The Fatal Paradox

@Extrain,

Extrain;161014 wrote:

Why? I thought concrete objects were physical and abstract objects were non-physical. Your view sounds like metaphysical monism--the view that there is only one ontological category of "being"

It is...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

...It doesn't matter. This isn't new. Spinoza and Parmenides of old thought there was only one substance, and David Chalmers and John Searle of recent think the mental and physical are one and the same. But I don't understand what your point is...:whistling:

...and no its not new. no big deal...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

What "necessary order" are you speaking of? What "relation of the variables" are you speaking of? What are "variables"?

For the purpose a variable can be considered an object...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

Sounds really smart and cool. What is "qualitative identity"? What is an "algorithm"? And how, exactly, does logic "give rise to the qualitative identity of variables"? What do you mean by this? Can you give me an example of how this is supposed to work in logic, please? And what do you mean by "gives rise to"?

The nature of every part on the set directly or indirectly relates to the Whole and emerges from first and final causes...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

There is nothing remotely interesting, explanatory, or novel about what you are saying. So I don't see the point of all this mumbo jumbo. I simply don't care.

Fine no problem with that, do as you please.

Extrain;161014 wrote:

In any case, I want an explanatory answer to the following B.S you delivered earlier:

I will repeat:

Can you please show me a logical demonstration of what you just said using SET-THEORY? Thanks.

read on...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

So why can someone not be a "Hard determinist" even if he wanted to? You didn't tell me why this is impossible.

Because you don?t have a mechanic model to causation simulation, fully dialectical and self explained without confronting BEING Ontic Eternal immutable nature...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

What is a "nominal quantitative value" and what does that have to do with with determinism?

refers to a priori intrinsic knowledge that a variable has of the total amount of objects there is and their form conformity (relational simulation), which are also objects, on the Universal set structure in relation to itself. It may explain entanglement in Quantum Mechanics...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

What is the difference between a "meta-variable" and a "variable"?

A Meta Variable is the set of continued variables in discrete space packets of the same apparent variable.

Extrain;161014 wrote:

What is a "total set potential"?

The number or total of all possible relations between the elements of the set...for instance, for a Universe of 10 variables there would be a total of 100 possible relations.

Extrain;161014 wrote:

How are "algorithms present in each variable"? What does that mean?

each variable self nature in the axis of the "program" implies knowledge on the total of variables there is, their ordered relations in space time and its "GPS" position in relation to them and the role to be simulated accordingly with the "project"...

Each variable/object inner nature contains a priori the form to conform with its future form on discrete space time packet, thus simulating transition/movement, and implying previous knowledge of its paired next object moment, and structural architectural conformity with the entire project of reality through time space simulated continuity...

Extrain;161014 wrote:

What are "local pairs"?

The objects, things, variables, that are in direct contact in space time through the law?s of Physic.

Extrain;161014 wrote:

Oh, really? Please, do tell me more! Which aspects of set theory do you disagree with, now, and why do you disagree with those aspects? And how is Hard-determinism "dialectical"? What does "dialectical" mean?

Simulating causation from an a priori reality implies perfect conformity between what is now and what comes to be tomorrow even if in truth they really coexist, there you have your algorithm...or do you really believe that BEING grows in nothingness to be bigger and bigger with new emerging property?s ? its very amusing, Wonderland is on your side...

Now I acknowledge that the entire idea is not finished far from it but also that it sounds sufficiently interesting to explore to were I stand.

---------- Post added 05-06-2010 at 08:58 PM ----------

Post Scriptum: Let me ad that I don?t believe in a Creator the "MACHINE" is self sufficient !

@Amperage,

[QUOTE=Amperage;160948]but soft determinism or a compatibilist or even a free will incompatibilist would not say that a persons is bound by physical necessity in terms of their actions so I don't see how you can say that. I am specifically making a case against hard determinism for that reason[/QUOTE]A free will incompatibilist? I guess you mean Libertarian. A Libertarian is similar to a Soft determinist in that both Libertarians and Soft determinists believe in free will. A Libertarian is dissimilar to Soft determinist in that Soft determinists are Determinist whereas Libertarians are Indeterminists. A Libertarian is similar to Hard determinists in that both believe that determinism and free will are incompatible. Soft determinists, on the other hand, believe that determinism and free will are compatible; that's why Soft determinists are called Compatibilists.

@fast,

fast;161063 wrote:

A free will incompatibilist? I guess you mean Libertarian. A Libertarian is similar to a Soft determinist in that both Libertarians and Soft determinists believe in free will. A Libertarian is dissimilar to Soft determinist in that Soft determinists are Determinist whereas Libertarians are Indeterminists. A Libertarian is similar to Hard determinists in that both believe that determinism and free will are incompatible. Soft determinists, on the other hand, believe that determinism and free will are compatible; that's why Soft determinists are called Compatibilists.

I think he meant an incompatiblist to free will...
why are you so picky, if one can clearly see what he meant ?

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161068 wrote:

I think he meant an incompatiblist to free will...
why are you so picky, if one can clearly see what he meant ?

"Being picky," as you call it, is necessary to get the issues straight. You obviously don't care about clarity and precision because you think philosophy doesn't have any rules just like street-basketball: "anything goes!"

@Extrain,

Extrain;161071 wrote:

"Being picky," as you call it, is necessary to get the issues straight. You obviously don't care about clarity and precision because you think philosophy doesn't have any rules just like street-basketball: "anything goes!"

No ! it is not true and I admire those who spend time, eyes, and patience with it, believe me I do !...
That does not mean that one should not explore in a less formal approach, new ways and ideas, or recycle old Truths in conformity with modern perspective. Better to do it than do nothing...

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161075 wrote:

Better to do it than do nothing...

Not necessarily. Not at all

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;161076 wrote:

Not necessarily. Not at all

Well that is true I admit, but I don?t think that it apply?s to me or to my effort to make it sufficiently clear...it could be better, is also true !

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;160796 wrote:

And on top of it, your question about the drunk shows you simply don't understand what is at issue.

kennethamy;161041 wrote:

And now I don't even understand it.

One moment you understand what I mean and claim that what I mean shows a misunderstanding of the issue at hand. The next moment you don't even understand what I mean. It's kind of hard to take anything you say seriously.

@Fil Albuquerque,

Time will tell if some of this less accomplished ideas were in fact in essence right...

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;161081 wrote:

One moment you understand what I mean and claim that what I mean shows a misunderstanding of the issue at hand. The next moment you don't even understand what I mean. It's kind of hard to take anything you say seriously.

Not at all. I just took a better look at what you said. It sometimes happens that what one thought made sense at first, does not upon some thought. Hasn't that ever happened to you?

@Fil Albuquerque,

Fil. Albuquerque;161075 wrote:

That does not mean that one should not explore in a less formal approach,

...then you don't understand how the discipline functions at all. Like Ken says, "trying to do philosophy without logic is like trying to row a boat without a paddle." It gets you nowhere, and you only succeed in talking jibberish like you always do.

Fil. Albuquerque;161075 wrote:

new ways and ideas, or recycle old Truths

What do you think Philosophy does? Do you think every philosopher today is still stuck on Descartes, Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel???

Fil. Albuquerque;161075 wrote:

in conformity with modern perspective.

So what is this "modern perspective"? Please, do tell!

Fil. Albuquerque;161075 wrote:

Better to do it than do nothing...

Wrong. You either do it right, or you don't bother discussing it at all. What use is cooking up your own esoteric verbiage if you are not making any sense? You might as well become a politician. In spite of what you think, analytic philosophy is a very academically rigorous discipline, and logic is the bedrock of all investigation.

@Fil Albuquerque,

[QUOTE=Fil. Albuquerque;161068]I think he meant an incompatiblist to free will...[/QUOTE]That is even more confusing.

Some people believe determinism is true and therefore believe free will is false. Some people believe free will is true and therefore believe determinism is false. The former are hard determinists, and the latter are Libertarians, and both are Incompatibilists.

Determinism has to do with causation, and free will has to do with compulsion. People confuse the two, and that is the source of much confusion over the issue of whether or not determinism and free will are compatible with one another.

All events are caused, but not all events are compelled, so some events are both caused and compelled while other events are caused yet not compelled.

Your friendly neighborhood fatalists can be overheard saying, "what's the point?" When my fatalist friend was alive, he most certainly could look both ways before crossing the street, but he never did, and I asked him once why he didn't, and his response was, "what's the point ... if I'm gonna get hit, I'm gonna get hit."

Of course, he was right; what he said is true (though only trivially true), but that was no good reason to think he couldn't avoid getting hit and thus no good reason for not looking both ways; all he had to do was look both ways and not walk in front of cars that approached him, but unfortunately, he saw no point, and that unfortunate view was a product of thinking there was no point.

Strangely enough, he never got hit by a car. He got hit by a bullet. When he went off to war, he was told to put his bullet proof hat on, but guess what, he saw no point, for he felt that if it's meant for him to die with a bullet (as if there's a bullet out there somewhere with his name on it), then he's gonna die by a bullet to the head.

Now, is it the case that fatalists can never do anything about what may happen to them, or is the case that they most certain can but choose not to because they see no point in avoiding their fate?

Quote:

why are you so picky, if one can clearly see what he meant ?

Just trying to bring clarity when I can.[/SIZE]

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;161084 wrote:

Not at all. I just took a better look at what you said. It sometimes happens that what one thought made sense at first, does not upon some thought. Hasn't that ever happened to you?

Oh certainly and when it does, I admit my error and apologize.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;161091 wrote:

Oh certainly and when it does, I admit my error and apologize.

Good. But the error I committed was that at first glance, it seemed to me that you made sense, but that what you wrote was irrelevant. But when I considered once again what you wrote, I concluded that you did not even make sense, and that you were extremely confused.

But what do you think I should apologize for (if you do)? Is it for even thinking (at first) that you made sense when you did not? To whom should I apologize for that. To you? All right, if you think so. Anything for peace. I am sorry that I thought you made sense when, if fact, you did not. Feel better?

@Extrain,

[QUOTE=Extrain;161087]Wrong. You either do it right, or you don't bother discussing it at all. What use is cooking up your own esoteric verbiage if you are not making any sense?[/QUOTE]I don't know that I'd go that far.

He may improve, if he ever decides to do so, and part of that is acknowledging that having at least a minimal understanding of logic is a step in the right direction. He may not take the steps to do so if he stops discussing it all together.

Nevertheless, I feel your frustration.

@fast,

Ken and Fast,

I am not settled on these issues...

Question:

We all know this: The "old" way of construing free-will is that if a person has free will then he or she could have acted differently than he or she otherwise did. If determinism is true, then no one can act differently than he or she actually did. So if determinism is true, then no one has free will.

To my knowledge, compatibilists typically deny this construal of free will, and adopt some kind of alternate position concerning agent-centered causal sufficiency--or control-- that is supposed to be compatible with determinism, while denying that free-will has anything to do with the ability to choose from a range of possible actions open for selection.

So how do you guys construe free-will? What "definition" do you offer?

Here is one option mentioned by the SEP:

Quote:

Since determinism is a thesis about what must happen in the future given the actual past, determinism is consistent with the future being different given a different past. So the classical compatibilists analyzed any assertion that an agent could have done otherwise as a conditional assertion reporting what an agent would have done under certain counterfactual conditions.

So some compatibilists will analyze freedom in terms of counterfactuals: Suppose someone freely wills X. The compatibilist might say that at the time of willing X, to say that the person could have done Y and not-X is just to say that had he wanted or chosen to do Y and not-X, he would have chosen to do Y and not-X.

So the difference between a free and unfree action for the compatibilist of this brand seems to be this: A "free" action X is an action that someone would have done, if he wanted to do X. And an unfree action is what someone could not have done, even if he wanted to do X ("compulsion"). But in some respects, the former action still seems to be a kind of shallow counterfactual "freedom." After all, if determinism is true, then one who does choose X still cannot fail to choose X, since can implies does.

questions...

@Extrain,

Extrain;161099 wrote:

Ken and Fast,

I am not settled on these issues...

Question:

We all know this: The "old" way of construing free-will is that if a person has free will then he or she could have acted differently than he or she otherwise did. If determinism is true, then no one can act differently than he or she actually did. So if determinism is true, then no one has free will.

Goodness! I don't know that. Since it seems to me clearly false that if determinism is true that no one could have done other than he did. As G.E. Moore points out that although I both did not jump one inch off the ground this morning, and I did not jump 100 feet off the ground this morning. It is pretty certain that as decrepit as I am, I could have jumped one inch off the ground this morning, but I could not have jumped 100 feet off the ground this morning. And, remember, I did neither one. So how can it be correct to say that I could not have done either if unless determinism is false? Or, are you saying that since I could have done the one, but not done the other, that shows that determinism is false?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;161105 wrote:

Goodness! I don't know that. Since it seems to me clearly false that if determinism is true that no one could have done other than he did.

Oh...Well, denying, accepting, or modifiying this construal of free will is just the "typical" compatibilist response...I understand the philosophical map concerning the problem of free-will and determinism centers on denying or accepting one or other of the following incompatible theses the SEP construes as the Classical Formulation of the Problem:

Some person (qua agent), at some time, could have acted otherwise than she did.
Actions are events.
Every event has a cause.
If an event is caused, then it is causally determined.
If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the act could not have acted otherwise than in the way that she did.

I am just aware that some compatibilist might modify what 1 is saying, instead of rejecting 5, while others will accept 1 as it is and deny the truth of 5.

Also, I am not sure if I accept 2 and 3 while denying 4 and 5, or if I deny 3 while accepting 4 and 5 just as libertarians do. It seems you opt for the former as do I.

@Extrain,

Extrain;161106 wrote:

Oh...Well, denying, accepting, or modifiying this construal of free will is just the "typical" compatibilist response...

Yours doesn't seem to me to be an overwhelming rebuttal, unless you think it is obvious that a "typical compatibilist response cannot be correct nevertheless. Tell me, do you really doubt that I could have jumped one inch into the air, although I could not have jumped 100 feet into the air, even though I did neither? And on what evidence would that doubt be based? For I have a large amount of inductive evidence for that claim, as you must recognize.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;161110 wrote:

Yours doesn't seem to me to be an overwhelming rebuttal, unless you think it is obvious that a "typical compatibilist response cannot be correct nevertheless. Tell me, do you really doubt that I could have jumped one inch into the air, although I could not have jumped 100 feet into the air, even though I did neither? And on what evidence would that doubt be based? For I have a large amount of inductive evidence for that claim, as you must recognize.

But you don't have any inductive evidence other than what people do, not what a person can do given his alleged "range of forking alternative options." Hard-determinism is no less inductively supported than Libertarianism. But this isn't even the problem.

I agree 1. is true. 1. is intuitively correct to me; I just don't know how I want to analyze free will. Suppose a person does X. Do I analyze freedom to do Y in terms of counterfactuals about what a person would have done if he wanted to Y instead of X, or in terms of what a person could do given his available options before him? The "forking path" model with respect to free-will is not the same as a counterfactual analysis of creaturely freedom. The problem is that determinism directly challenges the former notion (which you apparently hold), but not so easily challenge the latter.

So I just don't know where I fall on the philosophical map with respect to reconciling free-will and determinism. You have to admit it is much more complicated than you are doing it justice since if determinism is true, it seems plainly obvious to incompatibilist determinists that since every event that is caused is causally determined, and all actions are events, then an agent who acts could have not done anything other than what he did do.

Philosophy Forum

The Fatal Paradox

Quick Links

My Account

able2know