I did not (quote me), and even if I did, that does not imply the argument is valid in any understanding of that (in the common philosophical one, that the conclusion is viable does not imply that a particular argument for that conclusion is valid).

Right. In that case you think proposition bivalence is false, and that there are gaps in truth values, even for propositions! That is a minority view as far as I know..

I dont think anyone has claimed 6. The idea is that true statements describe facts, and if a causally effective agent has more than one course of action available, then before that course of action is chosen and acted upon, there is no fact to be described. In short, the statements under discussion dont express propositions, if propositions take bivalent truth values.
In any case, I suspect that realists about abstract objects, etc, are talking about logical truth, and as logics are separate from reality, the question of the logical truth or falsity of abstract objects, seems to me, to be beside the point, concerning free will.

I took this to mean that my notions were not some outlandish thing that I myself made up and that obviously an argument can and has been made for this

I will not attempt to explain the problems with the above to you. I think you should learn logic, and then modal logic (alethic and temporal, the others are not important for this), and then discuss this again. If you want, I can recommend you some books on these subjects. I can also send you a logic textbook over email if you write me and PM with your email. The book doesn't cover modal logic (IIRC) but it covers propositional and predicate logic.

Maybe Ken will attempt to explain it to you. I have tried too many times explaining this stuff to people without the relevant background knowledge and I think it is a waste of my time. Ken is much more patient than I am, so you should talk to him.

I didn't say it was a viable position. I said it was a minority position. It is easy to make an argument for anything and everything. What matters is whether that argument is rationally persuasive. I have not seen one potentially rationally persuasive argument so far. I may have been reading the wrong works, who knows?

maybe you could simply point out 1 of the problems....1 would suffice....but oh well I guess.

take the modal logic......I would assume you are referring to my saying what "will be the case MUST be the case"

the reason I make that leap....and the reason I think making the leap is not unreasonable is because if that leap cannot be made then the only option left is that you will chose X and die simply because you want to even though you know ahead of time that choosing X is going to kill you.

that's why I asked the question...which is more likely to be the case. I personally don't think I would freely choose X if X is guaranteed to kill me. But proposition bivalence says that I will choose X....so I can only assume that, for whatever reason, choosing X is a must.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 09:50 PM ----------

what more of a viable option do you need than a denial of fatalism?

until you respond to my hypothetical which specifically address the above issue..and explain to me what's wrong with it....Then I'm at a loss I guess

I will not attempt to explain the problems with the above to you. I think you should learn logic, and then modal logic (alethic and temporal, the others are not important for this), and then discuss this again. If you want, I can recommend you some books on these subjects. I can also send you a logic textbook over email if you write me and PM with your email. The book doesn't cover modal logic (IIRC) but it covers propositional and predicate logic.

Maybe Ken will attempt to explain it to you. I have tried too many times explaining this stuff to people without the relevant background knowledge and I think it is a waste of my time. Ken is much more patient than I am, so you should talk to him.

this, must be spoken clearly !

[CENTER]:bigsmile:
As a child I grew up in a Calvinistic family. One of the 'dogma's' was the pre-destination; by birth it was all-ready determined if you would go to Heaven or Hell as I understood.

It made no sense to me; why bother to become a good christian if it was decided all-ready I would go to Heaven ? It did not occur to me to go to Hell.

Blind Faith and Determinism make no sense to me. I learned to Think, not flawless (sometimes not logical), and feel a Priviledged Human to be able to do so. Even when making decisions I do not fully comprehend I rely on myself. There are times I am not allowed to do so and those periods are awefull and damaging to me.

Free will on the other hand is a fiction. We are all limited in what we can do. May be we want to do damaging things to others... In our actions we are limited, and that is a good thing. But in our harts we should feel free men and women, proud and glad to be a-live.

In the End we will all meet Death, but in Life we should feel free and allow Others the same Freedom. No man should suffer a life in captivity or slavery or poverty just because of his Birth.

[/CENTER]

maybe you could simply point out 1 of the problems....1 would suffice....but oh well I guess.

take the modal logic......I would assume you are referring to my saying what "will be the case MUST be the case"

the reason I make that leap....and the reason I think making the leap is not unreasonable is because if that leap cannot be made then the only option left is that you will chose X and die simply because you want to even though you know ahead of time that choosing X is going to kill you.

that's why I asked the question...which is more likely to be the case. I personally don't think I would freely choose X if X is guaranteed to kill me. But proposition bivalence says that I will choose X....so I can only assume that, for whatever reason, choosing X is a must.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 09:50 PM ----------

what more of a viable option do you need than a denial of fatalism?

until you respond to my hypothetical which specifically address the above issue..and explain to me what's wrong with it....Then I'm at a loss I guess

Suppose it is true that I am going to wear a blue sweater tomorrow. Now, why must that be true? Who, or what, is forcing me to do so? Let me just point out before you reply that I will do X does not imply, I will necessarily do X, or I necessarily will do X. And let me add that if it did imply those propositions, then it would imply fatalism. For it would imply that whatever I did, I could not avoid wearing a blue sweater.

Suppose it is true that I am going to wear a blue sweater tomorrow. Now, why must that be true? Who, or what, is forcing me to do so? Let me just point out before you reply that I will do X does not imply, I will necessarily do X, or I necessarily will do X. And let me add that if it did imply those propositions, then it would imply fatalism. For it would imply that whatever I did, I could not avoid wearing a blue sweater.

First, let me just state that your point, "I will do X does not imply, I will necessarily do X", is correct.....or at least is the accepted notion.

Now having said that, I'm left to wonder why anyone would still "do X" if they were told in advance(say by God or something) that, "doing X will kill you."

It is guaranteed that, given the proposition is true and proposition bivalence is true, "X will happen" even knowing in advance X will kill you.

That is why I say, "well geez I really don't think I'd do X if I knew it would kill me ahead of time, but proposition bivalence says I will, therefore it seems reasonable to me to conclude that, not only will I do X tomorrow, for some unknown reason I will necessarily do X tomorrow."

obviously it still might NOT be the case that "I will do X implies I will necessarily do X".....BUT if it does not then we are left trying to understand why we "will do X" when we've been told in advance X will lead to our death.

I see this as a slight problem, that is easily circumvented by concluding that not all propositions are bivalent....

I imagine that if you knew that doing X would kill you, you would not do X if it were up to you whether you do X. Am I missing something? That answer seems to easy.

IF propositions are bivalent then EVEN knowing in advance will not allow you to change the outcome.....X will still happen.

Yes but it only happens because we want it to. Anything you know in advance about what you've freely chosen will be because you freely chose it. If I tell you that you will kill your wife you aren't forced to do it. It's quite the opposite. The only reason I can truthfully say that you will kill your wife is because you will kill your wife.

I agree with you.

BUT

IF propositions are bivalent then EVEN knowing in advance will not allow you to change the outcome.....X will still happen.

thus where the problem lies

My claim is that one cannot know in advance because there IS nothing to know. propositions aren't bivalent...no truth value exists prior to the actual happening.

yes, but you don't see the problem with this?
what you say is obviously possible(and very well may be the case and if that is your position I'm am 100% OK with it....to be honest I agree and think that this possibly reflects what actually is the case) but I'm left to wonder why I would freely choose to do X IF I KNEW IN ADVANCE that X will kill me.

But I would not know that if I did X I would die if I did not do X, would I? I don't understand the problem.

People do it all the time. I'm still trying to get my dad to quit smoking.