well yes, we have no way of knowing ahead of time and this makes this entire hypothetical argument we've had for a few pages now moot because the principle of bivalence makes the claim that statements are true or false even before the fact without this being a testable thing.

This is why I took it to the extreme and was saying, "well what if it was knowable ahead of time"?

what if somehow we could see before the fact if a statement about the future was true of false....

so I guess from my angle you're saying "I could not know this fact unless my brushing my teeth in the morning was true" well what if somehow did know beforehand that the statement "i will brush my teeth in the morning" was true...could you not brush your teeth? The answer is that you could but you never would

My wife is making coffee, and I expect that she'll shortly offer me a cup. If I have free will, then there are two courses of action available to me, I can accept or I can refuse, so, if I have free will neither the statement "ughaibu will accept" nor "ughaibu will refuse" is presently true, as there is no fact that can make either statement true.

My wife is making coffee, and I expect that she'll shortly offer me a cup. If I have free will, then there are two courses of action available to me, I can accept or I can refuse, so, if I have free will neither the statement "ughaibu will accept" nor "ughaibu will refuse" is presently true, as there is no fact that can make either statement true.

My wife is making coffee, and I expect that she'll shortly offer me a cup. If I have free will, then there are two courses of action available to me, I can accept or I can refuse, so, if I have free will neither the statement "ughaibu will accept" nor "ughaibu will refuse" is presently true, as there is no fact that can make either statement true.

this was my argument earlier

I denied this principle and I still do as a matter of fact(at least when pertaining to future free willed choices) but I was wrong that this principle is an argument FOR determinism

That is a different argument, of course. I suppose we can postulate future facts. I imagine that there is no fact of the matter whether there are or are not future facts. So we are free to postulate them to explain how we can know that future statements are true. If you do not think that there are future facts, do you think there are past facts? For, aren't statements about the past true?

Yes, we seem to be in agreement, for a change.If the future is fully described by factual statements, then the future exists, and always has existed. About such a world, the only possibilities are fatalism or determinism.

Yes, we seem to be in agreement, for a change.If the future is fully described by factual statements, then the future exists, and always has existed. About such a world, the only possibilities are fatalism or determinism.

But future events can be true or false, don't you think?

If you do not think that there are future facts, do you think there are past facts? For, aren't statements about the past true?

No doubt there are some statements, about future states of affairs, which are true now, but if a future state of affairs is contingent on a free choice by a causally effective agent, then there is no fact of the matter before that choice has been made. If you think that statements can be true or false, independent of any fact, then you'll need to elucidate your theory of truth.

The future need not exist now. But it will exist in the future. And, of course, future statements are made true by future facts.

Then there are not true (or false) now, are they?

Why not? It is true or false now that they will be true or false in the future.

I've explained this. You'll need to be more specific about what it is that you dont understand, or you will need to specify a fact independent theory of truth.

I did not say I don't understand something. I have proposed a way of making sense of future statements being true now. They are true now because it is now true that future statements will be true.

this is why I think that the principle of bivalence does not apply to future free willed choices.....that the 1 exception to the rule.

The statement "I will wear a blue shirt" is neither true nor false before the fact and is only and can only be assigned a value after the fact.

well there are really only 3 options:

1. Either such statements have no value(null, neither true nor false) before the fact.
2. Determinism is true.
3. One will ALWAYS freely choose in accordance with said statement.

If you think that future statements are not true now because there are no facts now that make them true, then you must think that statements about the past are not true now because there are no longer facts that make them true. So, for instance, you must think that the statement that Lincoln was assassinated is not true now, since the fact that made it true is long gone. And, in fact, you must think that only statements about the present are true or false. Isn't that right?

I did not say I don't understand something. I have proposed a way of making sense of future statements being true now. They are true now because it is now true that future statements will be true.

No that's not right and I don't quite see how that follows.

This only applies to facts about future free willed choices.......facts about the past are obviously true or false and we can look and see. and facts about future not involving free willed choices can be true or false before the fact.