If determinism is the case, then it is either a fact now that I will be asleep in one hours time or it is a fact now that I will not be asleep in one hours time. Assuming that determinism is the case and the fact is that I will be asleep in one hours time, how is the alternative of not being asleep realisable?

...because it is not necessary that you will be asleep in one hour's time. The alternative of not being asleep is realizable because it is also true that it is possible one might not be asleep in one hour's time.

...because it is not necessary that you will be asleep in one hour's time. The alternative of not being asleep is realizable because it is also true that it is possible one might not be asleep in one hour's time.

So? I didn't say that either.



That' sloppy talk. But ok. It is a fact we only "choose true truth-values." But it is false to conclude that we could not choose otherwise since it is possible that we could have chosen otherwise just as it is possible for Nixon to have chosen to be poet and not to become the president instead.

1) it is true that I will be asleep
2) if I will not be asleep, then it is be true that I will not be asleep
3) in which case, it is be true that I will be asleep and not asleep, which is absurd.
So, if it's true that I will be asleep, how is the alternative realisable?

1) it is true that I will be asleep
2) if I will not be asleep, then it is be true that I will not be asleep
3) in which case, it is be true that I will be asleep and not asleep, which is absurd.
So, if it's true that I will be asleep, how is the alternative realisable?

But (2) is false if (1) is true. So (3) is also false. So it is not true that you will not be asleep in one hour's time, since you will, in fact, be sleeping in one hour's time.

But it is still possible that you won't be asleep in one's hour's time. There's is nothing about your future sleeping that entails you will be necessarily sleeping, just as my eating an ice-cream cone right now doesn't entail it is not possible for me to be eating steak instead, since it is certainly possible I could have been eating steak instead. There is nothing necessary by my eating an ice-cream cone.

I wonder if its already necessary and sufficient that one has true value true, now, given that both, now, cannot have the same value, now ? hum...:rolleyes:

Would be something like...otherwise always true !

If it is true that I will be asleep, how is it possible for me to not be asleep? How is that alternative realisable in a determined world?

If it is true that I will be asleep, how is it possible for me to not be asleep? How is that alternative realisable in a determined world?

Because causal sufficiency is not causal necessity. That's the big confusion everyone makes.

No. Propositions are either possibly true, necessarily true, or contingently true--meaning true now, but not necessarily true. Propositions are not "necessarily and sufficiently" true. That doesn't make sense.

So, you are claiming that in the case that I will be asleep and it's true that I will be asleep, then I can also realise the case of not being asleep. In short, you reckon that it can be true that I'm asleep now, despite the fact that I'm awake.

No. I am saying it is not necessary that you are asleep when you are asleep. So it is true that you could have been awake even though you are asleep.

No. I am saying it is not necessarily true that you are asleep when you are asleep. So it is true that you could have been awake even though you are, in fact, asleep.

But it's not true that I can be awake if it's true that I'm asleep, is it? That would mean that I am awake and it's true that I'm asleep, wouldn't it? How do I realise the possibility of being awake when it's true that I'm asleep?

OK. OK !
...so it gets better ! Having a true value now true, its a not necessary true, but still it is sufficiently true ? would you agree ? enlighten me please, I am feeling slow here...

But some say, since in fact he was asleep, the state of the world at that given point in space and time was such that it may have been necessary that he was asleep, since he was asleep...of course, they cannot prove it.

Sufficiency applies to causal conditions such as, P is causally sufficient for Q. If P then Q. Or, it applies to definitions: "P" is true if and only if P.

Sufficiency is not a feature of true or false propositions themselves. It simply doesn't make sense that a proposition can be sufficient. "Sufficient for what"? I ask you...

But it's not true that I can be awake if it's true that I'm asleep, is it? That would mean that I am awake and it's true that I'm asleep, wouldn't it?

How do I realise the possibility of being awake when it's true that I'm asleep?

You wake up. Do you deny you sometimes wake up from your sleep? Do you necessarily sleep when you are asleep?

You wake up. Do you deny you sometimes wake up from your sleep? Do you necessarily sleep when you are asleep? That doesn't even make sense to me. The proposition is then false that at such and such a time you were going to be asleep. So just because it is true that you are sleeping at time1, doesn't mean it is false you may not have been alseep at time1, precisely because it is possible that you wake up from your sleep at time1.