Of course, we could simply say (from a realist perspective) that some things are true, and that if any such things are justifiably believed, then they are known. This is OK as far as it goes, but it does not get us very far. What is the use of saying that we (perhaps) actually know some things, if we are not aware of the extent (if any) of our knowledge?

But then there is a third tier, consisting of things that we "know" in the everyday sense of the word, but where error is a serious possibility. This corresponds to the "mediated/inferential" category mentioned earlier - things such as our "knowledge" that a new house we saw yesterday is still there. Should we include this third tier in the realm of genuine knowledge?

Kennethamy - When I said "what is known cannot be false", I meant it in sense 1 - definitely not in sense 2. Sorry for the ambiguity.

With that point cleared up, I would draw your attention to the following part of my previous post:



My post concerned the practical difficulties of using the word "know" where we think we probably know but are not quite sure. As Zetherin said earlier, "it just seems too convenient, or not well thought out". I was trying to address this problem. I identified three categories or 'tiers' of "knowledge": (1) beyond all doubt; (2) beyond 'Cartesian' doubt; and (3) beyond practical doubt. See that post for further details.

Either I know or I do not know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Whether I am sure I know or not is not relevant to that. I don't have to be sure that I know to know. What problem arises from not being sure that one knows? Isn't the issue just whether or not one knows? That is, I don't think I see what is the problem. I may, in the same way think I know that some substance is gold. But I am not sure. Now what?

What problem arises from not being sure that one knows?

I hope I didn't say that knowledge was like a triangle, since I have no idea what that would mean. It sounds like something Yoda would say.

... I think that for Zeth and ACB, that is precisely the problem ... that is, of what practical value is a concept of knowledge that you can't be sure of? ... and again, a possible answer seems to be grounded in whether you look at knowledge as an individual phenomenon or as a cultural phenomenon ... knowledge as a cultural phenomenon has practical value because the "body of certainty" is so small and the "body of belief" is so large and variable - having a "body of knowledge" to differentiate between the levels of justification of belief within a culture has its uses ... (although you could probably achieve the same effect by having a "body of justified belief" and leaving the "can't be sure of" thing to discussions of truth - but I think the more naive of the scientists would start squawking if you tried to shine a light on the fact that science is justified belief ) ...

---------- Post added 11-11-2009 at 07:34 PM ----------



... in a round about way, I'm afraid you did: "A belief cannot be knowledge unless that belief is true, just as nothing can be a triangle unless it has three angles." ... but I guess it's better to sound like Yoda-in-a-round-about-way than to sound straight up like Yoda ... I don't even want to know what Star Wars character I sound like! ...

Well, if I think I know that some substance is gold, but I am not sure, that means I believe that it is probably gold. But consider this:

If I:
(A1) believe a substance is gold, and
(A2) my belief is justified, and
(A3) it actually is gold,
then (A4) I know it is gold.

Now let's include the element of uncertainty in the belief. If I:
(B1) believe a substance is probably gold, and
(B2) my belief is justified, and
(B3)******
then (B4)******

Fill in B3 and B4, on the analogy of A3 and A4. What should B3 say? "It actually is gold"? But then it does not correspond properly to B1, as it omits the "probably". How about "it actually is probably gold"? But that doesn't seem to make sense, as it mixes up ontology ("actually") with epistemology ("probably"). A similar problem arises with B4 ("I know it is probably gold"?).

My main point is this: If we believe that something is probably the case, how can we apply the 'T' part of JTB to that? Can it be true that something is probably the case?

If I am talking nonsense, just ignore me..... :unsure:

It seems to me that knowing can be of practical value as long as one believes he knows. Knowing that he knows adds nothing to it. Anyway, the practical value of knowing is a different issue that concerns the pragmatics of knowing, not the semantics of knowing.

... perhaps if I rephrase things this way: understanding that justified beliefs are more practical than unjustified beliefs has value ... what practical value does "truth" add over and above that? ... that is, can you tell the difference between a justified belief and a justified true belief? ... (and if so, why isn't knowledge just truth?) ...

Of course I can tell the difference. I once believed that Rio was the capital of Brazil because it had been for a long time, and that is what I learned in school. I had missed that the capital had been changed to Brazileira in the middle of the jungle. So, I had a justified belief which was false, and not true.

Knowledge is not just truth because there a a lot of true propositions that I do no know are true.

... to restate that last sentence, you know now that what you thought you knew you in fact did not know ... that is, you currently have a justified true belief that your previously held justified true belief was mistaken ... but are you certain that your current justified true belief isn't also mistaken? - and if not, what has "truth" added to this picture that could not be said more simply as "you currently have a justified belief that your previously held justified belief was mistaken"? ...



... fair enough - how 'bout this then: if there truly is a discernible difference between a justified belief and a justified true belief, then why isn't knowledge simply the truth that you are aware of? ...

What truth adds to justified belief is that the true justified belief is true, but only justified beliefs may also be false.

Of course, I could be aware of a truth, but not know that the trurh was a truth. After all, when I believe something is a truth, I am aware of that truth.

... and that is indeed the theoretic distinction ... the question is, is it nothing more than a theoretic distinction? ... that is, can one only ponder this theoretic distinction abstractly and never actually be able to practically apply it? ...



... actually, I was using "aware of" precisely in contrast to "believe in" or "know" - I did not intend for them to be synonymous ... anyhoo, the point I was shooting for is that if there is a distinguishable difference between justified belief and justified true belief, that difference is truth ... and if truth itself cannot be ascertained (but only justifiably believed), then for all practical purposes there is no distinguishable difference between justified belief and justified true belief - for as you remarked, one does not hold a justified belief unless they also believe it to be true ...

Don't you think it is practically better to have a justified true belief than to have a justified false belief.

But, what would it be to "ascertain" truth over and above having good reason to think what you belief is true? The Rationalists thought that there is a kind of illumination that comes with truth. Spinoza wrote that "truth is its own mark". But that is because they thought that it was possible to by-pass evidence. They thought we could have what has been called, "angelic knowledge". What Descartes called, "a clear and distinct idea". In other words, that knowing was a purely mental state, so that when one knew, one would know that one knew, just as when one was in pain, one would know that one was in pain. That is the point of the question of this thread.

... of course! ... and if the theoretic distinction could be practically applied, I would be able to ascertain the difference! ...



... ah - that point flew right over my head because I'm not nearly as well-read on the open issues of epistemology as you ... so it sounds like what you are asking is if there is such a thing a "direct access" to (communion with?) truth, yes? ...

But, what would it be to "ascertain" truth over and above having good reason to think what you belief is true? The Rationalists thought that there is a kind of illumination that comes with truth. Spinoza wrote that "truth is its own mark". But that is because they thought that it was possible to by-pass evidence. They thought we could have what has been called, "angelic knowledge". What Descartes called, "a clear and distinct idea". In other words, that knowing was a purely mental state, so that when one knew, one would know that one knew, just as when one was in pain, one would know that one was in pain. That is the point of the question of this thread.

And it seems to me that is precisely the way many of the greatest scientific advances have been made as well, by single individuals sitting in a room, conducting thought experiments, and hitting upon an idea which became "angelic,certain or luminous knowledge". Most great ideas are simple, elegant and profound in art, music and even in science. In science these ideas are latter confirmed by empirical observation and predictive power but in their origin they are the result of illuminated reason and the insight of individuals. "imagination is more important than knowledge" Einstein.

Perhaps. But unless there is evidence for it (justification) it isn't knowledge. How knowledge is discovered is one thing, but how it is confirmed as knowledge is quite a different thing.

What was the status of the theory between presentation and confirmation?
Was it a truth that had been discovered but not confirmed?
Truth but not yet knowledge?
It seems to me it depends on how one defines and uses the terms?

When I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, am I saying that something that is going on in my mind, or that something is going on in Ecuador? Just what am I saying?