well proposition bivalence leaves room for the possibility that one could discover the truth value of ANY proposition EVEN propositions which have yet to occur.

Thus it is within possibility that you could discover if the proposition "I will do X on December 15, 2010" is true or false even today on April 15, 2010

Yes it does. But so what? Whether it is true or false depends on what I do. So if it is true, then that means I chose to do X, and if it is false, that means I did not chose to do X. Still don't get your difficulty. Are you supposing that whether I chose to do X or not is somehow preordained (as you wrote earlier)? But why assume that?

As Wittgenstein remarked, it is as if a fly were buzzing around, looking for a way out of the bottle he thought it was trapped in, and all the fly had to do was to look up and see the opening in the bottle. It would be so easy for the fly to look up and see the opening. But he keeps buzzing away, and going round and round. But never looking up.

"What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the bottle".

Yes it does. But so what? Whether it is true or false depends on what I do. So if it is true, then that means I chose to do X, and if it is false, that means I did not chose to do X. Still don't get your difficulty. Are you supposing that whether I chose to do X or not is somehow preordained (as you wrote earlier)? But why assume that?

Source of that quote.

The only reason to assume that is because one may wonder why I will still choose X if I knew in advance what would happen by choosing X and found the outcome to be unfavorable......that's it. Because if a proposition about Dec 15,2010 is true and I find out it's true on April 15,2010 then it's still going to happen. This is what leaves me to wonder.

It is true in April only if it is true in December. But if you don't choose to do it, it will not be true in December, and therefore, not in April.

Source of that quote.

obviously.....but the answer can be discovered in April as to what you will do in December.....if proposition bivalence is true

having said that it still does not discredit free will so the problem in that respect is moot

The only reason to assume that is because one may wonder why I will still choose X if I knew in advance what would happen by choosing X and found the outcome to be unfavorable......that's it. Because if a proposition about Dec 15,2010 is true and I find out it's true on April 15,2010 then it's still going to happen. This is what leaves me to wonder.

I've explained this before. If you find out about it, it's only because your finding out about it isn't going to make it untrue. Again, imagine a fortune telling machine that cannot say false propositions about the future.

Amperage: What color shirt will I wear tomorrow? And before you answer you should know that whatever color you say, I'll purposely pick another color.

Zoltar: I know what color you will wear but I can't tell you because then you won't wear it.

Philosophical Investigations 121

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 11:43 AM ----------



So I have been saying. Have you stopped buzzing and got out of the bottle?

I've explained this before. If you find out about it, it's only because your finding out about it isn't going to make it untrue. Again, imagine a fortune telling machine that cannot say false propositions about the future.

Amperage: What color shirt will I wear tomorrow? And before you answer you should know that whatever color you say, I'll purposely pick another color.

Zoltar: I know what color you will wear but I can't tell you because then you won't wear it.

I was only ever in the bottle between posts #820 and #870 every post after that I was arguing from a point of view I didn't necessarily agree with.......thought I don't see that this point of view can be proven wrong and may hold some merit.

I do still think for proposition bivalence to be true then fatalism might also true.

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 10:51 AM ----------

.

I guess you are still buzzing, then. I don't know what pov you are referring to. But if you mean that bi-valence implies free will is false, I think that view has no merit at all. It is just the result of confusions. Especially the modal fallacy.

I've certainty addressed the modal fallacy issue several times. No I was arguing from the point of view that proposition bivalence is false.....not that free will is false

that...propositions about the future contain no truth value prior to the actually happening UNLESS the proposition must necessarily be true or must necessarily be false

the thing is if proposition bivalence is true then it will not change anything for him to tell me

Yes, I understand. Bzzzzzz.

You can't change the truth of what Zoltar knows but you can change the truth of what Zoltar says. That is why Zoltar is limited in what he can tell you. I think we are starting to get into game theory territory with all these considerations of "if you do this then I'll do this but you know that so I'll do this etc".

aserting proposition bivlanece is false means I'm still in the bottle?

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 11:06 AM ----------

I don't think so. But asserting that bi-valence is incompatible with free will does.

I don't think so. But asserting that bi-valence is incompatible with free will does.

Therefore, if zoltar really does know the value, because the value really does exist, then he is in no danger of being proven wrong by saying what he knows. It's not like telling me will change the outcome.

If Zoltar tries to think of what color you're going to wear and red pops into his mind and he says red then you could wear white instead. That's why Zoltar can't tell you. It's the only way for a color to pop into Zoltar's mind because in any other case it wouldn't happen. Zoltar's knowledge includes knowledge of its own actions.