If W is deterministic, then every state in W is necessary.


reason: If W is deterministic, then there exist an initial condition I, and deterministic law L such that for every state E in W, there is sequence of states
A, B, C ... that lead to E where each state acts in conjuncture with L to produce the next state.

So, given ( E), there is:


(I, L )-->( A, L) -->( B, L)--> ------->( E)

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 02:33 AM ----------

Claim 2: fatalism is not true in all possible worlds.

Reason:

Suppose Fatalism is true in all possible worlds. This cannot be so, since we can define a possible world W* such that:

a) W* do not have any regularities.

Since a is logical possible, and W* is without regularity, then it follows that W* is where fatalism is false. Thus, claim 2 is true.


Uh, Uh, here comes the heavy machinery.

How about this? Since fatalism is not true in this (actual) world, fatalism is not true in all possible worlds. QED
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 01:52 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162065 wrote:
Claim 1: If W is deterministic, then every state in W is necessary.
This is false! If it were true, then where is the conclusion stating, "All states are necessary" down below? You prove nothing.

TuringEquivalent;162065 wrote:
reason: If W is deterministic, then there exist an initial condition I, and deterministic law L such that for every state E in W, there is sequence of states
A, B, C ... that lead to E where each state acts in conjuncture with L to produce the next state.

So, given ( E), there is:


(I, L )-->( A, L) -->( B, L)--> ------->( E)


I guess you could say that. I've never heard of one Law L. I've certainly heard of many Laws. This makes no difference, though, because you are doing no more than drawing the following conclusion through the following set of laws and an initial condition P by means of modus ponens, and a hypothetical syllogistic inference. (I've done this earlier in the thread several times, too)

P-->Q
Q-->R
R-->S

Therefore, P-->S
P
Therefore, S

Where do you get the conclusion "every state is necessary? This is a modal fallacy.

TuringEquivalent;162065 wrote:
Claim 2: fatalism is not true in all possible worlds.

Reason:

Suppose Fatalism is true in all possible worlds. This cannot be so, since we can define a possible world W* such that:

a) W* do not have any regularities.

Since a is logical possible, and W* is without regularity, then it follows that W* is where fatalism is false. Thus, claim 2 is true.


Lol. That's just stipulating a definition by relativizing your claim to a possible world W* where fatalism is false. This doesn't accomplishing anything other than just assume fatalism is contingent. I will ask again, why is fatalism contingently true if it is true?

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 01:59 AM ----------

kennethamy;162071 wrote:
Uh, Uh, here comes the heavy machinery.

How about this? Since fatalism is not true in this (actual) world, fatalism is not true in all possible worlds. QED


Or how about this: if fatalism is true in the actual world, world W*, fatalism is true in all possible worlds...QED (of course, i don't like that...lol)
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 02:13 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;162070 wrote:
Huh? Why is the burden on me more than you if I can imagine it? You are begging the question on behalf of your own imagination.

Besides, what you say is a contradiction. If fatalism is false in a world and is logically impossible in that world, then it is logically impossible in all worlds. That's just what "logically impossible" means. I must say your understanding of the semantics of possible worlds is incredibly confused.



No, there isn't. That's just the point of Kripke's argument which you apparently haven't read. Water=H20 is metaphysically necessary, and that is intuitively true.



Of course, but "Intuition" is a technical term in philosophy implying something on the lines of "self-evidently the case." And "Imagination" has no place in philosophy, unless you think philosophy is about writing poetry. So it is self-evident to me that fatalism, if true, would be true in all possible worlds. There is no reason to suppose it is contingent because there is nothing in the content of that claim which implies it is contingent in the first place.



You simply don't understand what you are saying, and this very same mistake is made too often. Determinism is a claim which explicitly says, "a set of initial conditions together with the laws of nature entails all future facts." This "entaliment" is logical entailment through material implication, If P then Q, P, therefore Q. This has nothing to do with "physical necessity." There is no such thing.

The real world conditions are causally sufficient conditions. Sufficiency is not necessity. Sufficiency is purely conditional on prior causes, and there is nothing "necessary" about this sufficiency at all. To think otherwise is to commit the modal fallacy which you continue to assert.



Since when is de dicto necessity relativized to possible worlds? That doesn't even make any sense at all. If a proposition is necessarily true, then it is true in all possible worlds. If it is true some worlds but not others, then it is contingently true. Period.



This is redundant.



This is wrong. Q is determined because "If P then Q, and Q" is true. It does not follow from this that "It is physically necessary that Q." That doesn't even make sense. "Physically necessary" with respect to what??


You need to summary it into a nice paragraph, so that i can reply. Too many, and it is starting to look like work for me.

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 03:16 AM ----------

kennethamy;162071 wrote:
Uh, Uh, here comes the heavy machinery.

How about this? Since fatalism is not true in this (actual) world, fatalism is not true in all possible worlds. QED


come on, you know i am right. Why fight?

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 03:22 AM ----------

Quote:
I guess you could say that. I've never heard of one Law L. I've certainly heard of many Laws. This makes no difference, though, because you are doing no more than drawing the following conclusion through the following set of laws and an initial condition P by means of modus ponens, and a hypothetical syllogistic inference. (I've done this earlier in the thread several times, too)

P-->Q
Q-->R
R-->S

Therefore, P-->S
P
Therefore, S

Where do you get the conclusion "every state is necessary? This is a modal fallacy.


What is your problem with claim 1? I don ` t see a reason?


Quote:

Lol. That's just stipulating a definition by relativizing your claim to a possible world W* where fatalism is false. This doesn't accomplishing anything other than just assume fatalism is contingent. I will ask again, why is fatalism contingently true if it is true?


Really? I stipulated a definition? Where? You disagree that (a) is logically impossible? how?
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 02:36 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162075 wrote:
You need to summary it into a nice paragraph, so that i can reply. Too many, and it is starting to look like work for me.


Then get to work and prove determinism logically implies every event is necessary. I don't see it. That will consist of constructing an argument with a set of premises and a conclusion stating "every event is necessary."

TuringEquivalent;162075 wrote:
come on, you know i am right. Why fight?


Lol. Ken, have you ever heard this kind of rebuttal before in a philosophical discussion? lol...too funny.

TuringEquivalent;162075 wrote:
What is your problem with claim 1? I don ` t see a reason?


I don't see a reason for think determinism logically implies all events are necessary. Why do you think this is true since you can't even show it?

TuringEquivalent;162075 wrote:
Really? I stipulated a definition? Where? You disagree that (a) is logically impossible? how?


"Fatalism is false in world W*" is stipulated. You draw the conclusion, "therefore, fatalism is contingent." That's just a tautology, not an argument.

Further, "Fatalism is true" is not argument. That's an assumption. So there is no reason for believing it is true.
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 02:47 am
@Extrain,
Quote:
I don't see a reason for think determinism logically implies all events are necessary. Why do you think this is true since you can't even show it?



What do you call claim 1. Can you not ******* see? I ask you again. What problem do you have with claim 1?

Quote:
"Fatalism is false in world W*" is stipulated. You draw the conclusion, "therefore, fatalism is contingent." That's just a tautology, not an argument.


LOL.. .This is rather pathetic. I never stipulate that at all. I ask you one more time. Why the hell do you think W* in claim 2 is logically impossible?

Quote:
Lol. Ken, have you ever heard this kind of rebuttal before in a philosophical discussion? lol...too funny.


I am ******* funny? You are a joking. I show my case in claim 1, and claim 2, and you still can ` t understand ****. :sarcastic:
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:06 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162083 wrote:
What do you call claim 1. Can you not ******* see? I ask you again. What problem do you have with claim 1?


I already told you. Claim 1., is what people call an "unproven assumption." Have you ever heard of those things? Astrologers and fortune-tellers make some pretty neat assumptions too.

TuringEquivalent;162083 wrote:
LOL.. .This is rather pathetic. I never stipulate that at all. I ask you one more time. Why the hell do you think W* is logically impossible?


I don't actually think that. Honestly, I don't care. You've merely told me a) is logically possible to drive the point home that fatalism is contingently true. And you do this by stipulating a world W* where there are no regularities. So what? Stipulation is as stipulation does. I want to know why you think fatalism, as a philosophical thesis, is not necessarily true, without stipulating the semantics of possible worlds analyses. Your arguments are pathetic.

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 03:09 AM ----------

TuringEquivalent;162083 wrote:
What do you call claim 1. Can you not ******* see? I ask you again. What problem do you have with claim 1?
LOL.. .This is rather pathetic. I never stipulate that at all. I ask you one more time. Why the hell do you think W* in claim 2 is logically impossible?
I am ******* funny? You are a joking. I show my case in claim 1, and claim 2, and you still can ` t understand ****. :sarcastic:


uh, oh... mom's getting mad.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:15 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;161822 wrote:
Pay attention to what "subset of possibility" means.
Well, pay attention to the consequences, because realisable possibilities are the most restricted set of the three, there is no inference from either of the other two, to the conclusion that an agent could have done otherwise. Unless your meaning is something on the lines of 'if the agent was in a different and determined world, then it would have been true that they would've made some different choice and performed some different action', but as the agent is not in some different and determined world, such an action, whatever it might be, was never realisable.
Extrain;161822 wrote:
x is realisable: uh oh....no definition.
Use a standard dictionary: to bring into reality realisable - definition of realisable by the Free Online Dictionary, Thesaurus and Encyclopedia.
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:15 am
@Extrain,
Quote:
Yeah, it's called an assumption....hello?


E in W is necessary given (I,L). You disagree?

Quote:

I don't actually think that. You've just told me a) is logically possible to drive the point home that fatalism is contingently true. And you do this by stipulating a world W* where there are no regularities.


a is logically possible. To deny this rather stupid. You disagree?



Quote:

So what? Stipulation is as stipulation does. Your arguments are pathetic.


If there is a world without any regularity( ie: W*), then fatalism is not true in W*. You disagree?


Quote:

uh, oh... mom's getting mad.


yep. I am really really angry. My skin is turning green. You don` t want to make me mad. Just give up. Laughing
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:24 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162088 wrote:
E in W is necessary given (I,L). You disagree?


Yes, I disagree. Prove it to me logically. "Necessity" is a strictly modal notion. Hence, I want to see the modal proof.

TuringEquivalent;162088 wrote:
a is logically possible. To deny this rather stupid. You disagree?


I guess. But I also think it is pretty stupid to think fatalism is true in the actual world, or any world for that matter, too. It doesn't even make sense. You possess this mistaken notion that de dicto necessary propositions can be true within some worlds and not within all worlds. But this is a contradiction, and you need to look it up. De dicto necessary propositions are just true in all possible worlds. Period.

TuringEquivalent;162088 wrote:
If there is a world without any regularity( ie: W*), then fatalism is not true in W*. You disagree?


That's not my problem, actually. If you think it is inuitively true that fatalism is false in some worlds, then what makes you think it is intuitvely true in the actual world?? That's your problem. Your distinctions are totally random and without rhyme or reason.

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 03:40 AM ----------

ughaibu;162087 wrote:
Well, pay attention to the consequences, because realisable possibilities are the most restricted set of the three, there is no inference from either of the other two, to the conclusion that an agent could have done otherwise.


There is no inference to the conclusion that the agent could not have done otherwise, either. So what's your point? The point is moot. After all, if X is not realisable, X could still be physically possible.

The problem is that you have not even defined the limit to what is, and is not, realisable.
X is logically possible: X is does not violate the law of non-contradiction.
X is physically possible: X does not violate the laws of nature.
X is realisable: *NO DEFINITION*

So I don't know what "realisable" is supposed to mean other than that something either is, or is not, the case, and that it is not possible for something to be something it is not, or to be doing something it is not actually doing. Well, duh.

ughaibu;162087 wrote:
Unless your meaning is something on the lines of 'if the agent was in a different and determined world, then it would have been true that they would've made some different choice and performed some different action',


No, I am actually saying it is physically possible in this world for the agent to do such and such, so long as what he does, does not violate the laws of physics. That's what "physically possible" means.

ughaibu;162087 wrote:


Wow, my philosophical vocabulary just exponentially grew. Thanks for the link to a Thesarus.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:50 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;162091 wrote:
No, I am actually saying it is physically possible in this world for the agent to do such and such, so long as what he does, does not violate the laws of physics. That's what "physically possible" means.
Just to be clear about this, when you say that an agent has the ability to do otherwise than they do, you dont mean they had a realisable alternative, you mean that there are other actions that are possible for human beings. Is that right?
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 03:57 am
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;162095 wrote:
Just to be clear about this, when you say that an agent has the ability to do otherwise than they do, you dont mean they had a realisable alternative, you mean that there are other actions that are possible for human beings. Is that right?


I already told you, I don't know what "realisable" means for the purposes of this philosophical discourse. A dictionary doesn't help at all. You need to give that word your own philosophical defintion before I can make any sense of it philosophically.
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 04:03 am
@Extrain,
Quote:
Yes, I disagree. Prove it to me logically. "Necessity" is a strictly modal notion. Hence, I want to see the modal proof.


LOL.... Are you ******* joking? How is a logical proof show physical necessity between events? I will do as you say if you can show me "logically" why the divergence of a the gravitational field is -4*pi *rho *G? oK?

Quote:

I guess.


If (a) is logically possible. Don` t you also have to agree that it is logically possible for there to be a world that is completely lawless, and without regularity?

Quote:
. It doesn't even make sense. You have possess this mistaken notion that de dicto necessary propositions can be true within some worlds but not within all worlds. But this is a contradiction, and you need to look it up. De dicto necessary propositions are just true in all possible worlds. Period.


Where did i give any de dicto necessary propositions?


Quote:
Yes. But that's not my problem, actually. If you think it is inuitively true fatalism is false in some worlds, then what makes you think it is true in the actual world??

I never claim it is true in the actual world at all.
Quote:

That's your problem. Your distinctions are totally random and without rhyme or reason.


How am i responsible for your problem? it is not my problem you can` t understand. fatalism is obviously contingent. You think it is not, and in the same category as any analytic truth. That is serious **** up.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 04:08 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;162097 wrote:
I already told you, I don't know what "realisable" means for the purposes of this philosophical discourse.
You are a complete waste of time.
Extrain;161583 wrote:
ughaibu;161578 wrote:
Obviously I can only realise a possibility that is physically possible and equally obviously I can not realise all physical possibilities.
So what?
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 04:13 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162100 wrote:
LOL.... Are you ******* joking? How is a logical proof show physical necessity between events? I will do as you say if you can show me "logically" why the divergence of a the gravitational field is -4*pi *rho *G? oK?


If you can't show that with strong empirical reasons, then there is no empirical reason to think it's true. If you can't demonstrate that logically, or philosophically, then there is no reason to think it's logically or philosophically true. Hence, there is no reason to think it's true.

TuringEquivalent;162100 wrote:
I never claim it is true in the actual world at all.


Then fatalism is false in the actual world. Game over.

---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 04:18 AM ----------

ughaibu;162102 wrote:
You are a complete waste of time.


Actually, you are a waste of time because you can't even define your own words. If "realisable" has such an unequivocal philosophical meaning like you claim it does, then why can't you define it, U? For the last time, define it, please.

"Obviously I can only realise a possibility that is physically possible and equally obviously I can not realise all physical possibilities.

So what?"

I am merely running with the logical syntax of your saying what is realisable is a "subset" of what is physically possible. I understand the logic of sets and subsets within sets, but I don't understand what "realisable" means for the purposes of this philosophical discourse. You KNOW I've had a problem with that word since you first introduced it. No one knows what it is supposed to mean, not even YOU.
 
TuringEquivalent
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 04:23 am
@Extrain,
Quote:
If you can't show that with strong empirical reasons, then there is no empirical reason to think it's true. If you can't demonstrate that logically, or philosophically, then there is no reason to think it's logically or philosophically true. Hence, there is no reason to think it's true.



This is a joke, right? How much philosophy do you know? Are you in high school?
You are asking me to prove "logically" an a posteriori claim. Are you drinking something, because whatever it is, i want some! :perplexed:



Quote:
Then fatalism is false in the actual world. Game over.


As i assume, you can` t read. Why else would you have so damn much trouble with claim 1 and 2. My claim is that fatalism is metaphysical contingent.


I honest don` t know if our world is where fatalism is false, but your conviction is surely unjustified. Pretty crazy stuff.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 04:38 am
@TuringEquivalent,
TuringEquivalent;162106 wrote:
You are asking me to prove "logically" an a posteriori claim.


Well, if it is an a posteriori claim, then give me some empirical reasons for believing it. (Actually, fatalism is NOT an a posteriori claim. It is an a priori philosophical one.) Fatalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

TuringEquivalent;162106 wrote:
Are you in high school? Are you drinking something, because whatever it is, i want some!


Do I need to remind you that I am not the one ranting and swearing like a child, while personally attacking his interlocutor?

TuringEquivalent;162106 wrote:
This is a joke, right? How much philosophy do you know?


If you must know I have a BA in philosophy, and about to finish my MA. I don't waste my time with amateur hogwash, so I apologize my answers are very curt. Some amateurs are genuine critical thinkers who know what they are talking about, and they say very substantive things from which I continue to learn. Unfortunately, some do not, and just enjoy creating *word salds* that sound "smart" to their own ears, but are really empty of any real philosophical value. It all depends on how much one is willing to apply himself.

[QUOTE=TuringEquivalent;162106] So what?As i assume, you can` t read. Why else would you have so damn much trouble with claim 1 and 2. My claim is that fatalism is metaphysical contingent.[/QUOTE]But if fatalism is false in the actual world, does it really matter? You said you don't even know if it is true in the actual world.

Possible worlds are merely theoretical postulates anyway, unless you're like David Lewis who thinks possible worlds really exist. I don't, however.

TuringEquivalent;162106 wrote:
I honest don` t know if our world is where fatalism is false, but your conviction is surely unjustified. Pretty crazy stuff.


Sheesh...

First, if you don't know it is false in the actual world, then you don't know that it is true in the actual world, either. And if you don't know it is true in the actual world, then you are not justified in believing it is true in the actual world since all knowledge is justified, true belief.

Second, what's really backwards is that you think Fatalism is an a posteriori claim, but then simultaneously assert you don't even know if it is true in the actual world! Well, if you don't know it is true in the actual world, then what makes you think it is an a posteriori claim? You obviously don't have any evidence of this claim being true, because if you did, you would be able to offer that evidence. But you have none. So there is not any good reason to think fatalism is an a posteriori claim at all!

Get a grip on what you really think before you come to the table with a well-defined thesis. So far, you don't have one, and lack any arguments for what you "may or may not" think is true. I am wasting my time.

:rolleyes:
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 07:57 am
@Extrain,
Extrain;162073 wrote:


Or how about this: if fatalism is true in the actual world, world W*, fatalism is true in all possible worlds...QED (of course, i don't like that...lol)


Neither do I, since I have no idea how to tell whether it is even plausible, let alone true. And when I translate it into language I can understand, I like it even less: the translation would be, of course, if fatalism is true, then it is a necessary truth. That simply seems false. Of course, the converse is true, and should not be confused with it. Maybe the falsity of, if fatalism is true, it is a necessary truth would become more obvious if I were to change it into: if fatalism were true, it would be a necessary truth. For how could a proposition be a necessary truth if true, when the proposition is actually false?
 
mark noble
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 09:31 am
@kennethamy,
Hello all,

How can anyone or anything avoid what will innevitably be their/it's next action?

Fate - is absolutely certain.

If you turn left - then turning left was your fate
If you turn right - then right
If you fall down - watch your step in future

fate/destiny is merely the result of what has occured, for what will occur is absolutely unpredictable.

How you label it is down to you - do you chose your actions, or are you subject to given unavoidable external processes?
My own outlook on this is (I remain on the fence) because I must

There is no such thing as no such thing.

Thank you and farewell

Mark...
 
Extrain
 
Reply Sun 9 May, 2010 09:47 am
@mark noble,
mark noble;162153 wrote:
Fate - is absolutely certain.

If you turn left - then turning left was your fate
If you turn right - then right
If you fall down - watch your step in future


If Fate is absolutely certain, then which course of action is absolutely certain, turning left or turning right? You've just trivially said, "If I turn left, then I turn left" and "If I turn right, then I turn right."

mark noble;162153 wrote:
fate/destiny is merely the result of what has occured, for what will occur is absolutely unpredictable.


If what will occur is absolutely unpredictable, then what will occur is not absolutely certain. The contrapositive is also true. If what will occur is absolutely certain, then what will occur is absolutely predictable.
 
 

 
Copyright © 2024 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.03 seconds on 12/26/2024 at 10:15:23