... thanks for the clarification ..



... given that you're following the traditional definition of knowledge as a belief that is both justified and true, this probably depends to a great deal upon which theory of truth you subscribe to - correspondence, coherence, or pragmatist (the latter two of which essentially cause knowledge to be simply justified belief ) ...



... assuming you're into the correspondence theory of truth (which I imagine Ken is), then you can actually use coherence (a belief fits into a coherent system of beliefs) and/or pragmatist (the deployment of a belief results in positive action) theories of truth as means for justification ...



... if a belief can only be shown to be unjustified in the presence of new evidence, and that evidence can only be accessed through new means (whether instrumental or ideological), then I don't think it can be said that those who did not have access to that evidence nor means were unjustified in their belief ...

My view is as follows:

1. In the correspondence theory of truth, knowledge is justified true belief. I think this theory is right.

2. In the coherence and pragmatist theories of truth, knowledge is simply justified belief. I think these theories are wrong.

3. The coherence or pragmatist theories of justification can be combined with the correspondence theory of truth. And I think they should.

4. Incidentally, are coherence and pragmatism two sides of the same coin? If a belief "works", must it cohere with other beliefs, and vice versa?

5. The reason I think coherence and pragmatist theories of truth are wrong is that, given a finite amount of evidence, there will always be more than one possible state of affairs that (a) coheres with the existing evidence, and (b) works. (All theories are 'underdetermined'.) This would result in the co-existence of contradictory truths. Only the correspondence theory can avoid this.

I don't think that is true. You can have coherence theory of justification and a correspondence theory of truth.

Isn't this inconsistent with what you just wrote in your previous comment?

But why not? Couldn't that former evidence been gathered by illegitimate methods. For example thinking that what is dreamed is evidence, or what is "seen" in the entrails of a bat?

4. Incidentally, are coherence and pragmatism two sides of the same coin? If a belief "works", must it cohere with other beliefs, and vice versa?

5. The reason I think coherence and pragmatist theories of truth are wrong is that, given a finite amount of evidence, there will always be more than one possible state of affairs that (a) coheres with the existing evidence, and (b) works. (All theories are 'underdetermined'.) This would result in the co-existence of contradictory truths. Only the correspondence theory can avoid this.

When I claim to know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, am I saying that something that is going on in my mind, or that something is going on in Ecuador?

I think you are not distinguishing between coherence theories of justification, and coherence theories of truth. Are you mixing them? up.They are quite different. And they could both go under the rubric of "coherence theories of knowledge".

here, I'm talking about selecting the correspondence theory of truth as the "correct" theory ... in which case, the other two theories are "incorrect" theories, but can still be applied as justification in the JTB model of knowledge ...

... I'm not sure that simply because there are (broadly speaking) three theories of truth means that it is coherent to try to combine them into a single theory of truth - as I showed before, that can quickly lead to an incoherent theory ...



... nope - here, I'm talking about selecting the correspondence theory of truth as the "correct" theory ... in which case, the other two theories are "incorrect" theories, but can still be applied as justification in the JTB model of knowledge ...



... illegitimate according to whom? ...

---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 09:13 AM ----------



... that the deployment of two independent beliefs both result in positive action does not imply that the two beliefs are coherent ... I think that if it were practically possible to examine all of our individual beliefs for coherency with one another, we would find that many of our beliefs are not coherent with one another (and are thus merely pragmatic) ...



... but if we are to adhere to the correspondence theory of truth, then we also need to accept the consequences:

a. You cannot know what you know.
b. Through advances in our belief systems regarding the nature of the world, we have demonstrated that no belief systems before ours count as knowledge (i.e., our ancestors knew nothing about the natural world).
c. Through future advances in belief systems regarding the nature of the world, it will be demonstrated that our current belief systems do not count as knowledge (i.e., we know nothing about the natural world).
d. That cultural and personal truths are always changing means that our past and current cultural and personal belief systems do not count as knowledge (i.e., we know nothing about ourselves).

... so in effect, it would appear that the only thing that the JTB model of knowledge (as grounded in the correspondence theory of truth) shows us is that nobody knows anything ... the only way I can see to try to salvage anything out of this is to add a temporal dimension to the model - that is, knowledge is a justified belief that is held at the same time that the belief is also true ... but this leads to the non-intuitive situation where one and the same justified belief can be at once both knowledge (the belief was true yesterday) and not knowledge (the belief is false today) ... also note that this only salvages things for truths that are subject to change ...

I didn't say we could combine the theories of truth. I said that the coherence and pragmatic theory are wrong. I don't understand what you mean by "can still be applied as justification". Justification is not truth.

We always know what we know. You must mean that we do not know that we know. And we do know that we knew. If I believe I know that Lincoln was assassinated, and then look it up and discover that he was assassinated, then I know that I knew he was assassinated.

... in the JTB model, that you looked it up and read that Lincoln was assassinated is simply justification for believing that Lincoln was assassinated ... that only covers the JB part of the model - to know what you know, you still need to establish the truth ... and to establish the truth you need to have direct access to it - you would have had to have been there and witnessed the event (and even then, can you trust your senses to deliver the truth undistorted? can you trust that you weren't hallucinating?) ... so since you do not have direct access to historical events, you cannot establish their truth ... therefore, under the JTB model of knowledge, for all things historical (and a whole lot more), you cannot know what you know ...

Kennethamy may be referring to the distinction between knowing beyond a reasonable doubt and knowing beyond all doubt.

Even without having been there, we can know beyond a reasonable doubt that Lincoln was assassinated (of course, the 'reason' here would be based on the justification, I think). And, so, when we say "I know Lincoln was assassinated", this is implied. It should never be assumed that we are speaking of absolute certainty.

... and if "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the criteria for knowledge, isn't that exactly the same as saying that knowledge is simply justified belief? ...

... the JTB model has three parts: justification, belief, and truth ... that you cannot use the coherency of a set of beliefs to establish truth does not mean that you cannot use the coherency of a set of beliefs to establish justification ... that's all we're saying ...



... in the JTB model, that you looked it up and read that Lincoln was assassinated is simply justification for believing that Lincoln was assassinated ... that only covers the JB part of the model - to know what you know, you still need to establish the truth ... and to establish the truth you need to have direct access to it - you would have had to have been there and witnessed the event (and even then, can you trust your senses to deliver the truth undistorted? can you trust that you weren't hallucinating?) ... so since you do not have direct access to historical events, you cannot establish their truth ... therefore, under the JTB model of knowledge, for all things historical (and a whole lot more), you cannot know what you know ...

This is where I become confused: Access to truth.

But is it right to argue (as you seem to be doing) that:

1. I can know only if I have direct access to the truth.
2. I can have direct access to the truth only if the truth concerns the contents of my own mind.
3. But knowing does not concern only the contents of my own mind.
4. Thus I cannot know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador (or that Lincoln was assassinated". ?

Why cannot we have inferential knowledge as well as direct knowledge? Or, inferential access to the truth as well as direct access to the truth?

I think part of the problem may be that in the case of direct knowledge of our mental states like the sensation of pain, our knowledge seems to be incorrigible. We cannot be mistaken (whether that is true is a different question). So that we think that only if we cannot be mistaken, can we "really" know what we claim to know. But that means that absolute certainty, the impossibility of error, is a necessary criterion of knowledge. And, is that true? As I pointed out earlier, for truth to be a necessary condition of knowing, we know only if we are not mistaken. But that does not mean that we know only if it is impossible for us to be mistaken. And that is an important distinction between the actuality of mistake, and the impossibility of mistaken. If only the inactuality of mistake is required for knowledge, then we do not require direct access to the truth. But if the impossibility of mistake is required, then, of course, direct access is required to the truth. But what is the argument for the view that certainty, or the impossibility of error is required for knowledge? There is no such good argument that I know of.

...
---------- Post added 11-09-2009 at 12:10 PM ----------



... and that is a nice criticism of the definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" ... also, note that I am not arguing for a definition of knowledge as "justified true belief" - I am simply following the definition to its logical conclusions, as you have just done, and found it wanting ...

I don't think I found it wanting. What I found is that there is no good argument for certainty being a necessary condition of knowledge, nor that our knowledge of our own mental states need be a model of all knowledge. I know that you are not arguing for the JTB model. But I am, and I see no good objection to it. And, I am not clear just what your objection is. But consider this: suppose that certainty were a necessary condition of knowledge, and suppose "direct access" to truth were a necessary condition of knowledge as you seem to be arguing. Then there could be no scientific knowledge, We, then, would not know, as we believe we do know that water is H20, nor that Mars is the fourth planet. And we would not know more today than we did 100 years ago, since most of what we know today is the result of science. Have you an answer to that objection?

But consider this: suppose that certainty were a necessary condition of knowledge, and suppose "direct access" to truth were a necessary condition of knowledge as you seem to be arguing.

Then there could be no scientific knowledge, We, then, would not know, as we believe we do know that water is H20, nor that Mars is the fourth planet. And we would not know more today than we did 100 years ago, since most of what we know today is the result of science. Have you an answer to that objection?

Could it be that all of our advancements are held together by strings of justifications, rather than knowledge?

... that's an interesting question: can there really be such a thing as a "body of knowledge", or just a "body of tentative knowledge"? ...

I just don't know if any of this has to do with knowledge, or if even knowledge exists. Is knowledge an idealistic notion? Should we revise this notion - have we matured, and come to grips with uncertainty, as a species? Tentative knowledge seems a bit contradictory. We're still trying to keep the word "knowledge" in the mix, because, I think, it gives us some certainty, and we fear not having it.

... and if "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the criteria for knowledge, isn't that exactly the same as saying that knowledge is simply justified belief? ...

3. If our present beliefs are justified in the light of current human understanding, we are entitled to call them knowledge. If future discoveries show that they were false, then we (or posterity) should deny that they were really knowledge. But if we or posterity find them still true beyond reasonable doubt, we/they should maintain the claim that they were knowledge.