You have what's called a "growing block theory" about all future events. I happen to sympathize with that view. But this view still holds that all future events are determined by the past: these future events just haven't happened yet, so they don't exist. But that doesn't entail future events are uncaused. They are caused when a future event becomes present.

But he didn't say that future events are uncaused. He said that future events mustn't happen the way they will.

But he thinks this is consistent with determinism. It is not. So whatever his view is, it is inconsistent.

Sorry for butting in here, I know it can be annoying. I did read some of your conversation with him but not the entirety.

I must ask, what is that thing that he thinks is consistent with determinism and which you think is not?

Determinism is the doctrine that all macro-events have strict antecedent causes.

No event that I (or anyone else) has ever observed didn't have a cause.

Out of curiosity, do remember by chance where you came across this molecular interference produced in experiments?

You, on the other hand, think that determinism tells us something about the future. I know you think this because you said the underlined: "Facts of the past together in conjunction with the laws of nature entail every truth about the future."

Determinism does not speak to, let alone guarantee, what is to come at all. We may take what we know of determinism and couple it with something else and draw conclusions about future events, but determinism itself is strictly a looking back principle that in essence is limited only to the antecedent causes of events, be those of past, present, or future events.

What is a "cause" and how do you spot them?

...and the problem is expansion towards what, nothingness ?
How can Space expand into nothingness ???

...What I actually said:Can you get a better more elegant description of how things to become are not to be transcendent to each other ? and I mean transcendent not transcendental ...duh !

If I fire a gun at you then it may or may not kill you but that doesn't seem to be a problem for moral culpability. I still could have predicted that it would probably kill you. Therefore we don't require that people actually cause their bad actions, only that they could have predicted the likely consequences of them. It's the thought that counts.

If I fire a gun at you then it may or may not kill you but that doesn't seem to be a problem for moral culpability. I still could have predicted that it would probably kill you. Therefore we don't require that people actually cause their bad actions, only that they could have predicted the likely consequences of them. It's the thought that counts.

Well, legally there are different consequences for attempted murder and murder, as you know.

Right, legally, but morally? It's hard to see how your failure to execute your misdeed is somehow more morally right than if you had succeeded.

Ah, let me see here.

I don't believe fast is arguing what you think he is arguing. I believe fast's point was simply that future events aren't logically necessary. And I'm not sure you even disagree with him. I think his confusion came with you said, "Facts of the past together in conjunction with the laws of nature entail every truth about the future". What I think you meant was that future events are causually determined (I don't like this word, but hey, we are talking about determinism here!) by past events - which of course makes sense; it's a chain of events. However, fast interpreted this as future events are logically necessitated - that is, they must happen the way they will.

But there is a difference between something being part of a chain of events, and something being logically necessary. And, so, I'm not sure you and fast are even in disagreement.

Well, legally there are different consequences for attempted murder and murder, as you know.



The freedom is in the choice to do said thing. We aren't infallible and so cannot say with absolute certainty that it will happen.

But what does that matter?

But if my mental choosing does not result in a correlation with the effect, even my acting will not necessarily correspond to what I meant...were is the freedom even to will straight ?

The mental choosing is the free will. That's it. It's not any more complicated than that.

It happening is an entirely different matter. The best we can do is choose to do something (since we have free will), and then act it out. If I choose to go to the grocery store, but then get hit by a car on the way there, I still demonstrated I had free will. However, things just didn't end up as I had planned.

I think this is a nonsensical view. If every event has to have a cause and causes are events then every event's causes need a cause and so forth. This leads to an infinite regress of causes. Of course, some people may say "so what". But the problem is that each of these causes rests on, depends on, yet another cause. It's hard to see how, individually, any of these causes can come into to existence when their existence rests on yet another cause which falls under the same argument.