The Fatal Paradox

@Amperage,

Amperage;161432 wrote:

well if you espouse bivalence for future tense propositions, then you espouse fatalism

But argue that, is to argue from the premise that necessarily every future contingent proposition is true or false, to the conclusion that every future contingent is necessarily true, or is necessarily false. But that argument is fallacious because it commits the modal fallacy. Case closed. How many times need this be pointed out?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161550 wrote:

But if I wake up, then it's not true that I'm asleep!!!

Of course! Did I ever deny that?

ughaibu;161550 wrote:

Seriously, if determinism is the case, then there is a fact, true at all times, before, during and after my sleep, how (this means I want an explanation in physical terms) do I realise the possibility of being awake at the time that it's true that I'm asleep?

sheesh...You are sleeping at time1 means you are sleeping at time1. I am not saying you are both sleeping and not sleeping at this time. Suppose it is true you are asleep at time1 on such and such a day and in such and such a place:

"A is asleep at time1" is true. This is perfectly compatible with the truth of, "It is possible A might not have been asleep at time1"--they are both true--no inconsistency.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161550 wrote:

But if I wake up, then it's not true that I'm asleep!!!
Seriously, if determinism is the case, then there is a fact, true at all times, before, during and after my sleep, how (this means I want an explanation in physical terms) do I realise the possibility of being awake at the time that it's true that I'm asleep?

@Extrain,

Extrain;161554 wrote:

"A is asleep at time1" is true. This is perfectly compatible with the truth of, "It is possible A might not have been asleep at time1"--they are both true--no inconsistency.

How do I realise the possibility of being awake at the time during which it is true that I'm asleep?

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161556 wrote:

How do I realise the possibility of being awake at the time during which it is true that I'm asleep?

That's just a silly question. It is like asking "how can I not be chopping wood when I am chopping wood"? If you are chopping wood, then you are chopping wood, you are not not chopping wood. Necessity and possibility has nothing to do with it unless you just assume that everything happens necessarily which is intuitively false.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161557 wrote:

That's just a silly question. It is like asking "how can I not be chopping wood when I am chopping wood"? If you are chopping wood, then you are chopping wood, you are not not chopping wood. Necessity and possibility has nothing to do with it unless you just assume that everything happens necessarily which is intuitively false.

But there is a difference from when it happens, to right before it happened you could have chose otherwise...

---------- Post added 05-07-2010 at 11:44 PM ----------

Can necessity came together with the event ???

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161558 wrote:

But there is a difference from when it happens, to right before it happened you could have chose otherwise...

And what difference is there other than the fact that I go from not chopping wood to chopping wood? How can I be necessarily chopping wood. That sounds completely wrong. You don't necessarily chop wood. If you did, then why are you not doing it all the time?

@Extrain,

Extrain;161557 wrote:

That's just a silly question. It is like asking "how can I not be chopping wood when I am chopping wood"? If you are chopping wood, then you are chopping wood, you are not not chopping wood. Necessity and possibility has nothing to do with it unless you just assume that everything happens necessarily which is intuitively false.

Well, an agent has free will on occasions when they make and act on a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives, logical possibility doesn't come into it, because the physically possible is a proper subset of the logically possible, and the realisable is a proper subset of the physically possible. So, there is no inference from the logically possible to the realisable, logical possibility only sets limits, it's irrelevant to the question of free will and determinism. In short, unless you can demonstrate that it is possible to realise an alternative to the truth, then compatibilism fails.

@Fil Albuquerque,

Of course you could have chosen otherwise even after the event, but still it refers to just before the event on the moment of efficient cause.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161554 wrote:

Of course! Did I ever deny that?

sheesh...Suppose it is true you are asleep at time1 on such and such a day and in such and such a place:

"A is asleep at time1" is true. This is perfectly compatible with the truth of, "It is possible A might not have been asleep at time1"--they are both true--no inconsistency.

U. here is doubly confused:

He confuses:

1. Necessarily, if A is asleep, then A is not awake (which is true) with if A is asleep, then A is necessarily not awake (which is false), and;

2. He confuses modal with epistemic possibility. A is asleep is modally consistent with it is possible that A is awake, since A is asleep is a contingent proposition even if my knowing that A is asleep is inconsistent with my knowing (it is possible that) A is awake. "It is possible that p" may mean, that ~p is contingent; or it may mean that for all I know, p is is true.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161562 wrote:

And what difference is there other than the fact that I go from not chopping wood to chopping wood? How can I be necessarily chopping wood. That sounds completely wrong. You don't necessarily chop wood. If you did, then why are you not doing it all the time?

Necessity is pinpointed to that event in that Time/Space frame...just that.

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161566 wrote:

Necessity is pinpointed to that event in that Time/Space frame...just that.

You mean that whenever I chop wood, I necessarily chop wood? I think you are confusing:

1. Necessarily, whenever I chop wood, I chop wood. Which is true. With:
2. Whenever I chop wood, I necessarily chop wood. Which is false.

And the modal fallacy once more rears it ugly head.

@Fil Albuquerque,

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161563 wrote:

Well, an agent has free will on occasions when they make and act on a conscious choice from amongst realisable alternatives, logical possibility doesn't come into it, because the physically possible is a proper subset of the logically possible, and the realisable is a proper subset of the physically possible.

Why is what is realisable a subset of what is physically possible? Don't you just assume this? I may be chopping wood because that is physically possible. But that doesn't mean that my not chopping wood is not physically possible while I am chopping wood. So you just assume that my chopping and not-chopping wood is physically possible, but my chopping wood is realisably necessary when I am chopping wood because my not chopping wood is realizably impossible. I disagree. Until you can show any good reason for thinking otherwise, I don't have to accept that distinction. Besides, it is absurd. If you were realisably chopping wood necessarily, then you would be physically chopping wood all the time. But you are not, so "realized necessity" is false.

ughaibu;161563 wrote:

So, there is no inference from the logically possible to the realisable, logical possibility only sets limits, it's irrelevant to the question of free will and determinism.

The only limit to logical possibility is anything that is self-contradictory. So anything that is not contradictory is logically possible. But none of this has to do with determinism which is a thesis about causal sufficiency, not causal necessity.

ughaibu;161563 wrote:

In short, unless you can demonstrate that it is possible to realise an alternative to the truth, then compatibilism fails.

That conclusion doesn't logically follow at all. So your argument is a non-sequiter. I can argue back that until you demonstrate that what is true must be the case, there is no reason to suppose everything happens necessarily. It is still true that I may not have been chopping the wood even while I am chopping the wood. There is nothing inconsistent about this. So I don't understand what advantage you have, here.

@Extrain,

when you are chopping wood !

---------- Post added 05-08-2010 at 12:10 AM ----------

So the chopping wood you did was necessary or not, at the moment you did it ?

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161573 wrote:

Why is my chopping wood necessary? There is no reason to think this is true. It is a useless presupposition. You are just chopping wood at the time of your swinging the axe. You are not necessarily chopping wood while you are swinging the axe. Besides, your inference is invalid. P does not entail necessarily P.

Fil. Albuquerque;161573 wrote:

Of course you can decide to stop chopping wood while you are chopping wood. It happens all the time. That's how people stop chopping wood! The evidence is stacked against your claim.

Fil. Albuquerque;161573 wrote:

So the chopping wood you did was necessary or not, at the moment you did it ?

It is not necessary. It is contingent.

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161570 wrote:

No, it is not a fair question. Why should it be? Not unless you have some good reason to think that it should have been otherwise. After all, if it had been otherwise, then you would have asked the very same question. There is, of course, always some cause that a contingent truth is true, and not false (or so I believe, anyway) but that does not mean that what is contingently true should have been false, and that it is not false needs some special explanation; an explanation other than the ordinary explanation which is to give the cause that what is true, is true. Why what is true is not false has a cause; not a plot.

But, although your question embodies an error, it is a good error to make, since it teaches us something important when we understand why it is an error.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161572 wrote:

Why is what is realisable a subset of what is physically possible?

Are you suggesting that I can realise a physical impossibility? Obviously I can only realise a possibility that is physically possible and equally obviously I can not realise all physical possibilities.

Extrain;161572 wrote:

The only limit to logical possibility is anything that is self-contradictory.

Nothing to do with what I wrote. Mooted realisable possibilities can be discarded if they're logically impossible.

Extrain;161572 wrote:

That conclusion doesn't logically follow at all.

Sure it does:
1) in a determined world, there is a true statement describing exactly one possible evolution of the state of the world
2) from 1 it follows that the set of courses of action from which an agent can realise a choice contains exactly one element
3) free will requires that the set of actions from which an agent can realise a choice contains at least two elements
4) therefore, in a determined world there is no free will.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161578 wrote:

Are you suggesting that I can realise a physical impossibility? Obviously I can only realise a possibility that is physically possible and equally obviously I can not realise all physical possibilities.Nothing to do with what I wrote. Mooted realisable possibilities can be discarded if they're logically impossible.Sure it does:
1) in a determined world, there is a true statement describing exactly one possible evolution of the state of the world
2) from 1 it follows that the set of courses of action from which an agent can realise a choice contains exactly one element
3) free will requires that the set of actions from which an agent can realise a choice contains at least two elements
4) therefore, in a determined world there is no free will.

In a determined world, then necessarily, if E occurs, then E occurs. How does that imply that there is no free will; i.e. that if E occurs, then necessarily, E occurs? Answer, it does not. Where E is a choice, or an action).

Oh, dat ole debbil, modal fallacy! Logic does not appear to destroy him. Should we try exorcism?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;161579 wrote:

How does that imply that there is no free will

Extrain has accepted that an agent can not realise the possibility of not being asleep when it is true that that agent is asleep.

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