It is an epistemic gamble given the knowledge that we lack about the future. It is not an epistemic gamble given what we know about past cases of people walking into gun fire without protective armour.

Even if fatalism is true, it is still wise to wear protective armour. And the decision is justified given what we know about the past.

I don't see that. You are simply trying to make a pragmatic argument for wearing b.a. whether or not fatalism is true. But apart from the merits of that argument, it is hardly relevant.

The police do not purchase protective gear because they think that fatalism might be true, but it is wise to do so. They purchase protective gear because there is ample statistical evidence (and what other evidence could there be?) that fatalism is false.

Would anyone seriously argue that we do not know that protective gear works, but that it is just a wise bet to wear it? You may be arguing from the notion that only certain knowledge is knowledge, even though I know you don't think that is so. Are you? Otherwise why would you argue that there is only a pragmatic argument for wearing protective gear? Don't you think that there is overwhelming statistical evidence that wearing protective gear saves lives? To switch the example only slightly, would you seriously argue that a soldier who takes no precautions on a battlefield is equally likely to be a casualty with a soldier who does take precautions? Although, of course, we cannot know this with absolute certainty.

Yes, I am offering that pragmatic argument since it seems you were making the claim that fatalist's are unjustified in believing adorning protective armour protects them. This is false. Why would they be unjustified? Perhaps you were not arguing this.



Interesting: it seems you have the same objection to fatalism that I do to moral relativism. It is either a completely trivial thesis without falsfiable examples, or it has an incredible amount of instances which actually falsify it. It doesn't actually specify any concrete cases in which fatalism is supposed to hold, but ad hocs every instance in which it seems to be disconfirmed. Hence, its "unfalsifiability."



I agree with this. I explicitly acknowledged in my last post that past frequencies of empirical probabilities show it is more likely you die than live by walking into gunfire without protective armour--and that we all know this.

But fatalists do not believe the armor protects them. If they did, they would not be fatalists. So I don't know what you mean.

But to know this is to know that (non-trivial) fatalism is false. Isn't it?

Why would they not believe this? Nothing about their thesis entails that they do or must not believe that armour protects them. Honestly, I don't understand.




I guess if you mean that "One is more likely to die than live by not wearing protective armour when walking into gunfire" is an instance of non-trivial fatalism which would be committed to the thesis that "Necessarily, by walking into gunfire without armour, you will live." But is a fatalist forced to believe that by his own view? I don't know...

I don't see that. You are simply trying to make a pragmatic argument for wearing b.a. whether or not fatalism is true.

Can you tell me why it is invalid to say that given all that the police officer know, it is wise for the officer to wear the armor?

But how could a fatalist believe that armor protects him, since he believes it makes no difference to what happens to him whether or not he wears armor? What do you think fatalists believe?

The fatalist does not think that by walking into gunfire without armor, that he will live. He thinks it make no difference, for whatever happens will inevitably happen no matter what he does. I take it that fatalists believe what fatalists believe. Don't you?

I can't since I don't believe it is wrong. Where did you ever get the idea that I did?

Very interesting!... I guess they believe nothing, right? Or if they do, then they are not epistemically justified in believing whatever they believe. If every event happens necessarily, then there are not even any firm beliefs which a fatalist could rationally hold about what would happen if he did this or that, at least not rationally. This is why determinism is a counterexample to fatalism, yes? Determinism deals with conditional (not absolute) necessity such that, "if I do this (P), then this (Q) will happen." But fatalists can't even hold that, at least not consistently. They can only hold, "If I do this, then it doesn't matter, because Q will happen anyway even if I did not do P." Ahhh! I get it now. Nice! Fatalists cannot even be determinists.



Ibid, above.

Therefore, it is certainly wise for him to wear armor. What I did say is that the argument for wearing armor is not (only) pragmatic, but is evidential. I think you misunderstood that. The pragmatic argument is, we don't know that wearing armor is protective, but still, even if we don't know, it would be wise to wear it. The evidential argument is, yes we do know that wearing armor is protective, and therefore it would be wise to wear it. I think the evidential argument is correct.

My argument is typical in philosophy. We look at the entire system of beliefs of an agent to access his justification.

Yes. so???....... Isn't non-fatalism justified? I don't understand what you are objecting to. If anything.

you skipped post 509.

I guess that what the fatalist believes is that if the bullet has his name written on it, then there is nothing he can do, so what is the point of doing anything at all to prevent that bullet from finding him.

Exactly. Determinism and Fatalism are incompatible. As you would expect, since determinism is (at least) compatible with science.


The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.

The Rubayhat of Omar Kyam. (Edward Fitzgerald).

Did I? Well, could you express your point again, then. I am rather vague now about what it is supposed to be.

1. The world in which officer live is such that fatalism is true.
2. It is a wise choice for the officer to wear his armor given all he knows.

You reason for denying 1 is from 2, but since you agree that 2 is true. You have no more reason to reject 1.

From 1, and 2, it follows that there is nothing logically impossible about:

3. Our world is such that fatalism is true.

I guess I never thought through the epistemic implications of fatalism. It is even more ridiculous than I initially thought since the result is that we can't know anything. Since every bit of empirical evidence is consistent with it, at most, a fatalist can only rationally hold that whatever happens, must happen--his thesis compels him to. So if determinism is true, there sure as sh*t isn't any causal sufficiency whatsoever. The notions of "power, influence, change," are rendered empty, ineffective, and obsolete.

Sure!

Here you go:

Non-trivial fatalism is not merely falsifiable, it is false. So it is not possible that all evidence is consistent with it. Non-trivial fatalism is refuted by the evidence. Isn't it?

Sorry. I really don't get it. Can you express it differently? I believe that fatalism is false. And I believe it is false because all our evidence is that it is false. Protective gear is tested before it is purchased. I am sure you know that. What do those tests show if not that whn officers wear that gear they are protected, and therefore, it is not true that it does not matter whether or not they wear protective gear? Why else would protective gear be purchased, and officers bother to wear it?