Defense of Freewill Against Determinism

@Amperage,

Amperage;151909 wrote:

this is not necessarily the case within ternary logic. Thus begging the question of why are you assuming such statements are not dictated by ternary logic?

All arguments presented in this thread seem to be using binary logic, including yours.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;151919 wrote:

All arguments presented in this thread seem to be using binary logic, including yours.

"seem to be" and "ARE" are not the same thing. This is not to say that cannot be, but point out where your assumption is.

I think an argument has been made over the past 20 pages or so which show why all the arguments in this thread are NOT using binary logic.

Such propositions as "colorless green ideas sleep furiously" for example and "I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow"....would both be indeterminate, IMO, prior to the action

@Amperage,

Amperage;151922 wrote:

"seem to be" and "ARE" are not the same thing. This is not to say that cannot be, but point out where your assumption is.

I think an argument has been made over the past 20 pages or so which show why all the arguments in this thread are NOT using binary logic.

Well you're sitting there saying "not" this and "not" that so it seems rather binary to me. I could be wrong though.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;151923 wrote:

Well you're sitting there saying "not" this and "not" that so it seems rather binary to me. I could be wrong though.

binary logic is not thrown out the window in these other systems......in ternary logic if A is true then not A would be false

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 02:23 PM ----------

only propositions about the future which must necessarily be true or must necessarily be false are determinate prior to the act.

What is your opinion about this statement?

@Amperage,

Amperage;151924 wrote:

binary logic is not thrown out the window in these other systems......in ternary logic if A is true then not A would be false

From what I've read, there are three values; true, false and unknown. Why wouldn't not true be unknown just as well as false? Also, not unknown would be either true or false. Right?

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;151927 wrote:

From what I've read, there are three values; true, false and unknown. Why wouldn't not true be unknown just as well as false? Also, not unknown would be either true or false. Right?

"Unknown" is not a separate truth value; it is an epistemological issue. If you don't know if some meaningful declarative statement is true and you don't know that it is false, it does not make it both not true and not false; it just means that you don't know which it is.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;151927 wrote:

From what I've read, there are three values; true, false and unknown. Why wouldn't not true be unknown just as well as false? Also, not unknown would be either true or false. Right?

I found some tables searching the web that were much more fleshed out last night but I can't seem to be able to find any right now....but I am not expert on the logic system, I simply started with the basic understanding that statements about my future choices cannot be determinate prior to my actually turning the choice into reality.
It was then I discovered others also felt the same way and then eventually I stumbled upon fuzzy logic, multi-valued logic, truth gaps and stuff like that....so in answer to your question I don't know, I'd have to look up what has been fleshed out by others as they've been working on these issues since the time of aristotle.

craig bourne for example has not unknown as true
http://cpb.blueorange.net/images/images/anal_middlemuddle.pdf

here is bourne table(I think):
Note: for "unknown" he uses the value 1/2

~ |
--------
1 | 0
1/2 | 1
0 | 1

& | 1 | 1/2 | 0
------------------
1 | 1 | 0 | 0
1/2 | 0 | 0 | 0
0 | 0 | 0 | 0

v | 1 | 1/2 | 0
------------------
1 | 1 | 1 | 1
1/2 | 1 | 0 | 0
0 | 1 | 0 | 0

these aren't actually bourne's tables but instead are someone else's that he brings up....He then brings up an interesting point about them and about why is it necessary for us to lose indeterminate outcomes

@Pyrrho,

Pyrrho;151936 wrote:

it does not make it both not true and not false; it just means that you don't know which it is.

Right but as mentioned earlier, just because we don't know if something is true or false doesn't mean it isn't true or false.

---------- Post added 04-14-2010 at 04:23 PM ----------

Amperage;151937 wrote:

craig bourne for example has not unknown as true

But a false value is not unknown either.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;151908 wrote:

If something is not true then it's false. If something is not false then it's true. It has to be one or the other. You're not going to convince me otherwise without some good reasons.

It is not true that the number 7 is purple. So is it false?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;151994 wrote:

It is not true that the number 7 is purple. So is it false?

Yes, it is false that the number 7 is purple.

All meaningful propositions are either true or false.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;151996 wrote:

Yes, it is false that the number 7 is purple.

All meaningful propositions are either true or false.

Well, that is one view. You accept the principle of bi-valence. But some people would hold that the sentence, "The number 7 is purple" is not meaningful, so although it is not true that the number 7 is purple, it is not false. What about the sentence proposed by Russell, "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination"? That is certainly not true, but is it false?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;151999 wrote:

Well, that is one view. You accept the principle of bi-valence. But some people would hold that the sentence, "The number 7 is purple" is not meaningful, so although it is not true that the number 7 is purple, it is not false. What about the sentence proposed by Russell, "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination"? That is certainly not true, but is it false?

The principle of bivalence only says that all meaningful propositions are either true or false. If it's not a meaningful proposition then the principle of bivalence is irrelevant.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;152001 wrote:

The principle of bivalence only says that all meaningful propositions are either true or false. If it's not a meaningful proposition then the principle of bivalence is irrelevant.

But, if meaningless sentences (they cannot be meaningless propositions) are not true, which they are not, then what are they?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;152017 wrote:

But, if meaningless sentences (they cannot be meaningless propositions) are not true, which they are not, then what are they?

What does this have to do with the principle of bivalence which deals only with meaningful propositions?

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;152019 wrote:

What does this have to do with the principle of bivalence which deals only with meaningful propositions?

But does it? .........

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;152021 wrote:

But does it? .........

Quote:

In logic, the semantic principle of bivalence states that every meaningful proposition is either true or false.

Principle of bivalence - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;152023 wrote:

Principle of bivalence - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

So what happens if a sentence is not true, even it it does not express a proposition?

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;152029 wrote:

So what happens if a sentence is not true, even it it does not express a proposition?

It doesn't really matter in the context of this discussion.

@Night Ripper,

Night Ripper;152035 wrote:

It doesn't really matter in the context of this discussion.

Of course it matters in the context of this discussion.....It's the reason we're having problems......you are calling a proposition meaningful which is NOT meaningful by your own definition since propositions about the future can ONLY(IMO) be determinate(prior to) if the proportion must necessarily be true or must necessarily be false; All other such propositions are indeterminate. So, unless the sentence "I will wear a green shirt tomorrow" must NECESSARILY be true or must NECESSARILY be false, then it is indeterminate at this time.

by what standard are you deeming propositions "meaningful" or "not meaningful"?

That is the point.

If your standard is propositions which are true or false then clearly we have demonstrated that the "meaningfulness" of propositions about future choice decisions is lacking in this regard.

@Night Ripper,

Amperage wrote:

by what standard are you deeming propositions "meaningful" or "not meaningful"?

Propositions can't be meaningless (remember, they're meaningful by definition - that's why they're propositions!). Sentences can be meaningless. And if you don't know what a meaningless sentence is, you ought to look one up, or just sit and think for a moment until you come up with one.

Quote:

So, unless the sentence "I will wear a green shirt tomorrow" must NECESSARILY be true or must NECESSARILY be false, then it is indeterminate at this time.

But who said the value was fixed? No one. You're still confused. All that has been said is that it has a value; it is either true or false. If you don't think it is either true or false, then I suppose you think it is a meaningless sentence then. Do you think "I will wear a green shirt tomorrow" is a meaningless sentence? If so, why? It seems to have meaning to me.

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