Propositions about the future are just as much 'set in stone' as are propositions about the past. Pretty much everyone agrees that propositions about the past are 'set in stone'. Why then do they believe that propositions about the future are so different? I don't understand. (And I really dislike figures of speech in philosophy and I always mark them with apostrophes.)

Right. In that case you think proposition bivalence is false, and that there are gaps in truth values, even for propositions! That is a minority view as far as I know. I didn't mean change as in going from one truth value to another. I meant change as in going from one truth state (be that true, false or none, or both) to another state. This is more broad. And following that you do believe that propositions change truth values.

A question for you is now. Do you believe propositions are abstract objects?

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 03:42 AM ----------



Yes, I never got to know. The only other person I know with this view is U. and is he terribly at explaining himself. Ken, do you know of any academic writing that argues for this position? I'd be interested to read about it because I can't think of any potentially rationally persuasive argument myself.

Right. ******In that case you think proposition bivalence is false, and that there are gaps in truth values, even for propositions!******** That is a minority view as far as I know. I didn't mean change as in going from one truth value to another. I meant change as in going from one truth state (be that true, false or none, or both) to another state. This is more broad. And following that you do believe that propositions change truth values.

A question for you is now. Do you believe propositions are abstract objects?

because for a proposition about the future to be set in stone would indicate that I am not in control of whether the statement is true or false.

if a proposition about something I will do on December 21, 2010 is already true or already false on April 14, 2010 then given the hypothetical scenario that I some how find out this determined value on April, 15, 2010 I would be powerless to defy the value.

it then follows that if free will exists then such a value must not exist.

We know that. But why do you say that? And propositions do not change truth value. The facts change. The proposition that it rains in Central Park at 3 pm does not change. What changes is the weather in Central Park. And, whether the proposition is true or false depend on the weather in Central Park.

What you say here is hard to understand. You want rationally persuasive arguments for your position? Shouldn't you be holding your position because you have what you think is a rationally persuasive argument? After all, if your view is false, then there is no rationally persuasive argument for it.

Not all of them, but some, yeah. "Today is april the 15th." using a simple indexical theory expresses the same as the sentence "At 3.32 april the 15th, it is april the 15th." which expresses a necessary truth, not a contingent one like it should.

I don't agree. I believe in free will and propositional bivalence. You position implies that my position is not just false, but inconsistent. I would like you to produce the complete argument (complete formal is even better) from proposition bivalence to no free will, but I very much doubt you will actually do that. Since pretty much every time that I have in the past asked people to produce a complete argument, so that their argument is completed 'naked' and free from all 'illusions' etc., pretty much no one has ever done it. Well Leaf did it once, and he did a good job, but then again, he already knows logic...

I'm pretty sure you cannot produce a such argument.

That's right. What is going to happen, is going to happen. Likewise, what did happen, did happen. And, what is happening, is happening.

YES! Finally someone gets my point! Thank you Emil.

As far as propositions being abstract objects....I'm not exactly sure.

To be honest, I'm not very learned per say on such things so I'm not exactly sure what the statement means....Don't get me wrong I certainty know it has meaning I just know that I don't know how to translate it in such a way as to makes sense to me. I don't know enough about it to understand what that means.(there...now everyone knows I'm not smart are you happy with yourself? ) .could you explain what that means or link me to something about it?



Note: emphasis mine.

The only other person I know with this view is U. and is he terribly at explaining himself. Ken, do you know of any academic writing that argues for this position?

well If I'm being honest I don't agree with what I said either.....but ONLY because I believe in God. (Actually when I first made the argument back on like page 82 I was being sincere until I realized that such a view would exclude God's ability to know the future)

For someone who doesn't think God exists or doesn't think God knows the future, then my argument is 100% valid in my opinion

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However, Emil, I do believe that to believe in proposition bivalence AND free will imples that fatalism is TRUE.
This is not a problem for me though as I'm perfectly OK with fatalism

what is your opinion on the correlation I'm making?

Actually to be honest......IMO, proposition bivalence implies fatalism no matter what.

You could try Belnap, here's his publications page: NB papers

I'm inclined to believe Ken got that before me, and he maybe just didn't express it so well.

The reason I ask is that pretty much everyone holds that propositions are abstract objects. Abstract objects are objects that are 'outside' ('not affected by') time and space (this is called being non-spatiotemporal). Since without time there is no change, propositions do not change. A change in truth value is a change (duh), so you may hold inconsistent beliefs (though probably not since you didn't know what abstract objects are). Consider this set of propositions:[INDENT]1. All future contingents are propositions.
2. All propositions are abstract objects.
Thus, 3. All future contingents are abstract objects.
4. All abstract objects do not change.
Thus 5. All future contingents do not change.
6. All future contingents change.

[/INDENT]You cannot consistently believe all of these. If you want to have a consistent view, then you need to not believe at least one of these. Which do you believe? You have so far claimed to believe 6. There are many ways to avoid inconsistent, though I prefer (and so do Ken I think) to disbelieve in 6.

The above is the web of belief approach coined by Quine, I think. (In his The Webs of belief. Downloadable on my site, here.)

well since "I" am not an abstract object.....I've "I'm" used in a proposition then such a proposition is certainly not abstract.

I suppose upon a quick scan of the options I would deny #2

You don't seem to understand what the terms means. Maybe you should read more about it before discussing it further. Discussion is not a good way to learn, and it seems to be learning that you need to do.

I guess so.

Thanks for the help though.

Thanks, but which?

You may want to look up the word "valid" in a philosophical dictionary. It does not mean what you think it means. In any case, I'm an atheist. I don't know about Z. or Ken.

Also, for me this is page 22.

This is exactly what someone who believes in logical determinism would say. I cannot teach you logic in this thread. To get rid of that 'disease' (logical determinism) I think you need to learn logic. Sad to say.

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 04:13 AM ----------



Thanks, but which? There are many articles there.

You don't seem to understand what the terms means. Maybe you should read more about it before discussing it further. Discussion is not a good way to learn, and it seems to be learning that you need to do.

well you said yourself that denying that propositions are bivalent is a viable stance....thus making the argument valid....at least to my understanding of the word valid.

OK here is why I say fatalism(I guess what you're calling logical determinism):

How do you respond to this scenario:

"Tomorrow I will die because I choose X instead of Y" (Y could equal ~X if you want)

given the assumption that proposition bivalence is true, suppose you find out before tomorrow that the previous statement is true.

given bivalence, you will STILL choose X and die

From my thinking there can ONLY be 2 explanations for why you still chose X:

1. Free will is an illusion and hard determinism made it so
2. No amount of knowledge, foreknowledge, money, love, respect, whatever would be enough to get you to NOT freely choose X

Now I must ask myself which is more likely to be the case?
That I would freely choose to do something which will kill me if I know before the fact that it's going to kill me?

OR

that what will be the case MUST be the case?

because if proposition bivalence is true these are the only 2 options..........HOWEVER if proposition bivalence is NOT true then no such foreknowledge can be had and the statement is neither true nor false before the fact.

How would you respond to this hypothetical?

Are you saying that I CAN'T deny #2????? You just got done telling me I had to NOT believe in 1 of those numbers. I didn't realize you meant any of them EXCEPT for #2

I suggest starting at 1990, reading the abstracts and deciding which looks like the kind of thing you're looking for.

[INDENT]1. All future contingents are propositions.
2. All propositions are abstract objects.
Thus, 3. All future contingents are abstract objects.
4. All abstract objects do not change.
Thus 5. All future contingents do not change.
6. All future contingents change.

[/INDENT]You cannot consistently believe all of these. If you want to have a consistent view, then you need to not believe at least one of these. Which do you believe?