Propositions can't be meaningless (remember, they're meaningful by definition - that's why they're propositions!). Sentences can be meaningless. And if you don't know what a meaningless sentence is, you ought to look one up, or just sit and think for a moment until you come up with one.

But who said the value was fixed? No one. You're still confused. All that has been said is that it has a value; it is either true or false. If you don't think it is either true or false, then I suppose you think it is a meaningless sentence then. Do you think "I will wear a green shirt tomorrow" is a meaningless sentence? If so, why? It seems to have meaning to me.

I can and certainly will agree to this. So the REAL issue I suppose is that we are mislabeling certain "sentences" as propositions which are clearly not......I then assert that sentences about future free willed choices are necessarily NOT propositions



this is getting into a semantical argument if I've ever been in one.

You are saying that it has A value exists but is not fixed and I'm saying that since the value is indeterminate before the fact it therefore becomes a meaningless assertion to claim it has A value.....by the fact that for it to contain a value implies it's fixed...unless you wish to claim that propositions can have a flux value...

The proposition has a truth value, of course, but what its truth value is depends on what happens in the world. So, it is not fixed. Whether the proposition, that it rains on August 14, 2010, at 3 PM in Central Park in New York City depends on what the weather is like on August 14, 2010, at 3 PM in Central Park in New York City. How can it be fixed?

It can't......This is precisely what I've been arguing.

Other's have been arguing that such a statement is necessarily either true or false even today on April 14th

I have been arguing the statement is neither true nor false until August 14th, 2010 at 3PM in central park in new york city

It can't......This is precisely what I've been arguing.

Other's have been arguing that such a statement is necessarily either true or false even today on April 14th

I have been arguing the statement is neither true nor false until August 14th, 2010 at 3PM in central park in new york city

I don't think they have. I think you think they have. What I think they have been arguing is that it is true or false that it rains etc., but that whether it is true or false depends on what happen on August 14.

It is necessarily true or false today, as are all propositions, but it is not either necessarily true or necessarily false. There is a difference there. In symbols: 1. (∀P)□(TP∨FP) (For all propositions (P), it is either true, or it is false. 2. (∀P)(□TP∨□FP) (For all propositions (P), it is either necessarily true or necessarily false). (1) is true and (2) is false but people sometimes confuse them, as they confuse other propositions/sentences involving modal terms. I find that people are very ill equipped from nature to reason about modalities, and that people benefit greatly from learning to reason with modalities, that is, by studying modal logic.

It is necessarily true or false today, as are all propositions, but it is not either necessarily true or necessarily false. There is a difference there. In symbols: 1. (∀P)□(TP∨FP) (For all propositions (P), it is either true, or it is false. 2. (∀P)(□TP∨□FP) (For all propositions (P), it is either necessarily true or necessarily false). (1) is true and (2) is false but people sometimes confuse them, as they confuse other propositions/sentences involving modal terms. I find that people are very ill equipped from nature to reason about modalities, and that people benefit greatly from learning to reason with modalities, that is, by studying modal logic.

the bold statement is what I've been arguing against....and seemingly the others have been arguing for.

Propositions can't be meaningless (remember, they're meaningful by definition - that's why they're propositions!). Sentences can be meaningless. And if you don't know what a meaningless sentence is, you ought to look one up, or just sit and think for a moment until you come up with one.



But who said the value was fixed? No one. You're still confused. All that has been said is that it has a value; it is either true or false. If you don't think it is either true or false, then I suppose you think it is a meaningless sentence then. Do you think "I will wear a green shirt tomorrow" is a meaningless sentence? If so, why? It seems to have meaning to me.

The others? Like who?

well then there has been a failure to communicate.

OK here is the formal explanation for what I have been saying.


Let (1/2) = unknown, indeterminate, null, or blank, meaningless to talk about, non existent.... whatever term you prefer.

Since ~(1/2) = 1
(justification for this is given in the file but I'll post it if necessary)


it follows:

Let P = I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow
Let the truth value of P = 1/2

It then follows (P v ~P) is a true statement(since 1 OR'd with anything is still 1) while also maintaining that P as indeterminate

v = OR

Thus the statement has neither true nor false value in and of itself until said time...

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 08:23 PM ----------

the bold statement is what I've been arguing against....and seemingly the others have been arguing for.

well then there has been a failure to communicate.

OK here is the formal explanation for what I have been saying.


Let (1/2) = unknown, indeterminate, null, or blank, meaningless to talk about, non existent.... whatever term you prefer.

Since ~(1/2) = 1
(justification for this is given in the file but I'll post it if necessary)


it follows:

Let P = I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow
Let the truth value of P = 1/2(for obvious reasons)

It then follows (P v ~P) is a true statement(since 1 OR'd with anything is still 1) while also maintaining that P as indeterminate

v = OR

Thus the statement has neither true nor false value in and of itself until said time...

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 08:23 PM ----------

the bold statement is what I've been arguing against....and seemingly the others have been arguing for.

Yes. It is the slippage from 1 to 2 that is the mistake. And, it is true that some fail to notice the slippage. Does Amperage notice the difference between 1 and 2?

They have not. At least Ken has not.

Also, there was a slight error in my translation of the symbols. The first should be "For all propositions (P), necessarily, it is either true, or it is false."

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 03:29 AM ----------



I'm not sure. I find that generally, the only people that can distinguish between them are the ones that have studied logic and know that it matters very much sometimes where the operator is placed. That may be wrong but it is my impression. Logic makes the mind 'see' distinctions it didn't see before as it were clouded by words. Are you going to quote Wittgenstein now?

Today is simply shorthand for April 14th, 2010. Translate it to "April 14th, 2010 is Wednesday" and it is timelessly true. Problems that indexicals like "today" and "behind me" introduce are easily solved.

Then my apologies to all. Apparently I have been a victim of simple misunderstanding the point you were making.


the thing is if ya'll agree with the proof I just provided then saying a statement has a fixed value of true or a fixed value of false prior to the happening(exactly what bivalence states) is incorrect.


to say a proposition has value atemporal would then be incorrect <----I know for a fact this has been argued for. A proposition only becomes true or false after the fact...

They have not. At least Ken has not.

Also, there was a slight error in my translation of the symbols. The first should be "For all propositions (P), necessarily, it is either true, or it is false."

---------- Post added 04-15-2010 at 03:29 AM ----------



I'm not sure. I find that generally, the only people that can distinguish between them are the ones that have studied logic and know that it matters very much sometimes where the operator is placed. That may be wrong but it is my impression. Logic makes the mind 'see' distinctions it didn't see before as it were clouded by words. Are you going to quote Wittgenstein now?

There is still disagreement then. I didn't read your proof/argument, but I shall go back and do it. I don't agree, and neither does Ken, that propositions change truth values, from which it follows, that they don't change truth value after some fact happens. Propositions are necessarily true, or false. That is true for all times, obviously, as it is itself a necessary truth.

the funny thing is that I made 2 different arguments in various places throughout this thread as to why a proposition could actually have a set value prior to the fact and I could still have free will....just in case I guess

I don't agree that propositions change truth value.....they don't have a truth value AT ALL before the fact...it doesn't change....it just doesn't exist beforehand

I don't agree that propositions change truth value.....they don't have a truth value AT ALL before the fact...it doesn't change....it just doesn't exist beforehand

We know that. But why do you say that?