... unfortunately, since we know that we do not have any access to "truth" to any great degree with the exception of what we agree to be cultural truths ("Quito is the capital of Ecuador") or have invented on our own, and since even those latter two are always in flux, this means we will never know what we know with the exception of these three things: 1) that we don't have access to the truths we have not invented, 2) the truths that have been invented as a culture are not under our full control, and 3) we can always change our mind about personal truths, thus downgrading any previous knowledge to mere belief ... (and note that these three things are all mental events) ... so let me ask you this: is this suitable as a theory of knowledge? as an epistemology? that beyond these three things, "knowledge" can be here one moment and gone the next even if nothing in our head has changed? ...

Reality is composed of events.
All of "experience" is composed of "mental events"

I don't know what you mean by "access to the truth". I have the same access to the truth that Mars is the fourth planet that I have to the truth that Quito is the capital of Ecuador.

... you only have access to what your human senses can sense and what your human mind can conceptualize - can that ever be "truth"? ... at any rate, if all there is to epistemology is that the only things we can know we know is that we can't know what we know, and that any old belief no matter how unjustified counts as "knowledge" if it just so happens to be true (but again, we can never know), then I find it very uninteresting ... it seems to me to be much more productive to investigate the process of justifying beliefs ... but that's just me ...

Skepticism results from the confusion of knowledge with certainty.

When this thread started I thought I believed that knowing is a mental event, but now I don't know anymore.

So, what is supposed to follow from that?

As I see it, the situation is as follows:

1. We only know something if our belief in it is both justified and true.

2. We can never be certain that any empirical belief is true; hence we can never be certain that we know something.

3. For a realist, there are truths independent of our minds. If any of these truths actually accord with our beliefs, then the beliefs in question (if justified) constitute knowledge. This is so by definition: truth + justification = knowledge. Certainty, or lack of it, is a separate issue. (Similarly, I may not be certain that X is a male sibling, but if he is, then he is definitely a brother, because male + sibling = brother.)

4. So we can never have any guarantee of knowledge, but we can still (as a matter of fact, from an outside perspective) actually have knowledge.

5. Arguably, although we cannot be certain, we can in some cases 'know that we know' beyond reasonable doubt.

That "knowing" must be a "mental event"?

When this thread started I thought I believed that knowing is a mental event, but now I don't know anymore.

1. We only know something if our belief in it is both justified and true.

5. Arguably, although we cannot be certain, we can in some cases 'know that we know' beyond reasonable doubt.

... there are two definitions of "know" here ... #1. knowledge is justified belief that corresponds to truth, and #5. knowledge is simply justified belief (aka "beyond a reasonable doubt") ... does it make sense for a theory of knowledge to allow two distinct definitions of knowledge? ...

Not if they are incompatible.

If knowledge were only JB then atheists and theists would both be right, since theists would know God existed, and atheists would know that God did not exist. And, so it would be known both that God exists, and that God does not exist. And that is a contradiction.

... I think you meant to say "Not if they are not incompatible." ...



... but is a theory of knowing simply a theory of being right, or should it rather be a theory of how people come to develop and justify beliefs, right or wrong? ... at any rate, here's how the two definitions are incompatible:

An atheist and a theist both have their justifications for knowing what they know - so by #5, both know what they know ... however, by #1, only one of them can be right about the existence/nonexistence of God, and so only one of them really knows what it is that they know that they know ... as this is logically incoherent, the two definitions are incompatible.

Why should the fact that both sides have justification for what they claim to know (to say that they know what they claim to know is to beg the question) mean that they know they know? Obviously they cannot both known they know when they claim to know incompatible propositions.

... there are two definitions of "know" here ... #1. knowledge is justified belief that corresponds to truth, and #5. knowledge is simply justified belief (aka "beyond a reasonable doubt") ... does it make sense for a theory of knowledge to allow two distinct definitions of knowledge? ...

I maintain that knowledge is justified true belief. My points #1 and #5 concern two distinct matters. Point #1 relates to whether, as an objective fact, we actually know some particular thing, e.g. that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Point #5 relates to whether we should be confident that we know anything at all. Whether something is actually true is a separate matter from whether we can be certain (or almost certain) that it is true.

Perhaps I should have said in #5 "be confident that we know" rather than "know that we know". (I did put the latter in quotes!)

However, I would like to explore further the question of justification. When we say that a belief is justified, are we simply talking about basic empirical data? (E.g. I have good reason to believe that Quito is the capital, because I have read and heard so on many occasions.) Or must we cast our net wider, and question our whole belief system? Must we consider the possibility that some future scientific or philosophical development will completely alter our worldview?

So I have the following questions:

1. What exactly does it mean to say that a belief is justified?

2. Can we ever say, in the light of new evidence, that a past belief was not really justified although we thought it was at the time?

Perhaps I should have said in #5 "be confident that we know" rather than "know that we know". (I did put the latter in quotes!)

However, I would like to explore further the question of justification. When we say that a belief is justified, are we simply talking about basic empirical data? (E.g. I have good reason to believe that Quito is the capital, because I have read and heard so on many occasions.) Or must we cast our net wider, and question our whole belief system? Must we consider the possibility that some future scientific or philosophical development will completely alter our worldview?

1. What exactly does it mean to say that a belief is justified?

2. Can we ever say, in the light of new evidence, that a past belief was not really justified although we thought it was at the time?