Is knowing a mental event?

@kennethamy,

Correspondence implies an objective world. It's a natural and useful paradigm, this mirror of nature. But if we want to be sticklers, we can describe this "objective world" as just one of our most important mental-models, and one that, as far as details go, we disagree on.

The consensus that such an objective world exists is very strong. So we treat it like an axiom. So the mirror of nature paradigm becomes unconscious and automatic. It sounds strange to us for such an obvious "truth" to be described as founded upon consensus. Great thinkers only become known as great thinkers as their novel metaphors/mental-models become assimilated by such a consensus.

"Knowledge as justified belief " sounds pretty good to me. What does "truth" refer to if not to consensus and justification.

Note: a person can describe a belief as justified despite a lack of consensus. And this is the source of "progress."

Any thoughts?

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107371 wrote:

Correspondence implies an objective world. It's natural and useful paradigm, this mirror of nature. But if we want to be sticklers, we can describe this "objective world" as just one of our most important mental-models, and one that, as far as details go, we disagree on.

The consensus that such an objective world exists is very strong. So we treat it like an axiom. So the mirror of nature paradigm becomes unconscious and automatic. It sounds strange to us for such an obvious "truth" to be described as founded upon consensus. Great thinkers only become known as great thinkers as their novel metaphors/mental-models become assimilated by such a consensus.

"Knowledge as justified belief " sounds pretty good to me. What does "truth" refer to if not to consensus and justification.

Note: a person can describe a belief as justified despite a lack of consensus. And this is the source of "progress."

Any thoughts?

Since justified belief may be false, and knowledge has to be true, justified belief cannot be knowledge. A's belief that God exists may be justified, and B's belief that God does not exist may be justified. But both A and B cannot know what they think they know. Therefore, justified belief is not knowledge.

@kennethamy,

I was offering a personal definition of the word "knowledge." When I say "I know," I imply that I have a justified belief that so and so "is the case."

How would you define "knowledge"?

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107374 wrote:

I was offering a personal definition of the word "knowledge." When I say "I know," I imply that I have a justified belief that so and so "is the case."

Certainly not so that I could know something that was false. I doubt whether anyone would use the term in that way. A necessary condition of knowledge is truth. So, for A to know that p is true implies that A's belief is adequately justified; and it is true. So, necessary conditions for A knows that p is true are that: A believes p is true; A's belief is adequately justified; and p is true. (where p is some proposition). So, true justified belief would be necessary conditions of knowing. But there is considerable question whether they are sufficient conditions of knowing. Therefore, since a definition of knowing would consist of both necessary and sufficient conditions, I don't know what would be a true definition of "knowing". But I am quite sure that TJB are necessary conditions of knowing. That is, it is impossible to know what is false. By the way, since words are public, I don't think a private definition of any word is worth very much. That is the Humpty-Dumpty theory of the meaning of terms. They mean exactly what he wants them to mean, "neither more nor less". And for that, he "pays them extra". (Alice Through the Looking Glass)

As Wittgenstein said, if "know" has a meaning, it is not a super-meaning. It is a humble meaning, like that of "chair", "table", and, "lamp". The fact that philosophers happen to be interested in that term, does not transform it into a super-term.

@kennethamy,

"Truth" is often used as a noun. For instance: "tell me the truth." Are we really in disagreement here?

I don't see how "truth" is necessary in the definition of "knowledge." If we think a person is silly on an issue, we say he knows nothing about it. Because we think his beliefs are not justified. The weight is now on "justified", and justification (for me) ties back into persuasion and consensus. We must convince other humans that our beliefs are justified, unless of course we align ourselves with consensus.

I'm a fan of Wittgenstein, especially his concept of language games. I am persuaded by his later more holistic view of language.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107381 wrote:

"Truth" is often used as a noun. For instance: "tell me the truth." Are we really in disagreement here?

I don't see how "truth" is necessary in the definition of "knowledge." If we think a person is silly on an issue, we say he knows nothing about it. Because we think his beliefs are not justified. The weight is now on "justified", and justification (for tie) ties back into persuasion and consensus. We must convince other humans that our beliefs are justified, unless of course we align ourselves with consensus.

Because if someone say that he knows that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador, we tell him he knows no such thing, since Quito is the capital of Ecuador. So how could he possibly know that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador when it is not?

@kennethamy,

How do you know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? Did you find the consensus on the matter persuasive? And therefore you think a contrary belief is not justified?

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107383 wrote:

How do you know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? Did you find the consensus on the matter persuasive? And therefore you think a contrary belief is not justified?

Irrelevant. If Quito is the capital of Ecuador, then no one can know that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador, since that would be false. Whether I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador is quite irrelevant to that point.

@kennethamy,

Not irrelevant at all. Rather this is a crucial point.

I feel that you cling to a notion of some truly "objective" reality that statements are true in relation to. I think such an objective reality is what some would describe as a white lie.

That Quito is the capital of Ecuador is only "true" to the degree that there is a consensus on the matter. What do you mean by "is" in the sentence "Quito is the capital of Ecuador." I invite you to elaborate on this.

I think that you mean that "Quito" is practical means by which to refer to this city. The proper name "Quito" is valuable only to the degree that there is a consensus about what it refers to.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107429 wrote:

Not irrelevant at all. Rather this is a crucial point.

I feel that you cling to a notion of some truly "objective" reality that statements are true in relation to. I think such an objective reality is what some would describe as a white lie.

That Quito is the capital of Ecuador is only "true" to the degree that there is a consensus on the matter. What do you mean by "is" in the sentence "Quito is the capital of Ecuador." I invite you to elaborate on this.

I think that you mean that "Quito" is practical means by which to refer to this city. The proper name "Quito" is valuable only to the degree that there is a consensus about what it refers to.

It is irrelevant because A cannot know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, and B cannot know, at the same time, that La Paz is the capital of Ecuador. The reason is that if Quito is the capital, then La Paz is not the capital, and contradictory propositions cannot both be known. That is how the word "know" operates. A and B cannot both know propositions that contradict one another. That is how "knowledge" differs from the word, "belief". Since A and B can both believe propositions that contradict one another.

@kennethamy,

The point is the definition of knowledge as justified belief. Both parties are persuaded that their belied is justified. What other element figures into this? I say knowledge is nothing but justified belief.

To "know" is to believe, and to believe implies an acceptance of said belief as justified.

Where is truth in all of this? Except as a synonym?

Can you define the truth as something other than justified belief? Go for it. If all there is is belief, than justification is equivalent to persuasion.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107451 wrote:

The point is the definition of knowledge as justified belief. Both parties are persuaded that their belied is justified. What other element figures into this? I say knowledge is nothing but justified belief.

To "know" is to believe, and to believe implies an acceptance of said belief as justified.

Where is truth in all of this? Except as a synonym?

Can you define the truth as something other than justified belief? Go for it. If all there is is belief, than justification is equivalent to persuasion.

Sure. A true belief is one that corresponds to the facts. A justified belief may not correspond to the facts. Therefore, a justified belief need not be a true belief. (I think I have mentioned all that several times). As I pointed out before, two people may have a justified belief about something, and one person may be right, and another person wrong. They cannot have justified beliefs which contradict one another, which are both true.

@kennethamy,

And what are the "facts." You are shifting your illusion of an objective standard from word to word. "Facts" are just justified beliefs. "Facts" are made of consensus.

Give it up, Ptolemy.

Points for tenaciousness. You are a stubborn foil. Smile

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107460 wrote:

And what are the "facts." You are shifting your illusion of an objective standard from word to word. "Facts" are just justified beliefs. "Facts" are made of consensus.

Give it up, Ptolemy.

Points for tenaciousness. You are a stubborn foil.

Facts are states of affairs in the world. They are also often called, 'truths". And, they are what make truth sentences true. They explain why it is that true sentences are true, and false sentences are not true. They are what are nowadays called, truth-makers. (They are what Joe Friday the detective refers to when he intones to an emotional witness, "Please Ma'm. Just the facts".).

@kennethamy,

And know you are shifting the illusion of objectivity to "states of affairs." And what are "states of affairs" made of? Justified beliefs. Persuasion and consensus.

There are no "objective" states of affairs. There are just statements about affairs, and these statements are justified beliefs -- with the exception of intentional lies of course. "Truth" is a property of sentences. And sometimes it's a noun that means justified belief.

Non-subjective reality is a superstition. And like many superstitions, it has been useful.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107472 wrote:

And know you are shifting the illusion of objectivity to "states of affairs." And what are "states of affairs" made of? Justified beliefs. Persuasion and consensus.

There are no "objective" states of affairs. There are just statements about affairs, and these statements are justified beliefs -- with the exception of intentional lies of course. "Truth" is a property of sentences. And sometimes it's a noun that means justified belief.

Non-subjective reality is a superstition. And like many superstitions, it has been useful.

A state of affairs was the existence of the Moon before there were people who even had beliefs on Earth. So, it could not be that states of affairs are "made of justified beliefs". Similarly, there were germs during the Middle Ages that caused diseases. However, no one then believed there were germs. Therefore, the fact of germs could not have been made up of beliefs (justified or not). I do suppose (hope) that you believe the Moon existed before the existence of human beings, and that germs existed before people had even heard of germs, let alone believed there were germs.

@Reconstructo,

Reconstructo;107472 wrote:

And now you are shifting the illusion of objectivity to "states of affairs." And what are "states of affairs" made of? Justified beliefs. Persuasion and consensus.

If astronomers discover a new object in space, and there is no consensus as to what it is, does that mean there are no facts about what it is?

No-one has any justified belief that it snowed in England on March 3rd, 819 BC, or that it did not. Does that mean that there is no fact of the matter?

Reconstructo;107472 wrote:

There are no "objective" states of affairs. There are just statements about affairs.

What do you mean by 'affairs' in your phrase "statements about affairs"? Are there only statements about statements about statements.....and so on with an infinite regress?

"I believe the Earth is round" does not mean the same as "I believe there is a consensus that the Earth is round".

@kennethamy,

Reconstructo wrote:

The point is the definition of knowledge as justified belief. Both parties are persuaded that their belied is justified. What other element figures into this? I say knowledge is nothing but justified belief.

If knowledge was only justified belief, how would one distinguish knowledge from what is not knowledge, from what is true from what is not true?

It seems as though you believe in some sort of subjective relativism. That is, you don't think one can make a truth proposition - every proposition is simply relative! What you say is your knowledge, what I say is mine, and what Jim says is his! No one can be wrong!

Is this what you believe? If so, why would you think this?

It's odd how science could have advanced so much simply from subjective beliefs with no objective backing, don't you think?

@ACB,

ACB;107492 wrote:

If astronomers discover a new object in space, and there is no consensus as to what it is, does that mean there are no facts about what it is?

No-one has any justified belief that it snowed in England on March 3rd, 819 BC, or that it did not. Does that mean that there is no fact of the matter?

What do you mean by 'affairs' in your phrase "statements about affairs"? Are there only statements about statements about statements.....and so on with an infinite regress?

"I believe the Earth is round" does not mean the same as "I believe there is a consensus that the Earth is round".

A sociologist of philosophy really ought to try to discover why so many have turned to some form of idealism, and rejected realism. Can it be just the influence of those like Rorty, or has the ground been already been prepared by other influences?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;107495 wrote:

A sociologist of philosophy really ought to try to discover why so many have turned to some form of idealism, and rejected realism. Can it be just the influence of those like Rorty, or has the ground been already been prepared by other influences?

It's easier to say the objective is an illusion, than to admit that you have the potential to be wrong.

I see many people who just begin contemplating things philosophical start off with a belief in some sort of subjective relativism. It's like that cool, "Ouuuu, things aren't how they seem!" feeling. It's a drastic way to put things in disarray - it makes you reconsider everything you initially thought was true - and this seems like the natural door to choose when you first start hearing all the thought-provoking philosophical talk! Unfortunately, it just leads to confusion, and strong subjectivism doesn't really make any sense once one exits from one's intellectual dungeon of a mind and steps foot in the practical world.

I would know, I've gone through it.

EDIT: Reconstructo - not implying you're definitely going through this, just offering up a possibility!

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