It is definitely not an event. It is a state of affairs. I suppose that you're asking whether it is a mental state of affairs. Yes it is. ^^

What is the state of affairs? That Quito is the capital of Ecuador? That is a state of affairs, but surely not a mental state of affairs. That I believe that Quito is the capital of Ecuador? That is a mental state of affairs, but that is not knowledge.

Basically you're getting into our old discussion: Re "Is knowledge a kind of belief?" Believing something is a mental state of affairs. Coming to believe something is a mental event. Events happen at some time, they are also called "happenings".

Having justification for something is a mental state of affairs. (I think. I'm an internalist. Externalists think that it is not a mental state of affairs.) Coming to have justification for something is a mental event.

That the believed proposition is true is not a mental state of affairs. (I'm a realist and think Tarski's semantic truth theory is correct.) Something becoming the case is sometimes a mental event, but not in the case with Quito being the capital of Ecuador. That not a mental event.

(Skipping the Gettier condition which may or may not involve non-mental affairs too.)

Is knowing a mental state of affairs? Some parts of it are. Knowing is not solely a mental state of affairs since it involves non-mental facts.

Belief is mental.I don't know about justification, since whether a belief is justified is not a matter to be decided by introspection. And, the truth of a belief is not mental. So, not solely mental is not mental.

An event is something that happens in time. And has a beginning and an end. Knowledge happens in time, and has a beginning and can have and end. Therefore, knowledge is an event. Do we disagree? Anyway, knowledge is fallible. No mental events are fallible. Knowledge is not a mental event.

I agree that "belief is mental" if that means that belief is a mental state of affairs.

Why does it matter whether it can be decided by introspection? And I'm not too sure that it cannot be decided my introspection, though it may be harder to judge whether one is justified or not in a belief, and evidently many people fail at it. (Cf. astrologers, creationists and what have we.)

I agree with "the truth of a belief is not mental" if that means that whether or not a belief is true depends on non-mental state of affairs or facts.



What do you mean by "event"?

Wiktionary on "event".

1. An occurrence of social or personal importance.
   
2. (physics) A point in spacetime having three spatial coordinates and one temporal coordinate
   
3. (computing) A possible action that the user can perform and is monitored by an application or the operating system (event listener). When an event occurs an event handler is called which performs a specific task.
   

I think the first and third ones are irrelevant to this context. That leaves the physics one. But I think that one is too strict for our purposes. Think of 9/11 (or 11/9 as we write it in Denmark). That event did not happen at a single time point but consisted of at least two other events: The crashing of a plane into the north tower and a crashing of a plane into the south tower.

Dictionary.com on "event"

1. something that happens or is regarded as happening; an occurrence, esp. one of some importance.
   
2. the outcome, issue, or result of anything: The venture had no successful event.
   
3. something that occurs in a certain place during a particular interval of time.
   
4. Physics. in relativity, an occurrence that is sharply localized at a single point in space and instant of time. Compare world point.
   
5. Sports. any of the contests in a program made up of one sport or of a number of sports: The broad jump event followed the pole vault.
   

The third one seems ok to me. I will adopt that one in failure to find a better definition.

You are correct. A person knowing something is an event (you were not very clear you just wrote "knowledge is an event" I had to guess a bit), though I think that is really stretching how one uses the word "event" in philosophy.

There seems to be no contrast between event and what I called state of affairs. I thought there was.

As for the fallibility of knowledge. I thought you believed that it was people and not knowledge that is fallible. Are they both fallible? If you simply mean can be wrong. Then not all knowledge is fallible, some knowing is of necessary truths and they cannot be false. Some knowledge is fallible, that is, the knowledge of contingent propositions. There is no knowledge of necessary falsehoods of course.

I think it is the mark of a mental event that its existence can be decided by introspection. I think that is what is crucial about whether knowing is a mental event. And I think that is why people think that knowing has to be certain.

(1) It is possible to be mistaken about whether one knows (Possible) BKp & ~p; and also, (2) Kp & (possible) ~p.

Justification and introspection
But justification can in most or at least many cases be decided by introspection. Can you offer an example of a situation where justification cannot be decided introspectively?

Certainty and introspection
Do you think people have to be 'certain' in some sense about introspective matters? Like what they believe? Could people not be wrong about whether or not they believe something? (This piece of fiction is both on topic and very funny.)

Formalization, knowledge and fallibility


You can find the symbols here

You think that I can decide by introspection that my belief is justified? How would I do that. Suppose I had tried to justify my belief by citing a dream.

Yes. I don't, myself, think that my mind is an open book (as did Descartes and others. Speakpigeon (FRDB) still thinks so. The Cartesian tradition is still strong in France. What I have been arguing is that that people who believe that knowledge implies certainty also think that since knowledge is a mental state, and that since all mental states are known by introspection, and introspection guarantees certainty because it constitutes direct knowledge, that when we know we directly know we know. So we are certain we know. But, as you know, I do not hold that view, since I am a fallibilist about knowledge.

As for the formalization, I just use "possible" rather than the diamond, and "necessary" rather than the square. Is there something the matter with that?

By thinking of why whatever it is you believe is true, is true. With your favorite example of the capital of Ecuador. You could recall how you got to believe this, e.g. by reading a good encyclopedia or atlas. That would give good reason to believe that you are justified in your belief about the capital of Ecuador.

Perhaps there are some cases where introspection cannot discover whether one is justified or not in some belief. Perhaps related to mental sicknesses.



I wonder, do they hold some anti-realist views? Otherwise it seems incoherent to me. Some anti-realist view and a coherency theory of truth seems consistent to me.



Yes. I like fancy symbols. :bigsmile:

Who is "they"? And I thought we were talking about a coherence theory of justification (Web of Belief) not of truth. A coherence theory of truth does fit in with anti-realism. But a coherence theory of justification does not.

I presume that "they" means the "people who believe that knowledge implies certainty" that you mention in your post #107.

"Knowledge implies certainty" is an anti-realist position, is it not? To a realist, knowledge depends on non-mental facts,

...whereas certainty is an entirely mental quality. So a realist could not believe that knowledge implies certainty, as this would be confusing two different types of thing.

Or by "knowledge implies certainty" do you only mean knowledge of one's own mental states?

He means this:
[INDENT]KIC. For all x and for all p, if Kx(p), then Cp.
[/INDENT]Where x are agents, p are propositions, Kx(p) means x knows that p and Cp means that p is epistemically certain. Lots of people believe that (KIC). They believe that if you know something, then you cannot be wrong. If that is interpreted to mean that what is believed cannot be false, then (KIC) is false. I don't know how else to interpret it.

I presume that "they" means the "people who believe that knowledge implies certainty" that you mention in your post #107.

"Knowledge implies certainty" is an anti-realist position, is it not? To a realist, knowledge depends on non-mental facts, whereas certainty is an entirely mental quality. So a realist could not believe that knowledge implies certainty, as this would be confusing two different types of thing.

Or by "knowledge implies certainty" do you only mean knowledge of one's own mental states?

By, "certainty", I mean infallibility, or the impossibility of error. That is not especially something mental, so far as I can see. However, it is true, that some have believed that we are infallible about our own mental states, and maybe, only about our own mental states.

Getting close to the roots of solipsism (IEP) now.

Maybe epistemological solipsism, but not metaphysical solipsism.

Notice the word "roots" in my post. I.e. the causes/reason for believing in metaphysical solipsism, that is, that only oneself exists. Of course metaphysical solipsism is (often, always?) motivated by epistemic solipsism, that is, that only can only have knowledge of oneself.

It doesn't follow from epistemic solipsism. Another case of the epistemic fallacy. A favorite of both Rationalism and Idealism. (Motivation and "roots" don't count. Those are historical/ psychological remarks).

If you know something, then by definition what you know is true. But you can never tell whether you know it.

Regarding the link in Emil's post #106, I think there is an ambiguity in the statement "It [the book] seems red to me". It could mean either "It seems red to my senses" or "Having considered all the evidence, including my memory of my eye problem, it seems to me that the book is red". In the former sense, the book really did seem red to Frank. In the latter sense, it did not (conclusively) seem red to him, and he was not claiming that it did; he was reserving judgement.

Did Frank "believe" that the book was red? I would say he had a tentative belief that it was. Or, to put it another way, a (firm) belief that it probably was. If he claimed to "believe" it in this sense, then his claim was correct. If, however, he claimed to believe unequivocally that the book was red, then he was not reporting his belief correctly. Either way, he was not mistaken in his own mind about his belief; he was directly and infallibly aware of it.

If you know something, then by definition what you know is true. But you can never tell whether you know it.