this is not what the principle of bivalence is saying...it's saying that it's written in stone BEFORE the fact.

Two admirals, A and B, are preparing their navies for a sea battle tomorrow. The battle will be fought until one side is victorious. But the 'laws' of the excluded middle (every statement is either true or false) and of noncontradiction (no statement is both true and false), require that one of the statements, 'A wins' and 'B wins', is true and the other is false.

Suppose 'A wins' is (today) true. Then whatever A does (or fails to do) today will make no difference; similarly, whatever B does (or fails to do) today will make no difference: the outcome is already settled. Or again, suppose 'A wins' is (today) false. Then no matter what A does today (or fails to do), it will make no difference; similarly, no matter what B does (or fails to do), it will make no difference: the outcome is already settled. Thus, if every statement is either true or false (and not both), then planning, or as Aristotle put it 'taking care', is illusory in its efficacy. The future will be what it will be, irrespective of our planning, intentions, etc.

Before the fact can still include consideration of what happens afterwards.

Aristotle(or this guys paraphrasing of Aristotle) explains exactly what I'm saying about bivalence right here. Not sure what his solution was but I think he just accepted determinism; something I'm not prepared to do:
If you don't see how this conflicts with free will I suggest taking another look at the principle of bivalence.

The truth of propositions does not 'make' events happen (occur).

Consider: My wearing a short-sleeved shirt today [Oct. 28] is what makes (the proposition expressed by) "Swartz is wearing a short-sleeved shirt on Oct. 28, 1997" true. It is not the other way round. Logical fatalism confuses the semantic (truth-making) order. It makes it appear that the truth of a proposition 'causes' an event to occur. It is, rather, that the event's occurring tomorrow 'makes' (but does not cause) the proposition to be true today. This is not 'backwards causation': the relation between an event and the truth of the proposition describing that event is not a causal relation whatever. It is a semantic relation.

The logic of the preceding paragraph can perhaps be made apparent by switching the example to one of speaking about the past rather than the future.

John Lennon was shot and killed in 1980. Let's suppose a group of ten persons is arguing about the year of his death. Alice says that it was 1976; Betty, that it was 1977; Cathy, that it was 1978; Denise, that it was 1979; Edith, that it was 1980; Freda, that it was 1981; etc.

Of the ten claims made, only Edith's is true. The other nine are false. Now ask yourself: Does Edith's making a true claim today (about the year of Lennon's death) account for Lennon's killing? Did Edith's asserting a truth today about Lennon's killing somehow or other 'force' Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon's chest? Of course not. Now what if the year of the discussion were 1975? Alex says, "Lennon will be killed in 1976." Bellamy says that it will happen in 1977. Charles, that it will happen in 1978. Damien, that it will happen in 1979. Eduardo, that it will happen in 1980. Frank, that it will happen in 1981. Graham, that it will happen in 1982. Etc. Of the ten discussants, one, namely Eduardo, gets it 'right'; the other nine make false predictions. Does Eduardo's true prediction (in 1975) somehow or other 'force' Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon's chest five years later, in 1980? Of course not.

Similarly you and I can make all sorts of predictions - some true, some false, some on the basis of excellent evidence ("There will be a lunar eclipse on Sept. 19, 2499"), some on the basis of no evidence whatever ("Simon Fraser University will remove all tuition fees in 1999") - but those that are true do not 'force' the predicted events to occur.

The future will be just what it is going to be. None of us can change the future. But that does not mean that we do not have free will. [INDENT] I cannot change the future - by anything I have done, am doing, or will do - from what it is going to be. But I can change the future from what it might have been. I may carefully consider the appearance of my garden, and after a bit of thought, mulling over a few alternatives, I decide to cut down the apple tree. By so doing, I change the future from what it might have been. But I do not change it from what it will be. Indeed, by my doing what I do, I - in small measure - contribute to making the future the very way it will be.

Similarly, I cannot change the present from the way it is. I can only change the present from the way it might have been, from the way it would have been were I not doing what I am doing right now. And finally, I cannot change the past from the way it was. In the past, I changed it from what it might have been, from what it would have been had I not done what I did.

We can change the world from what it might have been; but in doing that we contribute to making the world the way it was, is, and will be. We cannot - on pain of logical contradiction - change the world from the way it was, is, or will be. [/INDENT]

Source: Notes on Free Will and Determinism - Prof. Norman Swartz

is true before the fact then he has no say about it.....the proposition may not be what made him wear the shirt but if the proposition is true then he has no choice but to wear a blue shirt tomorrow.

He is missing the point. It's not the proposition that "made" him do anything, but if the proposition is true then "fate" has destined him to do it. The outcome is already known and he does not dodge that fact IMO

Why can't the fact that I freely chose something be what makes the statement true? If that's the case then how can the truth of the statement control what I freely chose? Don't you see the circularity?

So If I say "I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow" Then that statement is true right now.....or it's false right now.......it's not contingent upon anything. There is no if statement. A value of true or false exists right now absolutely.

It is here where my beef is. I disagree with that statement.

I do not believe a value exists right now for that proposition. Nor should anyone who is an advocate of free will IMO

That we can know that a proposition which refers to something about tomorrow is true, does not pose any problem for free will. We know either "I will wear a blue shirt tomorrow" or "I will not wear a blue shirt tomorrow" is true, and we can even know which one is true before the event even happens. How? Because, remember knowledge is justified belief that is true. I can have a justified belief that you will wear a blue shirt tomorrow, and if you indeed wear a blue shirt tomorrow, I did in fact know all along. It doesn't mean you couldn't have chose otherwise, or that you were compelled to make the choice you did.

This is another issue. I think the point is that even if we do not know which is true, nothing follows about the truth of either. There are many true propositions whose truth we do not know, and even, cannot know. So, if we do not, or cannot know, a future contingent is true, that does not imply it is not true. One issue at a time. Divide and conquer.

This was my line of thought.

1. If it is set in stone that "I Will wear a blue shirt tomorrow"

2. then it follows that I cannot NOT wear a blue shirt.

3. So if someone showed me such the stone saying so, I would not be able to defy it. Thus negating my free will. This is where my focus was at.....

OK I think I see now where I went astray.

This was my line of thought.

1. If it is set in stone that "I Will wear a blue shirt tomorrow"

2. then it follows that I cannot NOT wear a blue shirt.

3. So if someone showed me such a stone, I would not be able to defy it. Thus negating my free will. This is where my focus was at.....

however,


4. I guess what I failed to consider is that what may be the case is that I would NEVER freely choose NOT to wear a blue shirt tomorrow(even if shown the stone) and obviously that would have to be the case. Since if a case existed where I did freely choose not to wear blue shirt then the stone would have been wrong which is not possible.

For the record, we were all arguing FOR free will I think I failed to think about the last possibility I just described(4.).

I hope you are arguing that what you will do is set in the stone because that is what you will do, and not that you will do what you must do because what you do must do is set in stone. If that is what you are arguing, then I agree with you.

I am now arguing that even if it is set in stone, it doesn't negate the fact that it may be the case that I WOULD NEVER freely choose to do opposite of what the stone says(even if someone showed me the stone and offered me a bribe), and in fact this must be the case......well that or there is no such stone...although the principle of bivalence seems to be such a stone.

But it would not have been set in stone unless you were going to do it in the first place.

agreed. but I'm saying even if you somehow knew this fact ahead of time, you will still and always freely choose in the exact same way.

That must be case otherwise what was set in stone would be wrong which would not be possible.

I know I am going to eat brush my teeth tomorrow morning, but that does not mean that it is not up to me whether I do so.

for that proposition to be true.....it means that you will freely choose to do so even knowing this fact..........otherwise that proposition would have been false.

I could not know this fact unless my brushing my teeth in the morning was true, and it is up to me whether it is true, So, if I were not going to brush my teeth, I could not know I was going to brush my teeth.

for that proposition to be true.....it means that you will freely choose to do so even knowing this fact..........otherwise that proposition would have been false.