The universe isn't governed in the sense that the universe has to behave a certain way. It's rather that the universe can be described with law-like statements. The truth of these statements don't thereby force us into doing anything, however.

Causal determinism is not a threat to freewill.

The key word in the above paragraph is "necessitated". It's this term that gives the argument its weight. It's also this term that is decidedly unscientific. There's no possible way to test if an event is necessary i.e. it has to happen. You could flip a coin once a second and have it land on heads for the next 1,000 years but you still wouldn't have observed anything necessary. There's no possible way to test between something that has to happen vs. just does happen. In all cases we can only observe what happens. Even if something always happens that doesn't therefore mean that it must happen.

If the following statement is true...

1. You will wear a yellow shirt tomorrow.

...then it is true only because, tomorrow, you, in fact, wear a yellow shirt.

Likewise, if the following statement is true...

2. Nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light.

...then it is true only because, at all times and places, nothing, in fact, ever accelerates faster than the speed of light.

Statements take their truth from the world. The statement "the cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat.

Though, some people have it curiously twisted. They think that, in fact, nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light because the statement "nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light" is true! Instead of the statement being true because it corresponds with reality, reality conforms itself to the truth of the statement. That sounds much like the way chanting a magic spell such as "open sesame" can make the world conform to its power.

At this point, most people would say...

"But if it's true that nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light then I can't accelerate faster than the speed of light!"

This is a retreat to logical determinism and this is also a form of the modal fallacy. Strictly speaking, it's not that you can't. It's that you won't. Let's go back to a mundane example. If it's true now that..

3. Tomorrow I will wear a yellow shirt.

...then it seems like I have no choice but to wear a yellow shirt. I can't change my mind. That's false though. The solution to the problem is that (3) is only true because I don't change my mind. If I do change my mind then (3) won't be true. By saying (3) is true we're also implying "I will change my mind and wear blue instead" is false.

If we take this further and make it a law-like statement...

4. Night Ripper only wears yellow shirts.

...then (4) is true only if I never decide to wear a different color of shirt. If one day I decide to wear blue then (4) is false. However, we're already taking (4) as true now. Therefore, I don't (not that I can't) ever change my mind.

The universe isn't governed in the sense that the universe has to behave a certain way. It's rather that the universe can be described with law-like statements. The truth of these statements don't thereby force us into doing anything, however.

Causal determinism is not a threat to freewill.

The key word in the above paragraph is "necessitated". It's this term that gives the argument its weight. It's also this term that is decidedly unscientific. There's no possible way to test if an event is necessary i.e. it has to happen. You could flip a coin once a second and have it land on heads for the next 1,000 years but you still wouldn't have observed anything necessary. There's no possible way to test between something that has to happen vs. just does happen. In all cases we can only observe what happens. Even if something always happens that doesn't therefore mean that it must happen.

.

there could not be a uranium sphere a mile in diameter, since there is a physical law that prevents this.

You realise that quote of van Fraassen is from Laws and Symmetry? A book in which he argues that there are no laws of nature.

Causal determinism is not a threat to freewill.

The key word in the above paragraph is "necessitated". It's this term that gives the argument its weight. It's also this term that is decidedly unscientific. There's no possible way to test if an event is necessary i.e. it has to happen. You could flip a coin once a second and have it land on heads for the next 1,000 years but you still wouldn't have observed anything necessary. There's no possible way to test between something that has to happen vs. just does happen. In all cases we can only observe what happens. Even if something always happens that doesn't therefore mean that it must happen.

If the following statement is true...

1. You will wear a yellow shirt tomorrow.

...then it is true only because, tomorrow, you, in fact, wear a yellow shirt.

Likewise, if the following statement is true...

2. Nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light.

...then it is true only because, at all times and places, nothing, in fact, ever accelerates faster than the speed of light.

Statements take their truth from the world. The statement "the cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat.

Though, some people have it curiously twisted. They think that, in fact, nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light because the statement "nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light" is true! Instead of the statement being true because it corresponds with reality, reality conforms itself to the truth of the statement. That sounds much like the way chanting a magic spell such as "open sesame" can make the world conform to its power.

At this point, most people would say...

"But if it's true that nothing accelerates faster than the speed of light then I can't accelerate faster than the speed of light!"

This is a retreat to logical determinism and this is also a form of the modal fallacy. Strictly speaking, it's not that you can't. It's that you won't. Let's go back to a mundane example. If it's true now that..

3. Tomorrow I will wear a yellow shirt.

...then it seems like I have no choice but to wear a yellow shirt. I can't change my mind. That's false though. The solution to the problem is that (3) is only true because I don't change my mind. If I do change my mind then (3) won't be true. By saying (3) is true we're also implying "I will change my mind and wear blue instead" is false.

If we take this further and make it a law-like statement...

4. Night Ripper only wears yellow shirts.

...then (4) is true only if I never decide to wear a different color of shirt. If one day I decide to wear blue then (4) is false. However, we're already taking (4) as true now. Therefore, I don't (not that I can't) ever change my mind.

The universe isn't governed in the sense that the universe has to behave a certain way. It's rather that the universe can be described with law-like statements. The truth of these statements don't thereby force us into doing anything, however.

So, are you saying that it is false that you can't fly (without the aid of any devices), it is only that you do not fly? Why, though, do you not fly?

And what has this to do with free will?

As for free will, I think the first step is to decide what is being asserted when someone says that we have free will, as different people mean different things by such an expression:

Free Will[The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The perplexing nature of the puzzle is clearly revealed when the gold-sphere generalization is paired with a remarkably similar generalization about uranium spheres:[INDENT]All gold spheres are less than a mile in diameter. All uranium spheres are less than a mile in diameter.
[/INDENT] Though the former is not a law, the latter arguably is. The latter is not nearly so accidental as the first, since uranium's critical mass is such as to guarantee that such a large sphere will never exist (van Fraassen 1989, 27). What makes the difference? What makes the former an accidental generalization and the latter a law?



(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)



Notice that there are (both) no gold spheres spheres that are a mile in diameter, and there are no uranium spheres a mile in diameter. But still, it is true that there could be a gold sphere a mile in diameter (since there is no physical law of nature that prevents this) but there could not be a uranium sphere a mile in diameter, since there is a physical law that prevents this. So while it does just happen that there is neither a gold nor a uranium sphere a mile in diameter, the first is an accident since there could be; but the second is not an accident, since it is physically impossible that there should be such a uranium sphere. And, if it is physically impossible that there should be such a uranium sphere, isn't it physically necessary that there isn't such a sphere, whereas it is not physically necessary there there is no such gold sphere?

By the way. I also think there is no conflict between determinism and free will. But not because there is no nomic causation. Since the above argument seems to show that there is.

I think the above begs the question. A regularity theorist does not accept that there is a difference between the two cases. How would you show that there is? The above is really only convincing to necessity theorists.

But still, it is true that there could be a gold sphere a mile in diameter (since there is no physical law of nature that prevents this) but there could not be a uranium sphere a mile in diameter, since there is a physical law that prevents this.

I think the above begs the question. A regularity theorist does not accept that there is a difference between the two cases. How would you show that there is? The above is really only convincing to necessity theorists.

---------- Post added 03-27-2010 at 07:54 PM ----------

For a short introduction to a regularity theory, see Swartz's page here.

Regularity Theory

For a full book on regularity theory and necessity theory see Swartz's The Concept of Physical Law. Also freely available on the net.

"The Concept of Physical Law", by Norman Swartz

I confess to not having read the long versions, and only read part of the short introduction (skipping down to the parts that seemed most relevant), but how can one establish that the regularity theory is true? It seems to my rather slipshod reading of it that it is merely omitting the word "can" (and synonyms) and leaving us with "is" only. So it appears to be claiming that it is a myth that people cannot fly without the aid of any devices. What is true, according to the theory, is that people simply do not fly without the aid of any devices. But it seems to leave no answer to the question, why do people not fly without the aid of any devices? Or am I misunderstanding the theory?

The fact that all uranium spheres above a certain critical mass happen to undergo a nuclear chain reaction is not evidence that they have to and couldn't have done otherwise.

All explanations must come to an end. You can ask "why?" forever and at some point you have to say "that's just the way it is". These are called brute facts and I've never seen a convincing argument that doesn't appeal to them at some point. The only question is, which view is more empirical i.e. scientific, that the universe is controlled by magical laws that come from nowhere (or God if you're a theist) or that the universe isn't controlled at all? It's completely contingent.

The fact that all uranium spheres above a certain critical mass happen to undergo a nuclear chain reaction is not evidence that they have to and couldn't have done otherwise.

Well, to begin with, uranium spheresdon't do things. People (and maybe animals) do things.

Second of all, gold happens not to undergo a chain reaction above a certain critical mass, but (as we see) uranium does.

Third of all, what makes you think there isn't a covering law that explains why uranium does?

The fact (if it is one) that "all explanations come to an end" does not mean that they come to an end right at the beginning, does it?

Do you have any evidence that it could do otherwise? If not, how is your position any better?

Do you have any evidence that it could do otherwise? If not, how is your position any better?

But I thought we did have evidence that it could not do otherwise, anyway.

With two exceptions, since 1840, U.S. Presidents who have been elected in years ending in zero have been killed or have died of natural causes while in office. And one exception literally came within an inch of death.