Extrain has accepted that an agent can not realise the possibility of not being asleep when it is true that that agent is asleep.

Are you suggesting that I can realise a physical impossibility?

Obviously I can only realise a possibility that is physically possible and equally obviously I can not realise all physical possibilities.

Sure it does:
1) in a determined world, there is a true statement describing exactly one possible evolution of the state of the world.

2) from 1 it follows that the set of courses of action from which an agent can realise a choice contains exactly one element

3) free will requires that the set of actions from which an agent can realise a choice contains at least two elements
4) therefore, in a determined world there is no free will.

Extrain has accepted that an agent can not realise the possibility of not being asleep when it is true that that agent is asleep.

If that means that A cannot be both asleep and awake, who would not accept that? And what has that to do with the price of eggs?

Not at all. Accelerating to speeds greater than the velocity of light is physically impossible.

So what?

This is just an infinite conjunction of all true propositions about the world past, present, and future. This is not a particularly a determinst claim.



No, this doesn't logically follow from 1. A set of all true propositions about the state of the world does not have to be finite. You just assume that it has to be, so that the all propositions about what an agent could have done are false because you think the only true propositions are those which describe what, in fact, actually happens.

What??? I never said this. You say this! That's exactly what I have been arguing against. Pay attention to what I write.

FYI, I said exactly what you said Ken. I didn't express what you just said, using U's words. U is putting words into my mouth.

ughaibu;161556 wrote:

How do I realise the possibility of being awake at the time during which it is true that I'm asleep?

That's just a silly question. It is like asking "how can I not be chopping wood when I am chopping wood"? If you are chopping wood, then you are chopping wood, you are not not chopping wood.

Yes, and is it realisable?So realisable possibilities are a proper subset of physical possibilities.

Whether or not it is particularly a determinist claim is irrelevant, because it is in any case a claim of determinism.

What matters for free will is actual states of the world,

if determinism is the case, then there is only one true statement describing the state of the world at any time.

If an agent can not realise a possibility, ie if that possibility is only logical or physical, then that agent does not have free will regarding that possibility, by definition.

Again, so what?

No it isn't. Determinism claims an inital set of conditions and the laws of nature entails a set future state of affairs.

Why? You just assume this to make your case against free will. You are begging the question. What matters for free will are possible and contingent states of affairs.

So, you expressed doubt that realisable possibilities are a proper subset of physical possibilities.

Wrong. Determinism is the claim that given the state of the world at any arbitrarily selected time, the state of the world at all other times is exactly and globally specified by the given state in conjunction with unchanging laws of nature.

Rubbish. It's logically possible for me to be in London, now, and if in London, it's physically possible for me to kiss my mother, do you seriously maintain that this satisfies the conditions for an observer to state that I'm refraining from kissing my mother as a matter of free will?

There is no such distinction within physical possibility.

Get a clue.

It is not only logically possible to be in London, it is physically possible to be in London. Nothing stops you from flying to London.

Of course there is. It is physically possible for me to swim but I do not presently have that realisable possibility, and if you think that realisability is a questionable notion, what the hell has taken you so long to pick up on it?Your posts would be a lot less irksome if your abilities came within a fraction of your self assessment.So what? I'm not in London, I'm in Kanazawa, so kissing my mother is not within my option set, it is not a realisable possibility.

Of course there is. It is physically possible for me to swim but I do not presently have that realisable possibility, and if you think that realisability is a questionable notion, what the hell has taken you so long to pick up on it?Your posts would be a lot less irksome if your abilities came within a fraction of your self assessment.So what? I'm not in London, I'm in Kanazawa, so kissing my mother is not within my option set, it is not a realisable possibility.

I hate to butt in, but it appears that you are including practicality and maybe time into your assessment of realisability.
Of course it may be impractical to fly to London to kiss your mother, and will of course require time. But to say it is not a realisable possibility seems wrong.

I hate to butt in, but it appears that you are including practicality and maybe time into your assessment of realisability.
Of course it may be impractical to fly to London to kiss your mother, and will of course require time. But to say it is not a realisable possibility seems wrong.

But argue that, is to argue from the premise that necessarily every future contingent proposition is true or false, to the conclusion that every future contingent is necessarily true, or is necessarily false. But that argument is fallacious because it commits the modal fallacy. Case closed. How many times need this be pointed out?

Why would you think that? the POB clearly states the first without stating the latter. Exactly as fatalism. You yourself believe in the POB for future tense propositions so you explain it to me.

No, it is not a fair question. Why should it be? Not unless you have some good reason to think that it should have been otherwise. After all, if it had been otherwise, then you would have asked the very same question. There is, of course, always some cause that a contingent truth is true, and not false (or so I believe, anyway) but that does not mean that what is contingently true should have been false, and that it is not false needs some special explanation; an explanation other than the ordinary explanation which is to give the cause that what is true, is true. Why what is true is not false has a cause; not a plot.

But, although your question embodies an error, it is a good error to make, since it teaches us something important when we understand why it is an error.

Kissing my mother is not in my option set because I'm not in London, I would need to make and enact the decision to go to London, to bring it within an option set.

Exactly. It is physically possible to go to London to make it a realisable option for you.

It doesn't matter. He can still fly to London to kiss his mother. Do you deny that?

Of course not. But the fact, he does not do it has a cause, is very compelling to make think on it...