in what way is inevitability not fatalism?

The whole fact that a truth-value CAN exist and is fixed(either true or false) before the actual event takes place suggests that the future is fixed.

I disagree. You just claim this without argument. Please show why because you have given me no reason to believe it is even true!

Once again, I have not nor will you ever see me talk about fatalism or the POB and necessity. Neither concept requires it unless you are unwilling to think beyond the definition you were given from a website

You are emptying the concept "fatalism" of implications of necessity so that it doesn't mean what philosophers throughout history have meant by their use of that word. You can dispute conventionally accepted word meanings all you want. But I will stick to the old definition of the word. :rolleyes:

sure. Foreknowledge itself is a possible evidence of fate. But I, along with many, don't see foreknowledge as negating free will in any way. Hey, I don't know if fate is a real thing or not....but if it is, I see no reason to think free will would be negated.

well just think about it rationally

How can the proposition I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow be true before tomorrow?

Don't I get to decide whether it's true or not?

Apparently not, if a value exists before I make my decision.

This suggests that should I decide to put on a green shirt something will happen in such a way that I will somehow end up with a blue shirt on come tomorrow.

Fatalism states that all events are logically necessary and could not have been any other way. This view is of course absurd, for all the reasons already discussed. But even with that said, we can't go around changing definitions. This is how the term is used, and yes it is right of us to refer to authorities in this matter.

Now.

What you're talking about is different. If there is an omniscient God, that in and of itself would not negate free will. Knowing what someone is going to do, does not mean that that someone did not make the choice to do it. I can have a justified belief that you will wear a red shirt tomorrow, and if you in fact wear a red shirt tomorrow, I would have known that you would wear a red shirt. This doesn't mean it was necessary that you wear a red shirt; you had the capacity to choose, but it just so happened that I did know.

However, predestination (God determined the fate of the universe throughout all of time and space.)is a form of fatalism, as far as I know. So, if you believe that God decided the fate of the universe and we are simply acting out that fate, that does negate free will.

To recap, predestination and free will are incompatible. Fatalism and free will are incompatible. However, simply believing in an omniscient God does not entail predestination, and a belief in an omniscient God in and of itself is compatible with free will.

That's your answer? Ha ha!



First, we may not know that it is true or false.
Second, even if it is true, that doesn't entail I have no free will about the matter. Supposing I don't wear a blue shirt, but wear a red one instead. That just means "I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow" was false all along. What's the problem?



That all depends on the circumstances--someone can make you wear a red shirt instead so the statement is actually false.



So what if there is an actual truth-value before that decision is made? I don't see why this "interferes" with free will. It's not as if you were compelled to put on a blue shirt before you actually put on a blue shirt when the time came. I don't know what the problem is.



What? That's the modal fallacy again. If you decide to put on a green shirt tomorrow, then statement is false. Nothing is "preventing you" from doing anything. You think that because a proposition P is true now, that I MUST wear a blue shirt tomorrow. Again, that's your modal fallacy which you continue to deny. It is a fallacy whether you like it or not.

What? That's the modal fallacy I keep harping on. If you decide to put on a green shirt tomorrow, then statement is false. Nothing is "preventing you" from doing anything. You think that because a proposition "I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow" is true now, that somehow I MUST wear a blue shirt tomorrow. Again, that's your modal fallacy which you continue to deny. It is a fallacy whether you like it or not.

it doesn't interfere with free will. That's the whole point. Just as fatalism doesn't interfere with free will.

Seriously what is it with you and the modal fallacy? As I said, nothing that I am discussing has to do with necessity. Nothing.

There is no MUST....you just will. If you freely choose to put on a green shirt something will happen(maybe someone will break in and steal all your non-blue shirts) which will either force you or convince you to put on a blue shirt instead. Or maybe you'll close your eyes and randomly pick a blue shirt. You cannot negate the truth value of the the proposition. Not because of necessity but because of anything.

"I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow" is true. This is not inconsistent with the truth of, "I could have worn a green shirt tomorrow."

From the "Bible" perspective is correct, but that it sounds doggy, it sure does !...

"Nixon was president of the USA in 1972" is true. Do you think this is inconsistent with the truth of "Nixon could have not been the president and been a poet instead"? It doesn't seem "dodgy" to me at all. Of course it is true that Kennedy might not have been shot, and Clinton might not have ever received oral sex from Monica.

I don't see this at all. "Choice" means the same thing it always did: "the freedom to choose among alternative possibilities."

Some would say that you cannot change the past, others would even argue that such is not necessary true...what Nixon was in case you cannot change the past, it certainly tells something why Nixon could not have been other then President...even if it could have been otherwise, it is the case, that it was what it was...

Sure, no one denies that Nixon was president, and "it was what it was." But that doesn't mean Nixon was compelled to become president when he did. It is certainly possible that Nixon might not have been president, is true. And it is certainly possible that Nixon could have chosen otherwise than he did, is true.

I suppose that it is also true today, that Nixon could have not chosen other then the one with true value, true...true ? :sarcastic:

Yes, that's determinism. But that there are future facts of the matter doesn't entail the future is "fixed."

Huh? We don't "choose truth values." The causal outcomes of our choices make propositions about those outcomes true or false.