Ok.
Here you go:


Imagine a possible world W such that the following is true:
1. fatalism is true in W.
2. agents in W believe that "fatalism is false in W".
3. Agents in W is justified in believing that "fatalism is false in W".


I think 1 is independent of 2, and 3, and 3 is false. 1 is a metaphysical claim, while 2, and 3 are epistemic. 3 is false, because i cannot see how any agent in W can justified 1.

I think so. I am just trying to find what would be an instance of a non-trivial fatalist claim. Can we think of one? How can it even involve conditional statements of causal sufficiency since all "P-->Q" kinds of lawlike statements are trivially (because necessarily, not contingently) true? Not to mention the fact that both the antecedent and consequent are necessarily true so that any conditional lawlike statements are simply superfluously stated?

Presumably,
(N)P
(N)Q
are true.

So what use do we have for saying, "P-->Q"? This lawlike generalization is supposed to be contingently true. But if P and Q are already necessary, what use is there in saying "P is sufficient for Q"? None.

(N) (P-->Q) is even a weaker form of necessity than saying "(N)P and (N)Q." So out with the laws of nature! They have no application at all.

But if fatalism is true in W, then fatalism is true in all possible worlds, unless you think fatalism itself is only contingently true: true in W, but false in some other worlds.

But the question is: what justification do you have for believing 1. is true? And what reason do you have for believing 3. is false? Do you think everyone who believes fatalism is false hold an unjustified belief? Why?

fatalism is world bounded, or contingent. Do you need a reason?

3 is false. Again, it is obvious why it is so.

fatalism is world bounded, or contingent. Do you need a reason?

3 is false. Again, it is obvious why it is so.

I am just trying to find what would be an instance of a non-trivial fatalist claim. Can we think of one?

That it does not matter whether the soldier takes precautions or not. The soldier who takes no precautions is as likely to be shot as the one who takes precautions. That is not a trivial claim. And it is false.

1.
Yes, please. I just find it strange that you have a philosophical thesis that only holds in one world but not all worlds. Most philosophical claims are intended to be necessarily true. Why is fatalism true in one world, but not others? Usually, a philosopher has some really good reason for thinking so. If you don't, then you are merely stating a groundless assumption.


2.
It is? And why is that?

You mean that fatalism might not be true? Of course. Not only might it not be true, it is not true. What is the fuss?

1. Because we can easily imagine possible worlds such that fatalism is true, and other possible worlds in which fatalism is false.
2. Because 1 is a metaphysical thesis. 3 is false.

Can you provide a single reason to support 3?

Nice...ok. But is that true, if fatalism is true? Are not all likelihoods ruled out, since one of the disjuncts is necessarily true, having a probability of 1? The 50/50 ratio would have to be strictly logical, or epistemic, probability like flipping a coin--certainly not an empirical probability since all empirical probabilities are given by past frequencies, which fatalism would have to deny exists since everything occurs with a probability of 1.

ut this is contradictory. You should know that epistemic possibility is not a guide to metaphysical possibility. And you said 1. is a metaphysical claim. So why is 1. metaphysically contingent, and not metaphysically necessary?

Fatalism says everything happens necessarily.

This is incompatible with determinism which holds that everything happens only contingently, conditioned by prior causes. Also, the only existing argument that I know which might support it is invalid: "P-->Q, P, therefore, Necessarily Q"
05-09-2010 12:59 AM

No, determinism say everything happen necessarily( physical necessity).

Is what true if fatalism is true? I don't follow the rest of what you say. Is it not morally certain that that someone who wears a protective vest is less likely to be harmed by a gun than one who does not wear a protective vest? If not, why bother?

Alright, this subject is kind of lame...I don't think non-trivial fatalism can say anything about the emprical world without itself being either disconfirmed or vacuously true since the emprical world does not give any evidence of necessity (a la Hume). There are no "likelihoods." It has to make a statement that directly suggesting necessity, such as, "Necessarily Bob does not wear a vest and necessarily Bob lives." This suggests a lawlike statement such as, "If Bob wears a vest, then Bob lives". So if Bob wears a vest and does not live, then this non-trivial statement is false. That's the only way I can think of falsifying non-trivial fatalist claims.

Because it is easily to imagine possible worlds where fatalism is true, and other possible worlds where fatalism is false. That is why it is contingent.

This "necessity" is physical, and not logical.

So, fatalism is contingent.

No, determinism say everything happen necessarily( physical necessity).

Physically necessary = contingent. Contingent on the truth or falsity of laws of nature, which are, of course, themselves, contingent.

it is contingent, but necessary in some possible worlds.

The falsification is statistical, of course. It is not particularly about Bob. It is about the likelihood that Bob (or someone relevantly like Bob) will survive being shot if he wears a vest, or if he does not. Is there any real doubt that it is more likely that Bob will survive? And the evidence is, of course, the tests performed on vests like the one Bob wears.

Why does that evidence not falsify the claim that it makes no difference whether or not Bob wears the vest? Not, surely, because it is possible that Bob wears the vest and harmed anyway; or that he does not wear the vest and is not harmed anyway.

Why is this subject lame?

it is contingent, but necessary in some possible worlds.

But I can also imagine fatalism is true in all possible worlds.

Just because you can imagine something doesn't make it contingent. Kripke pointed this out. I can imagine Water not being H20, but that doesn't entail in some worlds water is not H20. Water=H20 is a metaphysically necessary identity, not a contingent identity since "Water" and "H20" both refer to the same kind of molecule. "Water" never refers to stuff that looks like, tastes like, and feels like water, but is actually the molecule XYZ on some distant planet. "Water" has always referred to H20, as soon as someone pointed to H20 and gave that substance the name "Water."

So ask you again, why is fatalism contingently true and not necessarily true?

Physical "necessity" is actually contingency, each event is dependent on a prior cause. This is determinism, not fatalism.

This is invalid. Just because fatalism says everything happens with necessity, this does not entail the thesis of fatailism itself is contingent. As far as you know, if it is true, it could be true in all possible worlds.

No it doesn't. It says everything happens contingently, conditioned by prior causes.

I understand what the evidence is. I just don't understand what the non-trivial fatalist claim is.



But how is, "it makes no difference whether or not Bob wears the vest" a falsifiable claim at all? What is it even saying? Shouldn't the claim be, "Bob necessarily lives when necessarily shot by necessarily wearing a vest, "--or something like that?



I might just be a little tired...