If Zoltar tries to think of what color you're going to wear and red pops into his mind and he says red then you could wear white instead. That's why Zoltar can't tell you. It's the only way for a color to pop into Zoltar's mind because in any other case it wouldn't happen. Zoltar's knowledge includes knowledge of its own actions. It reminds me of a Nash equilibrium.

proposition bivlance suggests that the proposition has a determinate truth value prior to the actual happening. That being the case, and since it is the case that a proposition cannot change from true to false or vice-versa, then if he actually knows the value he is in no danger of stating so....the outcome will not change.

If Zoltar says you will wear red then you can wear white instead. We have to agree on that to continue. That's my starting point for this argument. I'm trying to show you how the rest is consistent with this starting point.

If Zoltar says you will wear red then you can wear white instead. We have to agree on that to continue. That's my starting point for this argument. I'm trying to show you how the rest is consistent with this starting point.

I thought we said that everything zoltar says is true.......therefore if zoltar says you will wear red then it follows that you WILL wear red

Am I mistaken?

Right, which is why he can't say it since you would wear white instead.

why do you think saying it would change something?

why do you think saying it would change something? A proposition cannot be true and then change to false. If it's true then he can say it. If it's false then he can say that too. the proposition is not some magical thing whereby saying it one way or the other makes it happen. It just will happen(by free will or otherwise)....whether he says it or not.

if he says you will do X and everything he says is true then you will do X

Because it's obvious that you could wear a different color shirt...

well I'm NOT saying they are so...

Then I don't know what it is you are claiming is so.

at this point in the discussion I'm not claiming anything...I've made all my claims.

At this point, I am simply commenting on the curiousness of the fact that if zoltar tells me I'm going to do X tomorrow and I will die as a result and if everything zoltar says is true, then I will do X tomorrow and die....despite the fact that zoltar told me head of time.

this says nothing about my free will of choosing X only that it's curious that apparently I actually freely will choose X knowing full well it will kill me

But only if you do it anyway. Of course, if you do not do it, then either Zoltar will be mistaken, or he will not have told you that you were going to die because it would be false that you were going to die if you did not do it. Therefore, since Zoltar cannot be mistaken, he would not have told you you were going to die, since you were not going to die. So, either Zoltar is mistaken or he would not tell you you were going to die. QED. You are supposing that Zoltar would tell you that you were going to die if you did X. But Zoltar could not tell you such a thing, since he never makes a mistake. Isn't that true?

But only if you do it anyway. Of course, if you do not do it, then either Zoltar will be mistaken, or he will not have told you that you were going to die because it would be false that you were going to die if you did not do it. Therefore, since Zoltar cannot be mistaken, he would not have told you you were going to die, since you were not going to die. So, either Zoltar is mistaken or he would not tell you you were going to die. QED. You are supposing that Zoltar would tell you that you were going to die if you did X. But Zoltar could not tell you such a thing, since he never makes a mistake. Isn't that true?

Why couldn't he tell me such a thing? you are supposing that by telling you, you would have the ability to make him wrong. But if he tells you then he can't be wrong since the overriding presupposition is that anything is says is true.

***the only reason he wouldn't be able to tell is because the statement is neither true nor false before it actually happens meaning such statements aren't true or false thereby making it so he can't tell you because there is nothing to tell in terms of truth or falsity.....this is what I'm saying***

Because you claimed that Zoltar never makes mistakes, and since telling you that would be a mistake if you chose not do it, then Zoltar would not tell you that you were going to do it. QED

"We must follow the argument wherever it leads". Socrates

you are saying well he can't tell me....I"m saying well suppose he does.....and you're saying, no, because he can't...

he can't tell me or he won't tell me?

if he can't tell me then why can't he? well because the statement is not true nor is it false absolutely.....until it actually happens that is.

but proposition bivalence says it must either be true or it must be false absolutely.

in which case either he just won't tell me....in which case I can safely ask the hypothetical , "well suppose he does". or either proposition bivalence is wrong and he can't tell me because there is nothing to tell.

REGULARITIES ! (Night Ripper would win the day) :bigsmile:

in terms of what?

it's not like I'm denying free will here, I'm simply exposing what positing proposition bivalence entails.

if zoltar knowledge the outcome is the chief presupposition

then whether he tells me or whether he does not....does not change the outcome....this seems obvious.