The Fatal Paradox

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161379 wrote:

You agree that we can make choice, but then say we aren't free in doing so? Isn't that contradicting yourself?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;161381 wrote:

You agree that we can make choice, but then say we aren't free in doing so? Isn't that contradicting yourself?

Exactly. He doesn't even know what he is talking about. This is a continual issue with him, and he blames everyone else by calling them names for not understanding his obfuscation. I've reported his posts several times. I ask that someone gives him a warning, please. I'm tired of listening to this name-calling and play-ground bullying.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161382 wrote:

Exactly. He doesn't even know what he is talking about. This is a continual issue with him, and he blames everyone else by calling them names for not understanding his obfuscation. I've reported his posts several times. I ask that someone gives him a warning, please. I'm tired of listening to this name-calling and play-ground bullying.

I think there's a bit of a language barrier, and he probably means something different than what he is intending to mean.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;161381 wrote:

You agree that we can make choice, but then say we aren't free in doing so? Isn't that contradicting yourself?

If I offer you "tea or coffee?", this is a choice. If determinism is the case, then there is a fact about which you will choose even before I make the offer. Free will requires realisable alternatives, and that means that for free will to be the case, then there is no fact about whether you choose tea or you choose coffee, until you make the selection.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;161383 wrote:

I think there's a bit of a language barrier, and he probably means something different than what he is intending to mean.

I disagree. His language seems fine to me. Trying carrying on a discussion with him for some time, and you will notice the content of his posts deliberately degenerate into an elaborate obfuscation of the subject when he is asked to explain himself. Implied meanings have no room in philosophy, especially when you are asked to articulate better what you had in mind by saying this or that. He just doesn't think there are any rules in philosophy, so he thinks he has the liberty to say anything he wants that sounds "intellectually informative" to his ears, but is really not, in fact.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161388 wrote:

If I offer you "tea or coffee?", this is a choice. If determinism is the case, then there is a fact about which you will choose even before I make the offer. Free will requires realisable alternatives, and that means that for free will to be the case, then there is no fact about whether you choose tea or you choose coffee, until you make the selection.

But as noted, that there is a causal chain of events does not imply that those events are logically necessary. That there are causes for my making a choice, does not mean that I did not make a choice.

We're back to the compatibilist vs. incompatibilist debate.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;161390 wrote:

But as noted, that there is a causal chain of events does not imply that those events are logically necessary.

Logical necessity has nothing to do with the matter.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161391 wrote:

Logical necessity has nothing to do with the matter.

I just wanted to point out that because it is true that there are causes for my making a choice, that does not mean it is necessary that I make said choice. I have a choice, whether or not to make that choice Smile

But do you think anything else I wrote did have anything to do with the matter, or did you just want to point out the part which you think did not have to do with the matter? If just the latter, I don't have high hopes for this discussion.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;161392 wrote:

did you just want to point out the part which you think did not have to do with the matter?

I was explaining to you what it means to have a choice but no free will.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161393 wrote:

I was explaining to you what it means to have a choice but no free will.

Wait, explain that part again. Because as far as I understand it, having a choice is free will.

What is your understanding of "free will"?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;161394 wrote:

Wait, explain that part again. Because as far as I understand it, having a choice is free will.

What is your understanding of "free will"?

I've just explained it, post 304, if there's something you dont understand about that post, what is it?

@Extrain,

Extrain;161380 wrote:

Being doesn't grow in nothingness. Nothingness doesn't exist. So this doesn't even make sense to say it.

That's right. So to say the big bang came from nothingness or expanding in nothingness is a misnomer, and so it is not correct to say this about the Origin or the expansion of the universe. And?

Exactly. Are we talking passed eachother? It doesn't expand into nothingess. If space expanded "into nothingness," then nothing would be something. Contradiction. So it is false to say the universe is expanding into nothingness.

Your understanding of "expansion" in this instance as a containment metaphor, as if space were expanding "in" something, is deeply rudimentary. I don't even understand what "expanding into nothingness" means.

Hard determinism can make the case the future already exists so movement can be interpreted as a simulation towards a future that is already there...
On the contrary if the future is yet to really happen and is not a simulation, then we have to accept the problem were to space expands ? Into nothingness, once nothing is suppose to be outside space and time ??? Such seams to were I stand the problem to solve for those who are not hard determinists or fatalists...

I was provoked, miss quoted, and insulted on this regard and in many other issues... I expect that the direction off this forum acts accordingly !

No further !

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161395 wrote:

I've just explained it, post 304, if there's something you dont understand about that post, what is it?

The ability to make a choice is the ability to do otherwise than what one, in fact, did. If one cannot do otherwise, then one doesn't have the ability to make that choice. So having a choice is sufficient for free will because having a choice between A and B implies having alternative possibilities A and B to choose from, and if there are no alternative possibilities, but only one fixed event A, then it is not possible for him to choose B.

But why do you think there is already a fact of the matter about what someone would have chosen, before they have even chosen it? This just begs the question that the future is already fixed, which means it is necessary that someone does X.

---------- Post added 05-07-2010 at 04:34 PM ----------

Fil. Albuquerque;161399 wrote:

I explicitly said "expansion into nothingness" was a rudimentary metaphor YOU were working with, and so that it's best to drop it because it doesn't make any sense.

Second, the future is certainly just as real as the past, but the future and past are not simultaneous. So they don't "coexist" because "to coexist" implies they are both simultaneously present, or exist at the same time--which is false because it's a contradiction.

Third, there was no context. I can't read your mind. You are just adding things as we move along. Again, the misunderstanding is your own fault.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161400 wrote:

why do you think there is already a fact of the matter about what someone would have chosen, before they have even chosen it? This just begs the question that the future is already fixed, which means it is necessary that someone does X.

If determinism is the case, the state of the world at all times is globally specified by any arbitrarily selected state of the world, in conjunction with unchanging laws of nature. This is the basic contention of determinism, and it entails that all facts about all states of the world at all times, have and always will be facts. In short, it's a consequence of determinism there is a fact about which of, for example, tea or coffee, will be selected, before the selection is made.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161400 wrote:

The ability to make a choice is the ability to do otherwise than what one, in fact, did. If one cannot do otherwise, then one doesn't have the ability to make that choice. So having a choice is sufficient for free will because having a choice between A and B implies having alternative possibilities A and B to choose from, and if there are no alternative possibilities, but only one fixed event A, then it is not possible for him to choose B.

But why do you think there is already a fact of the matter about what someone would have chosen, before they have even chosen it? This just begs the question that the future is already fixed, which means it is necessary that someone does X.

---------- Post added 05-07-2010 at 04:34 PM ----------

I explicitly said "expansion into nothingness" was a rudimentary metaphor YOU were working with, and so that it's best to drop it because it doesn't make any sense.

Second, the future doesn't coexist with the past. That's a contradiction.

Third, there was no context. I can't read your mind. You are just adding things as we move along. Again, the misunderstanding is your own fault.

Regarding movement simulation in Time/Space:

I said it already in several other Threads and I can prove I said it, long before I even meet you !!!
You are wrong and unable to read !!!

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;161403 wrote:

If determinism is the case, the state of the world at all times is globally specified by any arbitrarily selected state of the world, in conjunction with unchanging laws of nature. This is the basic contention of determinism, and it entails that all facts about all states of the world at all times, have and always will be facts. In short, it's a consequence of determinism there is a fact about which of, for example, tea or coffee, will be selected, before the selection is made.

Yes, that's determinism. But that there are future facts of the matter doesn't entail the future is "fixed." If P then Q, P, therefore Q doesn't entail necessarily that Q. That would be a modal fallacy. Fatalism is not determinism. Causaly sufficiency is not the same thing as metaphysical necessity.

---------- Post added 05-07-2010 at 04:45 PM ----------

Fil. Albuquerque;161404 wrote:

Regarding movement simulation in Time/Space:

I said it already in several other Threads and I can prove I said it, long before I even meet you !!!
You are wrong and unable to read !!!

Oh, so you are blaming me for not reading posts I never had the chance to read? Lol. Get a grip on reality, man.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;161381 wrote:

You agree that we can make choice, but then say we aren't free in doing so? Isn't that contradicting yourself?

We are a necessary cause to will but not a sufficient one according to indeterminism once randomness plays a part in the process !!!

What is not to be understood in this ???

---------- Post added 05-07-2010 at 05:49 PM ----------

Extrain;161405 wrote:

Oh, so you are blaming me for not reading posts I never had the chance to read? Lol. Get a grip on reality, man.

@Extrain,

I got no feedback to my last post before this one so I'm just going to post it once more to see if anyone has any commentary.....ESPECIALLY those who espouse proposition bivalence for future tense propositions. Because it would seem to me that those who espouse proposition bivalence for future tense propositions would indeed be espousers of fatalism lest they have contradictory viewpoints

So here was the post:

It is my contention that hard determinism necessarily implies fatalism and NOT the other way around.

Let's look at the principle of bivalence for a second.

Suppose the proposition, you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow, is made.
Now, I think you maintain that that proposition necessarily has a value of either true or false today(before the event actually happens).
Let us suppose the value is true right now.
If it is true right now, then you will indeed wear a blue shirt tomorrow.
What's more, even if someone told you today that you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow, you will still wear a blue shirt tomorrow.
Having said that, does this negate your free will?
I would say no, it does not. But what it does do is imply that the future is set. Why? Because the proposition necessarily contained a value of true or false even before the actual event took place. And, according to the principle of bivalence, ALL propositions necessarily contain a value of either true or false, but not both and not neither; even future tense propositions. This implies that even knowing the value will not change your ability to make it wrong. Perhaps if you did want to not wear a blue shirt tomorrow someone will break into your house and force you to do so.....the point being, the proposition will still be true whether by your choice or whether against your will.

It is exactly similar to asking the question, if God knows what I'm going to do before I do it does that negate my free will? Again, I think you have argued, no, it does not.

So why on earth do you think that fatalism necessarily negates free will?

As I have said, fatalism, to me, is saying, Q will happen. It doesn't matter if it happens by choice, by randomness, or by physical necessity. It just will happen.

Thus, why I have claimed that hard-determinism implies fatalism while the reverse is not true. Fatalism does not imply hard determinism as fatalism can be just as compatible with free will as the principle of bivalence and God's foreknowledge can, IMO.

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161408 wrote:

I don't care. Until you actually show me a logical demonstration, your bragging is just hot air.

@Amperage,

In terms of free will itself, Leibniz believed that free choice in humans is brought about through the activity of the human intellect and the human will working in concert with one another. The intellect deliberates about alternatives and selects the one that it perceives to be the best of all things considered. The intellect then represents this alternative to the will as the one that is best to pursue. The will, which for Leibniz is a faculty characterized by "appetite for the good," then chooses that alternative which is represented to it as containing the most good.

Leibniz then believed there were two ways which one might exercise "control" over ones acts of will. First, one might be able to control what appears to ones self to be the best of all things considered. That is, one might control the process of deliberation. Second, one might be able to control the will's choosing that alternative which is presented to it by the intellect as representing the greatest good at that time.

Source: Leibniz on the Problem of Evil (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I personally think it is somewhat difficult to maintain a vision of free will without some sort of espousal of either a soul or dualism or some transcendent self which is not subject to causal determinism. I would then say Leibniz had the right idea and I tend to agree with his latter alternative. I would say that the will is presented with choices by the intellect and yet maintains the ability to veto the intellect.

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