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But this is false. If you want to claim this, then you need to show why a world where fatalism is false is logically impossible.
Sure, but this is not the case. There is good intuitive reason for the contingency.
Almost everyone agree that laws of nature are contingent, and mathematical propositions are necessary. This is established not so much by argumentation, but by intuition.
Determinism is physical necessity. Yes, it is necessary, but it necessary with respect to a world in which determinism is true.
No. Fatalism is necessary with respect to a world in which fatalism is true
This is not so in a possible world in which fatalism is false. Yes, it is contingent.
But this is wrong, if the laws of our world is deterministic.
Here is two argument:
Claim 1: If W is deterministic, then every state in W is necessary.
reason: If W is deterministic, then there exist an initial condition I, and deterministic law L such that for every state E in W, there is sequence of states
A, B, C ... that lead to E where each state acts in conjuncture with L to produce the next state.
So, given ( E), there is:
(I, L )-->( A, L) -->( B, L)--> ------->( E)
---------- Post added 05-09-2010 at 02:33 AM ----------
Claim 2: fatalism is not true in all possible worlds.
Reason:
Suppose Fatalism is true in all possible worlds. This cannot be so, since we can define a possible world W* such that:
a) W* do not have any regularities.
Since a is logical possible, and W* is without regularity, then it follows that W* is where fatalism is false. Thus, claim 2 is true.
Claim 1: If W is deterministic, then every state in W is necessary.
reason: If W is deterministic, then there exist an initial condition I, and deterministic law L such that for every state E in W, there is sequence of states
A, B, C ... that lead to E where each state acts in conjuncture with L to produce the next state.
So, given ( E), there is:
(I, L )-->( A, L) -->( B, L)--> ------->( E)
Claim 2: fatalism is not true in all possible worlds.
Reason:
Suppose Fatalism is true in all possible worlds. This cannot be so, since we can define a possible world W* such that:
a) W* do not have any regularities.
Since a is logical possible, and W* is without regularity, then it follows that W* is where fatalism is false. Thus, claim 2 is true.
Uh, Uh, here comes the heavy machinery.
How about this? Since fatalism is not true in this (actual) world, fatalism is not true in all possible worlds. QED
Huh? Why is the burden on me more than you if I can imagine it? You are begging the question on behalf of your own imagination.
Besides, what you say is a contradiction. If fatalism is false in a world and is logically impossible in that world, then it is logically impossible in all worlds. That's just what "logically impossible" means. I must say your understanding of the semantics of possible worlds is incredibly confused.
No, there isn't. That's just the point of Kripke's argument which you apparently haven't read. Water=H20 is metaphysically necessary, and that is intuitively true.
Of course, but "Intuition" is a technical term in philosophy implying something on the lines of "self-evidently the case." And "Imagination" has no place in philosophy, unless you think philosophy is about writing poetry. So it is self-evident to me that fatalism, if true, would be true in all possible worlds. There is no reason to suppose it is contingent because there is nothing in the content of that claim which implies it is contingent in the first place.
You simply don't understand what you are saying, and this very same mistake is made too often. Determinism is a claim which explicitly says, "a set of initial conditions together with the laws of nature entails all future facts." This "entaliment" is logical entailment through material implication, If P then Q, P, therefore Q. This has nothing to do with "physical necessity." There is no such thing.
The real world conditions are causally sufficient conditions. Sufficiency is not necessity. Sufficiency is purely conditional on prior causes, and there is nothing "necessary" about this sufficiency at all. To think otherwise is to commit the modal fallacy which you continue to assert.
Since when is de dicto necessity relativized to possible worlds? That doesn't even make any sense at all. If a proposition is necessarily true, then it is true in all possible worlds. If it is true some worlds but not others, then it is contingently true. Period.
This is redundant.
This is wrong. Q is determined because "If P then Q, and Q" is true. It does not follow from this that "It is physically necessary that Q." That doesn't even make sense. "Physically necessary" with respect to what??
Uh, Uh, here comes the heavy machinery.
How about this? Since fatalism is not true in this (actual) world, fatalism is not true in all possible worlds. QED
I guess you could say that. I've never heard of one Law L. I've certainly heard of many Laws. This makes no difference, though, because you are doing no more than drawing the following conclusion through the following set of laws and an initial condition P by means of modus ponens, and a hypothetical syllogistic inference. (I've done this earlier in the thread several times, too)
P-->Q
Q-->R
R-->S
Therefore, P-->S
P
Therefore, S
Where do you get the conclusion "every state is necessary? This is a modal fallacy.
Lol. That's just stipulating a definition by relativizing your claim to a possible world W* where fatalism is false. This doesn't accomplishing anything other than just assume fatalism is contingent. I will ask again, why is fatalism contingently true if it is true?
You need to summary it into a nice paragraph, so that i can reply. Too many, and it is starting to look like work for me.
come on, you know i am right. Why fight?
What is your problem with claim 1? I don ` t see a reason?
Really? I stipulated a definition? Where? You disagree that (a) is logically impossible? how?
I don't see a reason for think determinism logically implies all events are necessary. Why do you think this is true since you can't even show it?
"Fatalism is false in world W*" is stipulated. You draw the conclusion, "therefore, fatalism is contingent." That's just a tautology, not an argument.
Lol. Ken, have you ever heard this kind of rebuttal before in a philosophical discussion? lol...too funny.
What do you call claim 1. Can you not ******* see? I ask you again. What problem do you have with claim 1?
LOL.. .This is rather pathetic. I never stipulate that at all. I ask you one more time. Why the hell do you think W* is logically impossible?
What do you call claim 1. Can you not ******* see? I ask you again. What problem do you have with claim 1?
LOL.. .This is rather pathetic. I never stipulate that at all. I ask you one more time. Why the hell do you think W* in claim 2 is logically impossible?
I am ******* funny? You are a joking. I show my case in claim 1, and claim 2, and you still can ` t understand ****. :sarcastic:
Pay attention to what "subset of possibility" means.
x is realisable: uh oh....no definition.
Yeah, it's called an assumption....hello?
I don't actually think that. You've just told me a) is logically possible to drive the point home that fatalism is contingently true. And you do this by stipulating a world W* where there are no regularities.
So what? Stipulation is as stipulation does. Your arguments are pathetic.
uh, oh... mom's getting mad.
E in W is necessary given (I,L). You disagree?
a is logically possible. To deny this rather stupid. You disagree?
If there is a world without any regularity( ie: W*), then fatalism is not true in W*. You disagree?
Well, pay attention to the consequences, because realisable possibilities are the most restricted set of the three, there is no inference from either of the other two, to the conclusion that an agent could have done otherwise.
Unless your meaning is something on the lines of 'if the agent was in a different and determined world, then it would have been true that they would've made some different choice and performed some different action',
Use a standard dictionary: to bring into reality realisable - definition of realisable by the Free Online Dictionary, Thesaurus and Encyclopedia.
No, I am actually saying it is physically possible in this world for the agent to do such and such, so long as what he does, does not violate the laws of physics. That's what "physically possible" means.
Just to be clear about this, when you say that an agent has the ability to do otherwise than they do, you dont mean they had a realisable alternative, you mean that there are other actions that are possible for human beings. Is that right?
Yes, I disagree. Prove it to me logically. "Necessity" is a strictly modal notion. Hence, I want to see the modal proof.
I guess.
. It doesn't even make sense. You have possess this mistaken notion that de dicto necessary propositions can be true within some worlds but not within all worlds. But this is a contradiction, and you need to look it up. De dicto necessary propositions are just true in all possible worlds. Period.
Yes. But that's not my problem, actually. If you think it is inuitively true fatalism is false in some worlds, then what makes you think it is true in the actual world??
That's your problem. Your distinctions are totally random and without rhyme or reason.
I already told you, I don't know what "realisable" means for the purposes of this philosophical discourse.
ughaibu;161578 wrote:So what?Obviously I can only realise a possibility that is physically possible and equally obviously I can not realise all physical possibilities.
LOL.... Are you ******* joking? How is a logical proof show physical necessity between events? I will do as you say if you can show me "logically" why the divergence of a the gravitational field is -4*pi *rho *G? oK?
I never claim it is true in the actual world at all.
You are a complete waste of time.
If you can't show that with strong empirical reasons, then there is no empirical reason to think it's true. If you can't demonstrate that logically, or philosophically, then there is no reason to think it's logically or philosophically true. Hence, there is no reason to think it's true.
Then fatalism is false in the actual world. Game over.
You are asking me to prove "logically" an a posteriori claim.
Are you in high school? Are you drinking something, because whatever it is, i want some!
This is a joke, right? How much philosophy do you know?
I honest don` t know if our world is where fatalism is false, but your conviction is surely unjustified. Pretty crazy stuff.
Or how about this: if fatalism is true in the actual world, world W*, fatalism is true in all possible worlds...QED (of course, i don't like that...lol)
Fate - is absolutely certain.
If you turn left - then turning left was your fate
If you turn right - then right
If you fall down - watch your step in future
fate/destiny is merely the result of what has occured, for what will occur is absolutely unpredictable.