But you say things like this: "Because there is a truth value for a future tense proposition in the past, no one can change that truth value in the future"--directly implying no one has any control over the future. The way you choose your words is incredibly misleading.

Wait, so does the POB say or not say that the future tense propositions have a truth value? If it does, then you are contradicting the POV. If the POB does not say this, then you are saying something false about the POB.

We don't see any good reason to think otherwise. What do you think compatibilisim is all about? It is the attempt to arrive at a compromise between determinism and free will be rejecting fatalist implications. Fast, Ken, and myself have been criticizing your misunderstandings of this philosophical landsape for too many posts now....It's getting old.

No fatalism is not just determinism. Why? Because fate can be achieved by free will or by determinism or by random chance.

If you are fated to do Q this does not negate the fact you may WANT to do Q. Why would anyone think it would?

What do I call the doctrine that everything will happen necessarily? Well that depends on if your talking about logical necessity or physical necessity. If you're talking logical necessity then there is no such doctrine. If your talking about physical necessity then I call that hard-determinism.

Free will implies that I can do things which are not necessitated in any way shape or form.

Fate can be accomplished through free will or through determinism or by any other means under the sun.

Next, Do you think if Q will happen necessarily that negates the fact that I can freely choose Q? I would say no, it does not.

Determinism, to me, means 1 of two things......a determinist who is an incompatabilist would say that everything that happens, does so due to physical necessity.

A Determinist who is a compatiblist would say almost everything that happens does so due to physical necessity. The main exception being human unforced choices.

I'm not trying to be. That is precisely what the principle of bivalence says.

I don't know what the POV is but the Principle of Bivalence states that ALL propositions contain a value of either true or false but not both and not neither and the value cannot change. The POB is kind of an extension of the Law of Non-contradiction and Excluded Middle. The thing is, that the POB says ALL which means even future tense propositions. So, the proposition, Amperage will be president in the year 2024, is either true right now or false right now, but not neither, not undecided, and not both. And it's value cannot change....if it's true it will remain true now and forever; if it's false it will remain false now and forever.

So maybe you can explain what the POV is or you can use what I just wrote and answer your own question.

you have been arguing by simply using the definition. I am asking why if the future is set that necessarily negates free will.

Even if the future is set that does not negate the fact that I will have freely chosen everything I am fated to.

You still didn't answer my question. What are those differences? Can you specify what they are? So far, you are just making an arbitrary distinctions without telling anyone why you've made that distinction. I have a distinction, you don't.

No one thinks this.

What is Hard determinism, and how is it different than Soft determinism?

correct.

Again, what is fatalism and how is it different than determinism as a philosophical thesis? Tell me, please. I'm waiting....

Yes it does! If P is physically necessary, then it is physically impossible to do ~P. This logically follows! And you just defined free will as the ability to do things free of necessity. So you are contradicting yourself.

Then if everyone does things with physical necessity, it is physically impossible not do those things. This logically follows.

Compatibilists are soft-determinists. Maintaining free will, they deny every physical event is physically necessary. But they accept that every cause is causally sufficient for its effect. Causal sufficiency is not the same as causal necesssity.

There is much more going on here than you know about, or are willing to recognize. Philosophers are not as dense as you take them to be. I can tell that you never even bothered reading the SEP article on Compatibilism/Incompatibilism because your understanding of these topics is very rudimentary. Please read it, othewise I will just ignore you until you're on the same page with these distinctions.

Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Arguments for Incompatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Fatalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

the POB doesn't "say" this. This is entailed by it.

That was a typo. You know exactly what I meant. So I will ask again:

So does the POB say or not say that the future tense propositions have a truth value? If it does, then you are contradicting the POB. If the POB does not say this, then you are saying something false about the POB.

That's what "necessary" means! If I necessarily do P, then it is impossible to do ~P. This can be physical, metaphysical, or logical necessity. It doesn't matter. If something is necessary, then it is false that it could have been otherwise.

If free will is the ability to do otherwise, and if it is necessary that you do P, then it logically follows that doing ~P is impossible--or is necessarily false. What do you not understand?

Fatalism says everything is unfolding according a plan. That the future is set. That everything is unfolding exactly as it always would.

Determinism, to me, means 1 of two things......a determinist who is an incompatabilist would say that everything that happens, does so due to physical necessity.

A Determinist who is a compatiblist would say almost everything that happens does so due to physical necessity. The main exception being human unforced choices.

Well then no one must think fatalism and free will are at odds.

A Hard determinism would say that everything that happens, does so due to physical necessity.

Fatalism is the theory that things are unfolding exactly as they always would. And that that God knows the future.

Determinism is either all things or almost all things happen by physical necessity.

So if something is physically necessary this negates that I can freely choose it? That is ridiculous. It is physically necessary that I drink water to live and I can still freely choose to drink water.

this is exactly what a hard determinist would say

Didn't I say exactly that?????

I'll read the pages but I'll won't be on the same page with their distinctions because I don't agree with all of them.

No, I didn't know exactly what you meant. That's why I responded like I did. the POB says that future tense propositions DO have a truth value.

It's also false that I can't freely choose P.....who cares what could have been otherwise I choose to do P.

Are you denying that a P can both by physically necessary and freely chosen>

Mostly, I may never freely choose to do ~P so who cares?

Yes, and with necessity. But who cares anymore.

No, they don't. Hard determinists say that because every event is caused, and human decisions are events, then human decisions are caused. Therefore, I don't freely decide anything because antecedent past conditions determine how I act now. The past decides what decisions I will make in the future, I don't decide my decisions because then there would be infinite regress of decisions upon more decisions and no act ever gets performed. This is precisely their argument against Libertarians who think human decisions are completely random (or at least they have a problem explaining what appears to be total randomness in decision making power).

No. This is Incompatibilist Libertarianism, not Soft-Determinsim. Libertarians deny causal closure of physical in order to make room for uncaused human decisions. So they deny determinism is true, such that, some events, human decisions, are uncaused.

Soft determinists, on the other hand, accept causal closure of the physical since all human decisions are caused by antecedent past conditions (like Hard determinists do), but they deny those causes of my decisions are sufficient for the resulting decision, even though those antecedent causes are necessary for my decision. Therefore, past antecedenct conditions are not sufficient for any action I will perform since I am also partial cause of my action. So my decision, in conjunction with past causes, are jointly sufficient, thus entailing, the future effect.

I do. But my definition of fatalism is not YOURS. Get a grip.

Not exactly. That is more appropriate to fatalism. Hard determinism ACTUALLY AND EXPLICITLY says,

the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.

So, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time. Notice that an implication of determinism as it applies to a person's conduct is that, if determinism is true, there are (causal) conditions for that person's actions located in the remote past, prior to her birth, that are sufficient for each of her actions.

If God's knowledge is infallible, that would be the outcome, wouldn't it...

Lol. I will prove otherwise logically. If you disagree, then I need a counterargument to the following telling me which premise is false and why you think so.

(1) I have free will to do P if and only if I can do ~P.
(2) If I can do ~P, then ~P is possible to do.
(3) If I necessarily do P, then it is not possible to do not P.
(4) I necessarily do P.
(5) Therefore, it is not possible to do ~P
(6) Therefore, I can't do ~P.
(7) Therefore, I am not free to do P.

People like Hobbes was a self-declared determinist who said this, but he was confused, and so is every other self-proclaimed determinist who says this.

No, you said Soft Determnisists (Compatibilists) think "almost everything happens according to physical necessity." Though this falls out of their position, that's not why they are soft determinists. This is why Libertarians are Libertarians, and libertarians think some events don't have causes, namely, human decisions.

Soft determinists are compatibilists because they still think every event has a cause, but no cause determines its effect with necessity--since that is fatalism-- So they still maintain causes only determine their effects with sufficiency. And human decisions are partly necessary and together with the laws of nature are jointly sufficient for future effects.

You lack any good reason not to.

And this is what you deny, then? I don't even know what your position is.

If you can't do otherwise, then you are not free, since there exists only one possible course for you to choose. So it is not a choice at all. If necessarily P, then necessarily ~P. Logically, this follows. If you can't do ~P, then you are not free to do P. Free will is defined by what someone could have done given present conditions, not by what someone does given present conditions--a machine does that--it just does P, because "can P" implies "does P" if all events are necessary. Do you think we are machines? LOL!

Absolutely, because if your actions are physically necessitated, then you could not have done otherwise. That's what necessity is.
And it is a logical contradiction to suppose otherwise. You yourself defined free will as the ability to do P. So are you now retracting your statement?

But you said someone is free to do P if he could have done otherwise. Are you denying this?

I will get to that post in a second. First tell me if you think the POB is false, and whether you think your construal of fatalism is false. I can't tell what position you are advancing at all.

Second, I am confused that on your own construal, you think fatalism is true, and someone can have free will. But you also think that if determinism is true, somone can have free will, too?

What makes something not free? Do mechanical machines have free will too? What the hell do you believe???

Since it is impossible to avoid one's fate, since if one did so, it would not have been his fate, how could fatalism be false-which it clearly is?

To say it is false is to presume it is a factual matter with truth values. I grant this, but i don ` t think there is epistemic justification for it being one way, or the other.

Epistemic justification for what? That fatalism is false. Of course the belief that fatalism is false is justified. Unless it was, why would police departments spend money of equipping police with body armour? Fatalism implies that a police officer has no more chance of surviving being shot at when equipped with body armor than he does if he is not wearing body armor. Clearly the police don't believe that since they equip officers with body armor.

Epistemic justification for what? That fatalism is false. Of course the belief that fatalism is false is justified. Unless it was, why would police departments spend money of equipping police with body armour? Fatalism implies that a police officer has no more chance of surviving being shot at when equipped with body armor than he does if he is not wearing body armor. Clearly the police don't believe that since they equip officers with body armor.

why must it say with necessity? OK let us suppose the future is set such that it is your fate that Q. Does that statement in and of itself exclude your ability to freely choose Q?

hard determinist think that if we had all the inital conditions and we knew the state of the world at a given time, that a future event could be predicted, do they not?

The reason the think this is possible is because there is no possible way that the causal chain can change.There is no such thing as true randomness nor free will correct?

Does it not then follow that given the laws of nature that all events thereafter follow necessarily?

soft determinists do not believe that human actions are the result of physical necessity....yes or no?

Well then why would you say that no one thinks that If you are fated to do Q this does not negate the fact you may WANT to do Q? Or in other words, you said no one thinks that being fated to do Q means you can't freely choose to do Q.....If that is the case, and I agree, then fatalism and free will are NOT incompatible

Yes, but can you once try and and figure out what that IMPLIES? To me, that implies that given the laws of nature and initial conditions, everything thereafter happens by physical necessity. Do you not agree?

I disagree with (1). Why? Because I may NEVER want to do ~P so what does it matter if I can or cannot do it?

your quote: "Soft determinists are compatibilists becasue they still think ever event has a cause, but no cause determines its effect with necessity" my quote: "almost everything happens due to physical necessity"wow. Is that not exactly what I said?

sure I do. I've been arguing my reason for page upon page now, you've simply rejected it because it doesn't agree with SEP.

If you found out you were on the truman show would this negate your free will in some way? Since you were a slave of sorts?

Free will is the ability to do something of my choosing. This does not mean if I can't do ~P that I'm not still free to do P.

think of it this way. If someone said , "pick a hand any hand and I'll give you what's in it", and you pick the left hand and he's got 5 dollars in it and he gives it to you.....right afterward he says, "it's a good thing you picked the left too because I wasn't going to let you pick the right hand..."Did you or did you not freely choose the left hand? Honest question here.I think you exhibited your free will and chose the left hand.

it was their fate to buy the body armor of course

There are two views in this situation. Suppose we have a god like view of the world, and according to this view, the world could not be what it is, and what it will be is completely fixed. In the frog eye view of the police officer, he believe that he does have free will, and that planning, preparation for the future do matter.

There may be two views, but only one of them is justified. Are you under the impression that we do not have excellent reason to think that wearing body armor is justified? Why do they spend money to purchase it then?

If not for my belief in God, I would maintain that the POB does NOT hold for future tense propositions(exactly what Aristotle though btw). That is the one and only reason that I do agree with the POB.

I still don't know if fatalism is real but, I can at least admit it might be. Not that it matters because I don't know the future. And I am still freely choosing what I choose.

I vehemently believe that free will is real so anything else I think might be true, must be able to be compatible with free will.

I am advancing the possibility that free will and fate can be compatible while not claiming to know if either are true, but while strenuously claiming free will is.

The two views i mention is consistent with one another. The god ` s eye view is true, and the police officer `s view is false. I think the officer is obvious making a good choice when he wears the armor.

The police officer's view that body armor is protective is false. And so, his choice to wear it is a good choice? Are you all right?

The police officer's view that body armor is protective is false. And so, his choice to wear it is a good choice? Are you all right?

But Ken, isn't this the fallacy of the "lazy argument"? The conclusion that "we ought not to do anything because it makes no difference" is fallacious. Fatalists don't have to draw this conclusion. Non-fatalists can draw it too. So it is still nevertheless a fallacy and doesn't succeed in undermining fatalism one bit. Even if someone believes fatalism is true, it is absurd to suppose he is thereby unjustified for thinking adorning body armour is a good idea.

Supposing it is true officer A won't die because he wears body armour. Supposing it is true officer B will die even if he wears body armour. And supposing it is true officer C will die because he chooses not to wear body armour. It is still wise to wear body armour in all three case because wearing body armour is one of those things that is known to decrease your chances of dying when you are shot at. We know this from past cases. It matters not whether one knows the truth of the matter about the future.

Besides, if it is true someone lives in the future precisely because he wears body armour, it is because wearing body armour is one of those necessary steps which determines his fate that he won't die. So in all three cases, it is still a good decision to wear body armour whether the officer will die or not, simply because he has no determinate knowledge about the future. There is no good reason for anyone to take the gamble and not wear body armour.

That argument simply trivializes fatalism. I already pointed out that in one sense of "fate" fatalism is tautologically trivial: namely, what will happen will happen. If that is fatalism, then everyone is a fatalist. It also equates fatalism with determinism, and what is the point of doing that? We are not discussing whether determinism is true. We are discussing whether fatalism is true. And that supposes that fatalism and determinism are not the same theories. And, indeed, as I have just argued, fatalism and determinism are incompatible.

That it would be a gamble, as you say, not to wear body armor shows that fatalism is false. For how would it be a gamble not to wear body armor if fatalism were true?