I don't care. Until you actually show me a logical demonstration, your bragging is just hot air.

I got no feedback to my last post before this one so I'm just going to post it once more to see if anyone has any commentary.....ESPECIALLY those who espouse proposition bivalence for future tense propositions. Because it would seem to me that those who espouse proposition bivalence for future tense propositions would indeed be espousers of fatalism lest they have contradictory viewpoints

So here was the post:

It is my contention that hard determinism necessarily implies fatalism and NOT the other way around.

Let's look at the principle of bivalence for a second.

Suppose the proposition, you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow, is made.
Now, I think you maintain that that proposition necessarily has a value of either true or false today(before the event actually happens).
Let us suppose the value is true right now.
If it is true right now, then you will indeed wear a blue shirt tomorrow.
What's more, even if someone told you today that you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow, you will still wear a blue shirt tomorrow.
Having said that, does this negate your free will?
I would say no, it does not. But what it does do is imply that the future is set. Why? Because the proposition contained a necessary value of true or false even before the actual event took place. And, according to the principle of bivalence, ALL propositions necessarily contain a value of either true or false, but not both and not neither; even future tense propositions. This implies that even knowing the value will not change your ability to make it wrong. Perhaps if you did want to not wear a blue shirt tomorrow someone will break into your house and force you to do so.....the point being, the proposition will still be true whether by your choice or whether against your will.

It is exactly similar to asking the question, if God knows what I'm going to do before I do it does that negate my free will? Again, I think you have argued, no, it does not.

So why on earth do you think that fatalism necessarily negates free will?

As I have said, fatalism, to me, is saying, Q will happen. It doesn't matter if it happens by choice, by randomness, or by physical necessity. It just will happen.

Thus, why I have claimed that hard-determinism implies fatalism while the reverse is not true. Fatalism does not imply hard determinism as fatalism can be just as compatible with free will as the principle of bivalence and God's foreknowledge can, IMO.

This is not a question of caring or not, you have accused me of stating A and B without paying attention to rhetorical context in which such was said. those accusations can be showed false and may even be case for legal action against you.

Necessarily, for all propositions P (T or F, but not both).

This not the same as saying:
For all propositions P (necessarily T or necessarily F, but not both).

The concept of Free will is typically construed as "the ability to do otherwise than what one, in fact, did. Suppose I do X. If fatalism is false and determinism is true, then "I could have chosen Y instead of X if I wanted to do Y" is still true. But this same statement is false if fatalism is true, since I could not have done otherwise than what I, in fact, did since I did it necessarily.

well that's the thing. If philosophers think that fatalism necessarily negates free will then they are wrong for the very reasons I've laid out in that post. Unless of course the don't believe the principle of bivalence holds for future tense propositions and also don't believe in a God who has foreknowledge.

Because the proposition contained a necessary value of true or false even before the actual event took place.

And, according to the principle of bivalence, ALL propositions necessarily contain a value of either true or false, but not both and not neither; even future tense propositions.

This implies that even knowing the value will not change your ability to make it wrong.

Perhaps if you did want to not wear a blue shirt tomorrow someone will break into your house and force you to do so.....the point being, the proposition will still be true whether by your choice or whether against your will.

True, the law of bivalence does not say that propositions necessarily have to be T or necessarily F, but they necessarily must be one or the other(T or F) but not both and not neither, the ridiculous part for me is this supposedly holds even BEFORE the event actually takes place.

But you are wrong. Necessarily that P implies it is logically impossible that ~P. So Free Will IS incompatible with fatalism.

No, the principle of bivalence doesn't say this. Fatalism does. Be careful what you say.

That's correct.

What does knowing P is true have to do with whether or not the future is fixed? P can still be true, and the future is not fixed. P can also be a fact of the matter, but that doesn't entail that fact is fixed.

But determinism says our choices make the future what it is. It doesn't say the future is what it is regardless of our choices. That is contrary to determinism.

Why? I don't see the problem. Just because there is already a fact of the matter about my wearing a blue shirt tomorrow, doesn't entail that I will necessarily wear a blue shirt tomorrow. This is a modal fallacy.

No, if future tense propositions fall under the law of bivalence which does not negate free will then neither does fatalism because bivalence of future tense propsoitions implies fatalism.

Obviously, definitionally I know what philosophers mean when they say fatalism but they are wrong.

well if you espouse bivalence then you espouse fatalism

it's fixed because it cannot be made false. Meaning if, you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow, is ture, that proposition cannot be made false. Thus it is fixed. It's not fixed in the sense of negating free will but it is fixed. This is EXACTLY the same as fatalism.

you can be made to do something against your will. this is not contradictory to either free will being real or determinism.

No it's not because I have not said anything about necessity. Necessity doesn't matter. If a fact of the matter already exists we can then play the hypothetical game of you knowing this ahead of the event.......one way or another you will still wear a blue shirt. Be it by your free will or be it by some other means.

This is false. I have already shown you logically twice now. This is a modal fallacy.

(N)P
Therefore, P

is valid.

P
Therefore, (N)P

is invalid.

That's right. If a future event is fixed, then propositions about those events cannot be made false by anything within someone's power except that event itself which proposition is about. But determinism doesn't say the future is fixed. Fatalism says this. If something is fixed, that means it happens, or happened, necessarily. That Richard Nixon was president of the USA is true, and it is a fact of the matter that Nixon was president. So this fact can't be changed. But this a contingent fact, just like all facts are contingent facts--it could have been the case that Nixon was never president, but became a poet instead.

I agree. So?

I have not said this. You have. You are fallaciously calling fatalism something it most certainly is not. Fatalism is equivalent to future tense propositions falling under the law of bivalence.

Some people don't believe future tense propositions fall under bivalence,

and there may be some merit to the argument, but if you wish to maintain they do, then you have just made a valid argument for fatalism.

fatalism says that the future is fixed in the EXACT same way that the principle of bivalence says the future is fixed.

Neither one means anything happened necessarily. Just that they will happen.

Congratulations you just agreed to fatalism.

Fatalism need not say anything about necessity just as future tense propositions falling under the law of bivalence doesn't.

I think every proposition falls under the law of bivalence, past, present, and future tense. So what? I am not a fatalist. P is true does not ential P is necessarily true.

Then show it. I don't see it. You have fatalism and determinism backwards.

No! The principle of bivalence does NOT say the "future is fixed". It is not actually committed to P being true and Q being false. It just says P is true or false but not both. The POB is a purely logical principle about propositions, not a metaphysical principle about future events. It says nothing about the metaphysics of past, present, or future. You are making the POB say things it does not actually say.

False. "X is fated, and no one can do anything about that since X happens necessarily."

Wait. So now the principle of bivalence does not say the future is fixed? You are contradicting yourself.

And fatalism has everything to do with metaphysical necessity. You are deeply confused.

Fatalism need not say anything is necessarily true either. For some reason you can't see this. The POB is clearly fatalistic.

Fatalism is the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do. It may be argued for in various ways: by appeal to logical laws and metaphysical necessities; by appeal to the existence and nature of God; by appeal to causal determinism. When argued for in the first way, it is commonly called "Logical fatalism" (or, in some cases, "Metaphysical fatalism"); when argued for in the second way, it is commonly called "Theological fatalism". When argued for in the third way it is not now commonly referred to as "fatalism" at all, and such arguments will not be discussed here.

I am not arguing with this confusion anymore. Here is proof that you have misconstrued fatalism as determinism, and determinism as fatalism from the most trustworthy source SEP online:



Fatalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

They are wrong. You don't think I know what Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says the definition is? For some reason you think they can't be wrong....why?

If they said the world was flat would you believe that too?

this is nothing but an appeal to authority.

If they said the world was flat would you believe that too?

They are wrong. You don't think I know what Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says the definition is? For some reason you think they can't be wrong....why?

If they said the world was flat would you believe that too?

this is nothing but an appeal to authority.

I think I've given at least 2 good reasons, one of which I expounded on quite a bit, to show that fatalism can be true and not negate free will

You're aware that appealing to an authority is not always wrong, right? Justification for believing X can be an expert in a subject claiming X. Of course, that need not always be the case.



He shouldn't believe that, even if they said that. But not for the reasons you're probably thinking.

If you can't, which you clearly cannot, then your view is just hot air!

They are wrong.

I think I've given at least 2 good reasons, one of which I expounded on quite a bit, to show that fatalism can be true and not negate free will

Aristotle's workaround was to maintain that future tense proportions are neither true nor false....and that the POB did not apply to them.....do you believe this? Not according to what you said earlier but if you'd like to change your mind that would be find because at least you would be being consistent with your view on fatalism

No, You just don't pay attention to your own logical fallacies! What am I to do? And you are inventing principles which no philosopher holds today.

POB Says:

For all propopositions Px:

Ax (Px--> [(Tx or Fx) and ~(Tx and Fx)])

Now prove to me LOGICALLY that,

"Every future event is fixed" and "Fatalism is true" necessarily follows from POB.

If you can't, which you clearly cannot, then your view is just hot air!

Aristotle's argument shows otherwise in that article. You confuse POB with inevitability, which is a kind of metaphysical necessity to which POB does not subscribe. You are making it say things it does not. That's your own problem, not mine. And I disagree with you.

yes I'm very aware. I could be the one is wrong obviously. But it is my belief that they have created a definition of fatalism which necessarily negates free will which I don't see a need for. Especially when most would not conclude that the POB negates free will nor would most conclude that God's foreknowledge negates my free will

Haha, come on, how is he supposed to respond to that? You ask him to try to explain, but then immediately tell him he is incapable!

It's interesting how fast these debates get heated.

You must have a hearing problem. P does not logically imply Necessarily P.

What I think is that you are attempting to change the definition of fatalism to incorporate free will, so that your belief in God is not inconsistent with the rest of your beliefs. In other words, you could still believe in God's divine plan, but at the same time believe you are making your own choices.

Am I wrong?