Either, not all causes there may be, are to get to him when deciding, or they do, and he decides according to them all...in none of the cases he can escape what he decides.

I repeat:

No. You still commit the same old modal fallacy. It is false that I could not have done otherwise. Just because I do P does not entail I necessarily do P. I could still have done ~P, and have done Q instead if I really wanted to.

You are putting the cart before the horse.

Or even if you had merely wanted to. Of course, if I had also wanted to, then, ceterus paribus I would have done it. But, that is merely a trivial truism. And, if Fil. Albuquerque only means to state that truism, fair enough. That is, if I have sufficiently motivating reasons to do A, and if I also want to do A, then (CP) I will do A.

You are putting the cart before the horse. Together with all necessary causes along with my decision to do P, if I want to do P, then I do P. I don't necessarily do P.

Someone who cannot "escape what he decides" is just as dumb as saying "I cannot escape my chopping wood while I am chopping wood because I am not not chopping wood." Who cares. There is nothing necessary about my chopping the wood. If I choose to stop chopping would, then I will stop chopping wood. Period.

Or even if you had merely wanted to. Of course, if I had also wanted to, then, ceterus paribus I would have done it. But, that is merely a trivial truism. And, if Fil. Albuquerque only means to state that truism, fair enough. That is, if I have sufficiently motivating reasons to do A, and if I also want to do A, then (CP) I will do A.

although adding other necessary causes at time 1 makes you do it if they are there..

which they must given the world has an exact state in this panorama...what did you not understand in what I just said ???

2- If you wanted to stop you would do it at time2 since at time1 you did choose to not do it...true value true remember ?

Its actually a very good question since it goes straight to the root of what cause means...I wish you could see that, but what can I do ?...

What is the alternative ? Because you suggest there is one...it just happens the truism is all there is, and although you cannot know what will be, what will be has true value NOW !!!

If I had I could, only states that, if, does not equal what you in fact have done...

---------- Post added 05-08-2010 at 11:50 AM ----------

There is no alternative to a truism than a falsism. But that does not mean that a truism is not, exactly that, just a truism. It is not a metaphysical necessity (whatever that is). It is just a tautology.

And yes, I certainly agree that if P is true then P is true. Why should I not? How could I not? So it is necessarily true that if P then, P. But that does not mean that if P then, necessarily P. And that is what you keep missing. You keep misplacing the necessary operator. Just because P is true, it does not follow that P is necessarily true. Just because I weigh 150 pounds I don't necessarily weigh 150 pounds, although necessarily, if I weigh 150 pounds, then I weigh 150 pounds.

Exactly. This very same fallacy happens when people say that future facts are "fixed," implying what will happen, happens necessarily. So if it is true today that you will jump 1 foot tomorrow, it follows that you have no choice but to jump 1 foot tomorrow when the time comes because this event "must" happen.

Same with Amperage's misuse of the Principle of Bivalence for future tense propositions: He thinks that "Necessarily, all future tense propositions are true or false, but not both" logically implies, "All future tense propositions are necessarily true or necessarily false, but not both." This is another modal fallacy.

The continued use of this fallacious kind of argument demonstrates the importance of knowing logic when we philosophize.

No !
Whatever I decide I must have good reason to do so, if I have it, then I decide accordingly, necessary condition to my choosing A rather then B, and not against my will...of course is also necessary, that the possibility of A rises in the background, in the World...both together are sufficient condition thus cause takes place. Otherwise cause would not take place, and there would be suspension of action...

Movement has a Cause ! (movement, energy transfer, needs explanation) (One explanation to One fact, not possibility for several)

Anyway I get your point well enough...

This very same fallacy happens when people say that future facts are "fixed," implying what will happen, happens necessarily. So if it is true today that you will jump 1 foot tomorrow, it follows that you have no choice but to jump 1 foot tomorrow when the time comes because this event "must" happen.

As far as I can tell, you haven't shown any way in which you can realise any alternative possibility. So, you seem to be defending the bizarre notion that an agent has free will whenever that agent performs an action to which there is a merely logically possible alternative.

The odd thing is that Kennethamy is so enthusiastically slapping your back about this, because your position is at odds with one of his own favourite examples, the victim of armed robbery.

Like I said, if X is not physically possible, then X is not realisable. But if X is not is realisable, then X can still be physically possible because what is realisable is a subset of what is physically possible.

That everything realisable is physically possible doesn't imply that everything physically possible is realisable.

Same with Amperage's misuse of the Principle of Bivalence for future tense propositions: He thinks that "Necessarily, all future tense propositions are true or false, but not both" logically implies, "All future tense propositions are necessarily true or necessarily false, but not both." This is another modal fallacy.

No I don't. And for about the 5th time stop putting words in my mouth. Seriously man.

The POB states that future tense propositions have truth values before the actual event. Either true or false but not both and not neither.

Therefore it follows that it cannot just keep switching back and forth until the moment of the actual event. It cannot change truth values.

Thus the truth or falsity of the proposition cannot be made to be wrong.

If you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow is true then you will wear a blue shirt whether by your own choice or by compulsion, or randomness. But one way or another you will end up with a blue shirt on.

This is straight from the POB.

Thus the outcome is fixed while still maintaining your free will

If you espouse the POB for future tense propositions then you are espousing to fatalism. End of story.

Nothing has to happen by necessity for fatalism to still be true.
Things just have to happen the way they always will.

---------- Post added 05-08-2010 at 03:29 PM ----------

why you guys insist on claiming the POB holds for future tense propositions is beyond me(especially atheists), but since ya'll do, you must accept the consequences of all that it implies(ie. fatalism-->which DOES NOT have to say Q will happen necessarily, just that Q WILL happen)

---------- Post added 05-08-2010 at 03:33 PM ----------

please someone explain to me why fatalism necessarily must say that Q will happen necessarily because I see no good reason to think this at all.

Q will happen by any means....even free will.
if it is your fate for Q to happen.....it will happen. By free will or by some other means.

it doesn't interfere with free will. That's the whole point. Just as fatalism doesn't interfere with free will.

Seriously what is it with you and the modal fallacy? As I said, nothing that I am discussing has to do with necessity. Nothing.

There is no MUST....you just will. If you freely choose to put on a green shirt something will happen(maybe someone will break in and steal all your non-blue shirts) which will either force you or convince you to put on a blue shirt instead. Or maybe you'll close your eyes and randomly pick a blue shirt. You cannot negate the truth value of the the proposition. Not because of necessity but because of anything.

Is fatalism just determinism then? Are you collapsing the distinction? What do you call the doctrine which says everything is going to happen necessarily? I take that to mean "everything is fated." They are one and the same. I've been taught throughout my philosophical career that determinism says,

P-->Q
P
So, Q

And fatalism says,

N (P-->Q)

which is logically equivalent to,

N (P)--> N (Q)
N (P)
So, N (Q)

So I don't understand what you are doing. Are you reversing this distinction, or what? It is incredibly uncharitable denying an age-old distinction without telling anyone why. What do you think is determinism? What do you think is fatalism?



That's what fatalism is. You just groundlessly deny this without reason.



I guess you could put it that way--someone "forcing" or circumstances "dictating" the action X. This just goes without saying. We are compelled to do things all the time by our environment. But saying "you cannot negate the truth value of the propostion" is incredibly misleading, because all of our unimpeded freely chosen acts just do determine the true value of a propostion. True and false propositions don't "force someone to will X rather than Y." To think otherwise is a category mistake. And you've been implying this nonsense from the start, whether or not you meant to.

Like I said before, "X will do" is just the future tense of the present tense "X is doing." Now what is your point? You must recognize even if "I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow" is true that "I could wear a green shirt tomorrow" is still also true. If you deny this, then you are committed to believing free will is not possible given the truth of determinism.

No I don't. And for about the 5th time stop putting words in my mouth.

The POB states that future tense propositions have truth values before the actual event. Either true or false but not both and not neither.

why you guys insist on claiming the POB holds for future tense propositions is beyond me

please someone explain to me why fatalism necessarily must say that Q will happen necessarily because I see no good reason to think this at all.